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Abstract  
 The current thesis consists of three essays analysing recent corporate governance (CG) 
reforms in Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries. The three essays place 
emphasis on three closely related CG topics that quantitatively seek to investigate the extent to 
which MENA CG reforms have been effective in enhancing three main sets of corporate 
outcomes.  
 The first essay investigates the level and determinants of voluntary CG compliance and 
disclosure in MENA countries during the period from 2009 to 2014. Specifically, this essay 
aims to empirically examine two main research questions: first, what is the level of voluntary 
compliance with, and disclosure of, CG provisions among listed firms in MENA countries?; 
and second, what factors can explain the variance in the level of voluntary compliance with, 
and disclosure of, CG provisions among listed firms in MENA countries? Relying on insights 
from neo-institutional theory, the findings of this study reveal that in general MENA listed 
firms have a relatively lower level of voluntary compliance with, and disclosure of, CG 
practices compared to developed countries. However, the level of CG disclosure improved over 
period 2009 to 2014, indicating that MENA countries have responded positively to their CG 
codes of best practice and recommendations. The findings also suggest that firm-level factors 
(i.e., Islamic values, board characteristics and ownership structure mechanisms) and country-
level factors (i.e., religion and the quality of national governance) have a significant impact on 
firm-level voluntary CG compliance and disclosure. Specifically, the findings suggest that 
Islamic values disclosure, board diversity on the basis of gender and ethnicity, board 
independence and separation of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO)/chairperson roles have a 
positive association with the level of CG compliance and disclosure, while board size and 
director ownership impact negatively on the level of CG compliance and disclosure. The 
findings also suggest insignificant relationship between government ownership and block 
ownership with the level of CG compliance and disclosure. With regard to country-level 
factors, the results indicate that corporations listed in countries complying with Islamic 
economic principles and having high-quality national governance are more likely to voluntarily 
comply and disclose more CG practices than those that do not. 
 The second essay investigates the influence of board diversity (based on gender, ethnic 
minorities and nationality) on corporate outcomes. Thus, this essay seeks to empirically 
examine the extent to which board diversity influences firm market value, accounting returns, 
executives pay (EP) and the pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS). The findings attempt to 
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expand current understanding of the role that board diversity can play in enhancing market 
value, accounting returns, EP and the PPS among MENA countries’ listed firms. Specifically, 
the MENA region has distinctive social norms, legal framework and structure of the economy, 
which suggest that the effect of board diversity on corporate outcomes may be different from 
those observed in developed countries. Informed by critical insights from agency, resource 
dependence, cognitive development, social identity and stakeholder theories, the empirical 
evidence reveals that boards of directors of MENA listed firms are dominated by national Arab 
male directors. The empirical evidence also shows that board diversity is a significant 
determinant of corporate outcomes in MENA listed firms. Specifically, firms with boards more 
diversified by gender, ethnic minorities and nationality are more likely to have higher 
accounting returns and market value. Additionally, a high percentage of female directors on 
the board improves firm market value and accounting returns, while foreign directors 
significantly and positively influence accounting returns. Further, the empirical results show 
that a firm’s CG quality has no moderating effect on the relationship between board diversity 
and firm market value. However, a high percentage of ethnic and foreign directors positively 
and significantly impacts the accounting returns in firms with weak CG. With regard to the 
impact of board diversity on EP, the findings reveal that different measures of board diversity 
have no significant impact on EP, whereas the inclusion of female and minority ethnic directors 
on corporate boards appears to enhance the PPS. 
 The third and final essay examines the extent to which CG practices can explain auditor 
choice and observable changes in audit fees among listed firms in MENA countries. The key 
objective of this essay is to investigate how effective the CG practices, including CG Index, 
board characteristics and ownership structure mechanisms, are in influencing the auditor choice 
and fees. The results of this study have the potential to deepen current understanding of the 
ability of different CG practices to impact auditor choice and fees among firms listed in MENA 
countries. Specifically, the audit profession and its quality in the MENA region are relatively 
poorly established compared to developed countries. This suggests that the impact of CG 
measures on auditor choice and fees decisions may be different from that observed in 
developed countries. Employing insights from agency theory, the study finds that CG Index, 
board diversity based on gender and ethnicity, board independence, separation of the 
CEO/chairperson roles and concentrated ownership impact significantly and positively on firm 
choice of Big 4 auditors. Board size impacts positively, but insignificantly, on Big 4 auditor 
choice decision, whereas government ownership and director ownership are insignificant and 
negatively related to Big 4 auditor choice decision. The third essay also shows that CG Index, 
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board diversity based on gender and ethnicity and government ownership are significantly and 
negatively related to audit fees, whereas board size, board independence and director 
ownership have a significant, but positive effect on audit fees. Non-dual board leadership 
structure, and concentrated ownership have no significant impact on audit fees. 
 The documented empirical results of the three essays are fairly robust across a raft of 
econometric models and estimations that take into account potential endogeneity problems and 
alternative variables. 
 To summarise, empirical evidence for the extent of CG practices’ influence on these 
three sets of corporate outcomes among MENA countries’ listed firms is relatively rare. 
Accordingly, this study aims to contribute to the literature by providing new insights with 
specific focus on recent CG reforms that have been pursued in MENA countries. Particularly, 
this thesis contributes to the limited, but steadily growing body of literature on the effectiveness 
of CG mechanisms in influencing a number of crucial firm outcome, including voluntary CG 
compliance and disclosure, firm performance, EP, the PPS, and auditor choice and fees, among 
listed firms in MENA countries. 
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Introduction  
 The world has witnessed a number of prominent corporate scandals, such as Enron in 
the US, Parmalat in Europe and Health International Holdings (HIH) in Australia. These 
scandals were followed by the financial crisis of 2007/2008, in which a substantial number of 
firms were exposed to financial distress and bankruptcy. These scandals are supposed to arise 
from the magnitude of the agency problem and the failure to execute effective CG practices. 
The agency problem arose as a result of the separation of ownership and control. Agency theory 
views the firm as an interrelated set of contracting relationships among different parties. This 
theory assumes that parties of the contract relationship will act to maximise their resources by 
using information available to them, and may result in information asymmetry. In this regard, 
academics, practitioners, professionals and regulatory authorities have suggested the adoption 
of good CG practices to mitigate agency problems (Cadbury Report, 1992; Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 1999; Ho and Wong, 2001; Hussain and 
Mallin, 2002; Rainsbury et al., 2009). Accordingly, there is an international and national 
tendency for the issuance of rigorous legislations and reforms to encourage firms to commit to 
sound CG practices. For the purpose of improving the quality of firms’ governance, many 
countries have responded to these recommendations by issuing national codes of good CG 
practice. For example, the US issued the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 to restore the credibility 
of the US financial reporting system after several high-profile corporate scandals (Krishnan 
and Visvanathan, 2008).  
 MENA countries like most other emerging economies, have therefore recognised the 
importance of having an efficient corporate regulatory framework and good CG codes. For 
instance, Egypt is considered as one of the leading countries in the MENA region in terms of 
developing CG standards. In 2003, Egypt established the Egyptian Institute of Directors (EIoD) 
under the affiliation of the Ministry of Trade. EIoD, the first institute to focus on improving 
CG standards in the Arab region, was the main participant in issuing the Egyptian CG Codes 
(ECGC), in collaboration with many leading international organisations (e.g., United National 
Development Programme (UNDP), World Bank Institute (WBI), OECD and the European 
Union (EU)). Policy makers and regulatory bodies in the MENA region also understood the 
need to issue good CG guidelines and standards to improve the quality of domestic firms’ 
governance and thereby to ensure that they implement high standards of corporate behaviour. 
Accordingly, Oman, for example, issued a voluntary CG Code in 2002 to provide greater 
protection for all stakeholders. It was introduced to disseminate and promote a culture of 
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compliance, quality disclosure and accountability among Omani firms. Other MENA countries 
followed Oman in issuing national voluntary CG codes (e.g., Egyptian CG code 2005, Saudi 
CG code 2006, Jordanian CG code 2007, and UAE CG code 2007). These CG codes share a 
common objective of helping national firms to create effective internal controls that can 
alleviate agency problems associated with managers’ opportunistic behaviour at the expense 
of other stakeholders. It is important to mention that the recommendations contained in theses 
codes largely derived from the 1992 UK Cadbury Report and were influenced by an Anglo-
American CG tradition (Hussain and Mallin, 2002; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Al-
Abbas, 2009; Alshehri and Solomon, 2012; Piesse et al., 2012; Seidl et al., 2013). For instance, 
these codes recommend the adoption of a unitary-style board of directors, consisting of 
executive and non-executive directors (NEDs), and the separation of the positions of CEO and 
chairperson. Furthermore, companies are accountable for applying the recommendations 
included in the codes to shareholders through a voluntary ‘comply or explain’ compliance and 
disclosure regime.   
Most MENA countries have specific contextual characteristics, which are different 
from those of developed corporate settings, which raises concern as to whether the reliance on 
an Anglo-American CG model can provide effective CG mechanisms that are able to enhance 
corporate outcomes. Particularly because of the differences in corporate contexts between 
MENA and developed countries, it is expected that CG recommendations proposed by CG 
codes influence corporate outcome, including CG voluntary disclosure, firm market value, 
accounting returns, EP, the PPS, and auditor choice and fees, in a way different from those of 
developed countries. Therefore, it is expected that the firms’ compliance with good CG 
practices included in national CG codes will be different from developed countries’ and may 
be affected by the unique characteristics of MENA countries, which include a strong 
hierarchical social structure, the importance of personal relationships, religious notions built 
around Sharia Law, concentrated ownership, and the nature of some socio-economic 
institutions. 
The majority of previous studies, which examined the impact of internal CG 
mechanisms on voluntary CG disclosure, firm market value, accounting returns, EP, the PPS, 
and auditor choice and fees, have been conducted in developed countries. However, the CG 
literature shows that there is an obvious dearth of empirical evidence in emerging economies 
in general, and the MENA region in particular. Accordingly, examining the impact of CG on 
these topics in the MENA context enhances the CG literature by providing empirical evidence 
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on whether and the extent to which internal CG mechanisms have an impact on corporate 
outcomes in MENA countries.  
Therefore, this thesis comprises three essays that investigate the influence of firms’ 
internal CG mechanisms in MENA countries on three corporate outcomes: i) voluntary CG 
disclosure, ii) firm market value, accounting returns, EP and PPS, and iii) auditor choice and 
fees.  
 
i) First Essay 
The first essay investigates the extent of voluntary CG compliance and disclosure 
practices in MENA listed firms, and antecedents that may affect such disclosure. It addresses 
a number of research questions including: What is the level of voluntary compliance with, and 
disclosure of, CG practices among listed firms in MENA countries? This question gives rise to 
a number of sub-questions, as: (i) To what extent has the introduction of the national MENA 
CG codes improved CG compliance and disclosure practices?; (ii) With which CG-provision 
sub-groups do listed firms most comply?; (iii) Is there a significant difference among MENA 
sampled countries in terms of providing CG disclosure?; and (iv) Was there an improvement 
in the level of voluntary CG compliance and disclosure over the sampled period 2009 to 2014?   
The first essay also aims to answer the second and third central research questions: 
whether firms’ compliance with Islamic values, board characteristics and ownership structure 
mechanisms can explain observed cross-sectional differences in MENA listed firms’ voluntary 
CG disclosure; and whether the national religion and quality of governance can explain 
noticeable variations in the level of voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices. To 
answer these research questions, neo-institutional theory, which incorporates both efficiency 
and legitimation perspectives, was adopted to develop hypotheses and interpret the results. Ten 
hypotheses were developed and quantitatively examined, to specify: first, the nature of the 
relationship between firm-level voluntary CG disclosure and Islamic values, board size, board 
diversity on the basis of gender and ethnicity, board independence, separation of CEO and 
chairperson positions, government ownership, director ownership and block ownership; and 
second, the nature of the relationship between country-level voluntary CG disclosure and 
national religion and the quality of national governance. These hypotheses were examined 
using a sample of 100 listed firms from five MENA countries with 600 firm-year observations 
from 2009 to 2014 and multiple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis. 
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According to the unique institutional structures prevailing in the MENA region as will 
be detailed later, the first essay expects that CG disclosure in the MENA context may be 
different from what is reported in developed countries; hence, the MENA region represents an 
interesting context in which to empirically investigate the level and antecedents of voluntary 
CG disclosure. The first essay documents that in general MENA listed firms have a relatively 
lower level of voluntary compliance with, and disclosure of, CG practices compared to 
developed countries. However, the level of CG disclosure improved over the period 2009 to 
2014. It also finds that in general Islamic values disclosure, board characteristics and ownership 
structure mechanisms have a significant impact on firm-level voluntary CG disclosure. 
Specifically, the results indicate that firms with higher Islamic values disclosure, more board 
diversity on the basis of gender and ethnicity, a higher percentage of NEDs and separate 
CEO/chairperson roles, are more likely to disclose more CG information. In contrast, the 
findings suggest that board size and director ownership impact negatively on firm-level 
voluntary CG disclosure. However, the results do not indicate any empirical evidence to 
suggest that government ownership and block ownership have any significant relationship with 
the level of CG disclosure. With regard to investigating country-level antecedents to voluntary 
CG disclosure in the MENA context, the first essay found that religion and the quality of 
national governance significantly influence firms’ voluntary CG disclosure. These findings 
suggest that firms in countries complying with Islamic economic principles and having good 
national governance are more likely to disclose more CG practices than those that do not. 
 
ii) Second Essay 
The second essay empirically examines the relationship between board diversity (based 
on gender, ethnic minorities and nationality) and a number of corporate outcomes (i.e., market 
value, accounting returns, EP and the PPS). Motivated by the special characteristics of the 
MENA region, It addresses four research questions: (i) To what extent can board diversity 
based on gender, ethnic minority and nationality impact a firm’s market value and accounting 
returns?; (ii) Does CG quality moderate the relationship between board diversity and the firm’s 
financial performance?; (iii) What is the impact of appointing women, ethnic minorities and 
foreign directors on EP?; and (iv) Does board diversity enhance the PPS? 
The second essay adopted a multi-theoretical approach to develop hypotheses and 
interpret the results, where the chosen theories were considered complementary rather than 
alternative perspectives. The multi-theoretical framework includes critical insights from 
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agency, resource dependence, cognitive development, social identity and stakeholder theories. 
The relationship between board diversity and firm market value, accounting returns, EP and 
the PPS were investigated. Specifically, the second essay developed four hypotheses that 
examine the impact of board diversity on firm market value, accounting returns, EP and the 
PPS. These hypotheses also investigate the moderating effect of CG quality on the relationship 
between board diversity and both firm market value and accounting returns. To empirically test 
these hypotheses, two data sets were used. The hypotheses relating to the market value and 
accounting returns and the moderating effect of CG quality were examined based on a sample 
of 600 firm-year observations over six years from 2009 to 2014 by the application of a fixed 
effect regression model, whereas the hypotheses relating to EP and the PPS were examined 
based on a sample of 502 firm-year observations for the same period, and also via the 
application of the fixed effect regression model. 
Previous studies indicate mixed empirical evidence of the impact of board diversity on 
corporate outcomes. The second essay, however, expects that the MENA region’s social norms, 
legal framework, and structure of the economy suggest that the influence of board diversity on 
corporate outcomes may be different from that observed in developed countries. This, 
therefore, underlies the need to empirically analyse the extent to which board diversity based 
on gender, ethnicity and nationality influence corporate outcomes (i.e., firm market value, 
accounting returns, EP and the PPS). The results of this essay show that boards of directors of 
MENA listed firms are dominated by national Arab males. These results also illustrate that 
board diversity on the basis of gender, nationality and ethnicity generally has a significant 
impact on corporate outcomes. First, firms with more diversified boards based on gender, 
ethnic minorities and nationality are more likely to attain higher accounting returns and market 
value. Second, the empirical evidence indicates that a high percentage of female directors on 
the board improves firm market value and accounting returns, while foreign directors impact 
significantly and positively on accounting returns. Third, a firm’s CG quality has no 
moderating effect on the relationship between board diversity and firm market value. However, 
a high percentage of ethnic and foreign directors has a positive and significant effect on 
accounting returns in firms with weak CG. Fourth, different measures of board diversity have 
no significant impact on EP. Finally, the inclusion of female and minority ethnic directors on 
boards enhances the PPS. 
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iii) Third Essay 
The third essay empirically investigates the extent to which CG measures can determine 
the auditor choice and fees among listed firms. It aims to answer its main research question: 
Are better-governed firms more or less likely to choose one of the Big 4 auditors and pay high 
audit fees? Two sub-questions were also examined: (i) Do a broad composite CG Index, board 
characteristics and ownership structure mechanisms influence auditor choice?; and (ii) Do the 
broad composite CG index, board characteristics and ownership structure mechanisms impact 
audit fees?  
The third essay incorporates crucial insights from agency theory. Agency theory was 
used to develop eight hypotheses investigating the impact of the broad composite CG Index, 
board characteristics and ownership structure mechanisms on auditor choice and fees. Eight 
hypotheses were quantitatively examined to specify the nature of the relationship between 
auditor choice and fees on the one hand, and the CG Index, board size, board diversity, board 
independence, the separation of the CEO and chairperson positions, government ownership, 
director ownership and block ownership on the other hand. The hypotheses relating to auditor 
choice were examined based on a sample of 600 firm-year observations over six years by 
employing logistic regression technique, whereas the hypotheses relating to audit fees were 
examined based on a sample of 470 firm-year observations for the same period, but by 
employing multiple OLS linear regression analysis. 
The third essay expects that audit quality and audit profession in the MENA region are 
relatively weakly established compared to developed countries. This indicates that the impact 
of CG measures on auditor choice and fees decisions may be different from that observed in 
developed countries. Thus, examining the ability of CG measures to impact firm-level auditor 
choice and fees may be crucial in providing a deeper understanding of why and how a firm’s 
CG strategy might influence auditor choice and audit fees decisions. The results of this 
examination indicate that the CG Index, board characteristics and ownership structure 
mechanisms have a significant impact on auditor choice and fees. Specifically, the empirical 
evidence suggests that the CG Index, board diversity based on gender and ethnicity, board 
independence, separation of the CEO/chairperson roles and concentrated ownership have a 
significant and positive effect on the choice of the Big 4 auditors. Board size has a positive but 
insignificant impact on the Big 4 auditor choice decision, whereas government ownership and 
director ownership are insignificant and negatively related to this decision. Furthermore, the 
empirical evidence supports the negative and significant impact of the CG Index, board 
diversity based on gender and ethnicity and government ownership on audit fees, whereas, 
board size, board independence and director ownership impact significantly, but positively on 
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audit fees. However, non-dual board leadership structure and concentrated ownership have no 
significant impact on audit fees. Overall, the study’s findings propose that external audit quality 
(Big 4 auditor, high audit fees) do have a CG monitoring role in MENA listed firms. 
Furthermore, auditor choice and fees decisions are affected by the firm-level CG.  
 
Figure 1: Thesis summary constructed by the researcher 
 
 Overall the main topic of the thesis is CG practices and their effect on a number of firm 
outcomes in MENA countries. The first essay examines the extent of voluntary CG compliance 
and disclosure practices, and antecedents that may affect such disclosure. The second covers 
board diversity as a CG mechanism and its effect on market value, accounting returns, EP and 
the PPS. MENA countries have a lower representation of women, ethnic minorities and non-
nationals on boards. Therefore, this second essay aims to provide a rationale for diversifying 
boards. Finally, paper three discusses the effect of a number of CG mechanisms on the auditor 
choice and audit fees among listed companies. In summary, these three essays seek to provide 
a comprehensive view of the role that sound CG mechanisms can play in enhancing firm 
outcomes in the MENA context.     
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Abstract 
This essay investigates the level of compliance with, and disclosure of, corporate 
governance (CG) best practice recommendations and the extent to which a set of firm-level CG 
variables (Islamic values, board characteristics and ownership structure mechanisms) and 
country-level factors (religion and national governance quality) can explain discernible 
differences in the level of CG disclosure in a number of Middle Eastern and North African 
(MENA) countries. Using a sample of listed corporations in MENA countries from 2009 to 
2014, the findings of this study reveal that in general MENA listed firms have a relatively lower 
level of voluntary compliance with, and disclosure of, CG practices compared to developed 
countries. However, the level of CG disclosure improved over the examined period. It also 
finds that Islamic values disclosure, corporate board characteristics including board diversity, 
board independence and separation of the CEO/chairperson roles have a positive association 
with the level of CG disclosure. In contrast, the findings indicate that board size and director 
ownership impact negatively on the level of CG disclosure. The study does not, however, find 
any evidence to suggest that government ownership and block ownership have any significant 
relationship with the level of CG disclosure. With regard to country-level factors, the results 
suggest that firms in countries complying with Islamic economic principles and having high-
quality national governance are more likely to voluntarily comply and disclose more CG 
practices than those that do not. The findings are generally robust to different types of firm- 
and country-level factors, and largely in line with the predictions of the neo-institutional 
theoretical perspective.  
 
       
Keywords: Corporate governance. Disclosure. Religion. Board characteristics. Ownership 
structure. MENA economies. Neo-institutional theory.    
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1 Introduction  
 This study investigates the level of voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices 
in MENA countries, and the extent to which a set of CG practices at the firm level (Islamic 
values, board characteristics and ownership structure mechanisms), religion and quality of 
national governance can explain noticeable variations in the level of voluntary CG compliance 
and disclosure practices. The analysis and interpretations of the findings draw inspiration from 
neo-institutional theory.       
 
1.1 Background 
There is increasing global interest in developing the level of corporate compliance with, 
and disclosure of, sound CG practices (Ntim et al., 2012b; Al-Janadi et al., 2013; Elshandidy 
and Neri, 2015; Elmagrhi et al., 2016). MENA countries have pursued economic and financial 
reforms aimed at encouraging domestic savings and attracting foreign investment (Ben Naceur 
et al., 2007; Lagoarde-Segot and Lucey, 2008; Bae et al., 2012; Al-Janadi et al., 2013; Aljifri 
et al., 2014). These can be achieved by improving the disclosure environment and CG practices 
(Hussain and Mallin, 2002; Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan, 2010; Ebaid, 2013; Aljifri et al., 2014; 
Albitar, 2015). Although previous studies have used a number of theories, including agency, 
legitimacy, resource dependence and stakeholder to examine possible reasons that may explain 
why public corporations comply with, and disclose of, sound CG practices (Beekes and Brown, 
2006; Kent and Stewart, 2008; Lim, 2011; Samaha et al., 2012; Al-Janadi et al., 2013; Aljifri 
et al., 2014; Al-Bassam et al., 2015; Ntim, 2015), the recent discernible growth in the issuance 
and/or adoption of CG codes can arguably be explained within the context of neo-institutional 
theory (Judge et al., 2008; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008).  
Neo-institutional theory predicts that the prevalence of many business norms and 
practices among firms or countries is influenced by institutional aspects (e.g., economic, social 
and political forces) (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, 1991; Scott, 2001). Different members of 
society (e.g., corporations and nations) are subject to institutional forces, which may be driven 
by the need to pursue economic efficiency (substantive management) and/or social legitimacy 
(symbolic management) (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008). In 
this case, prior studies have successfully used neo-institutional theory at the national level to 
rationalise institutional forces, which drive or hinder the diffusion of several corporate 
practices. These include International Accounting Standards (IASs) (Judge et al., 2010) and 
CG codes (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Judge et al., 2008; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008). 
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Neo-institutional theory has also been used recently to explain company practices such as 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) (e.g., Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013b) and the adoption of 
voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices (Elmagrhi et al., 2016). However, there is a 
scarcity of studies which have employed neo-institutional theory at both national and company 
levels to explain the global adoption of CG practices (Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2009). 
 Consequently, the current study aims to contribute to the CG and voluntary disclosure 
literature by applying the generalised neo-institutional theory, which incorporates both 
efficiency and legitimation motives of economic entities operating within an institutional 
environment. First, from a legitimation/morality perspective, corporations tend to improve 
their legitimacy and social acceptance by adhering to regulative institutional pressures to 
conform to expected social behaviour and international standards (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; 
Suchman, 1995). Thus, firms can gain organisational legitimacy by showing compliance with 
good CG practices in the form of increasing CG disclosure. This can facilitate congruence of 
corporate goals and norms with those of the larger society. Also, business can gain and maintain 
good links with corporate stakeholders in order to improve corporate legitimacy by involving 
or mimicking accepted social behaviour (Mizruchi and Fein, 1999; Aguilera et al., 2007). 
Accordingly, neo-institutional theory suggests that corporations can gain the support of 
powerful corporate stakeholders (e.g., governments, politicians, shareholders and trade unions) 
by improving organisational legitimacy through engaging in sound CG practices (Freeman and 
Reeds, 1983; Freeman, 1984). 
 Second, the theoretical implications of the efficiency/instrumental view of neo-
institutional theory argue that adhering to coercive, mimetic and normative institutional forces 
can improve corporate image and goodwill and reduce political costs (Aguilera et al., 2007; 
Chen and Roberts, 2010). This in turn facilitates firms’ capacity to secure access to critical 
resources (e.g., capital, social relations and business contracts) which are necessary to enhance 
corporate performance and the overall interests of shareholders (Aguilera et al., 2007; Chen 
and Roberts, 2010). Similarly, public companies may engage in good CG practices in order to 
reduce information asymmetry and agency costs, and as a result improve investor confidence 
in the reported accounting information (Beyer et al., 2010; Samaha et al., 2012). 
 Although a large number of past studies have investigated the extent, motives and 
antecedents of corporate voluntary disclosure practices (Xie et al., 2003; Hope and Thomas, 
2008; Beyer et al., 2010; Dimitropoluos and Asterion, 2010; Al-Janadi et al., 2013; Aljifri et 
al., 2014; Al-Bassam et al., 2015; Albitar, 2015; Habash et al., 2015), they arguably suffer 
from a number of limitations. First, existing studies have investigated only a small number of 
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CG provisions (Samaha et al., 2012; Aljifri et al., 2014; Al-Moataz and Hussainey, 2014; 
Albitar, 2015; Ntim, 2015), and provided evidence from a limited number of observations 
and/or for short periods (e.g., one year) (Samaha et al., 2012; Al-Janadi et al., 2013; Aljifri et 
al., 2014; Al-Moataz and Hussainey 2014; Albitar, 2015). They have also captured compliance 
with CG best practices indirectly by using a survey (Conyon, 1994; Conyon and Mallin, 1997), 
or subjective analysts’ ratings (Patel et al., 2002; Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2012). Arguably, 
these weaknesses limit the generalisability of their findings. Second, emerging markets have 
shown observable interest in developing CG practices by the considerable number of reforms 
that have been introduced over the last decade (Hussain and Mallin, 2002; Al-Shammair and 
Al-Sultan, 2010; Ebaid, 2013, Habash et al., 2015). However, there is acute scarcity of studies 
that investigate CG practices in developing countries (Conyon and Mllin, 1997; Hussainey and 
Al-Najjar, 2012; Elmagrhi et al., 2016). This also arguably impairs the applicability of the 
findings from developed countries to developing countries, such as those in the MENA region.  
Third, although the neo-institutional theoretical perspective has been applied 
successfully to explain the institutional forces driving the diffusion of CG practices at the firm 
level (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013b; Elmagrhi et al., 2016), there is a dearth of studies that 
investigate reasons influencing the diffusion of CG practices at both company and national 
levels. As a result, this limits current understanding of the reasons underlying the world-wide 
diffusion of CG practices at both levels. Fourth, although disclosure decisions are perceived to 
be mainly influenced by top management and ownership structure mechanisms (Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002, 2005; Ntim et al., 2012b), existing CG disclosure studies have investigated 
whether CG disclosure practices are largely driven by general company features, such as firm 
size, profitability, liquidity and gearing (Al-Moataz and Hussainey 2014; Waweru, 2014; 
Waweru et al., 2014). Fifth, although religion is often considered to be one of the main 
institutional and cultural pillars that may affect corporate activities (Archambault and 
Archambault, 2003; Chan-Serafin et al., 2013), few studies have examined the effect of 
religious practices on modern organisations’ outcomes and decisions, including CG disclosures 
(Tracey, 2012; Chan-Serafin et al., 2013). Finally, existing studies on voluntary CG 
compliance and disclosure practices have focused on individual countries (Hussainey and Al-
Najjar, 2012; Ntim et al., 2012a; Samaha et al., 2012; Elmagrhi et al., 2016), with virtually no 
cross-country evidence. Therefore, and given the limitations of existing studies, the current 
study aims to examine CG practices within the MENA context.  
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1.2 Motivation  
MENA countries provide an interesting context in which to conduct the current study 
for a number of reasons. First, most of these countries have many common cultural aspects 
(e.g., they speak Arabic, follow Islam, and share many customs and traditions). This affects 
their economic features, information environment and corporate practices (Kuran, 1995; Al-
Shamri and Al-Sultan, 2010; Al-Bassam et al., 2015; Habash et al., 2015). It also provides 
opportunities for harmonisation and convergence of CG codes and practices at both national 
and company levels (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). Second, almost all MENA countries 
are emerging markets, which need to develop their investment environment, especially stock 
markets. Therefore, they have pursued economic and financial reforms in order to attract 
foreign direct investment (Lagoarde-Segot and Lucey, 2008; Piesse et al., 2012; Aljifri et al., 
2014). The issuance and implementation of CG codes in these countries are, therefore, essential 
for their economic success (Solomon et al., 2003; Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013). Thus, the 
findings of this study may have important implications not just for MENA countries, but also 
for other developing countries and emerging markets which have pursued CG reforms. 
Third, the MENA context is characterised by strong Islamic beliefs that are expected to 
have important effects on the adoption and implementation of high CG standards. It is argued 
that societies with strong religious principles are more likely to exhibit higher levels of 
transparency and compliance with regulations (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Boytsun et al., 2011; 
Al-Bassam and Ntim, 2016; Elghuweel et al., 2016). Typically, within the MENA region, 
individuals appear to rely mainly on religious norms in monitoring business activities (Rahman, 
1998; Kamla et al., 2006). Unlike most previous studies, which were conducted in western 
contexts, where business is not influenced by religious tenets, the current study is conducted in 
MENA countries, where Shariah Law significantly influences business.  
Fourth, unlike developed countries where strong legal enforcement affects corporate 
practices, emerging economies including MENA countries have weak legal enforcement, 
meaning that firms operating in these countries are expected to be more influenced by informal 
rules (Allen et al., 2005). In this regard, MENA countries’ corporate practices are expected to 
be affected by both formal and informal rules (Moideenkutty et al., 2011). Specifically, 
managers can be expected to be more influenced by informal rules (e.g., family, norms, Arabic 
custom and tribalism) and to give them higher priority than formal rules and CG mechanisms, 
such as board characteristics and establishing audit and CG committees (Haniffa and Hudaib, 
2006; Metcalfe, 2007; Common, 2008; Boytsun et al., 2011). Therefore, norms and community 
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aspects may negatively impact MENA directors’ ability to independently monitor managers 
and encourage firms to comply with and disclose CG practices. 
Finally, the distinctive features of the MENA context may lead to different results from 
what is reported in developed countries. There is a dearth of empirical research on MENA CG 
compliance and disclosure. Therefore, the current study is motivated to investigate the level 
and determinants of voluntary CG disclosure in the MENA context to enhance current 
understanding of the determinants of corporate voluntary disclosure of CG practices. A few 
studies address some aspects of CG in the MENA context, but they are limited in scope. 
Specifically, the current study is different in the following main aspects. First, previous studies’ 
focus on a single country may threaten the generalisability of the results. For example, Al- 
Bassam et al. (2015) and Al-Motaz and Hussainey (2014) conducted their studies in Saudi 
Arabia, and Samaha et al. (2012) in Egypt. Second, the samples used by those studies are 
smaller than the current study’s sample, again limiting the generalisability of their findings. 
For instance, Samaha et al. (2012) employed a sample of 100 firms at the financial year ending 
2009, while the current study employs a sample of 100 listed firms from five MENA countries 
from 2009 to 2014.   
  
1.3 Contributions 
Consequently, the current study seeks to extend existing knowledge by offering a 
number of new contributions to the literature. First, it seeks to add to the extant literature by 
providing new cross-country evidence on the level of compliance with and disclosure of good 
CG practices in MENA countries, using the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD 2006) guidance on good CG practices. Second, and distinct from past 
studies, this study investigates the effect of a newly identified antecedents (i.e. Islamic values 
at the levels of firms and countries) on voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices. 
Third, the current study adds to the existing literature by examining whether board 
characteristics and ownership structure mechanisms can explain observable changes in 
voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices. Finally, it uses a neo-institutional 
theoretical perspective to evaluate the diffusion of good CG practices at both the national and 
company levels. 
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1.4 Structure of the Essay 
The remainder of the essay is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly discusses recent 
CG practices in MENA countries; Section 3 presents the theoretical framework, literature 
review and development of hypotheses; Section 4 discusses the research design; Section 5 
presents the empirical analysis and analysis of robustness; and finally Section 6 offers 
concluding remarks.      
                                  
2 Corporate Governance in MENA Countries: Background and 
Institutional Framework    
 Most MENA countries have many cultural, social and economic features in common, 
along with other characteristics of developing countries. Specifically, the people speak Arabic, 
follow Islam, and share many customs and traditions, which may have an effect on economic 
features and the information environment (Kuran, 1995; Al-Shamri and Al-Sultan, 2010; Al-
Moataz and Hussainy, 2014; Al-Bassam et al., 2015; Albitar, 2015; Habbash et al., 2015). 
Although some MENA countries are oil exporters (e.g., the Gulf states), they are all still 
considered as developing countries with emerging stock markets. First, most companies in 
developing countries are either state owned or family held firms with concentrated ownership. 
As such, they differ from companies in developed countries which depend extensively on 
external finance from stock markets (Fawzy, 2004; Black et al., 2006; Omran et al., 2008; 
Piesse et al., 2012; Al-Janadi et al., 2013; Aljifri et al., 2014; Albitar, 2015). Second, the legal 
system is generally a civil law system, with frequent government intervention (Rabelo and 
Vascancels, 2002; Reed, 2002; Omran et al., 2008). Corporate law tends to provide limited 
protection to minority shareholders (Black et al., 2006). Additionally, accounting standards are 
established and implemented by government, with little involvement of national professional 
accounting bodies, which may be poorly organised or even non-existent (Al-Shammair and Al-
Sultan 2010; Dimitropoulos and Asterious, 2010; Aljifri et al., 2014; Albitar, 2015).  
Third, the financial systems in most MENA countries are bank-orientated (Ebaid, 
2013), and they possess less developed capital markets (Rabelo and Vascancels, 2002). Most 
listed companies do not adhere to the disclosure and transparency requirements as there is little 
enforcement (Bolbol et al., 2005; Piesse et al., 2012; Samaha et al., 2012; Aljifri et al., 2014; 
Albitar, 2015). Therefore, minority shareholders’ rights are limited because of the inefficiency 
in the information environment that encourages insiders and majority shareholders to gain from 
private information (Dimitropoulos and Asterious, 2010; Piesse et al., 2012). Fourth, corporate 
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stakeholders (e.g., labour unions and minority shareholders) have a limited role in the 
development of good governance mechanisms in public corporations (Piesse et al., 2012). 
Finally, the regulatory policy, including formulating business-related laws and regulations, 
needs to be reformed by the following procedures: first, evaluating and overseeing the process 
of adopting regulations; and second, improved coordination between regulatory agencies to 
maximise the regulatory policy outcomes for both society and the economy (OECD, 2013).          
Despite differences among MENA countries, almost all need to develop their 
investment environment, especially their stock markets and related CG mechanisms. Sound 
CG practices help firms to obtain finance, lower the cost of capital, achieve better performance, 
and provide fairer treatment for all stockholders (Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013; Aljifri et al., 
2014). Similarly, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries depend extensively on extracting 
and exporting oil and have recently discovered the need for diversifying their  finance and 
investment by developing their financial markets, especially given the volatility of oil prices of 
the early 1980s and late 1990s (Piesse et al., 2012; Aljifri et al., 2014). For other MENA 
countries, active capital markets are considered essential to guarantee the success of the 
economic and financial reforms which began in the early 1990s. These reforms depend on 
large-scale privatisation programmes to sell inherited, failed public sector companies and have 
them taken over and floated by local or foreign private owners (Piesse et al., 2012). 
Most MENA countries have thus engaged in economic and financial reforms (such as 
privatisation of state corporations, developing national stock exchanges and issuing national 
CG codes and business-related laws and regulations) to encourage domestic savings and to 
attract foreign investments (Hussain and Mallin, 2002; Al-Shammair and Al-Sultan 2010; Al-
Janadi et al., 2013; Ebaid, 2013; Aljifri et al., 2014; Albitar, 2015). The empirical evidence 
supports the role of good CG practices in enhancing market efficiency and the information 
environment of the MENA countries (Lagoarde-Segot and Lucey, 2008; Samaha et al., 2012; 
Al-Janadi et al., 2013; Al-Basaam et al., 2015; Albitar, 2015). However, other empirical 
evidence documents that their incentives for frequent disclosure and transparency are lower 
than their counterparts in developed countries (Alsaeed, 2006; Al-Shammair, 2008; Al-
Shammair and Al-Sultan, 2010; Albitar, 2015), due to the absence of standards set out by 
authoritative accounting and reporting bodies to oblige public firms to improve their disclosure 
practices (Alsaeed, 2006; Khasharmeh and Aljifri, 2010; Aljifri, et al., 2014; Albitar, 2015). 
Consequently, the current study encourages the regulatory bodies and governments which 
control all aspects of accounting and financial reporting regulations to make better informed 
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decisions and more effective regulations (Al-Shammair and Al-Sultan, 2010; Aljifri, et al., 
2014). 
The following sub-sections briefly discuss the CG background and institutional 
framework of the sampled MENA countries.  
 
2.1 Egypt  
 Egypt has one of the oldest capital markets in the region, going back to 1888 with the 
establishment of the Alexandria Exchange, followed by the Cairo Exchange in 1903. Although 
the Egyptian Exchange (EGX) was considered the fifth most active exchange market in the 
world during the 1940s, after the revolution of 1952 and the general trend toward 
nationalisation of a large number of Egyptian companies there was a long dormant period. Only 
in the 1990s did the wave of economic reform and privatisation begin, with the introduction of 
the government’s economic liberalisation programme. The first step toward a free market 
economy was in 1992 with the introduction of Capital Market Law number 52 that established 
the Capital Market Authority (CMA) to ensure the reliability of the market. This was followed 
by many subsequent decisions and regulations until the establishment of the Egyptian Financial 
Supervisory Authority (EFSA) in 2009, which is responsible for supervising and regulating 
financial markets (other than banks) and securitisation. The recent financial and economic 
reforms, including the establishment of regulatory institutions and issuing laws, aim to improve 
financial disclosure and transparency, attracting more local and foreign investments (Samaha 
et al., 2012; Ebaid, 2013). 
With regard to the Egyptian accounting and financial reporting environment, the 
government decided to implement the IASs on a gradual basis. This plan commenced in 
October 1997 with the introduction of Decree number 503 by the Ministry of Economics to 
establish the Egyptian Accounting Standards (EASs); these are the IASs with amendments 
suitable for the national economic and financial environment. The government amended the 
EASs in 2006 by Decree number 243 of the Minster of Investment. The new EASs were 
developed in accordance with the IAS and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
that were current in 2005. Egyptian listed companies were also required to adopt IFRS if there 
was no comparable EAS. 
As a code law country, Egypt is characterised by a weak level of investor protection, 
the published financial statements forming the basis for taxation, accounting standards 
established and enforced by the government, and a bank-oriented financial system, with a small 
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number of banks providing the major finance for companies. The financial statements are 
considered the main source of information available to investors in the capital market, as the 
financial analysis industry is still at an early stage of development and listed firms do not supply 
sufficient reliable voluntary disclosure (Ebaid, 2013).     
Regarding CG, Egypt is considered one of the leading countries in the MENA region 
in its application of CG best practice. In 2003, the Egyptian Institute of Directors (EIoD) was 
established under the affiliation of the Ministry of Trade and Industry. EIoD was the first 
institute focusing on CG practices in the Arab region and the main participant in issuing the 
Egyptian CG Codes (ECGC). EIoD benefits from consultation and collaboration with many 
leading international organisations, including the UNDP, WBI, OECD and EU. EIoD has been 
affiliated to the Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority (EFSA) since November 2011, 
under Presidential Decree number 251 issued by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces 
(SCAF); between 2004 and 2011 it had been affiliated to the Ministry of Investment under 
Presidential Decree number 231, 2004.                 
EIoD has participated in the issuance of the three main ECGCs since 2005. The first 
ECGC was issued in October 2005 in accordance with CG principles issued by the OECD and 
a number of countries including South Africa, Malaysia and Philippines. Under this code, 
Egypt became the second country in the MENA region after Oman (2002) to develop a 
domestic CG code. ECGC 2005 was directed at listed joint stock companies, especially those 
being actively traded on the stock market, to achieve optimum protection and balance between 
the interests of directors, shareholders and other stakeholders. The second ECGC was released 
in July 2006 in accordance with CG guidelines on state-owned enterprises issued by the OECD 
in January 2005. State-owned enterprises in Egypt were to participate in liberalising the public 
enterprise sector from any constraints that would restrict them from competing with the private 
sector. The latest ECGC was issued in March 2011 in order to update the first ECGC, based on 
the latest Egyptian and international CG experience. It should be noted that the ECGCs are 
considered only as guidelines for the correct and proper conduct of corporate management, 
coinciding with international practice and standards in order to achieve an equitable 
arrangement of different stakeholders’ interests; they are not enforceable under the law.                 
 
2.2 Jordan  
The financial reporting environment in Jordan has disciplined by the International 
Accounting and Auditing Standards since 1997 when the Jordanian Companies Law number 
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22 was issued by the National Assembly (the legislative body). This law required the public 
and private shareholding companies, general partnerships, limited partnerships, limited liability 
companies, private shareholding companies and foreign companies operating in Jordan to 
organise their accounts and keep registers and books in accordance with recognised 
International Accounting and Auditing Standards. The other Jordanian regulatory parties (i.e., 
Jordanian Securities Commission, Central Bank of Jordan and Jordanian Insurance 
Commission) used their powers to require the adoption of IFRS for regulated companies under 
their jurisdiction. The Jordanian Association of Certified Public Accountants (JACPA) advises 
the government in the areas of accounting and auditing standards, as specified under law 
number 73 of 2003, for imposing compliance with International Accounting and Auditing 
Standards.  
From the issuance of Companies Law number 22 in 1997, all Jordanian companies were 
required to comply with the IASs until 2007, when some accounting policy options permitted 
in IFRSs were withdrawn. This elimination was related to the revaluation of fair-value 
accounting policy options for all property, plant and equipment, intangible assets and 
investment property, involving amendment of the cost-depreciation-impairment model. This 
was because there was no active markets for property and intangibles in Jordan. However, it is 
considered as temporary amendment that may be cancelled if the regulators’ concerns are 
removed. 
 The Amman Financial Market (AFM), a public financial institution with a legal, 
administrative and financial identity independent of the state, was established in accordance 
with law number 31 in January 1976. It was established with objectives including encouraging 
savings and investment in securities, to organise the issuance and dealings in securities. 
However, the real launch of the Jordanian Capital Market began with the issuance of Securities 
Law number 23 in 1997; from the AMF, three main institutions emerged: the Jordan Securities 
Commission (JSC), Amman Stock Exchange (ASE), and Securities Depository Centre (SDC) 
(Omar and Simon, 2011). JSC provides a supervisory and legislative role for the issuance and 
dealing in information associated with all activities and operations of securities. ASE, which 
was established in March 1999 to reflect the national privatisation policy, is a private, non-
financial and separate entity. It also has the executive role and is governed by Securities Law 
number 76 issued in 2002. SDC, also a non-financial, private entity with a separate financial 
and administrative structure, was established in May 1999 (Omar and Simon, 2011). 
 Omar and Simon (2011) reported an improvement in the level of aggregated (voluntary 
and mandatory) disclosure in Jordan over time when they compared their results for 2003 with 
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previous Jordanian studies. They suggested that this improvement was due to the development 
of the regulatory system and the orientation of the economy toward privatisation.  
In 2007 Jordan began issuing CG codes with one for banks under the Central Bank of 
Jordan, following the issuance of the Bank Director’s Handbook of CG in 2004. The main 
purpose of this code is to promote the implementation of international best practice in the CG 
of Jordanian banks. Each bank was required to develop its own code by 31 December 2007 
according to its particular needs and principles, besides incorporating the minimum standards 
of the Central Bank of Jordan. Each bank was also required to publish its own code in its annual 
report, stating the extent of its compliance with the code or otherwise explaining why any 
provisions had not been complied with. CG code 2007 was followed by the issuance of a CG 
code for shareholding companies listed on the ASE in 2008 by the JSC. The main purposes of 
this code is to enhance management performance and safeguard the rights of stockholders, in 
order to improve economic performance and the investment environment. Jordanian listed 
companies are required to comply with the rules of the CG code 2008 as a guide, otherwise to 
explain in their annual reports the reasons for non-compliance. In 2012 the Companies Control 
Department, which was established in 2003 as a department independent of the Ministry of 
Industry and Trade, in partnership with the International Financial Corporation (IFC) and 
World Bank Group, issued the Jordanian CG Code for private shareholding companies, limited 
liability companies, non-listed shareholding companies, private shareholding companies that 
are not for profit and limited liability companies that are not for profit. This recent CG code is 
based on the ‘comply or explain’ principle.                 
 
2.3 Oman  
 The main participant in formulating and supervising the business information 
environment in the Sultanate of Oman is the Capital Market Authority (CMA). A government 
entity, the Omani CMA was founded according to the Royal Decree (80/98) issued on 9 
November 1998, and began its work on 9 January 1999 as a legal personality with independent 
administrative and financial identity. It is responsible for many activities related to the capital 
market and insurance sectors, such as regulating and supervising the issuance of securities in 
the capital market in addition to monitoring the Muscat Securities Market (MSM), public 
shareholding companies and auditing companies under Omani CMA jurisdiction. 
 Therefore, the Omani CMA performs three main roles regarding the capital market and 
insurance sectors. The first is the regulatory role, under which it sets rules and regulations 
38 
 
which organise the capital market and insurance sectors. Its second role is supervisory, through 
which it monitors the institutions under its jurisdiction to ensure the efficiency of the capital 
market and insurance sector, in addition to protecting investors and other participants. Finally, 
the Omani CMA performs an awareness role, developing awareness and knowledge among 
investors about matters related to their investments and rights. It also aims to make managers 
and directors of public companies aware of their responsibilities toward different stakeholders, 
and to spread knowledge among the general public about the importance of the capital market 
and insurance sectors in developing economic growth and ensuring the prosperity of society as 
a whole. 
 On 21 June 1988, the MSM was founded as an independent government entity 
according to Royal Decree (53/88). MSM has many objectives, including organising and 
regulating the Omani securities market, monitoring the process of buying and selling securities 
to ensure the integrity of the trading procedures and fairness of securities prices, and protecting 
investors’ interests by encouraging corporate disclosure by companies listed in MSM. 
Ten years later, on 9 November 1998, Royal Decree (80/98) was issued to cancel a 
previous one (50/88), replacing the original MSM with two separate entities. The first is the 
Muscat Securities Market (MSM) where the exchange process for all listed securities takes 
place. MSM is a government entity with independent administration and finance. The other 
body is the CMA which, among other functions, regulates and supervises MSM. Furthermore, 
on 25 February 1998 the Muscat Clearing and Depository Company (MCDC) was established 
according to Royal Decree (82/98) as an Omani closed joint stock company; 60% of its capital 
was owned by MSM and the remainder by banks, brokerage companies and investors. The 
main objective of MCDC is to ensure stable dealing in securities for a greater flow of foreign 
investments to the Sultanate. 
 With regard to financial reporting, Omanian listed companies adapted IFRS following 
Capital Market Law number 80 (Royal Decree 80/1998). Article 282 of the Executive 
Regulation of this law committed all listed companies in MSM to prepare financial statements 
according to IFRS. Article 79 of the Income Tax Law, which had been issued according to 
Royal Decree 47/1981, and Article 61 of its Executive Regulations imposed the use of IASs in 
treating financial leases. Article number 30 of the law organising the Accountancy and 
Auditing profession (Royal Decree 77/1986), stipulated that accountants should apply IASs 
when preparing balance sheet and financial accounts. 
In conclusion, Omani companies are required to apply IFRS in preparing their financial 
statements, whether or not their securities are treated in a public market. The Chamber of 
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Commerce, Ministry of Finance, Central Bank of Oman and CMA collaborate with accounting 
firms to provide IFRS training programmes for Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). 
 Regarding CG practices, Oman was the first country in the MENA region to issue a 
national CG code, in 2002 (3 June  2002, according to Circular number 11/2002 later amended 
by Circular number 1/2003 for public listed companies). The Omani CMA had established a 
committee of members of different economic sectors to found this national CG code, reflecting 
recent trends in best CG practice internationally, and at the same time consistent with the 
Omani environment. The code was established to improve investors’ confidence in the local 
securities market through guaranteeing equitable treatment of various stakeholders.             
                            
2.4 Saudi Arabia 
The financial reporting environment in Saudi Arabia, much like others in the MENA 
region, is affected by culture and tradition (Piesse et al., 2012; Al-Moataz and Hussainey, 
2014). Saudi companies were obligated to use Saudi Accounting Standards issued by the Saudi 
Organisation for Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA), a professional organisation 
established under Royal Decree number 12 in 1991 to promote the accounting and auditing 
profession. In 2012 SOCPA began an IFRS convergence plan, requiring listed firms other than 
banks and insurance companies to report using IFRSs with some modifications, which 
included: adding more disclosure requirements, removing optimal treatments and amending 
the requirements that contradicted Sharia or local laws. Meanwhile, the Saudi Arabia Monetary 
Authority (SANA), the Saudi central bank, required local banks and insurance companies to 
report under IFRS.  
Even though SOCPA, which operates under the supervision of the Ministry of 
Commerce, is associated with reviewing, developing, and approving accounting and auditing 
standards, the ultimate authority enforcing Saudi companies to use a specific financial reporting 
framework is the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the Saudi Capital Market Authority 
(CMA). The Saudi CMA, which is a government organisation, officially started in 1991 by 
establishing its basic regulations according to Royal Decree number M/30 to regulate and 
develop the Saudi Capital Market. The Saudi CMA issues rules and regulations for 
implementing the provisions of the Capital Market Law. Its main objectives are to reinforce 
transparency and disclosure standards in all listed companies and to enhance confidence in the 
investment environment by protecting investors and dealers from fraud and illegal acts in the 
market.                   
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With regard to CG practices, the Board of the Saudi CMA has released CG codes in the 
kingdom since Resolution number 1/212/2006 of November 2006, based on the Capital Market 
Law number M/30 issued in August 2003 and amended by Resolution number 1/1/2009 issued 
in January 2009. The main objective of the rules and standards of the CG code issued in 2006, 
which were oriented mainly to listed joint companies, was to protect shareholders’ interests 
and other stakeholders’ rights. The rules and standards stated in this Saudi CG Code 2006 were 
merely guidelines, not binding for all companies listed in the stock exchange, but stipulating 
that companies must disclose in their board of directors’ report which provisions have been 
implemented and which not, with the reasons for not implementing them. The Saudi CMA 
issued a second CG Code in 2010 to accommodate Resolution number 1-10-2010 issued in 
March 2010 by the Board of the Saudi CMA, amending the definition of the board of director’s 
‘independent member’ in the CG Code of 2006.                
 
2.5 United Arab of Emirates 
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) was established in 1971. With an economy heavily 
dependent on extracting and exporting oil as its main source of income (Aljifri et al., 2014), 
the UAE is considered one of the most active emerging markets in the region. The federal 
government is trying to create an environment that attracts investors not only from the region 
but also from all over the world. Five entities control the financial reporting requirements and 
practice: the Ministry of Economy, the Central Bank of the UAE (CBUAE), Emirates 
Securities and Commodities Authority (ESCA), Dubai International Financial Centre and Abu 
Dhabi Accountability Authority (Aljifri et al., 2014). The UAE Accountants and Auditors 
Association (AAA) is a consulting body and has no official role in regulating the profession. 
The UAE’s Federal Commercial Companies Law number 8 issued in 1984 and its 
amendment, law number 13 issued in 1988, were released by the Ministry of Economy. These 
two laws require firms to keep detailed records and to provide audited financial statements to 
the ministry and other authorities concerned, without determining particular standards. 
However, they can only recommend companies to follow International Accepted Accounting 
Practices. Circular number 20 issued in 1999 by the CBUAE, however, required all financial 
institutions reporting to it to adopt the IAS/IFRS in their annual reports. The ESCA was 
established according to Federal Law number 4 in 2000, requiring all listed public firms to 
submit interim and annual audited financial statements to it. The main objectives of the ESCA 
are overseeing the activities of the financial markets and promoting proper conduct amongst 
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members of the exchange, beside its other role in establishing and licensing public joint stock 
companies. 
The UAE has three main independent securities markets: Abu Dhabi Securities 
Exchange (ASX), Dubai Financial Market (DFM), and Dubai International Financial Exchange 
(NASDAQ Dubai). ASX was established according to local law number 3 in November 2000 
to trade the shares of the UAE companies. Companies listed in ASX applying IFRS. DFM was 
founded by resolution number 14 in March 2000, issued by the Ministry of Economy. It 
operates as a secondary market for trading in securities issued by local or foreign companies 
and governments, and permits its listed companies to use IFRS. NASDAQ Dubai began 
operation in September 2005 as one of the international financial exchanges in the Middle East. 
Its listing rules require companies to use IFRS in preparing their financial statements.  
CG Codes and Principles in the UAE began with the issuance of a CG code for joint 
stock companies, according to decision number 32/R of April 2007, issued by the chairperson 
of the Securities and Commodities Authority. This CG code was followed by Ministerial 
Resolution number 518 in October 2009, which delegated to the Securities and Commodities 
Authority the control and verification of companies’ compliance with the rules and provisions 
of CG code 2007. This code is applied to all listed companies and institutions in the country, 
except those wholly owned by the federal or local government, banks and other financial 
institutions under the supervision of the Central Bank, and foreign companies listed in any of 
the financial markets. Recently, in recognition of the importance of SMEs, which represent 
95% of all firms registered in the UAE and contribute to Dubai’s economy through 42% of the 
workforce and 40% of value added, the CG Code for SMEs was issued in September 2011. Its 
main objectives are overcoming both the lack of internal SMEs’ implementation of CG 
expertise and the unavailability of external qualified specialists in the region, in order to 
improve SMEs’ growth, profitability and sustainability.  
 
3 Theoretical Framework, Literature Review and Development of 
Hypotheses  
3.1 A Neo-institutional Framework for Good Corporate Governance 
Practices 
Generally, institutions can be referred to as accepted value patterns of the common 
culture (e.g., socio-economic beliefs, norms and practices). These are integrated into different 
features of social system units, such as education, law, politics and religion (Judge et al., 2008, 
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2010). Therefore, institutions can be categorised into two groups: formal institutions (e.g., laws 
and regulations) and/or informal institutions (e.g., norms and conventions) (Judge et al., 2008, 
2010). Institutional theory argues that over time organisations tend to become structured, and 
to operate in the same way influenced by social norms, symbols, beliefs and rituals, meeting 
social expectation and being socially accepted (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983). Institutionalisation is described as the process of repeating actions over time, 
given that these actions have similar meanings as perceived by different society members 
(Scott, 1987). Institutional theory studies the interaction between the organisation and the 
environment in which it operates. In other words, how can organisations remain stable and 
enhance their survival prospects by incorporating institutionalised norms and rules (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983)? Institutional theory, like most other theories 
which are used as a theoretical framework for social and environmental accounting research 
(e.g., resource dependence theory and stakeholder theory), is system oriented. This assumes 
any organisation affects the society in which it is located as well as being affected by that 
society (Gray et al., 1995; Chen and Roberts, 2010). 
The institutional perception has three structural levels of analysis: social institutions, 
governance structures and actors in institutional settings (Scott, 2001). First, social (global) 
institutions have the power to shape the overall institutional context by imposing what is 
perceived as a socially acceptable system. Over time this imposed system is diffused informally 
(Judge et al., 2008, 2010). The governance level has also been divided into organisations and 
organisational sectors or fields (e.g., groups of organisations operating in the same industry), 
while individuals and groups are represented as actors on the bottom level of Scott’s model.  
From the neo-institutional perspective, there are three types of institutional pressure: 
coercive/regulative, cognitive/mimetic and normative. These pressures can be incorporated to 
rationalise the diffusion of good CG practices at the company or national levels. Neo-
institutional theory argues that companies have to adhere to governmental or other equivalent 
regulations, such as capital markets, according to the coercive process. Organisations may 
follow the steps of those which are successful in their field, derived from a mimetic approach. 
Likewise, in order to gain investors’ confidence, organisations may voluntarily follow 
conventional practices and norms, according to the normative process (Vaaler and Schrage, 
2006; Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2009). Therefore, institutional theory predicts that 
organisational practices tend to become isomorphic over time due to these three types of 
pressure (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, 1991). 
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CG codes, which are issued either by the stock exchange (as in the UK, Australia, 
Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE) or by investors’ associations (as in Ireland and Germany), 
lead to coercive isomorphism either because these codes become part of the listing 
requirements for publicly traded firms or because institutional investors push for firms to 
comply with them. However, codes which are issued by directors (as in South Africa and 
Egypt), professional associations (as in Malaysia) and governments are more likely to be 
endorsed by normative isomorphism, as the companies comply with these codes as legitimate 
values and norms. Finally, CG codes which are issued by managers’ associations (as in USA 
and India) are widespread and subject to the forces of mimetic isomorphism because companies 
try to follow the best practice already established by leading companies. 
The motives driving institutional antecedents, which stimulate or constrain the 
diffusion of a number of organisational practices, can generally be categorised into efficiency 
(or instrumental) and legitimation (or moral/relational) (Aguilra and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004, 
Aguilera et al., 2007; Zation and Cuomon, 2008). Institutional theory predicts the diffusion 
and/or imposition of a number of corporate practices that are driven either by competition to 
access economic resources (economic efficiency), and/or by seeking social approval for the 
right to exist (social legitimacy) (Zattoni and Cuomon, 2008).  
Accordingly, the current study aims to apply the generalised neo-institutional theory 
which incorporates both efficiency and legitimation motives of economic variables operating 
within an institutional environment (Ntim and Soobaroyen 2013b; Elmagrhi et al., 2016), to 
explain differences in CG voluntary disclosure practices at both organisational and national 
levels. First, from a legitimation/moral perspective, corporations can improve their legitimacy 
and social acceptance by adhering to the regulative institutional pressures to conform to 
expected social behaviours and international standards (Ashford and Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 
1995). Therefore they gain organisational legitimacy by showing compliance with good CG 
practices in the form of increased CG disclosure. This facilitates the congruence of corporate 
goals and norms with those of the larger society. Similarly, economic units can access and 
maintain good links with corporate stakeholders to improve corporate legitimacy by being 
involved in or mimicking accepted social behaviour (Mizrachi and Fein, 1999; Aguilera et al., 
2007). Furthermore, being involved in transparent CG practices helps firms to legitimise their 
corporate operations by reducing political costs (Branco and Rodrigues, 2008; Cheng et al., 
2008) and improves their ability to access more resources (e.g., raw materials and government 
contracts) (Jensen, 2002; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). As a result, neo-institutional theory 
suggests that corporations can win the support of powerful corporate stakeholders such as 
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governments, politicians, shareholders and trade unions, improving their organisational 
legitimacy by being involved in sound CG practices (Freeman and Reeds, 1983; Freeman, 
1984). 
On the other hand, the theoretical implications of the efficiency (instrumental) view of 
neo-institutional theory argue that adhering to coercive, mimetic and normative institutional 
forces helps economic entities gain critical resources to enhance corporate performance and 
the overall interests of shareholders (Aguilra, 2007; Chen and Roberts, 2010). Conducting good 
CG practices mitigates agency conflict by decreasing information asymmetry between 
management and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Sheu et al., 2010; Leung and 
Ilsever, 2013), reducing managerial monitoring and bonding costs (Beiner et al., 2006) and 
helping managers and investors to identify profitable investment opportunities (Bushman and 
Smith, 2001). As a result, the costs of external capital obtained by the firm are reduced, thereby 
improving company value (La Porta et al., 2002; Gompers et al., 2003; Durnev and Kim, 2005). 
Neo-institutional theory has been used at the national level to explain the diffusion 
and/or imposition of a number of corporate practices. These include differences in the adoption 
of international accounting and CG standards (Aguilra and Jackson, 2003, Yoshikawa et al., 
2007; Zation and Cuomon, 2008), other studies that used neo-institutional theory to explain 
CSR practices (Ntim and Soobarayen, 2013b), and the compliance with and disclosure of CG 
practices at company level (Elmagrhi et al., 2016). However, few studies (e.g., Elshandidy et 
al., 2015) have attempted to adopt neo-institutional theory (efficiency and legitimacy 
perspectives) at both national and company levels to study the diffusion of CG practices 
(Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2009). This motivates the current study to add to the neo-institutional 
and CG disclosure literature by explaining the main institutional antecedents of the diffusion 
of CG voluntary disclosure at both organisational and national levels. 
 
3.2 Literature Review and Development of Hypotheses 
Past studies have examined a number of antecedents that explain the differences in the 
extent of voluntary disclosure of good CG practices (e.g., Haniffa and Cooke, 2002, 2005; Eng 
and Mak, 2003; Barako et al., 2006; Mallin and Ow-Yong, 2012; Ntim et al., 2012b; Samaha 
et al., 2012; Al-Moataz and Hussainey, 2014; Elmagrhi et al., 2016). The current study extends 
voluntary disclosure literature. In particular, it uses neo-institutional theory to investigate the 
association among firm-level CG factors (Islamic values, board characteristics and ownership 
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structure mechanisms), country-level factors (religion and quality of national governance) and 
the level of voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices in MENA listed firms. 
  
3.2.1 Firm-level Antecedents of Voluntary Corporate Governance 
Compliance and Disclosure Practices  
3.2.1.1 Islamic Values Disclosure 
Islamic financial products involve equity and risk sharing elements. These mitigate the 
problems arising from different timescales between short-term, on-sight demandable deposit 
contracts and long-term high-risk loan contracts (Beck et al., 2013). Sharia-compliant financial 
products are consistent with the religious beliefs of followers of Islam, meeting their need to 
use finance according to their beliefs (Beck et al., 2013). Sharia-compliant finance has the 
following characteristics. First, Islamic institutions do not charge interest (riba) for their 
Sharia-compliant products because only goods and services are allowed to bear a price (Beck 
et al., 2013; Baele et al., 2014). However, interest is replaced by an uncertain return which is 
dependent on the borrowing company’s realised profits (Baele et al., 2014). Second, Islamic 
products do not include speculation or financing of specific prohibited activities (like drugs, 
alcohol and pork) (Beck et al., 2013). Third, Islamic finance is based on risk sharing between 
different parties (the idea of profit and loss) (Beck et al., 2013; Beal et al., 2014). Finally, all 
Sharia-compliant transactions have to be real economic transactions backed by a tangible asset 
(Beck et al., 2013). 
Every Muslim has to pay a religious tax (zakah) based on his wealth when it reaches a 
certain threshold. Firms are either required by law to pay zakah (as in Saudi Arabia) or to pay 
it voluntarily on behalf and upon the request of their investors. Thus, they are probably more 
motivated to provide information to their shareholders to help them to calculate the amount of 
zakah due in respect of their investments (Baydoun and Willett, 1997; Maali et al., 2006). The 
main objective of corporate reporting by Islamic business enterprises is to show the firm’s 
adherence to Sharia principles (Baydoun and Willett, 1997) and it helps Muslim shareholders 
to calculate and pay their zakah (Maali et al., 2006). Furthermore, Islamic businesses invest in 
more voluntary corporate disclosure as they are accountable to the Islamic community, umma, 
to show their operations and that they contribute to the well-being of the Islamic community 
(Maali et al., 2006). 
From the efficiency perspective of neo-institutional theory, the relationship between 
Islamic banks and their borrowers is based on the principle of risk sharing (profit and loss 
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sharing). For instance, a mudarba contract includes an implied understanding that profits will 
be shared between bank and borrowers at a predetermined ratio, while the bank will absorb or 
be charged with losses (Beck et al., 2013). Under this mudarba contract, the borrower 
(entrepreneur) has limited liability provisions. Major investment decisions are still held in the 
hands of the entrepreneur. Firms cannot take any investment decision without approval of the 
bank (Beck et al., 2013). This means the bank is considered one of several investors (Baele et 
al., 2014). Other kinds of Sharia-compliant financial products provided by Islamic banks for 
firms to obtain finance include musharakah, murabha and ijarah contracts. Musharakah is a 
partnership where all partners invest both money and expertise. Murabha contracts are much 
like leasing contracts in conventional banking. The bank purchases goods on behalf of client 
and then resells them to him on credit in a different contract at a marked-up price and in 
instalments over a period of time or in a lump sum on maturity of the contract. Ijarah is similar 
to an operating lease where client rents the investment goods for a fee while the goods are still 
owned by the bank (Beck et al., 2013; Baele et al., 2014). Accordingly, firms obtaining Islamic 
finance are expected to be involved in more voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices 
to meet Islamic finance providers’ demand for information about their investments.         
In general, firms with higher debt ratios arguably face higher levels of agency conflict 
because managers of firms with high leverage (gearing) are more likely to shift wealth from 
debtholders to shareholders by different mechanisms (e.g., issue more debt, declare and pay 
more dividends). Furthermore, debtholders use debt covenants which depend on accounting 
numbers to protect their interest. Thus, the existence of debt contracts will affect accounting 
choices by management, either to avoid covenant violations or to gain better debt-contract 
terms (i.e., lower interest rate or higher debt ratings) (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990; Altamuro 
et al., 2005; Rainsbury et al., 2009). 
Moreover, obtaining debts motivates managers to disclose more information, because 
creation of a debt binds them to pay out future cash flows (i.e. principal and other debt costs). 
This reduces the free cash flow available for spending at their discretion. Also, the threat of 
failure to pay debts and their interest motivates managers to use debt funds and run the 
organisation more efficiently (Jensen, 1986). Accordingly, firms with higher leverage are more 
likely to disclose additional voluntary information, because this reduces information 
asymmetry and agency conflict, in turn reducing the likelihood of debtholders’ price protection 
(e.g. increase in debt costs). This results from a fear of transferring their wealth to shareholders. 
As a result, firms are unable to settle obligations when they become due (Ettredg et al., 2002; 
Xiao et al., 2004; Al- Shammair and Al- Sultan, 2010; Omar and Simon, 2011).  
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Similarly, and from a legitimisation neo-institutional theoretical perspective, Islamic 
business ethics encourage transparency in business activities by increasing the extent of 
voluntary disclosure (Gambling and Abdelkarim, 1993; Sarker, 1999; Haniffa and Cooke, 
2002, 2005; Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009; Farook et al., 2012). Borrowers seeking Islamic finance are 
different from their counterparts in conventional finance. Their religious beliefs encourage 
them not to default on Islamic loans (coercive pressure) (Iannaccone, 1998; Guiso, et al., 2006). 
The lower default rates of Islamic loans compared to conventional loans may be for two 
reasons. First, Islamic loans are governed by different contracts than conventional loans (Baele 
et al., 2014). Second, the distinctive properties of borrowers who decide to take Islamic loan is 
also different. Because loans are conducted according to Sharia, borrowers are expected to 
repay the loan as Sharia prohibits misappropriation of other people’s property (Baele et al., 
2014). Accordingly, firms obtaining Islamic finance are more likely to comply with high levels 
of voluntary CG disclosure to improve their reputation and image. Similarly, they legitimate 
their operations by working within the framework of society’s values, norms and beliefs. 
Even though there is an increase in the importance of Islamic transactions, especially 
in the MENA region, there are few studies on Islamic values and their effect on voluntary 
disclosure. For example, Ongena and Sendeniz-Yuncu (2011) find empirical evidence that 
Islamic banks mainly deal with more transparent firms, using 16,056 bank relationships from 
1999 to 2008 in Turkey. Farook et al. (2012) document that Islamic governance (i.e., 
characteristics of the Sharia Supervisory Board) has a positive effect on the level of voluntary 
disclosure by Islamic banks. Maali et al. (2012) report that banks committed to zakah are 
associated with more social disclosures than banks not paying zakah. Al-Bassam and Ntim 
(2016), using a sample of 75 Saudi listed firms from 2004 to 2010, report that corporations that 
depict greater commitment towards incorporating Islamic values into their operations engage 
in higher voluntary CG disclosures than those that do not. Thus, based on these arguments, the 
first hypothesis is as follows: 
H1. There is a positive association between Islamic Values Disclosure Index and 
the level of voluntary corporate governance disclosure.   
 
3.2.1.2 Corporate Board Characteristics Variables 
The board of directors is at the top of all decision-control systems in any firm that 
monitors executives’ behaviour for their shareholders’ interest (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Beeks 
et al., 2004). It is responsible for many functions such as controlling, monitoring, and advising 
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managers and connecting the organisation with the external environment (Lipton and Lorsch, 
1992; Jensen, 1993; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013a, b). Previous studies have documented the 
effect of corporate board characteristics in taking many important decisions including the level 
of corporate disclosure (Ntim et al., 2012b; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013a; Tauringana and 
Mangena, 2014; Al-Bassam et al., 2015; Elmagrhi et al., 2016) 
 
3.2.1.2.1 Board Size  
From the efficiency perspective of neo-institutional theory, large boards are more 
efficient in monitoring and evaluating managers’ behaviour to make sure they are consistent 
with shareholders’ interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Pound, 1995; 
Dalton et al., 1998; Lin and Hwong, 2010). This is because large boards are less influenced by 
a dominant CEO than are small boards (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013b). The board of directors 
reduces agency conflict between managers and different stakeholders by controlling and 
monitoring managerial decisions relating to the quality of financial reporting; this decreases 
information asymmetry between managers and other external financial report users 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Dimitropoulos and Asteriou, 2010; Leung and Ilsever, 2013). Similarly, and 
from the legitimisation perspective of neo-institutional theory, larger boards provide a better 
counselling (or expert) role. Large boards can have directors with company-specific knowledge 
and managerial expertise to help fulfil this role (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Jensen, 1993; Dalton 
et al., 1998). Likewise, large boards are more likely to include directors with different areas of 
expertise and stakeholder representation (e.g., bankers and CEOs of other firms). This provides 
firms with resources and information, and effective board-environment links by engaging in 
good CG voluntary disclosure practices (Pfoffer and Salancik, 1978, Provon, 1980, Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989; Dalton et al., 1998; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013b). Accordingly, large boards 
which include diversified stakeholders with different information needs are better motivated to 
fulfil these needs by publishing more voluntary disclosure including good CG practices.  
On the other hand, and from the efficiency neo-institutional theory perspective, a 
number of studies have argued that large boards lack coordination and channels of 
communication between members as a result of “free-rider” problems (Lipton and Lorsch, 
1992). Thus, it is expected that small boards will be more effective in carrying out their 
monitoring role and engaging in more transparent voluntary disclosure practices (John and 
Senbet, 1998; Dimitropoulos and Asterious, 2010; Tauringana and Mangena, 2014; Ciampi, 
2015). Furthermore, large boards are less likely to carry out their functions effectively, because 
they are more susceptible to CEO control (Jensen, 1993), and have high risk-averse policies 
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(Yermack, 1996). Additionally, with large boards, the decision-making process consumes more 
time, coordination problems are more likely to arise, and open discussions of managerial 
performance less likely (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996; Coles et al. 2008). Consequently, the 
extent of voluntary disclosure (including CG practices) will deteriorate in firms with large 
boards. 
The differences in theoretical evidence of the ideal board size have been supported by 
differing empirical results. Many studies conclude that board size is positively associated with 
the level of voluntary disclosure (e.g., Eng and Mak, 2003; Barako et al., 2006; Hussainey and 
Al-Najjar, 2012; Ntim et al., 2012b; Elmagrhi et al., 2016), while others document a negative 
association between board size and voluntary disclosure (e.g., Cerdioni and Parbonetti, 2007; 
Tauringana and Mangena, 2014). Some find no association at all (e.g., Lakhal, 2005; Cheng 
and Courtenay, 2006).  
There is a gap in the literature examining the effect of board size on financial reporting 
quality in MENA countries. Ezat and El-Masry (2008), Al Janadi et al. (2013), Al-Bassam et 
al. (2015) and Albitar (2015) have found a positive association between board size and the 
extent of voluntary disclosure, while Samaha et al. (2012) find no evidence to support this 
relationship.  There is disagreement among national CG codes about the appropriate size of a 
board. The Egyptian CG code 2011, for example, suggests that it should not be less than five 
members if they are to fulfil their duties effectively. The Saudi CG code 2010 recommends a 
board size of 3 to 11 members, and the Jordanian CG code 2012 3 to 13. Given the inconclusive 
theoretical and empirical literature, the second hypothesis is as follows: 
H2. There is an association between board size and the level of voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure.   
 
3.2.1.2.2 Board Diversity  
 Corporate boards are required to fulfil certain roles which include: advisory, monitoring 
and securing organisational resources (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996; Ntim, 2015). Board 
diversity enhances their effectiveness (Carter et al., 2010; Lucas-Perez et al., 2015), improving 
their ability to fulfil their assigned roles. Diversity refers to the wide range of attributes and 
characteristics of board members (Vander Walt and Ingley, 2003), which can be divided into 
demographic attributes which are directly observable characteristics (such as gender, age, race 
and ethnicity) and cognitive or unobservable characteristics (such as education, religion and 
occupation) (Maznerski, 1994; Milliken and Martins, 1996; Mahadeo et al., 2012).  
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From the efficiency perspective of neo-institutional theory, board efficiency is more 
likely to be enhanced in boards whose members are of different genders, ethnicity or cultural 
backgrounds. This is because they can raise issues in board discussions and offer new thoughts 
better than more homogeneous boards (Carter et al., 2003; Walt and Ingley, 2003). 
Furthermore, Adams and Ferreira (2009) argue that a higher proportion of women represented 
on boards affects board performance positively by increasing the frequency of board meetings 
and thereby the board’s allocated effort on monitoring. Additionally, more heterogonous 
boards can access external organisations’ support through different channels of communication 
provided by the different directors (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Ntim, 2015). Likewise, 
diversified boards enhance network ties that provide access to support, expertise and 
counselling from external organisations (Beckman and Haunscild, 2002; Carter et al., 2003; 
Bear et al., 2010; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013b). Similarly, and from the legitimation 
perspective, the more diversified boards provide better links between the company and its 
external environment and influential stakeholders (Bear et al., 2010; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 
2013b), enhancing company legitimacy and the board’s trustworthiness (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 
2013b; Perrault, 2014). Recruiting directors with a broader range of attributes also enhances 
board efficiency by increasing board independence, improving managerial monitoring and 
performance (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013b; Elmagrhi et al., 2016), and bringing more ideas 
and opinions to board discussions (Carter et al., 2003). Accordingly, the members of more 
diversified boards are less likely to collude with each other, which enhances their monitoring 
role (Carter et al., 2003; Ayuso and Argandona, 2007). From the neo-institutional perspective, 
it is expected that heterogeneous boards are more likely to engage in greater compliance with 
voluntary CG disclosure than their less diversified counterparts. 
 A large number of empirical studies have supported the positive impact of diversified 
boards on voluntary CG disclosure (e.g., Haniffa and Cook, 2002, 2005; Barako and Brown, 
2008; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013 a, b; Elmagrhi et al., 2016), although there are fewer such 
studies with regard to MENA countries. In Jordan, Ibrahim and Hanefah (2014) document that 
board diversity (independence, gender, age and nationality) has a positive significant impact 
on the level of CSR disclosure. Elghuweel (2015) reports empirical evidence from Omani 
firms, showing a positive significant association between voluntary CG disclosure and board 
diversity based on nationality, whereas board diversity based on gender has a negative but 
insignificant effect on it. Jordan’s CG code 2012 recommends that boards should consider a 
balance between age, gender and experience to achieve its required roles and responsibilities 
effectively. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, the current research is the first cross-
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MENA study to provide empirical evidence for the impact of board diversity on the extent of 
compliance with and disclosure of voluntary CG practices. Thus, based on these arguments, 
the third hypothesis is as follows: 
H3. There is a positive association between board diversity on the basis of gender and 
ethnic minority and the level of voluntary corporate governance disclosure.   
 
3.2.1.2.3 Board Independence  
 Outside directors who are considered independent from management are referred to as 
non-executive directors (NEDs). They do not have ties that could materially concern their 
independent judgment (Dey, 2008). From the efficiency view of neo-institutional theory, 
boards of directors comprising more NEDs effectively monitor managers to protect 
shareholders’ interests, because they are not tied by personal and/or professional relationships 
to the firm or its management (Dalton et al., 1998; Dey, 2008). Thus boards dominated by 
outside directors have strong monitoring incentives, while those dominated by inside directors 
have weak monitoring incentives (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007). Outside directors are also less 
likely to collude with managers, since the directors’ human capital is valued according to how 
effectively they monitor managers (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Furthermore, the 
appointment of independent NEDs tends to bring more diversification to corporate boards (e.g., 
CEOs of other firms, investment bankers, major suppliers, or former government officials). 
Consequently, this helps organisations to face potential environmental pressure by gaining 
valued resources and information in addition to facilitating inter-firm commitments (Pfeffer 
and Salancik 1978; Proven, 1980). Similarly, outside directors with expertise in capital 
markets, corporate law or relevant technology contribute their specified knowledge and 
expertise to supporting top managers in dealing with specialised decision problems (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983).  
Likewise, the legitimation view of neo-institutional theory argues that the appointment 
of independent NEDs increases the opportunity for representation across a wider range of 
outside stakeholders (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013b), mitigating 
legitimacy concerns arising from separating ownership and control. Accordingly, outside 
directors who are less aligned to management monitor board activities better and limit 
opportunistic behaviour by managers. Thus, they encourage firms to disclose more information 
to outside investors (i.e. more voluntary disclosure) (Eng and Mak, 2003). Chen and Jaggi 
(2001) and Haniffa and Cook (2002) further suggest that a high proportion of outside directors 
is associated with more corporate disclosure. This reflects the role of powerful NEDs in forcing 
52 
 
management to produce higher levels of disclosure. Thus, boards with a large number of 
independent directors are expected to engage in more voluntary CG disclosure. 
With regard to empirical evidence, a large number of studies have reported a positive 
impact of the presence of independent NEDs on the extent of voluntary disclosure (e.g., Chen 
and Jaggi, 2001; Abdelsalam and Street, 2007; Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008; Mallin and Ow-
Yong, 2012; Elmagrhi et al., 2016; Tauringana and Chithambo, 2016), although a few have 
reported a negative impact (e.g., Eng and Mak, 2003; Barako et al., 2006; Al-Moataz and 
Hussainey, 2014). In the MENA countries too, the literature has offered mixed results. While 
Ezat and El-Masry (2008), Samaha and Dahawy (2010; 2011), Samaha et al. (2012) and Al 
Janadi et al. (2013) have reported a positive impact of NEDs on the extent of voluntary 
disclosure, Al-Motaz and Hussainey (2014) find a negative association. Albitar (2015) reports 
empirical evidence from 124 listed Jordanian companies of a negative significant association 
between the percentage of independent directors and the extent of voluntary disclosure. Aljifri 
et al. (2014) find no significant association between the percentage of NEDs on boards and 
voluntary disclosure. Regarding MENA CG codes, the Egyptian CG code 2011, UAE CG code 
2009, Saudi CG code 2010, and Omani CG code 2002 recommend that boards be dominated 
by non-executive and independent directors to ensure board independence and ability to fulfil 
the monitoring role efficiently. Thus, based on these arguments, the fourth hypothesis is as 
follows: 
H4. There is a positive association between the proportion of NEDs and the level of 
voluntary corporate governance disclosure. 
   
3.2.1.2.4 Board Leadership Structure  
 The board chairperson is responsible for running board meetings, in addition to 
supervising, hiring, firing, evaluating and compensating the CEO (Jensen, 1993). Thus, the 
efficiency view of neo-institutional theory suggests that separation of the chairperson and CEO 
positions helps the chairperson to effectively fulfil this monitoring role. Boards dominated by 
the CEO as a chairperson tend to behave for the benefit of the CEO (e.g., receiving higher 
compensation) (Ahmed and Henry, 2012). Ahmed and Duellman (2007) argue that the dual 
CEO/chairperson position weakens the monitoring incentives of outside directors, because the 
CEO is more likely to influence their nomination and election. Separation of the chairperson 
and CEO positions is found to be associated with better performance (Brickely et al., 1997), 
while concentrating the board leadership structure (i.e. CEO serves simultaneously as 
chairperson) reduces the effectiveness of the board’s monitoring regarding potential 
53 
 
domination of the board. This is because the manager who initiates and implements important 
decisions (as CEO) also has to control and monitor these decisions (as chairperson), and may 
make decisions for his own benefit at the expense of shareholders’ interests (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1983; Rechner and Dalton, 1991; Finkelstein and D'aveni, 1994).  
Similarly, the legitimation view of neo-institutional theory suggests that separation of 
the two roles improves the checks and balances over management performance. If the CEO 
helps to control board meetings, determine agenda items and select board members, this results 
in lack of trust between management and owners (Haniff and Cook, 2002, 2005), which may 
have a negative impact on the legitimacy of managerial decisions. However, concern over such 
legitimacy can be removed by separating the chairperson, who may even be a non-executive 
from outside the firm, from the CEO position. This separation of roles improves the quality of 
monitoring and therefore of corporate reporting, and reduces any advantage that might be 
gained from withholding information (Forker, 1992). Although the dual role of the CEO limits 
the monitoring role of the board over managers (Molz, 1988), lowering the quality of disclosure 
(Forker, 1992), it can facilitate supervising company performance and work toward achieving 
shareholders’ interests. This is as a result of the unified firm leadership and removal of any 
internal or external ambiguity regarding the responsibility for company processes and 
outcomes (Donaldson, 1990; Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Finkelstein and D'aveni, 1994). 
Despite the conflicting results reported in the literature, the majority of empirical 
evidence has supported the negative impact of CEO role duality on the extent of voluntary 
disclosure (e.g., Haniff and Cooke, 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003; Gul and Leung, 2004; Barako 
et al., 2006; Laksmana, 2008). Other studies have found no significant association between the 
two variables (e.g., Ho and Wong, 2001; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Ntin and Soobaroyen, 
2013a). With regard to MENA countries, Samaha et al. (2012) find that CEO role duality is 
associated with lower CG disclosure, while Ezat and El-Masry (2008) and Al-Shemary and Al-
Soultan (2010) report an insignificant association between the two variables. On the other hand 
Al Janadi (2013), using 87 companies from the Saudi stock market, finds that the separation of 
CEO and chairperson positions has a negative significant impact on voluntary CG disclosure. 
The Egyptian CG code 2011, UAE CG code 2009, Saudi CG code 2010 and Omani CG code 
2002 recommend separation of chairperson and CEO to ensure that boards are capable of 
providing their monitoring role efficiently. Thus, based on these arguments, the fifth hypothesis 
is as follows: 
H5. There is an association between the separation of the board leadership position 
from CEO and the level of voluntary corporate governance disclosure.   
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3.2.1.3 Ownership Structure Mechanisms 
 Ownership structure mechanisms have been reported to influence voluntary disclosure 
(Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Dam and Scholtens, 2012; Al Janadi et al., 2013; Ntim and 
Soobaroyen, 2013b; Albitar, 2015; Ntim, 2016). The level of ownership concentration and the 
type of control exerted by majority shareholders determine the level of compliance with, and 
disclosure of, CG practices (Samaha et al., 2012; Mateescu 2015; Elmagrhi et al., 2016). 
 
3.2.1.3.1 Government Ownership  
From the neo-institutional theory perspective, governments represent the highest level 
of society institutions in Scott’s (2001) three-level model, as they possess the coercive power 
of the state to regulate and control the actions of lower society actors, including firms and 
organisations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, 1991; Scott, 1987, 2001; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 
2013b). Additionally, national governments are more likely to show compliance with 
international codes of good CG and prescriptions for voluntary practices (e.g., IFRS), 
supported by transnational institutions such as EU, OECD and the World Bank (Aguilera and 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Judge et al., 2008; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008). These global institutions 
participate in the convergence of CG codes around the world, especially in developing 
countries, by issuing more general codes. Consequently, and from the efficiency view of neo-
institutional theory, corporations with high government ownership seek to gain government 
support by engaging in good CG practices (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013b). Because winning 
the support of government not only legitimates corporate operations (Aguilera et al., 2007), it 
also in terms of efficiency aids in gaining essential resources such as subsidies, tax exemptions 
and contracts to improve company performance (Pfeffer and Salanick, 1978; Malherbe and 
Segal, 2003; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). Likewise, good voluntary CG practices adopted by 
corporations help to mitigate agency conflicts between management and influential owners, 
including governments (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013b). 
Additionally, corporations with a greater proportion of government ownership face a high level 
of agency conflicts between government and other shareholders that can be mitigated by 
increasing corporate disclosure (Eng and Mak, 2003). 
As mentioned previously, the neo-institutional theoretical perspective suggests that 
firms with a large proportion of state ownership are more likely to adopt voluntary disclosure 
practice. However, a number of studies argue that higher levels of state ownership, with wide 
and powerful political connections, provide protection against review and discipline by 
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regulatory authorities (e.g., Jia et al., 2009; Hou and Moore, 2010). Consequently, firms with 
high government ownership are less likely to voluntarily disclose CG practices. 
Empirically, there is a lack of studies examining the association between government 
ownership and the extent of voluntary disclosure in emerging markets in general and MENA 
countries in particular. Eng and Mak (2003), Ntim et al. (2012b), Ntim and Soobaroyen 
(2013b) and Al-Bassam et al. (2015) have documented that government ownership impacts 
positively on voluntary disclosure practices in emerging markets, while Dam and Scholtens 
(2012) and Al Janadi et al., (2013) find a negative significant impact of state ownership on 
voluntary disclosure. Thus, based on these arguments and mixed results, the sixth hypothesis 
is as follows: 
H6. There is an association between government ownership and the level of 
voluntary corporate governance disclosure.                         
 
3.2.1.3.2 Director Ownership 
Director ownership probably influences decisions regarding voluntary CG disclosure 
practices (Eng and Mak, 2003; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006). However, the association 
between director shareholdings and organisational performance is not conclusive (Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006). From the efficiency perspective of neo-institutional theory, higher director 
ownership mitigates agency conflicts between directors and shareholders by aligning their 
interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Lilienfield-Toal and Ruenzi, 2014). Consequently, 
boards need not bend to increase voluntary CG disclosure (Eng and Mak, 2003; Samaha et al., 
2012). Furthermore, and from the legitimisation perspective, firms with lower director 
ownership tend to invest more in CG practices and voluntary CG disclosure to enhance 
company legitimacy and stakeholder confidence in the board (Eng and Mak, 2003; Ghazali and 
Weetman, 2006).    
Empirically, most evidence has shown a negative association between director 
ownership and voluntary disclosure of CG practices (e.g., Ruland et al., 1990; Hussain and Al-
Najjar, 2012). With regard to MENA and developing countries in general, Oh et al. (2011), 
Samaha and Dahawy (2011), Khan et al. (2013) and Albitar (2015) have reported a negative 
impact of director ownership on voluntary CG disclosure practices. However, Samaha et al. 
(2012) report an insignificant impact. Thus, based on these arguments, the seventh hypothesis 
is as follows: 
H7. There is a negative association between director ownership and the level of 
voluntary corporate governance disclosure. 
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3.2.1.3.3 Block Ownership  
Concentration of ownership mitigates agency conflict by decreasing information 
asymmetry, thus improving firm value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), while firms with diffused 
ownership tend to increase corporate disclosure to substitute for the greater monitoring that is 
required (Eng and Mak, 2003). Neo-institutional theory, from the efficiency perspective, 
suggests that concentrated or block ownership, when working as an additional monitoring tool, 
reduces agency conflicts. Consequently, there is less need for the increased voluntary 
disclosure which is normally required by powerful stakeholders, while firms with more 
dispersed ownership engage in greater voluntary disclosure to monitor management (Brammer 
and Pavelin, 2008; Reverte, 2009; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013b). Similarly, from the 
legitimation perspective, firms with a concentrated ownership structure are less likely to be 
subject to coercive, mimetic and normative institutional pressures to adopt more transparent 
disclosure practices. They do not encounter more public accountability from less powerful 
outside structures than their counterparts (Khan et al., 2013; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013b). On 
the contrary, firms with dispersed ownership structures are subject to more agency problems 
from managerial opportunism and conflicts of interest (Oh et al., 2011). This can be mitigated 
by engaging in more transparent practices that may work as bonding and monitoring 
mechanisms (Reverte, 2009). Summing up, from the neo-institutional perspective, firms with 
block ownership are less likely to engage in disclosing voluntary good CG practices compared 
to their counterparts with more diffused ownership.  
Empirically, the literature is largely consistent with the theoretical perspective that 
firms with more concentrated ownership are less likely to conduct additional voluntary CG 
disclosure. For example, Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Marston and Polei (2004), Bozec and 
Bozec (2007), Al-Najjar and Abed (2014), and Elmagrhi et al. (2016) have documented that 
block ownership impacts negatively on CG disclosure. In the MENA region, Samaha and 
Dahawy (2011) and Samaha et al., (2012) have reported empirical evidence from Egypt for the 
negative association between block ownership and CG disclosure, while Al-Bassam et al. 
(2015) find empirical evidence from Saudi Arabia for a positive but insignificant effect of block 
ownership on voluntary CG disclosure. Thus, based on these arguments, the eighth hypothesis 
is as follows: 
H8. There is a negative association between block ownership and the level of 
voluntary corporate governance disclosure. 
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3.2.2 Country-level Antecedents of Voluntary Corporate Governance 
Compliance and Disclosure Practices  
3.2.2.1 Religion   
The institutional environment may better explain CG practices than do firm-level 
factors (Judge et al., 2008, 2010). Although religion is considered one of the main institutional 
and cultural pillars that may affect corporate activities (Archambault and Archambault, 2003; 
Chan-Serafin et al., 2013), few scholars have investigated its impact on modern organisations’ 
outcomes and decisions, including CG disclosure (Tracey, 2012; Chan-Serafin et al., 2013). 
Contrary to western society where religion is considered as a private matter (Rice, 
1999), in most Muslim countries Islam influences people’s daily activities and business, as it 
is integrated in all aspects of society including politics, community, law and economy (Ryan, 
2000; Tinker, 2004; Hassan and Christopher, 2005; Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009; Kamla, 2009; Aribi 
and Gao, 2010). Therefore, business, financial and all economic transactions are performed 
with the inspiration of Islamic principles. Governance of public corporations is also strongly 
influenced by Islamic values that emanate mainly from Sharia (Grais and Pellegrini, 2006; 
Safieddine, 2009; Judge, 2010). Muslims believe that resources are provided to an individual 
by God in the form of trust, and therefore accountability is ultimately to God (Bhatti and Bhatti, 
2010). The umma or society also has the right to know about the operations and transactions of 
business organisations (Lewis, 2006). Therefore, Islamic economics requires business 
organisations to provide accurate and fair corporate disclosure to the different readers of their 
annual reports, so that they can make informed economic decisions (Maali et al., 2006; Abu-
Tapanjeh, 2009). The Islamic ideals of unity of purpose of life,  universal brotherhood and trust 
suggest that organisations should show greater transparency (Suleiman and Willett, 2003) and 
apply sound CG practices and more disclosure (Hassan and Christopher, 2005). Hassan and 
Christopher (2005) proposed that in Muslim societies, organisations can use annual reports as 
a medium for promoting Islamic values (compliance with Islamic Sharia, zakah, fairness and 
justice – vis-à-vis sound CG practices and disclosure). Accordingly, Islamic institutions are 
expected to disclose relevant corporate information to earn legitimacy for their continued 
existence (Baydoun and Willett, 2000; Haniffa, 2001; Lewis, 2001; Maali et al., 2006; Tracey, 
2012).  
Business organisations (particularly Islamic financial institutions) generally encounter 
unique agency relationships and CG challenges, requiring separate examination (Lewis, 2005; 
Safieddine, 2009). Agency conflicts arise because: first, unlike traditional organisations that 
seek to maximise shareholders’ wealth, Islamic organisations need to comply with Sharia 
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before increase their value, thus any divergence from raising profits from Sharia-compliant 
investments creates an additional source of agency problems (Hamid et al., 1993; Archer et al., 
1998; Chapra and Ahmed, 2002; Safieddine 2009). Second, the nature of some investment 
contracts separates cash flow and control rights (Sarker, 1999; Safieddine 2009). For example, 
in profit-sharing contracts (mudaraba), financial institutions are entitled to manage the capital 
of investors. The profits are shared in mutually agreed proportions, and financial loss is 
completely borne by the capital owner, unless it was the result of proven misconduct or 
negligence on the part of the bank (Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000). Hence, managers are 
presented with opportunities to extract personal benefits at the expense of investors’ interests 
(Abdel Karim, 2001; Abdel Karim and Archer 2002, 2006). Agency conflicts do not, therefore, 
arise solely from the separation of ownership and shareholder control but also from the 
separation of cash flow and control rights (Safieddine 2009). This increases adverse selection, 
moral hazard and monitoring the costs of borrowing (Choudhury and Alam, 2006; Chong and 
Liu, 2009), in addition to exacerbating agency problems by increasing opportunities for 
managerial expropriation of corporate assets (Safieddine, 2009; Vinnicombe, 2010). One way 
to mitigate the unique CG conflicts facing Islamic business organisations is to provide 
shareholders and others stakeholders with true, fair and pertinent information on a timely basis 
(Sarker, 1999; Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009; Safieddine 2009). Therefore, and from the legitimacy 
view of neo-institutional theory, corporations in countries where Islamic values are dominant 
signal their intention to commit to sound governance standards by incorporating a greater level 
of compliance with and disclosure of CG practices. 
The existing theoretical frameworks rarely recognise religion as a foundation for 
explaining why organisations comply with and voluntarily disclose CG information, or assess 
their performance in terms of fulfilling their obligation to God and society (Haniffa, 2001). 
This is reflected in the dearth of literature investigating the impact of religion on CG practices. 
Comparing the annual reports of 21 conventional financial institutions (CFIs) and 21 Islamic 
financial institutions (IFIs) operating in the Gulf region, Aribi and Gao (2010) find significant 
differences in the level and the extent of CSR disclosure between IFIs and CFIs. Using a sample 
of 761 industrial companies from 37 countries, Archambault and Archambault (2003) find 
empirical evidence supporting the positive and significant effect of religion (Islamic, Catholic, 
Protestant and Buddhist) on corporate financial disclosure. On the other hand, Hassan and 
Christopher (2005) investigated the impact of Islam on CG statement disclosure in the annual 
reports of Malaysian banks. They find that Islamic banks do not exhibit better CG practices 
and disclosure than do conventional banks. Maali et al. (2006) also suggest that social reporting 
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is not a major concern for most Islamic banks, although banks required to pay zakah do offer 
more social disclosures. The distinctive Islamic corporate form creates unique CG challenges 
that makes examining CG compliance and disclosure in MENA countries an interesting issue 
(Lawis, 2005; Safieddine, 2009; Al-Bassam et al., 2012). 
Therefore, the ninth prediction is that wide implementation of Islamic economic values 
across countries will lead to an increase in the extent of compliance with and disclosure of CG 
practices. The Islamic economic values variable is measured using the Global Islamic Economy 
Indicator developed by Thomson Reuters in collaboration with the Dubai Islamic Economy 
Development Centre, which measures the development of the global Islamic economy across 
its multiple sectors. From the neo-institutional theory perspective, and following arguments 
from previous studies, the current study assumes that the Global Islamic Economy Indicator 
(GIEI) positively and significantly impacts voluntary CG disclosure practices. This leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
H9. There is a positive association between the Global Islamic Economy Indicator 
and the level of voluntary corporate governance disclosure. 
 
3.2.2.2 National Governance Quality 
After the GIEI, the current study examines the extent to which the quality of the 
institutional environment of governance impacts on the level of compliance with and disclosure 
of CG practices in the MENA region. Available data from international organisations, such as 
the World Bank Group and Transparency International, demonstrates that, compared to the rest 
of the world, MENA countries are generally characterised by poor governance indicators. This 
is supported by the often relatively high levels of corruption, political instability, poor 
regulatory quality, lack of accountability and general ineffectiveness of government 
institutions across several MENA countries (Bishara, 2011; Heidenhof, 2014: Tunyi and Ntim, 
2016). Even though governance indicators in the MENA region show some improvement since 
the Arab Spring, they are still weak compared to the rest of the world (Bishara, 2011; 
Heidenhof, 2014). This part of the world encounters a number of governance challenges that 
include: “the very high concentration of political and economic power by the governing elites 
and those close to them, a general lack of transparency and accountability of state actors and 
deeply felt feelings of a lack of dignity, social justice and inequality by the populace at large” 
(Heidenhof, 2014:2). 
 CG legitimacy at the national level arises from perceiving CG as a means by which a 
nation constrains and directs corporate power so that it efficiently creates economic value and 
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fairly distributes national income (Monks, 2007; Judge et al., 2008). On the national level, 
Judge et al. (2008) argue that the legitimacy of CG practices is derived from the degree of law 
and order in the society, the cultural view of competitiveness, and the extent to which 
corruption is embraced within a nation. Corruption is defined as “the misuse of public power 
(or office) for private benefit” (Judge et al., 2008:771). Corruption has been found to have a 
negative impact on a firm’s borrowing ability, stock valuations and CG practices (Ng, 2006). 
It not only deters the development of sound governance practices, it is also considered as an 
outcome of bad governance practices (Randall, 1999; Wu, 2005). The literature also 
demonstrates that disclosure is influenced by the level of corruption in a country. Firms 
operating in countries characterised by a high level of corruption are generally assumed to have 
a lower level of corporate disclosure because they may be engaged in unethical practices 
(Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012; Baldini et al., 2016). MENA countries have high levels of 
corruption and lack regulations to protect minority shareholders (Bishara, 2011). Stimulating 
transparency and disclosure are considered to be one of the main mechanisms required to 
overcome inefficiencies in governance in MENA countries (Bishara, 2011; Heidenhof, 2014). 
 Additionally, and with regard to the rule of law and regulations, corporate insiders are 
more likely to undertake activities to serve their own interests or those of other stakeholders at 
the expense of shareholders, and different countries have adopt legislation to protect 
shareholders (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012). Government efficiency and reporting regulations 
influence the extent of corporate disclosure practices (Baldini et al., 2016). In countries 
characterised by the existence of many constitutional and political constraints, companies are 
less likely to disclose more information (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Roe, 2003; Ioannou and 
Serafeim, 2012). La Porta et al. (1996) argue that strong legal protection rights encourage small 
investors to enter the stock market, resulting in wide dispersion of ownership. In addition, better 
legal protection of creditors increases firms’ likelihood of higher debt finance. Accordingly, 
countries with widely dispersed ownership and a high level of debt financing are likely to 
provide more detailed corporate disclosure to meet the demands of different groups of investors 
and creditors (Jaggi and Low, 2000). Political freedom and stability also provide a suitable 
environment for the development of the accounting profession in general and corporate 
reporting and disclosure in particular (Belkaoui, 1983). 
In a cross-country study that used neo-institutional theory to explore potential 
antecedents of CG legitimacy from 1997 to 2005, Judge et al. (2008) find that CG legitimacy 
at the national level is influenced by the extent of law and order, cultural emphasis on global 
competitiveness, and the prevalence of corruption. Using 14,174 firm-year observations for the 
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period 2005 to 2012, Baldini, et al. (2016) find that a high level of corruption has a significant 
negative impact on the level of environmental, social and governance disclosure. The strength 
of formal institutions is also negatively related to environmental disclosure, although it has no 
impact on social and governance disclosure. Mateescu (2015) investigated national 
institutional and company-level factors affecting CG disclosure practices. Using a sample of 
51 companies listed in four emerging European countries (Estonia, Poland, Hungary and 
Romania), he reports a significant positive impact of the country-level variables (rule of law, 
government effectiveness and regulatory quality) on companies’ level of compliance with and 
disclosure of CG practices. Using 401 firms from six countries, Jaggi and Low (2000) find 
empirical evidence that firms from common law countries with widely dispersed ownership 
and a high level of debt financing are associated with higher financial disclosures, compared 
to firms from code law countries. In a cross-country study (examining data from 55 countries), 
Belkaoui (1983) finds no significant relationship between political freedom and corporate 
disclosure, although Goodrich (1986) finds a link between political systems and accounting 
clusters.   
Consequently, the tenth prediction is that improvements in the quality of national 
governance across countries will lead to an increase in the extent of compliance with and 
disclosure of CG practices. In line with prior studies, we measure the quality of national 
governance and institutional environment using time-varying measures of corruption, 
including the World Bank’s Control of Corruption Index (CCI), measures of political and legal 
maturity including the World Bank’s Voice and Accountability Index (VAI), Political Stability 
Index (PSI), Government Effectiveness Index (GEI), Regulatory Quality Index (RQI) and Rule 
of Law Index (RLI). From the neo-institutional theory perspective, and following arguments 
from previous studies, the current study assumes that the quality of national governance is a 
significant structural factor influencing CG disclosure practices. This leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
H10. There is a positive association between the quality of national governance and 
the level of voluntary corporate governance disclosure. 
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4 Research Design 
4.1. Sample Selection and Data Sources 
The study uses a sample of 600 firm-year observations from five MENA countries’ 
listed firms over the period 2009 to 2014. 1  For the purpose of the current study, the countries 
selected are Egypt, Jordan, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The choice of these specific 
countries is to satisfy two main criteria. First, the selected countries should reflect the diversity 
in MENA countries in order to support the generalisation of the results. Specifically, from a 
capital perspective, whereas Saudi Arabia and the UAE are net capital exporting countries, 
Egypt and Jordan are considered net capital importing companies. Oman was the first country 
in the MENA region to issue its National CG Code in 2002. Second, in order to ensure data 
availability and sample homogeneity, some filtering rules were applied. Accordingly, some 
countries were excluded from the sample. For example, Israel was dropped because its firms 
are dual-listed and provide annual reports according to the SEC requirements (10-K form); and 
others, like Bahrain and Qatar, because their capital markets include mostly financial and 
investment corporations. Countries where most firms issue their financial reports in languages 
other than Arabic or English, such as Morocco and Tunisia, were excluded, as were those with 
non-active stock markets, such as Iraq and Libya. 
Since financial and utility firms are subject to different regulations and have different 
capital structures, their impact on disclosure and CG practices is different (Reverte, 2009; Ntim 
and Soobaroyen, 2013b). Consequently, firms in these industries are excluded from the sample. 
 
Table 1: Summary of sample composition 
 Egypt Jordan Oman Saudi 
Arabia 
United Arab 
of Emirates 
Total listed firms 214 236 117 169 123 
Less: Financial and Utilities firms 71 115 46 57 76 
Total firms available to be sampled  
 
143 121 71 112 47 
Final selected sample 20 20 20 20 20 
Percentage of sample 14% 17% 28% 18% 43% 
Sources: Sampled countries’ stock exchanges 
 
The remaining listed firms (total firms available to be sampled) are classified into five 
main industries: basic materials/oil and gas; industrial; customer goods; customer 
services/healthcare; and technology/telecommunication. The current study follows the Industry 
                                               
1The MENA region includes Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, West 
Bank and Gaza, and the Republic of Yemen. http://www.worldbank.org.  
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Classification Benchmark (ICB). Since the number of observations from oil and gas, healthcare 
and telecommunication industries was relatively small, the observations from these three 
industries were added to basic-material, consumer-services and technology industries, 
respectively. The current study uses this industry stratified sample because voluntary CG 
compliance and disclosure practices could be influenced by industry type (Cooke, 1992; Street 
and Bryant 2000; Al Janadi et al., 2013; Habbash et al., 2015), and to be in line with previous 
voluntary disclosure literature (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013 a,b; Al-Bassam et al., 2015; 
Elmagrhi et al., 2016). The final sample was selected randomly from these five industry 
categories in the five countries (four firms in each industry), making 100 firms from 2009 to 
2014 and giving a total of 600 firm-year observations. Firms to be included in the final sample 
should have annual reports for all six years and these reports should include detailed data 
related to CG disclosure (e.g., board characteristics and ownership structure mechanisms). 
The study uses content analysis to measure CG attributes and CG disclosure in data 
collected by hand from the annual financial reports. Because traditional content analysis takes 
a significant amount of time and effort, only 600 firm-year observations are considered, starting 
in 2009. The financial crisis of 2007/2008 brought into question the effectiveness of CG and 
disclosure practices (Elmagrhi et al., 2016). This study may therefore explain how far the crisis 
has affected CG structures and disclosure practices. The sampling period ends in 2014, as this 
was the latest year for which the annual reports were available when the data collection began.   
Therefore, the current study uses a time series and cross-sectional data. This panel data 
structure is characterised by its ability to provide more informative data, more reliability, less 
multicollinearity among variables, a greater degree of freedom and greater efficiency (Gujarati, 
2003; Wooldridge, 2010). Additionally, the convergence of CG practices takes a relatively long 
time to materialise, so undertaking longitudinal studies will be more imperative (Yoshikawa 
and Rasheed, 2009).  
Data on firms’ Islamic values, board characteristics and ownership structure 
mechanisms were manually collected from firms’ annual reports, their websites, capital 
markets websites and other websites. Financial and accounting variables were collected from 
the Datastream database. Finally, country-level data, including GDP and the quality of national 
governance, were collected from the website of the World Bank; the Global Islamic Economy 
Indicator and Corruption Perception Index were collected from Thomson Reuters and 
Transparency International websites, respectively, while the Inflation Index came from the 
International Monetary Fund’s website. 
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4.2. Measurement of Variables 
Two OLS regression models were employed to examine the hypotheses, investigating 
the impact of both firm-level CG mechanisms (Islamic values, board characteristics and 
ownership structure mechanisms) and country-level CG mechanisms (religion and governance 
quality) on the extent of CG voluntary disclosure. The hypotheses will be tested using a sample 
of MENA listed firms. The study variables are classified into three main categories: dependent, 
independent (firm-level and country-level CG measures) and control (firm-level and country-
level) variables, as illustrated in Table 2.  
 
4.2.1 Voluntary Corporate Governance Disclosure (Dependent Variable) 
Measurement  
The main objective of the current study is to examine the level and determinants of 
compliance with the best CG measures practices among listed firms in MENA countries. 
Therefore, the CG index (MCGI) is the dependent variable used to investigate the main firm- 
and country-level antecedents that drive voluntary CG disclosure among MENA listed firms. 
The current study follows recent research which adopts the CG index as a methodological 
approach (e.g., Ntim et al., 2012a; Allegrini and Greco, 2013; AI-Bassam et al., 2015; 
Elmagrhi et al., 2016). This examines the level and determinants of CG compliance, 
particularly recently after many countries have issued their codes of good CG. With regard to 
the CG codes, past studies can be classified into two categories: the first relies on international 
CG codes (e.g., Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Report, 1999; 
Commonwealth Principles, 1999) (e.g., Samaha et al., 2012); and the second on national CG 
codes (e.g., King Report II, 2002; Saudi CG Code, 2006; UK Combined Code, 2010) (e.g., 
Ntim et al., 2012a; AI-Bassam et al., 2015; Elmagrhi et al., 2016). 
The current study uses a constructed CG index (MCGI). This index follows a checklist 
developed by the Intergovernmental Working Group of Experts on International Standards of 
Accounting and Reporting (ISAR), organised by the United Nations Conference Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD, 2006).2 This checklist (“UNCTAD ISAR benchmark”) for good 
practice in CG disclosure is based on five sections used to construct five sub-indices: (i) 
                                               
2Two benchmark items were removed from the original 2006 UNCTAD ISAR benchmark that included 53 items. 
A disclosure on “Practices on related party transactions where control exists” was removed because of substantive 
overlap with another item “Nature, type and elements of related-party transactions”. Also disclosure on “Types 
and duties of outside board and management positions” was removed because of substantive overlap with another 
item “Number of outside board and management position directorships held by the directors”. The UNCTAD 
ISAR benchmark (MCGI) is presented in Appendix (1). 
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ownership structure and exercise of control rights (OSH); (ii) financial transparency (TCY); 
(iii) auditing (AUD); (iv) corporate responsibility and compliance (RTY); and (v) board and 
management structure and process (BMS). The MCGI is constructed by awarding a value of 1 
if each of the 51 CG provisions is disclosed, and 0 otherwise. With this binary scoring scheme 
a firm’s total disclosure score in a particular firm-year can vary between 0 (perfect non-
compliance and non-disclosure) and 100% (perfect compliance and disclosure). Obviously, the 
higher the index level, the better the compliance and disclosure process. The next sub-sections 
will discuss the dependent variable’s measurement.  
 
4.2.1.1 Data Sources for the MENA Corporate Governance Index  
Firms’ annual reports are used as the main source to collect CG data. The current study 
relies on this information source for the following reasons. First, although annual reports are 
used in conjunction with other sources, they have competitive advantages (e.g., verifiability, 
objectivity, regularity and standardisation) (Cascino et al., 2014). Second, the amount of 
disclosure provided by firms in annual reports is positively associated with the level of 
disclosure reported via other media (Lang and Lundholm, 1993). Finally, although a few 
studies rely on other means to examine voluntary disclosure, such as Internet reporting (e.g., 
Marston and Polei, 2004; Abdelsalam and Street, 2007; Ezat and El-Masry, 2008), the majority 
of researchers depend on annual reports. Thus, in line with most previous research, the current 
study uses annual reports that contain financial and non-financial information audited by 
external auditors to calculate the dependent variable (e.g., Barako et al., 2006; Ntim et al., 
2012a; Allegrini and Greco, 2013; AI-Bassam et al., 2015; Elmagrhi et al., 2016). 
 
4.2.1.2 The Choice between Binary and Ordinal Coding Schemes 
 Two approaches could be used to score a voluntary CG disclosure index (Cooke, 1989), 
namely a simple binary coding scheme (un-weighted index) and a complex ordinal coding 
scheme (weighted index). The first approach provides an equal weight of 1 if a particular CG 
provision is applied, and 0 otherwise, whereas the second assigns a gradual scale for the degree 
of disclosure (e.g., qualitative information, quantified information, or both). Therefore, the 
complex ordinal coding approach assesses the quality of CG disclosure and reflects the relative 
importance of each CG provision (Gompers et al., 2003; Beattie et al., 2004).  
 Despite the possible advantages of using the complex ordinal coding, the current study 
applies simple binary coding to examine the level of voluntary CG disclosure for a number of 
reasons. First, the design of the MCGI enables the researcher to check whether its provisions 
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are applied or not. Therefore, this scheme is appropriate for the current study which measures 
neither the quality of CG disclosures, nor the relative impact of different CG provisions. 
Instead, it captures only the occurrence or absence of voluntary CG disclosure. Second, there 
is no strictly developed theoretical basis that rationalises giving certain weights to various CG 
disclosure provisions (Black et al., 2006). Thus, it is unnecessary to dominate the CG 
disclosure index by a particular set of CG provisions that could cause bias towards one or some 
of the provisions (Botosan, 1997; Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Bhagat et al., 2008). Third, it is easier 
to replicate an un-weighted index as it is more transparent (Beiner et al., 2006). The scheme 
assumes that all provisions are equally important. This enables the current study to avoid 
making judgments in assigning a particular provision (Owusu-Ansah, 1998). Fourth, many 
studies suggest that similar results are obtained from weighted and un-weighted indices 
(Botson, 1997; Barako et al., 2006; Ntim et al., 2012a). Finally, as binary coding has been used 
so widely in recent studies, using it here enables direct comparison between the current study 
and those studies (e.g., Tsipouri and Xanthakis, 2004; Henry, 2008; Aggarwal et al., 2011; 
Ntim et al., 2012a; Samaha et al., 2012; Allegrini and Greco, 2013; AI-Bassam et al., 2015; 
Elmagrhi et al., 2016). 
Consistent with previous studies, the current study designed a CG disclosure score-
sheet to code firms on their level of CG disclosure, and the annual reports of the 100 firms were 
examined and compared with the MCGI’s provisions. Additionally, each firm’s annual reports 
were thoroughly read before starting the coding to make sure that all disclosed the main items 
(Cook, 1989; Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Naser et al., 2002).  
 
4.2.1.3 The Reliability and Validity of the Constructed Corporate 
Governance Index 
To obtain effective inference from employing a measure of disclosure in the research, 
the instrument of measurement (MCGI) should be reliable and valid (Weber, 1990; Hassan and 
Marston, 2010) in measuring CG disclosure amongst MENA listed firms. The following sub-
sections discusses the procedures carried out to test the reliability and validity of the disclosure 
measure. 
 
4.2.1.3.1 The Reliability Test of the Corporate Governance Index 
The coding scheme is considered to be reliable if the index scores awarded to the text 
(financial report) can be replicated by another coder (Weber, 1990; Marston and Shrives, 1991; 
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Beattie et al., 2004). Therefore, reliability is largely related to two main issues: stability and 
consistency. 
Stability can be defined as the ability of the researcher to achieve the same results at 
different times using the same measuring procedure (Beattie et al., 2004). There are three types 
of reliability: inter-coder, test-retest and internal consistency reliability (Sekran, 2003). The 
content analysis for this study was conducted by a single researcher, so the test-retest reliability 
and internal consistency reliability were tested.  
This study follows procedures proposed by other researchers to meet the test-retest 
reliability (e.g., Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Omar and Simon, 2011; 
Samaha et al., 2012). First, the annual reports for an initial sample of 25 firms (one from each 
of five main industries in the five countries) for 2009 to 2014 were read in their entirety before 
coding their CG disclosures. This procedure helps to ensure that companies are not penalised 
for non-disclosure of non-applicable items in their annual reports (Omar and Simon, 2011). 
Following Cook (1989; 1991), Samaha et al. (2012), Al-Bassam et al. (2015) and Elmagrhi et 
al. (2016), a first round of coding was performed for the whole six years for each firm of the 
initial sample before moving on to the next firm, to increase consistency and accuracy. 3 
Second, a second round of coding was conducted for the entire sample (600 firm-year 
observations) after scoring the annual reports of the initial sample (Al-Bassam et al., 2015; 
Omar and Simon, 2011). Finally, after scoring the annual reports of all 600 firm-year 
observations, a third round was conducted as a final assessment, following Samaha et al. (2012) 
and Elmagrhi et al. (2016). This third round was conducted in order to improve the coding 
accuracy by identifying and correcting any mistakes or inconsistencies made during the 
previous two rounds. The results of the third round were largely similar to those of the two 
previous rounds, indicating that stability among the different rounds of coding was attained.    
Consistency means that the same index scores awarded to companies can be attained 
by another researcher (Weber, 1990; Marston and Shrives, 1991). In order to measure the 
internal consistency of the MCGI, Cronbach’s alpha test was conducted, following the example 
of previous studies which examined the impact of CG on corporate disclosure (e.g., Gul and 
Leung, 2004; Dey, 2008; Sharma, 2014; Elmagrhi et al., 2016). DeVellis (1991) suggests that 
a disclosure index scoring a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient between 0.7 and 0.8 indicates 
acceptable reliability. The coefficient for the five sub-indices in the MCGI is 0.713, indicating 
                                               
3 The first round of coding was performed under the advice of the researcher’s supervisors, who are experts in 
CG and have published extensively in reputable journals, such as Accounting, Auditing & Accountability 
Journal, Corporate Governance: An International Review and Journal of Business Ethics.                  
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that the power of the empirical test is less likely to be affected by a random measurement error. 
This value of Cronbach’s alpha confirms that the set of items in the MCGI complement each 
other well in capturing several features of the same variable (Litwin, 1995). Therefore, the 
scoring scheme conducted in this study largely meets the stability and consistency 
considerations required to ensure that the MCGI is a reliable measurement tool.   
 
4.2.1.3.2 The Validity Test of the Corporate Governance Index 
The second issue associated with the construction of indices is validity. Validity means 
the ability of the index scores to reflect what they are intended to measure (Carmines and Zeller, 
1991). The literature differentiates between two types of validity: content and construct 
validity. Content validity considers that the measurement index should include sufficient 
governance items to enable the researcher to perform the required examination, while construct 
validity means that the provisions included in the index must be match what the researcher 
intends to examine (Saunders et al., 2007).  
The following procedures were applied with the purpose of ensuring both content and 
construct validity associated with the MCGI. First, the index was prepared on the basis of a 
consultative process and ISAR’s deliberations during the period 2002-2005 and published in 
2006 (UNCTAD, 2006). In addition, this benchmark has been used for many years as a key 
measurement tool in UNCTAD’s research programme on CG disclosure (UNCTAD, 2011), 
and specifically to assess the level and determinants of voluntary CG disclosure in some 
emerging markets (e.g., Samaha et al., 2012). Accordingly, this ensures the validity of MCGI 
compared to researcher’s constructed indices that may be subject to judgment, which might 
lead to potential bias and errors (Core, 2001; Francis et al., 2008). 
 Second, it is argued that validation of the measuring instrument can be ensured when 
conducting analysis that involves empirical evidence to support the measuring instrument 
(Carmines and Zeller, 1991; Shevlin, 2004). This suggests that the disclosure index is valid if 
it is associated with firm-specific characteristics identified by past studies as determinants of 
voluntary disclosure, such as board characteristics, ownership structure mechanisms, size, 
leverage and auditor type (Botosan, 1997; Brown and Tucker, 2011). In line with previous 
studies (e.g., Botosan, 1997; Brown and Tucker, 2011), the current study tests the construct 
validity of the MCGI by empirically examining the association between the level of voluntary 
disclosure and variables that have been identified in prior studies to drive voluntary disclosure 
(e.g., board characteristics, ownership structure mechanisms, firm size, leverage and auditor 
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type). The empirical analysis of the current study, as will be detailed in section 5, indicates that 
the level of CG disclosure in MENA listed firms can be explained by a number of firm and 
country factors, including Islamic values, board characteristics, ownership structure 
mechanisms, and country-level religion and governance qualities. These results add validity to 
the MCGI.  
 
4.2.2 Independent Variables 
 The independent CG variables, of two types (firm-level and country-level), have been 
drawn from the CG literature to examine their impact on voluntary CG compliance and 
disclosure among MENA listed firms. The data for the firm-level explanatory variables were 
hand-collected from the firms’ annual reports and websites, while country-level governance 
qualities were collected from several websites: the World Bank and Thomson Reuters. The 
choice of CG measures at both levels is consistent with many past studies, and is subject to the 
availability of data. Table 2 shows summary definitions of the dependent (MCGI), independent 
and control variables used in this study. However, this section will briefly discuss the 
measurement of independent variables. 
 As illustrated in Table 2, with regard to firm-level factors, Islamic values disclosure 
(e.g., Maali et al., 2006; Farook, et al., 2011; Al-Bassam and Ntim, 2016) was measured using 
an index containing three provisions (whether a narrative regarding the fact that the firm’s 
funds and loans are on the basis of interest-free (riba) is disclosed, whether the firm discloses 
any Islamic and conventional finance separately, and whether a narrative regarding the 
appropriate calculation and payment of the Islamic religious tax (zakah) for the financial year 
is disclosed); it takes 1 if each of the three provisions is disclosed, 0 otherwise, scaled to a value 
between 0 and 100%. With respect to board characteristics, board size was measured in a 
similar manner to that used in earlier studies (e.g., Ntim et al., 2012b; Elmagrhi et al., 2016) 
as the natural log of the total number of directors on the board of a company. Board diversity 
was measured by the percentage of the total number of women and ethnic minority (non-Arab) 
directors to the total number of board directors (e.g., Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013a; Gyapong 
et al., 2015; Elmagrhi et al., 2016). Board independence was measured as the percentage of 
NEDs to the total number of board directors (e.g., Eng and Mak, 2003; Samaha et al., 2012). 
The board of directors’ leadership structure was measured using a dummy variable that takes 
the value of 1 if the roles of chairperson and CEO are separate at the end of its financial year, 
0 otherwise (e.g., Eng and Mak, 2003; Gul and Leung, 2004; Samaha et al., 2012). Government 
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and director4 ownerships were measured as a percentage of each type of ownership out of total 
shareholdings, while block ownership was measured as a percentage of shares held by 
shareholders with at least 5% of the total (e.g., Haniffa and Huddaib, 2006; Samaha et al., 
2012; Ntim et al., 2015a; Alotaibi and Hussainey, 2016). With regard to country-level 
explanatory variables, religion was measured using the Global Islamic Economy Indicator, 
which is an index reflecting the development of the global Islamic economy across multiple 
sectors (e.g., Archambault and Archambault, 2003). 5  Finally, the quality of national 
governance (i.e., voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption) is measured by indices developed by 
the World Bank (e.g., Judge et al., 2008; Mateescu, 2015; Baldini et al., 2016).   
 
4.2.3 Rationale for Control Variables  
The study controls for other variables found in previous studies to impact voluntary CG 
compliance and disclosure practices either at firm- or country-level (e.g., Hanifa and Cooke, 
2002; Eng and Mak, 2003; Ntim et al., 2012a,b; Al-Moataz and Hussainey, 2014; Al-Bassam 
et al., 2015; Albitar, 2015; Elshandidy et al., 2015; Elmagrhi et al., 2016). Control variables 
include: firm size (LNTA), firm age (AGE), growth opportunity (SGR), leverage (LEV), 
profitability (ROA), audit firm size (BIG4), year dummies (YDU) for the six years (2009-
2014), industry dummies (INDU) for the five industries (i.e., basic materials/oil and gas 
(BM&OG); industrial (INDUTR); customer goods (CGODS); customer services/healthcare 
(CSER&HCARE) and technology/telecommunication (TECH&TELE)). With regard to 
country-level control variables, these are: gross domestic product growth (GDP); Inflation 
Index (INFL) and Corruption Perception Index (CPI). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
4 This study measures director ownership including both insiders and outsiders. Many of previous studies 
examining the effect of director ownership on firm value have assumed that all corporate directors (insiders and 
outsiders) have similar shareholding motives (e.g., Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Morck et al., 1988; Welch, 2003; 
McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Davies et al., 2005; Golbe and Nyman, 2013; Ntim, 2013b). 
It is calculated by getting the average of 2013 and 2014 values as these are the only available data. 5 
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Firm-Level Control Variables 
4.2.3.1 Firm Size  
 CG practices are affected by firm size (Samaha et al., 2012; Habbash et al., 2015). 
Larger firms with a complex capital structure and operations have greater agency problems 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010), and therefore might provide more 
voluntary CG disclosure in order to reduce information asymmetry and mitigate agency 
conflict (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eng and Mak, 2003). Furthermore, large firms have 
sufficient resources to afford the additional voluntary disclosure costs, unlike smaller firms. 
They also encounter greater political costs. Therefore, large firms are likely to disclose more 
voluntary corporate disclosure to reduce political costs (Cooke, 1989; Watts and Zimmerman 
1990; Habbash et al., 2015).  
 Empirically, most previous studies have documented a positive impact of firm size on 
voluntary CG disclosure (e.g., Eng and Mak, 2003; Alsaeed, 2006; Omar and Simon, 2011; 
Ntim et al., 2012a; Samaha et al., 2012; Al-Bassam et al., 2015; Habbash et al., 2015; Elmagrhi 
et al. 2016). Thus, it is hypothesised that there is a positive association between firm size 
(LNTA), as proxied by the natural log of the book value of a firm’s assets, and voluntary CG 
disclosure. 
 
4.2.3.2 Firm Age 
 There is no consensus among scholars as to the impact of firm age on the level of 
corporate voluntary disclosure (Omar and Simon, 2011; Habbash et al., 2015). New firms have 
high operating risks, and thus are expected to provide more CG disclosure to reduce uncertainty 
about their operations and to increase the confidence of investors (Spero, 1979; Haniffa and 
Cook, 2002; Sehar et al., 2013). More voluntary disclosure also helps new firms to decrease 
information asymmetry and thereby increase their capital at lower costs, compared to older 
firms which depend more on internal funds (Haniffa and Cook, 2002; Omar and Simon, 2011). 
On the other hand new firms lack the financial resources and expertise to organise and 
disseminate more corporate voluntary disclosure (Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Akhtaruddin, 2005).         
Empirically, a number of prior studies have found no relationship between firm age and 
voluntary corporate disclosure (e.g., Haniffa and Cook, 2002; Omar and Simon, 2011; 
Elmagrhi, et al. 2016). However, Habbash et al. (2015) find that older firms provide more 
voluntary corporate disclosure. Therefore, it is hypothesised that there is an association 
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between firm age (AGE), as proxied by the natural log of the total number of years since a 
company was established, and voluntary CG disclosure. 
 
4.2.3.3 Growth Opportunity  
 Firms with growing business activities need to increase external capital (Beiner et al., 
2006; Henry, 2008; Chung and Zhang, 2011). Therefore, growing firms may aim to enhance 
their CG practices to obtain more finance at lower costs (Klapper and Love, 2004; Bozec et al., 
2010). Furthermore, voluntary CG disclosure ensures potential investors of the protection of 
their investments (Eng and Mak, 2003; Allegrini and Greco, 2013). 
Empirically, although several previous studies have supported the positive relationship 
between firm growth and voluntary CG disclosure (e.g., Gompers et al., 2003; Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006; Henry, 2008; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013a) others have found no impact of firm 
growth opportunity on voluntary CG disclosure (e.g., Ntim et al., 2012b; Al-Bassam et al., 
2015; Elmagrhi et al., 2016). Therefore, it is hypothesised that there is a positive association 
between firm growth opportunity (SGR), as proxied by the growth of sales, and voluntary CG 
disclosure.  
 
4.2.3.4 Leverage  
The level of voluntary CG disclosure may be affected by a firm’s leverage. Agency 
theory argues that firms with high debt ratios are more likely to transfer wealth from creditors 
to shareholders (Jensen, 1986). Therefore, highly leveraged firms tend to increase their 
voluntary disclosure and enhance transparency to gain lenders’ confidence and therefore to 
reduce financing costs (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Klapper and Love, 2004; Bozec et al., 2010; 
Omar and Simon, 2011).     
Empirical studies have reported mixed results in examining the impact of the level of 
firm leverage on voluntary corporate disclosure. One group has found a positive impact (e.g., 
Alsaeed, 2006; Barako et al., 2006; Al-Bassam et al., 2015; Elmagrhi et al. 2016), and another 
an insignificant impact (e.g., Ho and Wong, 2001; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Omar and Simon, 
2011; Ntim et al., 2012a; Samaha et al., 2012; Allegrini and Greco, 2013). Accordingly, it is 
hypothesised that there is a positive association between leverage (LEV), as proxied by the 
percentage of total debt to total assets, and voluntary CG disclosure. 
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4.2.3.5 Profitability  
Profitability may have a relationship with the level of voluntary CG disclosure. Agency 
theory argues that managers of firms with high profit have a strong incentive to disclose more 
information to justify the continuation of their position and compensation arrangements 
(Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Omar and Simon, 2011). Similarly, firms with high profit ratios 
prefer to differentiate themselves from other companies with low profitability ratios (Owusu-
Ansah, 1998; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Omar and Simon, 2011). 
A number of empirical studies have found that firms with high profit ratios provide 
more voluntary corporate disclosure (e.g., Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Ghazali and Weetman, 
2006; Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Omar and Simon, 2011; Ntim et al., 2012b), while another 
group has found an insignificant relationship between voluntary disclosure and profitability 
(e.g., Ho and Wong, 2001; Eng and Mak, 2003; Alsaeed, 2006; Barako et al., 2006; Samaha et 
al., 2012; Allegrini and Greco, 2013; Elmagrhi, et al. 2016). Accordingly, it is hypothesised 
that there is a positive association between profitability (ROA), as proxied by the percentage 
of operating profit to total assets, and voluntary CG disclosure. 
 
4.2.3.6 Audit Firm Size  
External auditing is used to attest the reliability and validity of financial statements 
provided by management, helping to reduce agency conflict between shareholders and 
managers by improving the external monitoring of shareholders and limiting the opportunistic 
activities of managers (Hossain et al., 1994; Ali et al., 2004; Alsaeed, 2006; Barako et al., 
2006; Omar and Simon, 2011; Luypaert and Van Caneghem, 2013). A number of previous 
studies have indicated that firms with high agency conflicts may hire a high-quality (BIG 4) 
auditor to mitigate probable agency conflicts (e.g., Fan and Wong, 2005; Hay and Davis, 2004; 
Gul et al., 2013). Large audit firms are more likely to provide better-quality audit process 
(DeAngelo, 1981; Palmrose, 1988; Eshleman and Guo, 2014), because they have more 
professional audit expertise, a wide range of skills, reputation, accounting-and-auditing 
knowledge and ethical standards (DeAngelo, 1981; Al-Ajmi, 2009; Ntim et al., 2012a, b). 
Empirical studies have found mixed results of the relationship between audit firm size 
and the extent of voluntary disclosure. Some have found no association between disclosure 
level and audit firm size (e.g., Ali et al., 2004; Alsaeed, 2005; Barako et al., 2006), while other 
researchers support the theoretical proposition of agency theory that large audit firms are 
associated with clients disclosing more information (e.g., Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Naser et al., 
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2002; Archambault and Archambault, 2003; Eng and Mak, 2003; Al-Janadi et al. 2013; Ntim 
and Soobaroyen, 2013a, b; Al-Bassam et al., 2015). Accordingly, it is hypothesised that there 
is a positive association between audit firm size (BIG4), as proxied by the auditor being one of 
the Big 4 audit firms, and voluntary CG disclosure. 
 
4.2.3.7 Industry Dummies  
Firms in different industries have varied financing structures, ownership structures, 
business characteristics and regulations (Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008; Ntim and 
Soobaroyen, 2013a, b; Habbash et al., 2015). This leads to variations in the levels of 
compliance with and disclosure of CG practices among firms by industry (Ntim et al., 2012b; 
Al-Bassam et al., 2015; Elmagrhi et al. 2016). For instance, firms whose operations create 
environmental damage (e.g., mining companies), have to disclose more voluntary information 
about their operations (Arcay and Vazquez, 2005).    
Therefore, and consistent with prior literature (e.g., Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Barako 
et al., 2006; Ntim et al., 2012b; Samaha et al., 2012; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013a, b; Al-
Bassam et al., 2015; Elmagrhi et al. 2016), five industry dummies are included as control 
variables to capture potential and unobserved industry-type heterogeneity.  
 
4.2.3.8 Year Dummies  
The literature suggests that firms’ voluntary CG disclosures vary over time (e.g., 
Conyon, 1994; Patel et al., 2002; Barako et al., 2006; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Mahadeo et 
al., 2012). For example, Albitar’s (2015) study of 124 Jordanian listed firms between 2010 and 
2012 finds that the extent of voluntary disclosure has mean scores of 32.1%, 34.5% and 38.3% 
for the years 2010, 2011 and 2012, respectively. Similarly, Al-Bassam et al. (2015), using 80 
Saudi listed firms between 2004 and 2010, find that firms’ compliance with the Saudi CG code 
improves overtime.  
Changes in the global economy may also have an impact on a firm’s voluntary CG 
disclosure. For instance, firms are expected to disclose more after periods of recession to 
reassure investors about their financial performance (Mangena et al., 2012). Accordingly, and 
following previous studies, this study includes six year dummy variables in the model to 
capture potential unobserved firm-level heterogeneity over the six-year period from 2009 to 
2014 (e.g., Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Al-Bassam et al., 2015; Barako et al., 2006; Ntim et al., 
2012a; Samaha et al., 2012; Elmagrhi, et al. 2016).  
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Country-Level Control Variables 
4.2.3.9 Gross Domestic Product Growth 
Country-level economic factors may also explain variations in CG disclosure 
(Belkaoui, 1983; Doupnik and Salter, 1995; Salter, 1998; Archambault and Archambault, 
2003). Corporate disclosure is influenced by national economic development (Archambault 
and Archambault, 2003), and theoretical evidence proposes that firms need to raise more capital 
in countries with increasing economic development. Thus, they are likely to provide more 
corporate disclosure to reduce information asymmetry and mitigate agency costs (Adhikari and 
Tondkar, 1992; Salter, 1998).  
In line with theoretical expectations, a number of previous studies have confirmed that 
average firm disclosure is higher in developed countries than in emerging markets (e.g., 
Adhikari and Tondkar, 1992; Salter, 1998; Archambault and Archambault, 2003). For instance, 
Adhikari and Tondkar (1992) document that the level of disclosure requirements of 35 stock 
exchanges in different countries is positively related to the degree of economic development. 
Therefore, it is expected that there is a positive association between gross domestic product 
(GDP), as proxied by GDP growth and voluntary CG disclosure. 
 
4.2.3.10 Inflation 
Inflation is an environmental element that affects accounting practices, as it negatively 
impacts the reliability of financial reports that are based on the historical cost assumption 
(Meek and Saudagaran, 1990; Archambault and Archambault, 1999, 2003). Therefore, firms 
operating in environments with high inflation are more likely to provide higher corporate 
disclosure in order to help investors to make informed decisions (Archambault and 
Archambault, 2003).  
Although theoretical evidence suggests a positive relationship between inflation and 
the level of voluntary CG disclosure, empirical evidence is mixed. Doupnik and Salter (1995) 
find a positive link between inflation and disclosure among countries with a macro-economic 
orientation. In contrast, using a sample of companies from 33 countries, Archambault and 
Archambault (2003) report a negative relationship between inflation and corporate disclosure. 
Consistent with theoretical and empirical evidence, it is expected that there is a positive 
association between inflation (INFL), as proxied by Inflation Index, average consumer price 
and voluntary CG disclosure.             
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4.2.3.11 Corruption Perception Index 
The extant literature indicates that corruption is a country-level structural factor 
affecting CG disclosure. Corruption has a negative impact on financial markets, as it is found 
to be associated with higher borrowing cost, lower stock valuation and weak CG (Ng, 2006). 
In countries with a high level of corruption, firms may be involved in unethical practices and 
thus prefer to disclose less information (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012; Baldini et al., 2016). 
Consistent with theoretical assumptions, the literature has reported a negative impact 
of corruption on the level of corporate disclosure practices (e.g., Judge et al., 2008; Baldini et 
al., 2016). Accordingly, it is expected that there is a positive association between the perceived 
level of corruption, as proxied by the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and voluntary CG 
disclosure.             
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Table 2: Summary of variables and measures  
Dependent variables  
MCGI Corporate governance (CG) Compliance and Disclosure Index containing 51 CG provisions using the CG benchmark of 
the United Nations Conference Trade and Development (UNCTAD 2006)'s guidance on good practice in CG disclosure, 
that takes 1 if each of the CG provisions is disclosed, 0 otherwise; scaled to a value between 0 and 100%.    
OSH Sub-index of MCGI related to ownership structure and exercise of control rights consisting of 9 provisions that take a value 
of 1 if each of the 9 provisions is disclosed 0 otherwise; scaled to a value between 0 and 100%.      
TCY Sub-index of MCGI related to financial transparency consisting of 8 provisions that takes a value of 1 if each of the 8 
provisions is disclosed 0 otherwise; scaled to a value between 0 and 100%.      
AUD Sub-index of MCGI related to auditing consisting of 9 provisions that takes a value of 1 if each of the 9 provisions is 
disclosed 0 otherwise; scaled to a value between 0 and 100%.      
RTY Sub-index of MCGI related to corporate responsibility and compliance consisting of 7 provisions that takes a value of 1 if 
each of the 7 provisions is disclosed 0 otherwise; scaled to a value between 0 and 100%.      
BMS Sub-index of MCGI related to board and management structure and process consisting of 18 provisions that takes a value 
of 1 if each of the 18 provisions is disclosed 0 otherwise; scaled to a value between 0 and 100%.      
Independent variables: Firm-level  
IVDI Islamic Values Disclosure Index containing 3 provisions (whether a narrative regarding the fact that the firm’s funds and 
loans are on the basis of interest-free (riba) is disclosed, whether the firm discloses any Islamic and conventional finance 
separately, and whether a narrative regarding the appropriate calculation and payment of the Islamic religious tax (zakah) 
for the financial year is disclosed) that takes 1 if each of provisions is disclosed, 0 otherwise; scaled to a value between 0 
and 100%. 
BSIZE Natural log of the total number of directors on the board of directors. 
BDIV The percentage of the total number of women and ethnic minority (non-Arab) directors to the total number of board 
members. 
BDIVG The percentage of women directors to the total number of board members. 
BDIVE The percentage of ethnic minority (non-Arab) directors to the total number of board members. 
NED The percentage of non-executive directors to the total number of board members. 
DBLS A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the roles of chairperson and CEO of firm are separated at the end of its 
financial year, 0 otherwise. 
GOWN Percentage of shares held by government.   
DOWN Percentage of shares held by all members of the board of directors.  
BOWN Percentage of shares held by shareholders with at least 5% of the total firm shareholdings.  
Independent variables: Country-level  
GIEI Global Islamic Economy Indicator, developed by Thomson Reuters in collaboration with the Dubai Islamic Economy 
Development Centre, measures the development of the global Islamic economy across its multiple sectors.  
VAI Voice and Accountability Index. Voice and accountability captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able 
to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.  
PSI Political Stability Index. Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism measures perceptions of the likelihood of 
political instability and/or politically motivated violence, including terrorism.  
GEI Government Effectiveness Index. Government effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation 
and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.  
RQI Regulatory Quality Index. Regulatory quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.  
RLI Rule of Law Index. Rule of law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as 
the likelihood of crime and violence.  
CCI Control of Corruption Index. Control of corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private 
gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.  
Control variables: Firm level 
LNTA Natural log of the book value of the total assets of a firm. 
AGE 
SGR 
LEV 
ROA 
BIG4 
Natural log of the total number of years since a company was established. 
The percentage of current year's sales minus previous year's sales divided by previous year's sales 
The percentage of total debt divided by total assets. 
Percentage of operating profit to total assets at the end of its financial year 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm is audited by a Big 4 audit firm (PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & 
Touche, Ernst & Young, and KPMG), 0 otherwise. 
YDU Dummies for the years 2009 to 2014 inclusive. 
INDU 
 
Dummies for each of the five main industries: basic materials/oil and gas; industrial; customer goods; customer 
services/health care and technology/telecommunication. 
Control variables: Country level 
GDP Gross domestic product growth (annual %). 
INFL Inflation index, average consumer prices. 
CPI Corruption Perception Index. The Corruption Perceptions Index measures the perceived levels of public sector corruption.   
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4.3 Model Specification 
 The following OLS regression model is used to investigate whether variations in the 
MCGI are explained or predicted by firm-level CG variables, as follows:  
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Where MCGI is the overall MENA countries’ CG disclosure index; IVDI is Islamic 
Values Disclosure Index, BSIZE is board size, BDIV is board diversity on the basis of both 
gender and ethnicity, NED is the percent of NEDs on the board, DBLS is the separation of CEO 
and chairperson roles, GOWN is governmental ownership, DOWN is director ownership, 
BOWN is block ownership and CONTROLS refers to a number of control variables: LNTA is 
firm size, AGE is firm age, SGR is growth opportunity, LEV is leverage, ROA is profitability, 
BIG4 is audit firm size, YDU is six year dummies (2009 to 2014), INDU is five industry 
dummies (BM&OG is basic materials/oil and gas; INDUTR is industrial; CGODS customer 
goods; CSER&HCARE customer services/healthcare and TECH&TELE is 
technology/telecommunication), while country control variables are: GDP is gross domestic 
product growth; INFL is Inflation Index; and CPI is the Corruption Perception Index.   
The second OLS regression model examines the effect of country-level religion and/or 
governance quality on the extent of voluntary CG disclosure. The model specification is of the 
following general form:  
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Where MCGI is overall MENA countries’ CG disclosure index; GIEI is Global Islamic 
Economy Indicator; NGOV stands for different measures of country-level governance 
variables: VAI is Voice and Accountability Index; PSI is Political Stability Index; GEI is 
Government Effectiveness Index; RQI is Regulatory Quality Index; RLI is Rule of Law Index; 
CCI is Control of Corruption Index. Controls are: LNTA is firm size, AGE is firm age, SGR is 
growth opportunity, LEV is leverage, ROA is profitability, BIG4 is audit firm size, YDU is year 
dummies (2009 to 2014), INDU is industry dummies (BM&OG is basic materials/oil and gas; 
INDUTR is industrial; CGODS customer goods; CSER&HCARE customer services/healthcare 
and TECH&TELE is technology/telecommunication), while country control variables are: 
GDP is gross domestic product growth; and INFL is Inflation Index. 
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4.4 Ordinary Least Squares Assumptions 
As indicated in the previous section and in line with CG studies (e.g., Black, 2001; 
Gompers et al., 2003; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Ntim et al., 2012a; Samaha et al., 2012; Ntim 
and Soobaroyen, 2013; Al-Bassam et al., 2015; Elmagrhi, et al. 2016), the Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) multivariate regression technique is used to test all the current study’s 
hypotheses. In order to ensure that OLS is a suitable estimation method to run the analysis, the 
OLS assumptions must be met before performing the analysis. Therefore, this section discusses 
a number of statistical tests and procedures that have been conducted to address the OLS 
assumptions: normality, multicollinearity, heteroskedasticity, linearity and autocorrelation. 
The normal distribution of continuous variables was tested using probability-
probability (P-P), quintile-quintile (Q-Q) and histograms (Black, 2001; Ntim et al. 2012a; Al-
Bassam et al., 2015). The MCGI appeared to be normally distributed. However, the explanatory 
variables show mixed results. For example, board independence (NED), and government 
ownership (GOWN) have a non-normal distribution, while board size (BSIZE), director 
ownership (DOWN) and block ownership (BOWN) are fairly normally distributed. Similarly, 
with regard to the control variables, most exhibit normal distribution. The non-normality 
problem was addressed by transforming affected variables (e.g., using the natural logarithm of 
the original values, square root and rank) such as sales growth (SGR).  
In addition, skewness and kurtosis tests were run to validate the finding of fairly normal 
distribution of most of the variables. For example, they provide additional verification for the 
relatively normal distribution of MCGI. Table 3 illustrates that the skewness of the MCGI is –
0.008, which is an approximate symmetric curve of a normal distribution, as the value of 
symmetrical distribution is zero according to Gujarati (2003) and Brooks (2008). Regarding 
kurtosis, Table 3 shows that the value of the MCGI is –0.740. This kurtosis value is not close 
to 3, so the null hypothesis cannot be rejected (Gujarati, 2003; Brooks, 2008).  
Regarding other explanatory and control variables, Table 3 shows that the skewness 
values for most of the continuous variables fall between 0.000 and 1.512, except for 
government ownership at 1.655. For the kurtosis test statistics, the variables fall between –
0.123 and 3.228, indicating slight mesokurtically in some of the data. However, a degree of 
non-normality in some of the data can be accepted, as it is difficult to ensure a perfectly normal 
distribution for any research data (Gujarati, 2003). Likewise, this study comprises 600 firm-
year observations, which represents a relatively large sample and can minimise the negative 
80 
 
effect of any existing non-normality in some variables (Brooks, 2008). The histogram depicting 
the distribution of the MCGI is presented in Appendix 2. 
 
Table 3: The OLS assumptions tests  
Variable VIF Tolerance Skewness Kurtosis Cook’s distances Leverage Values 
     Min Min Min Max 
MCGI   -0.008 -0.740     
IVDI 2.252 0.444 1.512 0.903 0.000 0.031 0.025 0.086 
BSIZE 1.576 0.635 0.189 0.130     
BDIV 1.381 0.724 1.282 0.466     
NED 1.545 0.647 -1.437 2.015     
DBLS 1.946 0.514       
GOWN 1.844 0.542 1.655 1.655     
DOWN 2.653 0.377 -0.007 -1.072     
BOWN 2.543 0.393 -0.510 -0.495     
LNTA 3.300 0.303 0.501 -0.363     
AGE 1.380 0.725 -1.118 1.682     
SGR 1.249 0.801 0.000 -.123     
LEV 1.593 0.628 0.373 -.0677     
ROA 1.344 0.744 0.111 1.836     
BIG4 1.668 0.600       
GDP 1.177 0.850 -0.753 3.228     
INFL 2.157 0.464 0.612 -1.053     
CPI 1.808 0.553 0.265 -.485     
Notes: variables are defined as follows: the MENA countries overall Corporate Governance Disclosure Index 
(MCGI); Islamic Values Disclosure Index (IVDI); board size (BSIZE); board diversity on the basis of both gender 
and ethnic minority (BDIV); percent of non-executive directors on the board (NED); separate of CEO and 
chairperson roles (DBLS); government ownership (GOWN); director ownership (DOWN); block ownership 
(BOWN); firm size (LNTA); firm age (AGE); growth opportunity (SGR); leverage (LEV); profitability (ROA); 
audit firm size (BIG4); gross domestic product growth (GDP);  Inflation Index (INFL); and Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI). Table 2 fully defines all the variables used. 
 
The multicollinearity assumption is tested by using a correlation matrix among the 
variables. The correlation matrix also helps to examine the direction and magnitude of the 
linear relationship between the variables. Tables 7 and 8 report a correlation matrix for the 
MENA CG index and all the explanatory and control variables for the firm-level and country-
level analyses, respectively. As already reported, the skewness and kurtosis statistics in Table 
3 show that the variables generally have a slight non-normal behaviour. Accordingly, Tables 7 
and 8 present both Pearson’s parametric and Spearman’s non-parametric correlation 
coefficients. The bottom left half of the table is used to illustrate the former, and the upper right 
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half the latter. The coefficients of both the parametric and non-parametric bivariate correlations 
presented in Tables 7 and 8 reveal similar patterns. This suggests that any remaining non-
normalities in the variables may be trivial and it may be statistically tolerable to use the OLS 
technique to estimate the specified structural equations. Apart from the high correlation 
coefficients among country-level governance measures, 6 the matrices in Tables 7 and 8 both 
suggest that correlations among the variables are relatively low. This indicates that no serious 
multicollinearity problems, which would affect the use of the OLS regression model, remain 
(see Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Dam and Scholtens, 2012; Ntim et al., 2012a; Ramly, 2012; 
Al-Bassam et al., 2015).  
After all the tests related to normality and transforming the data, multicollinearity may 
still pose a threat. Hence, Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and tolerance statistics tests are run 
to examine the existence of multicollinearity among the variables (Dam and Scholtens, 2012; 
Kajananthan, 2012). Multicollinearity may be a problem when tolerance is close to zero 
(Gujarati, 2003; Kajananthan, 2012) and VIF values are over 10 (Gujarati, 2003). VIF values 
and tolerance statistics are reported in Table 3, the former ranging between 1.177 and 3.300, 
and the latter between 0.303 and 0.850. Both VIF values and tolerance statistics provide 
additional evidence that there is no serious problem of multicollinearity in interpreting the 
results of the OLS regressions. 7  
After running the normality and multicollinearity tests on the individual variables, 
heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and linearity assumptions are examined to ascertain whether 
the OLS technique can be estimated properly. First, the existence of outliers that can cause 
heteroscedasticity and nonlinearity in the variables is tested using scatter plots, Breusch-Pagan 
test, Cook’s distances and leverage values. Non-constant variance of the error term in the 
estimated model causes hetereoscedasticity. The constructed scatter plots for MCGI (for 
brevity not reported here) suggest the non-existence of severe outliers, with distributions 
looking fairly random and linear. Likewise, consistent with Cooke (1989), Ramly (2012), and 
Al-Bassam et al. (2015), the Breusch-Pagan test was conducted to diagnose heteroscedasticity. 
The test result provides additional evidence confirming that the model does not suffer from 
heteroscedasticity, where the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity cannot be rejected (i.e., 
constant variance). 
                                               
6 The threat of high significant correlations among country-level governance qualities was resolved by running 
the OLS regression model seven times for each of the seven governance variables. 
7 Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and tolerance statistics tests are run to check for multicollinearity among the 
variables of the seven regression models that examine the impact of country-level governance factors on CG 
disclosure practices. For reasons of brevity the results of these tests are not presented here. 
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Second, following Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) and Ntim et al. (2012a), Cook’s distance 
and leverage values tests were carried out to check the linearity of the variables used. It is 
argued that non-linearity poses a threat if these values are greater than one (Pryce, 2005; 
Maddala and Lahiri, 2009). Table 3 shows that the Cook’s distance values are between 0.000 
and 0.031. Similarly, leverage values range from 0.025 to 0.085. Therefore, the Cook’s distance 
and leverage values do not exceed the critical values. This indicates that the association 
amongst the variables used in the OLS model is substantially linear.8 
Finally, in line with Kajananthan (2012), Ntim et al. (2012a), Al-Bassam et al. (2015) 
and Elmagrhi et al. (2016), the existence of autocorrelation or serial correlation was checked 
by the Durbin-Watson test. This test is used to check for a relationship between an error and 
its lagged value. A Durbin-Watson value of two and above indicates that the null hypothesis 
of no autocorrelation could not be rejected (Gujarati, 2003; Brooks, 2008). The Durbin-Watson 
values are between 1.396 and 2.180 in the models used. This indicates the presence of 
reasonable rather than severe positive autocorrelation problems. 
To summarise, a number of diagnostic tests were run to check OLS assumptions: P-P, 
Q-Q; histograms; skewness and kurtosis; correlation matrix; VIF; tolerance statistics; scatter 
plots; Breusch-Pagan test; Cook’s distance; leverage values; and Durbin-Watson. The results 
from these tests suggest that OLS assumptions, in general, are met, except that some of the 
variables do not follow a normal distribution. Therefore, these variables were transformed. 
Furthermore, this relative violation of normality assumption does not pose a serious threat to 
the estimated coefficients, given the large sample size used in this study.  
 
5 Empirical Results and Discussion 
5.1 Descriptive Analysis 
 Table 4 summarises the descriptive analysis of the main dependent and independent 
variables over the six years investigated (2009-2014). Panel A shows descriptive statistics for 
the overall level of disclosure and compliance with the MCGI. First, the index shows wide 
variation, ranging from 31.37% (16 out of 51) to 84.31% (43 out of 51), with the average 
(median) firm complying with 56.45 % (56.86%) of the 51 CG provisions examined. Second, 
the findings in Panel A suggest that the sampled firms have generally shown an improvement 
                                               
8 Cook’s distance and leverage values tests were conducted to check the linearity of the variables used in the seven 
regression models that examine the impact of country-level governance factors on CG disclosure practices. For 
reasons of brevity the results of these tests are not presented here.         
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in their CG voluntary disclosure practices over the investigated period. The average (median) 
aggregated compliance levels increased from 52.80% (53.92%) in 2009 to 59.43% (60.78%) 
in 2014. This in total represents a 6.63 (6.86) percentage point increase over the investigated 
six-year period. This improved disclosure over time is consistent with the literature on 
voluntary disclosure in developing markets in general (Patel et al., 2002; Barako et al., 2006; 
Mahadeo et al., 2012) and MENA countries in particular (e.g., Al-Bassam et al., 2015 from 
Saudi Arabia; Albitar, 2015 from Jordan). Also, Panel B shows a slight increase in the Islamic 
Values Disclosure Index (IVDI) average from 17% in 2009 to 19.33% in 2014. Furthermore, 
Panels D, E and F display an increase in average board diversity based on gender and ethnic 
minority (BDIV), board independence (NED) and separation of the CEO and chairperson roles 
(DBLS) over the period from 7.73%, 86.10% and 74% in 2009 to 8.72%, 88.55% and 84% in 
2014, respectively. 
 
Table 4: Summary of yearly descriptive statistics of levels of compliance with MCGI and CG 
mechanisms 
 
Variables  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 All  
Panel A: MENA countries CG Index (MCGI)% 
Mean 52.80 53.90 56.27 57.65 58.65 59.45 56.45 
Median 53.92 54.90 58.82 59.80 60.78 60.78 56.86 
STD 10.49 10.96 11.51 11.81 11.66 11.81 11.59 
Min 31.37 31.37 31.37 35.29 35.29 37.25 31.37 
Max 74.51 74.51 80.39 84.31 84.31 84.31 84.31 
Panel B: IVDI%  
Mean 17 17 17.67 19 19.33 19.33 18.22 
Median 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
STD 31.25 31.25 31.23 31.87 32.20 32.20 31.55 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Panel C: BSIZE 
Mean 8.61 8.56 8.49 8.48 8.50 8.50 8.52 
Median 9 9 9 8.50 9 9 9 
STD 2.76 2.67 2.47 2.54 2.60 2.58 2.59 
Min 4 5 5 5 4 4 4 
Max 19 18 17 18 17 18 19 
Panel D: BDIV%  
Mean 7.73 7.63 7.68 7.57 7.95 8.72 7.88 
Median 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
STD 14.65 14.61 14.34 14.25 14.08 14.44 14.34 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 61.54 66.67 69.23 66.67 61.54 61.54 69.23 
Panel E: NED% 
Mean 86.10 87.16 87.75 87.75 87.24 88.55 87.43 
Median 88.89 88.89 90 90 88.89 90.91 88.89 
STD 14.67 14.14 13.82 14.19 13.84 13.72 14.03 
Min 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 
Max 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Panel F: DBLS% 
Mean 74 76 78 80 81 84 79 
Median 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
STD 44.10 42.90 41.60 40.20 39.40 36.80 40.90 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Panel G: GOWN% 
Mean 15.91 16.04 15.80 16.38 16.19 16.55 16.15 
Median 3.98 3.61 3.07 2.80 1.54 3.51 3.29 
STD 24.61 24.64 24.49 24.91 24.87 24.69 24.60 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 98.67 98.67 98.63 96.43 96.43 96.43 98.67 
Panel H: DOWN% 
Mean 45.55 45.17 43.92 45.04 45.19 44.73 44.94 
Median 49.23 48.76 44.17 48.01 46.22 47.29 47.89 
STD 28.07 27.87 27.51 28.28 28.14 28.23 27.90 
Min 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.02 0 0 
Max 98.33 95.52 95.52 98.92 98.92 98.92 98.92 
Panel I: BOWN% 
Mean 55.54 55.07 54.95 55.95 56.42 57.36 55.88 
Median 58.93 58.51 58.76 58.34 60.05 62.55 59.49 
STD 24.01 23.47 23.22 23.44 23.40 23.29 23.39 
Min 5.46 5.41 5 5 5 5 5 
Max 95.83 92.17 92.74 98.92 98.92 98.92 98.92 
No. of observations 100 100 100 100 100 100 600 
 
 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows: the MENA countries overall Corporate Governance Disclosure Index (MCGI); 
Islamic Values Disclosure Index (IVDI); board size (BSIZE); board diversity on the basis of both gender and ethnic 
minority (BDIV); percent of non-executive directors on the board (NED); separate of CEO and chairperson roles (DBLS); 
government ownership (GOWN); director ownership (DOWN); and block ownership (BOWN). Table 2 fully defines all 
the variables used. 
            
Table 5 provides further inferences about MCGI and CG mechanisms but at the country 
level. The country-level descriptive statistics for the overall CG index presented in Panel A 
show that there is a substantial variation in the level of compliance with and disclosure of the 
MCGI among sampled countries. The UAE has the highest level of CG disclosure with the 
average (median) listed firms complying with 67.12% (66.67%) of the 51 CG provisions 
examined. On the other hand, Egyptian firms have the lowest level of CG disclosure with an 
average (median) of 45.36% (43.14%). Panel B suggests that Saudi firms are more compliant 
in conducting Islamic transitions, seeking Islamic finance and paying Islamic tax (zakah) with 
an average compliance with 68.89% of the IVDI, while Egyptian firms scoring the lowest 
compliance with 1.67% on the IVDI. Furthermore, Panel C shows that Egyptian firms have on 
average 10.39 members on the board, while Omani firms have on average 7.13 members. 
Regarding ownership structure mechanisms, Panel G shows that the highest average for 
government ownership (GOWN) is 26.69% in the UAE, and the lowest is for Jordanian firms, 
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with an average of 2.65%. Finally, results presented in Panels H and I show that Saudi listed 
firms have the lowest average director ownership (DOWN) and block ownership (BOWN) with 
26.32% and 40.32%, respectively. On the other hand Egyptian firms have the highest average 
director ownership (DOWN) 64.52%, while Omani firms have the highest average block 
ownership (BOWN) with 68.49%. 
 
Table 5: Summary of country descriptive statistics of levels of compliance with MCGI and CG 
mechanisms 
 
Variables  Egypt  Jordan Oman Saudi Arabia  UAE All  
Panel A: MENA countries CG Index (MCGI) % 
Mean 45.36 47.68 60.75 61.36 67.12 56.45 
Median 43.14 47.06 62.74 60.78 66.67 56.86 
STD 11.67 4.39 4.98 7.41 9.04 11.59 
Min 31.37 39.22 47.06 35.29 41.18 31.37 
Max 78.43 60.78 68.63 76.47 84.31 84.31 
Panel B: IVDI%  
Mean 1.67 8.61 3.33 68.89 8.61 18.22 
Median 0 0 0 66.67 0 0 
STD 7.29 23.47 12.52 24.34 19.56 31.55 
Min 0 0 0 33.33 0 0 
Max 33.33 100 66.67 100 66.67 100 
Panel C: BSIZE 
Mean 10.39 8.38 7.13 8.36 8.37 8.52 
Median 11 9 7 9 8.50 9 
STD 3.62 1.85 1.48 1.62 2.64 2.59 
Min 5 5 5 4 5 4 
Max 19 11 11 11 18 19 
Panel D: BDIV% 
Mean 10.64 4.57 19.19 3.30 1.70 7.88 
Median 0 0 15.48 0 0 0 
STD 16.59 12.58 16.84 9.16 5.15 14.34 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 69.23 66.67 66.67 37.50 28.57 69.23 
Panel E: NED% 
Mean 77.12 83.91 97.70 87.26 91.15 87.43 
Median 81.25 88.89 100 88.89 100 88.89 
STD 15.51 13.88 5.82 11.03 12.72 14.03 
Min 40 40 71.43 57.14 55.56 40 
Max 93.75 100 100 100 100 100 
Panel F: DBLS% 
Mean 38 61 100 96 100 79 
Median 0 100 100 100 100 100 
STD 48.60 49 0 20.10 0 40.90 
Min 0 0 100 0 100 0 
Max 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Panel G: GOWN% 
Mean 23.43 2.65 15.57 12.39 26.69 16.15 
Median 12.10 0 6.70 0 17.50 3.29 
STD 29.93 7.04 22.48 22.43 26.99 24.60 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 98.67 31.90 70 83.69 82 98.67 
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Panel H: DOWN% 
Mean 64.52 39.99 58.26 26.32 35.59 44.94 
Median 63.95 39.24 58.34 22.27 30.09 47.89 
STD 22.51 24.53 21.63 25.32 25.96 27.90 
Min 12.47 0.58 13.30 0.02 0 0 
Max 98.92 89.77 93.85 84.31 83.95 98.92 
Panel I: BOWN% 
Mean 65.16 47.97 68.49 40.32 57.48 55.88 
Median 68.74 48.52 67.33 39.87 60 59.49 
STD 20.25 23.31 15.53 24.31 20.28 23.39 
Min 8.37 5.52 35.55 5 17.50 5 
Max 98.92 90.21 93.85 83.69 83.95 98.92 
No. of observations 120 120 120 120 120 600 
 
 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows: the MENA countries overall Corporate Governance Disclosure Index (MCGI); 
Islamic Values Disclosure Index (IVDI); board size (BSIZE); board diversity on the basis of both gender and ethnic minority 
(BDIV); percent of non-executive directors on the board (NED); separate of CEO and chairperson roles (DBLS); government 
ownership (GOWN); director ownership (DOWN); block ownership (BOWN).Table 2 fully defines all the variables used. 
 
 Table 6 summarises the statistics of all the investigated variables (i.e. dependent, 
independent and control variables). Panel A shows descriptive statistics for the overall MCGI 
and its sub-indices over the six years examined (2009-2014). The MCGI’s five sub-indices also 
show substantial differences in their descriptive analysis. For example, ownership structure and 
exercise of control rights (OSH) ranges from a minimum compliance rate of 22.22% to a 
maximum of 100%, with the average firm complying with 63.31% of the nine CG provisions 
investigated. Also, board and management structure and process (BMS) ranges from a 
minimum compliance rate of 22.22% to a maximum of 88.89%, with the average firm 
complying with 58.09% of the 18 CG provisions investigated. Thus, descriptive statistics 
indicate considerable variations in the level of compliance and disclosure for both the overall 
MCGI and its five sub-indices, which is consistent with the CG disclosure literature in MENA 
countries (Al-Shammari, 2008; Samaha and Dahawy, 2010, 2011; Samaha et al., 2012; Al 
Janadi et al., 2013; Aljifri et al., 2014; Al-Moataz and Hussainey, 2014; Al-Bassam et al., 
2015; Albitar, 2015). Accordingly, despite the existence of the CG good practices’ convergence 
forces, MENA listed firms generally show a lower extent of compliance with and disclosure of 
the overall MCGI and its five sub-indices, along with significant disparities at this level 
compared to developed countries.9 These findings support the notion that the lack of enforcing 
capabilities in MENA countries enables most listed companies not to comply with disclosure 
and transparency requirements (Bolbol et al., 2005; Piesse et al., 2012; Samaha et al., 2012; 
Al Janadi et al., 2013; Albitar, 2015)   
                                               
9 For example, Bianchi et al., (2011) report that the average compliance with national CG code for Italy (85%); 
Mateescu, (2015) reports that the average compliance with national CG codes by four of Europe emerging 
countries was 86%; and Elmagrhi et al., 2016, using a sample of UK listed firms, find that the average compliance 
with UK CG index is 61.73%.     
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Table 6: Summary of descriptive statistics of the MCGI, independent and control variables 
for all sampled firms 
  
        High-Low MCGI 
Variables  Mean Median STD Minimum Maximum  Mean Diff. Median Diff. 
Panel A: The MCGI based on all 600 MENA firms year observations 
MCGI% 56.45 56.86 11.59 31.37 84.31  - - 
OSH% 63.31 66.67 11.77 22.22 100  - - 
TCY% 74.12 75 13.03 37.50 100  - - 
AUD% 53.70 55.56 22.24 0 100  - - 
RTY% 26.76 14.29 21.59 0 85.71  - - 
BMS% 58.09 61.11 15.58 22.22 88.89  - - 
Panel B: Firms with high MCGI  
MCGI% 65.50 64.71 6.35 56.86 84.31  - - 
OSH% 63.10 66.67 11.54 22.22 100  - - 
TCY% 79.59 87.50 10.58 50 100  - - 
AUD% 68.83 66.67 13.89 33.33 100  - - 
RTY% 37.39 28.57 22.46 0 85.71  - - 
BMS% 69.70 66.67 8.32 50 88.89  - - 
Panel C: Firms with low MCGI 
MCGI% 45.84 45.10 5.98 31.37 54.90  - - 
OSH% 63.57 66.67 12.05 22.22 77.78  - - 
TCY% 67.71 62.50 12.73 37.50 87.50  - - 
AUD% 35.95 33.33 16.27 0 77.78  - - 
RTY% 14.29 14.29 11.56 0 57.14  - - 
BMS% 44.46 44.44 10.11 22.22 66.67  - - 
Panel D: Independent variables: Firm-level 
IVDI% 18.22 0 31.55 0 100  15.85*** 13.23*** 
BSIZE 8.52 9 2.59 4 19  -0.47** -0.34 
BDIV% 7.88 0 14.34 0 69.23  3.66*** 2.33** 
BDIVG% 2.71 0 6.61 0 37.50  -1.45*** -1.78*** 
BDIVE% 5.20 0 12.78 0 66.67  5.15*** 4.16*** 
NED% 87.43 88.89 14.03 40 100  10.25*** 9.45*** 
DBLS % 79 100 40.90 0 100  40*** 36.90*** 
GOWN% 16.15 3.29 24.60 0 98.67  6.69*** 7.26*** 
DOWN% 44.94 47.89 27.90 0 98.92  -1.96 -2.16 
BOWN% 55.88 59.49 23.39 5 98.92  5.47*** 3.71* 
Panel E: Independent variables: Country-level      
GIEI 45.64 47.71 13.34 27.15 67.51  16.13*** 15.73*** 
VAI 17.49 18.72 8.16 2.84 27.49  -4.51*** -3.92*** 
PSI 43.20 33.80 24.03 6.60 81.04  27.95*** 27.45*** 
GEI 58.22 59.47 17.56 20.19 90.38  17.00*** 16.75*** 
RQI 57.56 57.18 12.97 25.00 80.29  12.57*** 12.08*** 
RLI 60.45 62.56 10.66 31.25 76.44  9.35*** 8.70*** 
CCI 59.31 60.77 16.19 27.96 87.56  14.42*** 14.19*** 
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Panel F: Control variables: Firm-level 
LNTA ($000,000) 2091.00 184.45 5728.09 3.45 35222.66  3189.55*** 3350.87*** 
AGE 21.84 20 10.06 1 47  -2.68*** -1.98** 
SGR% 9.06 5.94 45.45 -92.59 594.06  8.07** 8.73** 
LEV% 39.76 38.19 20.69 4.03 92.36  1.42 2.31 
ROA% 6.43 6.06 7.66 -32.09 31.03  2.24*** 1.93*** 
BIG4% 59 100 49.30 0 100  39.80*** 38.70*** 
Panel G: Control variables: Country-level 
GDP% 3.46 3.30 2.58 -5.20 10  0.71*** 0.68*** 
INFL% 179.70 149.43 59.92 110.50 316.99  0.33 6.60 
CPI 48.20 47.00 11.68 28.00 70.00  11.35*** 11.25*** 
 
Notes: the table shows summary descriptive statistics, and mean/median differences for sub-samples of firms with 
high and low Corporate Governance Index (MCGI) scores, respectively. ***, **, * indicate that mean/median 
difference between firms with high MCGI index scores (i.e. firms with MCGI score above the overall mean/median 
mark) and firms with low MCGI score (i.e. firms with MCGI score below the overall mean/median mark, respectively) 
is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Variables are defined as follows: the MENA countries overall 
Corporate Governance Disclosure Index (MCGI); ownership structure and exercise of control rights (OSH); financial 
transparency (TCY); auditing (AUD); corporate responsibility and compliance (RTY); board and management 
structure and process (BMS);  Islamic Values Disclosure Index (IVDI); board size (BSIZE); board diversity on the 
basis of gender (BDIVG); board diversity on the basis of ethnic minority (BDIVE); board diversity on the basis of 
both gender and ethnic minority (BDIV); percent of non-executive directors on the board (NED); separate of CEO 
and chairperson roles (DBLS); government ownership (GOWN); director ownership (DOWN); block ownership 
(BOWN); Global Islamic Economy Indicator (GIEI); Voice and Accountability Index (VAI); Political Stability Index 
(PSI); Government Effectiveness Index (GEI); Regulatory Quality Index (RQI);  Rule of Law Index (RLI); Control 
of Corruption Index (CCI); firm size (LNTA); firm age (AGE); growth opportunity (SGR); leverage (LEV); 
profitability (ROA); audit firm size (BIG4); gross domestic product growth (GDP); inflation index (INFL); and 
Corruption perception index (CPI). Table 2 fully defines all the variables used. 
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The descriptive statistics for independent and control variables are illustrated in Panels D, E, 
F and G. With regard to the independent variable Islamic values disclosure (IVDI), for example, the 
average (median) firm complies with 18.22% (0%) of the three Islamic CG provisions examined in 
this study. This indicates that a low percentage of sampled firms pay zakah and use Islamic finance 
as opposed to conventional finance. The board size (BSIZE) with a median of nine members is 
between a minimum of four and a maximum of 19. Board diversity (BDIV) on the basis of both 
gender and ethnic minority ranges from 0% to 69.23% with an average of 7.88%, which suggests that 
on average MENA listed firms’ boards are dominated by Arab males. Board diversity on the basis of 
gender (BDIVG) and ethnic minority (BDIVE) ranges from 0% to 37.50% and 66.67%, respectively, 
with averages of 2.71% and 5.20%. These descriptive statistics suggest that boards of directors in 
MENA companies have low diversity measured in terms of gender and ethnicity. The results are 
consistent with Ibrahim and Hanefah (2014) who find the average number of females and non-
nationals is 2.8% and 11%, respectively in 117 Jordanian listed companies for the period 2007-2011. 
With regard to independent directors (NED) the results document a minimum of 40% to a maximum 
100% with an average of 87.43%. This indicates that independent directors dominate boards of 
MENA listed firms. Additionally, most sampled firms have separate board CEO/chairperson roles 
with an average of 79%. Ownership structure mechanisms show variation, where government 
ownership (GOWN), director ownership (DOWN) and block ownership (BOWN) range from a 
minimum of 0%, 0% and 5% to a maximum of 98.67%, 98.92% and 98.92% with an average of 
16.15%, 44.94% and 55.88%, respectively. Ownership statistics are consistent with previous studies 
conducted in MENA countries. For example, Samaha et al., (2012) find block ownership to be 57.1% 
on average, while director ownership ranged from 0% to 97%. Elghuweel (2015) finds a similar high 
level of ownership concentration (55%) in Oman. The results demonstrate that firms in MENA 
countries have a relatively high level of concentrated ownership, similar to other firms in developing 
countries (for example Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013b) reveal an average block ownership of 53.14% 
in South Africa) and compared to firms in developed countries (for example Elmagrhi et al. (2016) 
document 41.98% average block ownership in the UK).  
Panel E of Table 6 illustrates country-level independent variables. The GIEI shows wide 
variation, ranging from 27.15% to 67.51%, with 45.64% average country application of Islamic 
economic principles. National governance quality variables also demonstrate a wide variation. For 
example, the Government Effectiveness Index (GEI) ranges from 20.19% to 90.38% with an average 
of 58.22%. In summary, the findings support an adequate variation in dependent, independent and 
control variables among sampled firms. This suggests that the sample is relatively representative of 
firms in MENA countries.  
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In order to derive more informative analysis from the statistics, the total sampled observations 
have been divided into two sub-groups: (i) firms with high MCGI scores (i.e., firms with MCGI scores 
above the overall mean/median mark); and (ii) firms with low MCGI scores (i.e., firms with MCGI 
scores below the overall mean/median mark). Columns 8 and 9 of Table 6 illustrate the findings of 
the t-test of comparison of differences in means/medians for both independent and control variables, 
generally indicating that each of the two sub-groups has significant differences in their means and 
medians. For instance, the mean is significantly different between firms with high CG scores and 
those with low CG scores as follows: Islamic Values Disclosure Index (IVDI) (15.85); board size 
(BSIZE) (-0.47); board diversity on the basis of gender and ethnic minority (BDIV) (3.66); board 
diversity on the basis of gender (BDIVG) (-1.45); board diversity on the basis of ethnic minority 
(BDIVE) (5.15); board independence (NED) (10.25); separation of CEO and chairperson roles 
(DBLS) (40); government ownership (GOWN) (6.69); block ownership (BOWN) (5.47); Global 
Islamic Economy Indicator (GIEI) (16.13); Voice and Accountability Index (VAI) (-4.51); Political 
Stability Index (PSI) (27.95); Government Effectiveness Index (GEI) (17.00); Regulatory Quality 
Index (RQI) (12.57); Rule of Law Index (RLI) (9.35); and Control of Corruption Index (CCI) (14.42). 
The findings suggest that firms complying with and disclosing Islamic values, with more diverse 
boards, independent boards, separate CEO and chairperson roles, high government and block 
ownership, and found in countries applying Islamic economic values and national government 
quality, are considerably more likely to use voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices. The 
reverse is true for firms with large board size, high director ownership and listed in countries with 
high Voice and Accountability Index. 
 Table 7 presents the correlation matrix (including both Pearson’s parametric and Spearman’s 
non-parametric coefficients) between the overall CG voluntary disclosure index (MCGI) and 
independent (firm-level) and control variables.10 The correlation analysis (i.e., Pearson’s parametric 
correlation coefficients only) demonstrates that MCGI positively and significantly correlates with 
Islamic Values Disclosure index (IVDI), diversity on prevalence of ethnic minorities employed at 
board level (BDIVE), board independence (NED), separate CEO/chairperson roles (DBLS), and 
government ownership (GOWN). On the other hand, the correlation matrix shows that MCGI has a 
negative significant correlation with board diversity on the basis of gender (BDIVG) and director 
ownership (DOWN).  
                                               
10 The correlation matrix illustrates that there is no presence of multicollinearity among the variables, as the correlation 
coefficients do not exceed 0.80 (Hannifa and Hudaib, 2006; Ramly, 2012) (as cited by Gujarati, 2003).  
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Table 7: Pearson and Spearman correlation matrices of all variables: firm-level analysis       
 MCGI IVDI BSIZE BDIV BDIVG BDIVE NED DBLS GOWN DOWN BOWN LNTA AGE SGR LEV ROA Big4 GDP INFL CPI 
MCGI 1 .261*** -0.052 .034 -.178*** .245*** .399*** .501*** .166*** -.137*** -0.014 .467*** -.124*** .083** .063 .120*** .420*** .220*** 0.053 .508*** 
IVDI .285*** 1 .104** -.188*** -.157*** .105*** -.017 .231*** -.044 -.274*** -.265*** .306*** -.171*** .139*** .067 .011 .146*** .126*** -.507*** -.100** 
BSIZE -.033 .117*** 1 .054 .276*** -.119*** .011 -.243*** .273*** .093** -.098** .355*** -.005 .102** .011 .081** .150*** -.091** 0.083** -.221*** 
BDIV .055 -.190*** .062 1 .612*** .753*** .159*** -.039 .016 .308*** .281*** -.034 -.134*** -.022 .046 .163*** .163*** .070* .077* -.103** 
BDIVG -.167*** -.160*** .274*** .559*** 1 .027 -.060 -.311*** .167*** .169*** .124*** -.042 -.063 -.019 -.055 .101** 0.018 -.042 .134*** -.219*** 
BDIVE .237*** -.105*** -.074* .786*** .030 1 .280*** .244*** -.097** .236*** .269*** .054 -.157*** -.023 .126*** .136*** .233*** .101** .002 0.068* 
NED .386*** .047 .029 .134*** -.087** .246*** 1 .448*** .226*** .107*** .137*** .138*** .000 .025 -.026 .143*** .339*** .159*** -.024 .365*** 
DBLS .500*** .222*** -.249*** .003 -.279*** .236*** .435*** 1 .023 -.068* .017 .201*** -.067 -.016 -.014 .005 .296*** .152*** -.121*** .435*** 
GOWN .140*** -.013 .167*** -.052 .077* -.123*** .062 .027 1 .206*** .220*** .557*** .114*** .053 .029 .128*** .350*** -.033 .313*** 0.027 
DOWN -.155*** -.243*** .107*** .323*** .152*** .262*** .022 -0.072* .273*** 1 .709*** .122*** -.143*** .116*** .118*** .266*** .154*** -.062 .255*** -.193*** 
BOWN -.007 -.247*** -.067 .279*** .099** .269*** .049 0.018 .328*** .710*** 1 .153*** -.113*** .062 .081** .222*** .178*** -.018 .300*** -0.017 
LNTA .457*** .369*** .353*** -.019 -.064 .062 .124*** .208*** .532*** .134*** .177*** 1 -.102** .155*** .221*** .083** .492*** .013 .183*** 0.066 
AGE -.172*** -.248*** -0.030 -.101** -.042 -.117*** -.075* -.117*** .053 -.082** -.070* -.226*** 1 -.074* -.230*** -.056 -.088** -.050 .206*** .096** 
SGR .078* .140*** -.096** -.011 -.014 -0.020 .027 -.015 .033 .127*** .089** .173*** -.116*** 1 .066 .302*** .107*** -.003 .062 -0.062 
LEV .065 .082** .003 .080* -.042 0.156*** -.033 -.012 -.016 .119*** .102** .272*** -.274*** .052 1 -.088** .221*** -.027 .047 -.099** 
ROA .097** .020 .089** .156*** .084** .137*** .080* -.010 .044 .243*** .243*** .068* -.009 .287*** -.139*** 1 .164*** .086** -.022 -0.005 
BIG4 .421*** .201*** .135*** .181*** .026 .235*** .352*** .296*** .238*** .145*** .200*** .489*** -.123*** .117*** .219*** .145*** 1 .053 .109*** .137*** 
GDP .117*** .185*** -.025 .059 -.005 0.052 .059 .054 -.037 -.042 -.048 0.011 -.043 .016 .007 .052 .016 1 -.253*** .182*** 
INFL .024 -.404*** .184*** -.031 .109*** -.089** -.140*** -.160*** .282*** .199*** .240*** .243*** .184*** .064 .079* -.073* .098** -.277*** 1 .097** 
CPI .597*** -0.03 -.202*** -.166*** -.243*** -0.015 .322*** .466*** 0.071* -.262*** -0.042 .175*** 0.044 -0.049 -.110*** -0.045 .157*** -0.046 .105*** 1 
 
Notes: the bottom half of the table contains Person’s parametric correlation coefficients, whereas the upper right half of the table shows Spearman’s non-parametric correlation coefficients. 
***, **, and * indicate that correlation is significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively. Variables are defined as follows: the MENA countries overall Corporate Governance Disclosure 
Index (MCGI); Islamic Values Disclosure Index (IVDI); board size (BSIZE); board diversity on the basis of gender (BDIVG); board diversity on the basis of ethnic minority (BDIVE); board 
diversity on the basis of both gender and ethnic minority (BDIV); percent of non-executive directors on the board (NED); separate of CEO and chairperson roles (DBLS); government ownership 
(GOWN); director ownership (DOWN); block ownership (BOWN); firm size (LNTA); firm age (AGE); growth opportunity (SGR); leverage (LEV); profitability (ROA); audit firm size (BIG4); 
gross domestic product growth (GDP); Inflation Index (INFL); and Corruption Perception Index (CPI). Table 2 fully defines all the variables used. 
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Table 8 presents the correlation matrix for the overall CG voluntary disclosure index (MCGI), 
independent (country-level) and control variables. The correlation analysis (i.e., Pearson’s parametric 
correlation coefficients only) reveals that MCGI positively and significantly correlates with Global 
Islamic Economy Indicator (GIEI); Political Stability Index (PSI); Government Effectiveness Index 
(GEI); Regulatory Quality Index (RQI); Rule of Law Index (RLI); and Control of Corruption Index 
(CCI). On the other hand, it shows that MCGI has a negative significant correlation with Voice and 
Accountability Index (VAI). 
Thus, the univariate analysis supports the prediction that firms complying with and disclosing 
Islamic values are more likely to comply with and disclose voluntary CG practices. Also, firms with 
highly diversified boards on the basis of ethnic minorities, independent boards and boards with 
separate leadership positions are more likely to voluntarily comply with, and disclose of, CG 
practices. It is also found that higher government ownership has an impact upon a firm’s voluntary 
compliance with, and disclosure of, CG practices positively. With regard to country-level variables, 
the findings suggest positive relationships for firms listed in countries with more compliance with 
Islamic economic values; scoring a high level of national governance quality (political stability, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption). On the other 
side, firms with highly diversified boards on the basis of gender, high director ownership and listed 
in countries with high voice and accountability are less likely to voluntarily comply with and disclose 
CG practices. With regard to control variables, correlation analysis illustrates that larger firms 
(LNTA), younger ones (AGE), high growth opportunity (SGR), high profitability (ROA), audited by 
one of the Big 4 audit firms, in countries with high GDP growth rates (GDP), and having a strongly 
enforced control of corruption (CPI) are more likely to voluntarily comply with and disclose CG 
practices.  
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Table 8: Pearson and Spearman correlation matrices of all variables: country-level analysis       
 MCGI GIEI VAI PSI  GEI RQI RLI CCI LNTA  AGE SGR LEV ROA BIG4 GDP INFL 
MCGI 1 .694*** -.209*** .630*** .556*** .507*** .491*** .438*** .467*** -.124*** .083** 0.063 .120*** .420*** .220*** 0.053 
GIEI .681*** 1 -.161*** .821*** .741*** .629*** .542*** .656*** .373*** 0.057 0.043 -.093** -0.026 .242*** .172*** -0.076* 
VAI -.219*** -0.003 1 .141*** .304*** .341*** .312*** .490*** -.373*** 0.065 -.174*** -0.04 -0.065 -.188*** -.180*** .156*** 
PSI .596*** .876*** .196*** 1 .926*** .879*** .788*** .830*** .167*** 0.052 -0.011 -.129*** .093** .242*** .236*** 0.054 
GEI .554*** .890*** .185*** .888*** 1 .888*** .842*** .923*** .091** 0.076* -0.072* -.119*** 0.049 .184*** .209*** .092** 
RQI .532*** .785*** .168*** .877*** .924*** 1 .847*** .877*** -0.015 0.048 -0.068* -.137*** .107*** .157*** .265*** 0.024 
RLI .481*** .690*** .107*** .767*** .873*** .942*** 1 .816*** -0.071* 0.075* -0.051 -.123*** .107*** .141*** .285*** 0.043 
CCI .553*** .902*** .262*** .857*** .955*** .874*** .820*** 1 0.006 .091** -.118*** -.109*** -0.008 .087** .244*** .081** 
LNTA .457*** .307*** -.345*** .123*** .130*** 0.021 -0.034 .109*** 1 -.102** .155*** .221*** .083** .492*** 0.013 .183*** 
AGE -.172*** 0.001 .150*** 0.016 0.009 -0.011 -0.025 0.02 -.226*** 1 -0.074* -.230*** -0.056 -.088** -0.05 .206*** 
SGR 0.078* 0.015 -.168*** -0.018 -0.069* -0.069* -0.078* -.093** .173*** -.116*** 1 0.066 .302*** .107*** -0.003 0.062 
LEV 0.065 -.114*** -0.023 -.142*** -.137*** -.155*** -.153*** -.130*** .272*** -.274*** 0.052 1 -.088** .221*** -0.027 0.047 
ROA .097** -0.021 -0.051 .098** -0.004 0.061 0.054 -0.035 0.068* -0.009 .287*** -.139*** 1 .164*** .086** -0.022 
BIG4 .421*** .233*** -.161*** .242*** .150*** .139*** .096** .121*** .489*** -.123*** .117*** .219*** .145*** 1 0.053 .109*** 
GDP  .117*** -0.044 -.304*** -0.031 -0.024 .132*** .154*** -0.054 0.011 -0.043 0.016 0.007 0.052 0.016 1 -.253*** 
INFL 0.024 .085** .253*** 0.033 -.105*** -.282*** -.467*** -0.069* .243*** .184*** 0.064 0.079* -0.073* .098** -.277*** 1 
 
Notes: the bottom half of the table contains Person’s parametric correlation coefficients, whereas the upper right half of the table shows Spearman’s non-parametric correlation 
coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate that correlation is significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively. Variables are defined as follows: the MENA countries overall 
Corporate Governance Disclosure Index (MCGI); Global Islamic Economy Indicator (GIEI); Voice and Accountability Index (VAI); Political stability index (PSI); Government 
Effectiveness Index (GEI); Regulatory Quality Index (RQI);  Rule of Law Index (RLI); Control of Corruption Index (CCI); firm size (LNTA); firm age (AGE); growth opportunity 
(SGR); leverage (LEV); profitability (ROA); audit firm size (BIG4); gross domestic product growth (GDP);  and inflation index (INFL). Table 2 fully defines all the variables used.   
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5.2 Multivariate Regression Analysis 
 Regression results for the model investigating firm-level antecedents of the level of disclosure 
and compliance with CG practices are illustrated in Table 9. Models 1, 2 and 3 show the cross-
sectional OLS regressions of Islamic values disclosure, board characteristics, ownership structure 
mechanisms and control variables on MCGI. In Model 1, board diversity is measured on the basis of 
both gender and ethnic minority, while in Models 2 and 3 board diversity is measured on the basis of 
gender (BDIVG) and ethnic minority (BDIVN), respectively.  
 With regard to Islamic values disclosure, Model 1 shows a positive and significant 
relationship between IVDI and MCGI, suggesting H1 is empirically supported. This evidence is 
consistent with the theoretical predictions of the neo-institutional theory insights. The efficiency-led 
perspective suggests that firms complying with, and disclosing, Islamic values are more likely to 
comply with, and disclose, good CG practices, to attract more resources by meeting Islamic finance 
providers’ demand for information about their investments. From the legitimisation perspective, firms 
practising Islamic values are more likely to voluntarily comply and disclose CG practices to improve 
their reputation and image. This legitimises their operations through working within the framework 
of their society’s principles. Empirically, the results are in line with the finding of Al-Bassam and 
Ntim (2016), which indicates that Islamic values drive the extent to which Saudi listed firms 
voluntarily comply with and disclose CG provisions contained in the 2006 Saudi code. Additionally, 
the current study’s result is in line with that of Ongena and Sendeniz-Yuncu (2011), which suggests 
that Islamic banks mainly deal with more transparent firms. The findings also support the empirical 
results of previous studies (e.g., Maali et al., 2006; Farook et al., 2011), which argue that Islamic 
banks with effective Islamic governance (e.g., required to pay the Islamic religious tax zakah) provide 
more voluntary disclosures than those who do not adhere to Sharia. 
 Second, large boards (BSIZE) are found to have a negative significant impact on the extent 
of a firm’s compliance with, and disclosure of, good CG practices, which supports H2. This finding 
is consistent with the suggestions of neo-institutional theory (efficiency perspective) that firms with 
large boards may suffer from problems in communication and coordination between board members. 
They also have an increased hazard of being dominated by the CEO, so large boards are inefficient 
in monitoring managers’ behaviour and in taking decisions, including more voluntary disclosure of 
CG practices (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996; Cerdioni and Parbonetti, 2007; Guest, 2009). 
Empirically, the findings are consistent with the literature (e.g., Cerdioni and Parbonetti, 2007; 
Tauringana and Mangena, 2014), which demonstrates that small boards of directors are more efficient 
in monitoring management and taking decisions related to expanding voluntary CG compliance and 
disclosure practices.  
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 With regard to other board characteristics variables, the empirical evidence supports H3, 
which suggests that more diversified boards based on gender and ethnic minority are more likely to 
voluntarily comply with and disclose CG practices. This evidence is consistent with the neo-
institutional theoretical framework (efficiency perspective), which suggests that boards with a higher 
proportion of women and ethnic minorities tend to fulfil their monitoring and counselling roles more 
efficiently. This can be accomplished by raising more discussion and innovative ideas in the 
boardroom. It also increases the opportunity to gain more resources by increasing voluntary CG 
compliance and disclosure practices. Additionally, from the neo-institutional theory (legitimation 
perspective), recruiting diversified members to the board of directors enhances a firm’s legitimacy 
and trustworthiness. Furthermore, it helps to attract more resources from powerful stakeholders by 
binding executives to greater voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices. Empirically, the 
findings are consistent with the literature (e.g., Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Barako and Brown, 2008; 
Elmagrhi et al., 2016). However, Model 2 in Table 9 illustrates that board diversity based on gender 
(BDIVG) is positively but insignificantly associated with MCGI because of the significant low 
representation of women on boards, an average of 2.71%. Boards with members from diverse ethnic 
minorities (BDIVE), as illustrated in Model 3 of Table 9 are positively and significantly associated 
with the extent of voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices. The findings reported in Models 
2 and 3 of Table 9 are consistent with the findings documented by Elghuweel (2015) in the Omani 
context.  
 Fourth, the proportion of independent non-executive board members (NED) is positively and 
significantly associated with MCGI, which also supports H4. This indicates that boards with a higher 
proportion of independent directors are more likely to have greater compliance with, and disclosure 
of, good CG practices. Therefore, the findings are consistent with the neo-institutional (efficiency 
and legitimation) perspective which argues that independent boards are more likely to put pressure 
on managers to increase the extent of voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices. 
Consequently this, in turn, can improve directors’ human capital by protecting shareholders’ interests 
(Dey, 2008). It also facilitates access to valuable resources and mitigates legitimacy concerns arising 
from separating ownership and control (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013b). Empirically, this finding is 
consistent with the previous studies of Ezat and El-Masry (2008), Samaha et al. (2012), Al Janadi et 
al. (2013) and Tauringana and Chithambo (2016), which suggest that the higher the proportion of 
independent directors the greater the extent of voluntary disclosure practices. 
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Table 9: Determinants of voluntary corporate governance compliance and disclosure practices (MCGI) 
 
Independent variables MCGI  MCGI  MCGI  OSH  TCY  AUD  RTY  BMS 
(Model) Predicted sign 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
Islamic Values Disclosure Index variable   
IVDI + 0.057*** 
(0.000) 
 0.044*** 
(0.001) 
 0.060*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.173 
(0.384) 
 -0.015 
(0.394) 
 0.060** 
(0.032) 
 0.156*** 
(0.000) 
 0.085*** 
(0.000) 
Board characteristics variables  
BSIZE +/- -0.020* 
(0.092) 
 -0.018 
(0.137) 
 -0.013 
(0.264) 
 0.006 
(0.721) 
 0.018 
(0.256) 
 -0.059** 
(0.021) 
 -0.086*** 
(0.002) 
 -0.005 
(0.791) 
BDIV + 0.147*** 
(0.000) 
     -0.115** 
(0.011) 
 0.198*** 
(0.000) 
 0.227*** 
(0.000) 
 0.294*** 
(0.000) 
 0.158*** 
(0.001) 
BDIVG +   0.076 
(0.299) 
   -  -  -  -  - 
BDIVE +     0.237*** 
(0.000) 
 -  -  -  -  - 
NED + 0.074*** 
(0.002) 
 0.082*** 
(0.001) 
 0.062** 
(0.011) 
 -0.030 
(0.423) 
 0.159*** 
(0.000) 
 0.161*** 
(0.002) 
 0.033 
(0.549) 
 0.061 
(0.123) 
DBLS +/- 0.025*** 
(0.008) 
 0.028*** 
(0.003) 
 0.017* 
(0.063) 
 -0.046*** 
(0.001) 
 0.000 
(0.972) 
 0.077*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.047** 
(0.027) 
 0.073*** 
(0.000) 
Ownership construction mechanisms   
GOWN +/- -0.019 
(0.200) 
 -0.032** 
(0.039) 
 -0.002 
(0.893) 
 0.020 
(0.386) 
 0.096*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.063** 
(0.050) 
 -0.123*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.028 
(0.248) 
DOWN - -0.061*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.054*** 
(0.001) 
 -0.059*** 
(0.000) 
 0.032 
(0.194) 
 -0.002 
(0.936) 
 -0.148*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.078** 
(0.034) 
 -0.085*** 
(0.001) 
BOWN - -0.000 
(0.979) 
 0.009 
(0.640) 
 -0.008 
(0.675) 
 -0.051* 
(0.072) 
 0.019 
(0.435) 
 0.046 
(0.247) 
 -0.055 
(0.199) 
 0.014 
(0.647) 
Control variables: Firm-level 
LNTA + 0.011*** 
(0.000) 
 0.011*** 
(0.000) 
 0.009*** 
(0.000) 
 0.010*** 
(0.009) 
 -0.018*** 
(0.000) 
 0.020*** 
(0.000) 
 0.022*** 
(0.000) 
 0.014*** 
(0.000) 
AGE +/- -0.014** 
(0.014) 
 -0.015*** 
(0.008) 
 -0.017*** 
(0.002) 
 -0.013 
(0.114) 
 -0.027*** 
(0.000) 
 0.004 
(0.739) 
 0.002 
(0.901) 
 -0.022** 
(0.013) 
SGR + 0.003 
(0.659) 
 0.001 
(0.922) 
 0.003 
(0.635) 
 -0.012 
(0.232) 
 -0.001 
(0.924) 
 .005 
(0.723) 
 -0.009 
(0.580) 
 0.015 
(0.173) 
LEV  + -0.023 
(0.160) 
 -0.025 
(0.150) 
 -0.030* 
(0.072) 
 0.042 
(0.102) 
 -0.015 
(0.495) 
 -0.021 
(0.547) 
 -0.030 
(0.432) 
 -0.058** 
(0.033) 
ROA  + 0.131*** 
(0.002) 
 0.146*** 
(0.001) 
 0.131*** 
(0.001) 
 -0.007 
(0.910) 
 0.139** 
(0.012) 
 0.073 
(0.413) 
 0.089 
(0.347) 
 0.243*** 
(0.000) 
BIG4  + 0.027*** 
(0.000) 
 0.032*** 
(0.000) 
 0.028*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.004 
(0.732) 
 0.042*** 
(0.000) 
 0.036** 
(0.018) 
 0.058*** 
(0.000) 
 0.019 
(0.103) 
Control variables: Country level 
GDP  + 0.353*** 
(0.002) 
 0.385*** 
(0.001) 
 0.370*** 
(0.001) 
 0.294* 
(0.094) 
 -0.065 
(0.670) 
 0.518** 
(0.036) 
 0.382 
(0.148) 
 0.475** 
(0.011) 
INFL  + 0.013** 
(0.045) 
 0.010 
(0.154) 
 0.015** 
(0.020) 
 -0.036*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.061*** 
(0.000) 
 0.024* 
(0.098) 
 0.161*** 
(0.000) 
 0.009 
(0.408) 
CPI  + 0.452*** 
(0.000) 
 0.431*** 
(0.000) 
 0.454*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.138*** 
(0.004) 
 0.509*** 
(0.000) 
 0.890*** 
(0.000) 
 0.698*** 
(0.000) 
 0.406*** 
(0.000) 
YDU  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
INDU Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
Constant  0.185***  0.188***  0.213***  0.726***  0.679***  -0.274***  -0.409***  0.156 
Durbin-Watson statistics 1.922  1.920  1.990  1.690  2.065  1.716  2.180  1.606 
F-value 47.04***  44.27***  48.63***  8.51***  27.15***  33.56***  23.41***  24.98*** 
Adjusted R2 66.65%  65.26%  67.40%  24.58%  53.16%  58.56%  49.31%  51.00 
No. of observations 600  600  600  600  600  600  600  600 
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Notes: P-values are between brackets. ***, **, * indicate that the relationships are significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. Variables are defined as 
follows: the MENA countries overall Corporate Governance Disclosure Index (MCGI); Islamic Values Disclosure Index (IVDI); board size (BSIZE); board diversity 
on the basis of gender (BDIVG); board diversity on the basis of ethnic minority (BDIVE); board diversity on the basis of both gender and ethnic minority (BDIV); 
percent of non-executive directors on the board (NED); separate of CEO and chairperson roles (DBLS); government ownership (GOWN); director ownership 
(DOWN); block ownership (BOWN); firm size (LNTA); firm age (AGE); growth opportunity (SGR); leverage (LEV); profitability (ROA); audit firm size (BIG4); 
gross domestic product growth (GDP);  Inflation Index (INFL); Corruption Perception Index (CPI); year dummies (YDU); and industry dummies (INDU). Table 2 
fully defines all the variables used. 
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Fifth, separation of the board leadership role (DBLS) is found to have a positive significant 
association with MCGI, which supports H5. Theoretically, this finding is consistent with neo-
institutional theory (efficiency and legitimation views). This suggests that boards with separate roles 
of chairperson and CEO are more likely to voluntarily comply with and disclose CG practices. Non-
dual board leadership enhances the legitimacy of managerial decisions by developing checks and 
balances over management’s performance and reducing advantages gained from withholding 
information (Forker, 1992). Empirically, the results support previous studies which have documented 
a positive and significant association between separate CEO/chairperson roles and the extent of 
voluntary disclosure of CG practices (Haniff and Cooke, 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003; Gul and Leung, 
2004; Barako et al., 2006; Laksmana, 2008; Samaha et al., 2012). 
 With regard to the association between ownership structure mechanisms and MCGI, the 
results show that different mechanisms have diverse impacts on voluntary CG compliance and 
disclosure practices. Specifically, government ownership is negatively but insignificantly associated 
with voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices, so H6 is not supported empirically. From the 
efficiency view of neo-institutional theory, firms with high government ownership are more likely to 
voluntarily disclose good CG practices to facilitate gaining essential resources (Haniffa and Huddaib, 
2006) and to mitigate agency conflict between management and owners (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 
2013b). Additionally, the legitimacy view of neo-institutional theory proposes that firms can 
legitimate operations by increasing the extent of voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices 
(Alguilera et al., 2007). Empirically, the negative association between government ownership and 
MCGI is congruent with the finding of Dam and Scholtens (2012). Alotaibi and Hussainey (2016) 
document that CSR disclosure level is negatively associated with percentage of government 
ownership in Saudi non-financial listed firms. Al Janadi et al. (2013) also report a significant negative 
relationship between state ownership and voluntary disclosure in Saudi Arabia. They suggest that 
governments in MENA countries with significant ownership have no interest in providing sufficient 
information to mitigate agency conflict. 
On the other hand, the current results provide empirical evidence that supports H7. The neo-
institutional (efficiency) perspective argues that a higher level of director ownership helps mitigate 
agency problems between directors and shareholders, thereby lowering the extent of voluntary CG 
compliance and disclosure practices (Eng and Mak, 2003; Samaha et al., 2012). Moreover, from the 
legitimisation perspective, firms increasing the level of voluntary CG compliance and disclosure 
practices to substitute for lower director ownership improve legitimacy and stakeholders’ confidence 
in boards (Eng and Mak, 2003; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006). The current result is consistent with 
the empirical results provided by previous studies in developing countries which have documented a 
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negative impact of director ownership on CG disclosure practices (e.g., Oh et al., 2011; Samaha and 
Dahawy, 2011; Khan et al., 2013; Albitar, 2015).  
The results in Table 9 indicate that block ownership is negatively but insignificantly 
associated with MCGI, and thereby H8 is not empirically supported. This finding is not in line with 
the predictions of neo-institutional theory (efficiency and legitimation perspectives), which suggests 
that firms with more concentrated ownership have fewer agency conflicts than do firms with wider 
ownership. Thus, concentrated ownership works as a monitoring tool substituting the need for more 
voluntary disclosure. Empirically, although it is insignificant, the negative association between block 
ownership and MCGI supports findings of Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Marston and Polei (2004), 
Bozec and Bozec (2007), Samaha and Dahawy (2011), Samaha et al. (2012), Al-Najjar and Abed 
(2014) and Elmagrhi et al. (2016).  
 With regard to the association between control variables and MCGI illustrated in Table 9, 
Models 1, 2 and 3 produce mixed results. For example, firm size (LNTA), profitability (ROA), audit 
firm size (BIG4), gross domestic product growth (GDP), Inflation Index (INFL) and Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) positively and significantly impact on voluntary CG compliance and 
disclosure practices. These results support the findings of Belkaoui (1983), Ntim et al. (2012b), Al 
Janadi et al. (2013), Albitar (2015), Habbash et al. (2015), Mateescu, (2015) and Elmagrhi et al., 
(2016). However, the other control variables, including leverage (LEV) and growth opportunity 
(SGR), have an insignificant impact on the MCGI. The insignificant influence of these variables is in 
line with previous studies which have found no association between these variables and voluntary 
disclosure (e.g., Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003; Samaha et al., 2010; Ntim et al., 
2012b; Ntim et al., 2013; Aljifri et al., 2014; Albitar, 2015; Mateescu, 2015). Furthermore, the results 
support the suggestion that young firms (AGE) are more likely to heighten the level of voluntary CG 
compliance and disclosure practices to gain market confidence by reducing uncertainty about their 
operations (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Sehar et al., 2013). Likewise, reported findings support the 
positive and significant effects of a country’s economic and cultural variables (GDP, INFL and CPI) 
on the extent of a firm's voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices. The findings of the current 
study illustrate that firms in countries with high economic growth (GDP) are associated with more 
voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices, which is consistent with the empirical evidence 
provided by several authors (e.g., Belkaoui, 1983; Salter, 1998; Archambault and Archambault, 
2003). Also, firms in countries suffering high inflation tend to disclose more (Doupnik and Salter, 
1995). The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) was found to have a positive significant impact on CG 
voluntary disclosure, consistent with Judge et al. (2008) and Baldini et al. (2016).   
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   The main CG index used in this study (MCGI) contains five sub-indices, namely ownership 
structure (OSH), financial transparency (TCY), auditing (AUD), corporate responsibility and 
compliance (RTY) and board and management structure and process (BMS). To infer the association 
between Islamic governance, board characteristics and ownership structure mechanisms with the five 
sub-indices and assess whether these relations differ from the overall MCGI, Table 9, Models 4 to 8, 
shows the results of OLS regression of the explanatory and control variables on the five sub-indices. 
For example, the coefficients of Islamic values disclosure (IVDI) remain statistically significant and 
positively associated with AUD, RTY and BMS sub-indices, but negatively and insignificantly 
associated with OSH and TCY sub-indices. With regard to board size (BSIZE) the coefficients 
(except for OSH, TCY and BMS) remain significant and negatively associated with both AUD and 
RTY sub-indices. In general, the coefficients of the ownership structure mechanisms (i.e., 
government ownership (GOWN) and block ownership (BOWN)) are insignificantly associated with 
most of the five sub-indices, while director ownership (DOWN) has a negative and significant effect 
on most of them. Generally, the findings presented in Models 4 to 8 of Table 9, empirically support 
the former results illustrated in Model 1 of Table 9.  
 Table 10 shows the regression results for the country-level antecedents of the level of 
disclosure and compliance with CG practices. Results which are demonstrated for Model 1 in Table 
10 confirm that firms listed in countries applying the Islamic economic model are more likely to 
comply with and disclose CG practices, which supports H9. Theoretically, this finding is consistent 
with the neo-institutional (efficiency and legitimation views) perspective. This suggests that firms 
listed in countries with more dominant Islamic economic sectors are more likely to voluntarily 
comply with and disclose CG practices. Business organisations in the Islamic world generally 
encounter unique agency relationships and CG challenges, requiring them to disclose more 
information to mitigate agency conflict in addition to gain social legitimacy. Empirically, the results 
support previous studies which have documented a positive impact of religion on the extent of 
corporate disclosure (e.g., Archambault and Archambault, 2003).  
Models 2-7 of Table 10 illustrate the results of the association between national governance 
quality variables and CG index (MCGI). In general, reported findings confirm that national 
governance quality (except, voice and accountability) is also positively related to CG disclosure 
(H10). This is consistent with the neo-institutional theory perspective which suggests that firms 
operating in countries characterised by high-quality governance (i.e., political stability, government 
efficiency, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption) are generally assumed to have a 
higher level of corporate disclosure. The current results support H10 and are consistent with the 
empirical results provided by several authors (e.g., Judge et al., 2008; Mateescu, 2015; Baldini et al., 
2016). 
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Table 10: Country determinants of voluntary corporate governance compliance and disclosure practices (MCGI) 
 
Independent Variables MCGI  MCGI  MCGI  MCGI  MCGI  MCGI  MCGI 
(Model) Predicted sign 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Global Islamic Economy Indicator variable 
GIEI + 0.543*** 
(0.000) 
            
National governance quality variables              
VAI +   -0.272 
(0.644) 
          
PSI +     0.275*** 
(0.000) 
        
GEL +       0.352*** 
(0.000) 
      
RQI +         0.471*** 
(0.000) 
    
RLI +           0.614*** 
(0.000) 
  
CCI +             0.378*** 
(0.000) 
Control variables: Firm-level    
LNTA + 0.005*** 
(0.003) 
 0.017*** 
(0.000) 
 0.016*** 
(0.000) 
 0.012*** 
(0.000) 
 0.015*** 
(0.000) 
 0.015*** 
(0.000) 
 0.012*** 
(0.000) 
AGE +/- -0.021*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.020** 
(.010) 
 -0.020*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.024*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.022*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.023*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.023*** 
(0.000) 
SGR + -0.002 
(0.752) 
 -0.006 
(0.529) 
 0.002 
(0.735) 
 0.004 
(0.552) 
 -0.003 
(0.638) 
 0.004 
(0.639) 
 0.005 
(0.461) 
LEV  + -.008 
(0.605) 
 -.085*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.017 
(0.308) 
 -0.027 
(0.123) 
 -0.028 
(0.118) 
 -0.032* 
(0.077) 
 -0.029* 
(0.098) 
ROA  + 0.110*** 
(0.005) 
 0.027 
(0.625) 
 -0.012 
(0.771) 
 0.071 
(0.103) 
 0.026 
(0.558) 
 0.034 
(0.448) 
 0.086** 
(0.049) 
BIG4  + 0.039*** 
(0.000) 
 .061*** 
(.000) 
 0.026*** 
(0.000) 
 0.043*** 
(0.000) 
 0.039*** 
(0.000) 
 0.041*** 
(0.000) 
 0.046*** 
(0.000) 
Control variables: Country-level 
GDP  + 0.468*** 
(0.000) 
 .310* 
(.063) 
 0.359*** 
(0.003) 
 0.451*** 
(0.000) 
 0.173 
(0.179) 
 0.265** 
(0.043) 
 0.517*** 
(0.000) 
INFL  + -0.013* 
(0.010) 
 -.014* 
(.082) 
 -0.019*** 
(0.001) 
 0.001 
(0.855) 
 0.014** 
(0.025) 
 0.041*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.001 
(0.818) 
YDU Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
INDU Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
Constant  0.300***  .426***  .310***  .237***  0.111***  -0.020  .0.174*** 
Durbin-Watson statistics 2.008  1.396  1.985  1.856  1.843  1.818  1.876 
F-value 69.66***  18.04***  58.55***  50.42***  47.19***  44.27***  46.87*** 
Adjusted R2 67.36%  33.87  63.36%  59.76%  58.12%  56.53%  66.57% 
No. of observations 600  600  600  600  600  600  600 
Notes: P-values are between brackets. ***, **, * indicate that the relationships are significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. Variables are defined as follows: the MENA countries overall Corporate 
Governance Disclosure Index (MCGI); Global Islamic Economy Indicator (GIEI); Voice and Accountability index (VAI); Political stability index (PSI); Government Effectiveness Index (GEI); Regulatory Quality 
Index (RQI);  Rule of Law Index (RLI); Control of Corruption Index (CCI); firm size (LNTA); firm age (AGE); growth opportunity (SGR); leverage (LEV); profitability (ROA); audit firm size (BIG4); country’s 
gross domestic product growth (GDP);  Country’s Inflation Index (INFL); year dummies (YDU); and Industry dummies (INDU). Table 2 fully defines all the variables used. 
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5.3 Robustness Tests     
 To ascertain the robustness of the results, further analyses were run. 
  
5.3.1 Results Based on weighted Corporate Governance Index 
The first sensitivity test is related to the 51 CG provisions of the overall MCGI. Each of these 
provisions is assigned equal weight in the overall MCGI. The five sub-indices are allocated different 
weights due to the existence of different numbers of provisions in each sub-index: ownership 
structure, OSH 17.6% (i.e., nine CG provisions divided by 51) financial transparency, TCY 15.7% 
(i.e., eight CG provisions), auditing, AUD 17.6% (i.e., nine CG provisions), corporate responsibility 
and compliance, RTY 13.7% (i.e., seven CG provisions), and board and management structure and 
process, BMS 35.3% (i.e., 18 CG provisions). Accordingly, an alternative index (weighted-MCGI) is 
created in which each of the five sub-indices is assigned an equal weight of 20% to find out whether 
the results hold regardless of the weighting of the five sub-indices. Model 1 of Table 11 shows the 
results of the association between explanatory variables (firm-level) and weighted CG index 
(weighted-MCGI). Generally, the results are consistent with those obtained using the non-weighted 
CG index (MCGI) presented in Model 1 of Table 9. 
 
5.3.2 Results Based on Non-Linear Assumption of Corporate Governance 
Measures 
To investigate the existence of a non-linear association between some board characteristics 
(i.e., board size (BSIZE)), ownership structure mechanisms (i.e., government ownership (GOWN), 
director ownership (DOWN), block ownership (BOWN)) and voluntary CG compliance and 
disclosure practices (following Short and Keasey, 1999; Guest, 2009; Elmagrhi et al., 2016), Model 
1 in Table 9 has been re-estimated by adding the square root of board size (BSIZE2), government 
(GOWN2), director (DOWN2) and block ownership (BOWN2). The results are documented in Models 
2 to 5 in Table 11, respectively. The findings in Model 2 illustrate that the association between larger 
boards (BSIZE2) and MCGI index is statistically insignificant, supporting the absence of a curvilinear 
relationship between board size and voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices. This evidence 
is incongruent with the findings of Guest (2009) and Elmagrhi et al. (2016), which suggest a non-
linear relationship between board size and firm performance. The findings reported in Model 3 of 
Table 11 do not support the existence of a curvilinear link between government ownership (GOWN) 
and MCGI. On the other hand, Models 4 and 5 show that the other ownership variables (i.e., DOWN2 
and BOWN2) have a positive and significant impact on MCGI. For example, with regard to BOWN2, 
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the evidence reported for Model 5 suggests that block owners become more entrenched at higher 
levels of ownership, which is consistent with theoretical suggestions that concentrated ownership is 
associated with less information asymmetry, and can ultimately lead to a reduction in agency 
problems (Reverte, 2009), thereby reducing the demand for more corporate disclosure (Ntim and 
Soobaroyen, 2013b). 
 
5.3.3 Results Based on the Lagged Structure Model 
Following Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013b), the study runs an additional robustness test, which 
regresses the current year’s voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices index (MCGI) on the 
previous year’s Islamic Values Disclosure Index (IVDI), board characteristics and ownership 
structure mechanisms. This lagged structure is used to account for possible endogeneity problems 
that might be caused by simultaneous association among the explanatory variables Islamic Values 
Disclosure Index (IVDI), board characteristics (BSIZE, BDIV, NED and DBLS), ownership structure 
mechanisms (GOWN, DOWN and BOWN) and the dependent variable (MCGI). The results 
presented for Model 6 in Table 11 show that in general the findings for Model 1 in Table 9 are largely 
robust in estimating lagged Islamic values disclosure, board characteristics, ownership structure 
mechanisms and voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices. 
 
5.3.4 Results Based on the 2SLS Model 
To address potential endogeneities that might arise as a result of omitted variables, a two-
stage least squares (2SLS) model was estimated (following Beiner et al., 2006; Henry, 2008). First, 
the probability of existence of an endogenous relationship between Islamic values disclosure, board 
characteristics and ownership structure mechanisms on the one hand and voluntary CG compliance 
and disclosure practices on the other hand was examined by a Durbin-Wu-Hausman exogeneity test 
(Beiner et al., 2006). The results reject the null hypothesis of no endogeneity. Consequently, 
conducting a 2SLS test using a CG mechanisms instrument that is better correlated with CG 
mechanisms and less with the regression structural errors, is more appropriate than the OLS model. 
The findings reported for Model 7 in Table 11 to some extent suggest that the results of the OLS 
model presented in Model 1 of Table 9 are robust to the existence of endogeneities caused by omitted 
variables. 
 
5.3.5 Results Based on the Fixed-Effect Model 
Finally, it has been suggested that voluntary compliance and disclosure of CG practices may 
be influenced by other firm-specific opportunities and difficulties (Henry, 2008). Therefore, a fixed-
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effect model was estimated to address potential unobserved firm-specific heterogeneities that the OLS 
regression model may fail to control (Henry, 2008; Guest, 2009; Ntim et al., 2012a; Elmagrhi et al., 
2016). The estimated fixed-effect model is based on the re-estimation of Model 1 in Table 9, by 
including 99 dummies to represent the 100 sampled firms. The findings illustrated in Model 8 of 
Table 11 indicate that board size (BSIZE), board independence (NED) and block ownership (BOWN) 
have a significantly negative impact on voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices. On the 
other hand, the separation of the CEO/chairperson role (DBLS) has a significantly positive 
association with the voluntary disclosure index (MCGI). Other results provide evidence that Islamic 
Values Disclosure Index (IVDI) and board diversity (BDIV) have a positive but insignificant relation 
with voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices (MCGI). Similarly, government ownership 
(GOWN) and director ownership (DOWN) are found to have an insignificant and negative association 
with voluntary disclosure of CG practice. Zhou (2001) and Wooldridge (2010) argue that a fixed-
effect approach may not be appropriate because intra-firm CG variables are relatively stable over 
time, while there are large differences between firms.             
Untabulated results shows that the findings related to the association between country-level 
explanatory factors and the extent of compliance with, and disclosure of, CG practices (presented in 
Models 1-7 of Table 10) are generally robust across the non-weighted CG index, controlling for 
internal CG mechanisms (board characteristics and ownership structure mechanisms), lagged, 2SLS 
and fixed-effect models. 
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Table 11: Sensitivity analyses of the determinants of corporate governance disclosures 
 
Independent Variables  
(Model) 
 
 
Predicted sign 
Weighted-
MCGI 
(1) 
 Non-linearity test   
MCGI 
(2) 
 MCGI 
(3) 
 MCGI 
(4) 
 MCGI 
(5) 
 Lagged 
(6) 
 2SLS 
(7) 
 Fixed-effect 
(8) 
IVDI + 0.054*** 
(0.000) 
 0.056*** 
(0.000) 
 0.056*** 
(0.000) 
 0.052*** 
(0.000) 
 0.055*** 
(0.000) 
 0.076*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.103 
(0.317) 
 0.018 
(0.307) 
Board characteristics variables 
BSIZE +/- -0.025** 
(0.026) 
 -0.129 
(0.240) 
 -0.019 
(0.118) 
 -0.016 
(0.177) 
 -0.017 
(0.163) 
 -0.025* 
(0.058) 
 -0.059 
(0.337) 
 -0.060*** 
(0.006) 
BSIZE2 +/-   0.026 
(0.318) 
            
BDIV + 0.153*** 
(0.000) 
 0.143*** 
(0.000) 
 0.147*** 
(0.000) 
 0.141*** 
(0.000) 
 0.140*** 
(0.000) 
 0.147*** 
(0.000) 
 0.009 
(0.958) 
 0.015 
(0.601) 
NED + 0.077*** 
(0.001) 
 0.077*** 
(0.002) 
 0.075*** 
(0.002) 
 0.069*** 
(0.004) 
 0.067*** 
(0.006) 
 0.094*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.059 
(0.586) 
 -0.095*** 
(0.001) 
DBLS +/- 0.011 
(0.193) 
 0.025*** 
(0.009) 
 0.025*** 
(0.008) 
 0.021** 
(0.023) 
 0.024*** 
(0.010) 
 0.018* 
(0.082) 
 0.148*** 
(0.000) 
 0.031*** 
(0.000) 
Ownership structure mechanisms 
GOWN +/- -0.020 
(0.172) 
 -0.019 
(0.210) 
 -0.027 
(0.542) 
 -0.021 
(0.155) 
 -0.021 
(0.162) 
 -0.021 
(0.202) 
 -0.350*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.042 
(0.244) 
GOWN2 +/-     0.010 
(0.860) 
          
DOWN - -0.056*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.064*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.062*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.176*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.064*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.075*** 
(0.000) 
 0.072 
(0.316) 
 -0.002 
(0.931) 
DOWN2 -       0.141*** 
(0.001) 
        
BOWN - -0.005 
(0.762) 
 0.002 
(0.921) 
 -0.000 
(0.978) 
 -0.020 
(0.296) 
 -0.094* 
(.068) 
 0.008 
(0.700) 
 -0.129*** 
(0.003) 
 -0.038* 
(0.095) 
BOWN2 -         0.096* 
(0.052) 
      
Control variables  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
YDU  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
INDU Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
Firm dummies Excluded   Excluded  Excluded  Excluded  Excluded  Excluded  Excluded  Included 
Constant  0.176***  0.296**  0.183***  0.196***  0.196***  0.185***  0.071  0.513*** 
Durbin-Watson statistics 2.051  1.928  1.925  1.954  1.940  1.961  1.922  1.850 
F-value 50.18***  45.34***  45.22***  46.54***  45.66***  41.74***  47.04***  30.76*** 
Adjusted R2 68.10  66.65  66.59  67.24  66.81  67.12  66.65  94.87 
No. of observations 600  600  600  600  600  600  600  600 
Notes: P-values are between brackets. ***, **, * indicate that the relationships are significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. Variables are defined as follows: the MENA countries overall Corporate Governance 
Disclosure Index (MCGI); Islamic Values Disclosure Index (IVDI); board size (BSIZE); board diversity on the basis of gender (BDIVG); board diversity on the basis of ethnic minority (BDIVE); board diversity on the basis 
of both gender and ethnic minority (BDIV); percent of non-executive directors on the board (NED); separate of CEO and chairperson roles (DBLS); government ownership (GOWN); director ownership (DOWN); block 
ownership (BOWN); firm size (LNTA); firm age (AGE); growth opportunity (SGR); leverage (LEV); profitability (ROA); audit firm size (BIG4); gross domestic product growth (GDP); Inflation Index (INFL); Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI); year dummies (YDU); and Industry dummies (INDU). Table 2 fully defines all the variables used. 
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6 Summary and Conclusion  
 Although MENA countries have engaged recently in extensive economic and financial 
reforms (e.g., issuing CG codes) to attract more private and foreign investments, the literature 
examining their level of compliance with, and disclosure of, CG practices is still limited. 
Consequently, this study investigates the extent of compliance with, and disclosure of, good CG 
practices among firms listed in MENA countries. Specifically, it examines whether firm- and country-
specific factors can explain cross-sectional variations in the extent of compliance with, and disclosure 
of, good CG practices in MENA countries using insights from neo-institutional theory.  
 The findings provide new evidence for the wide extent of heterogeneity in the level of 
compliance with and disclosure of good CG practices among MENA listed firms. MCGI ranges from 
a minimum of 31.37% to a maximum of 84.31%, with the average (median) firm compliance standing 
at 56.45% (56.86%). Despite the relatively large number of CG codes issued in MENA countries, 
companies still have a lower level of compliance with, and disclosure of, the provisions of these 
codes. The results are mostly consistent with the efficiency and legitimation inferences of neo-
institutional theory, which indicates that the extent of voluntary compliance with, and disclosure of, 
CG practices (i) is higher for companies committed to voluntary embrace and incorporate Islamic 
values in business operations; and companies with more diversified boards (based on gender and 
nationality), independent boards and boards with separate board leadership; and (ii) is lower for large 
boards, and companies with a high level of director ownership. With regard to country-level 
antecedents, the findings support the the positive and significant relationship between religion, quality 
of national governance and voluntary compliance with, and disclosure of, CG practices. 
 
6.1 Contributions, Policy Implications and Recommendations 
The findings make a number of contributions to the voluntary CG compliance and disclosure 
practices literature. First, the majority of national CG codes issued in MENA countries are based on 
an Anglo-American model that may be inconsistent with the local corporate context and may not lead 
to the desired outcomes. The current study provides empirical evidence that national CG codes 
generally attain favourable outcomes over time, although the differences in the corporate contexts of 
emerging and developed countries should be taken into account in introducing new CG reforms or 
modifying existing ones. The evidence also supports the suggestion that emerging economies tend to 
implement CG best practice as proposed by leading international organisations (e.g., OECD), in order 
to be globally competitive, attain international legitimacy, and thereby attract foreign investment. 
This supports the notion of the international movement toward attaining CG harmonisation, with 
different countries tending to adopt national CG structures similar to the Anglo-American model. 
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 Second, many studies investigating antecedents of voluntary compliance with, and disclosure 
of, good CG practices have been conducted in developed countries, where institutional structures and 
corporate settings are largely similar. However, there is limited evidence from emerging countries. 
Therefore, the current study contributes to the literature by investigating CG compliance and 
disclosure in MENA countries, using one of the largest and most extensive hand-collected data sets 
to date (a sample of 100 MENA listed firms from 2009 to 2014, with 600 firm-year observations) in 
order to permit generalisability of the results. Furthermore, unlike a large number of studies that rely 
on either time series or cross-sectional data, this study employs panel data that reduces the effect of 
multicollinearity, controls unobserved heterogeneity among variables and increases the degree of 
freedom. 
 Third, in line with the recommendation that CG can be better investigated by a composite CG 
index, this study used a CG index consisting of 51 provisions divided into five categories: ownership 
structure and exercise of control rights, financial transparency, auditing, corporate responsibility and 
compliance, and board and management structure and process. Through these, various issues 
associated with CG in the MENA countries’ corporate setting can be examined. This provides more 
suggestions for researchers, policy makers and others in MENA countries who prefer to use a 
constructed index, especially if it has been designed by a number of experts to examine the application 
of best CG practices. 
Fourth, unlike many other studies, this research adds to the literature by examining a number 
of CG measures that have not been widely investigated. It does not limit its analyses to a few types 
of board characteristics and ownership structure mechanisms in investigating why and how these 
antecedents may influence the CG disclosure and compliance level. Instead, it extends the existing 
literature by providing empirical evidence on firms’ Islamic values disclosure, a number of board 
characteristics including, board size, board diversity on the basis of gender and ethnicity, board 
independence, non-duality of board leadership, and ownership structure mechanisms: government, 
block and director ownership. It also investigates the impact of country-level factors including 
religion and the quality of national governance. The results illustrate that these factors generally 
significantly influence CG compliance and disclosure in MENA countries. 
Finally, unlike previous studies, the current research provides empirical evidence on whether 
the observed cross-sectional differences in voluntary CG disclosures can be explained by firm-level 
CG mechanisms (Islamic values disclosure, board characteristics and ownership structure 
mechanisms) and country-level mechanisms (religion and quality of national governance) using a 
variety of alternative models and estimations. A number of robustness analyses were conducted to 
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check the extent to which the main results holds or are sensitive to an alternative CG index: non-
linear relationship, omitted variables, and a number of endogeneity problems. 
 Furthermore, the results have important implications for corporations, regulators and policy 
makers not only in MENA countries but also in other developing countries and emerging markets 
intending to apply CG reforms. For companies, the findings suggest that Islamic values disclosure 
(e.g. conducting Islamic finance and investments, and paying zakah), board characteristics (smaller 
efficient boards, more diversified boards, independent boards and boards with separate leadership), 
and ownership characteristics (a lower level of director ownership) significantly affect the extent of 
voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices. Thus, firms can improve their commitment to 
good CG practice by considering these CG attributes. Additionally, with regard to governments and 
regulators in both MENA countries and other emerging markets, most of the findings imply that there 
is a low level of compliance with and disclosure of good CG practices. There is also a high degree of 
heterogeneity at this level among MENA listed firms. This is consistent with previous studies which 
have suggested that most listed companies in these countries do not adhere to disclosure and 
transparency requirements, given the lack of legislative enforcement. Therefore, this suggests that 
there is a need for the regulatory authorities and policy makers to further enhance CG compliance 
and enforcement. This can be attained by strengthening legislative enforcement and establishing a 
‘compliance and enforcement’ unit that will continuously observe the implementation of CG 
practices. 
 
6.2 Limitations and Avenues for Further Research 
Although the findings are generally robust across a number of econometric models, there are 
some limitations that suggest further research. First, this study depends on a limited sample size (i.e., 
600 firm-year observations collected from five MENA economies), because the content analysis used 
to collect data manually from financial reports consumes much time and effort. The study also had to 
consider the availability, accessibility, funding and time constraints of a PhD registration period. 
Thus, future studies could employ a larger representative sample sufficient to generalise the results. 
Second, the study investigates the impact of a limited set of firm-level internal CG mechanisms (i.e., 
Islamic values disclosure, board characteristics and ownership structure mechanisms) and country-
level variables (i.e., religion and quality of national governance) on voluntary CG compliance and 
disclosure practices. Future studies might examine the impact of other sets of internal CG mechanisms 
(e.g., board of directors’ efficiency and frequency of meetings, and existence and characteristics of 
the audit committee), along with other external CG characteristics (e.g., government regulations, 
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media exposure, market competition and takeover activities), and county-level cultural factors (e.g., 
cultural practices and social norms).  
Third, the current essay’s results depend on unweighted CG indices, and although these are 
generally robust, future studies might refine the analysis by employing a weighted CG index, after 
consulting independent professional organisations or finding a rigorously developed theoretical basis 
that rationalises the weightings of various CG provisions. Fourth, although the current study followed 
a number of procedures recommended in the literature to achieve a high level of reliability and 
validity, it was not possible to check the inter-coder reliability of the measurement index because the 
coding scheme was conducted by a single researcher, whose subjectivity may have affected the 
coding of the index. Therefore, future studies might compile a more reliable CG index by depending 
on more than one coder.  
Fifth, the current study relied mainly on the annual reports to collect CG provisions because 
these are perceived to be highly credible. However, using other sources of information, including 
reports from analysts and professional organisations, could extend the range of data. Sixth, the study 
employs only quantitative analysis in investigating the level and determinants of voluntary CG 
compliance and disclosure in MENA countries. Therefore, future studies might use both quantitative 
and qualitative analysis to interpret the results. Finally, this essay contributes to the literature by using 
the efficiency and legitimation inferences of neo-institutional theory to explain firms’ motivations for 
voluntary CG compliance and disclosure in MENA countries. However, future studies might depend 
on a multi-theoretical methodology (e.g., political cost theory, signalling theory, resource dependence 
theory and transaction cost theory) in order to arrive at a uniform theoretical framework that could be 
used to examine the antecedents of voluntary CG compliance and disclosure. 
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Abstract 
Despite a large number of previous studies examining the link between board diversity and 
corporate outcomes, the evidence is mixed. This essay investigates the impact of corporate board 
diversity based on gender, ethnic minorities and nationality on corporate outcomes, using data from 
a number of MENA countries. The study documents a positive and significant impact of diversified 
boards on both firm value and accounting returns. Specifically, it finds that appointing female 
directors improves firm market value and accounting returns, while foreign directors have a positive 
and significant effect on accounting performance. This study also shows that the relationship between 
the percentage of ethnic minority directors, foreign directors and firm accounting returns is stronger 
in weak-governed firms. Furthermore, the appointment of female and ethnic minority directors in 
boardrooms enhances the pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS). However, the study find no 
evidence for a significant effect of board diversity on executive-pay-packages (EP). The findings are 
robust across a number of corporate outcomes and different types of endogeneity. Overall, the results 
imply that recommendations and regulations concerning the appointment of women, ethnic minorities 
and foreigners to corporate boards should be based not only on moral implications but also on 
corporate outcome criteria in the MENA region and other developing countries.                   
        
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Board Diversity, Firm Outcome, Gender, Ethnicity, Nationality 
MENA. 
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1. Introduction  
 This essay aims to contribute to the literature on extant board composition and corporate 
outcomes in four main ways, by investigating whether: (i) board diversity based on gender, ethnic 
minority and nationality impacts firm market value and accounting returns; (ii) corporate governance 
(CG) quality moderates the relationship between board diversity and firm financial performance; (iii) 
appointing women, ethnic minorities and foreign directors determines EP; and (iv) board diversity 
moderates the PPS with specific focus on providing new empirical evidence from MENA countries. 
The analysis draws on multi-theoretical perspectives (e.g., agency, resource dependence, cognitive 
development, social identity and stakeholder).   
 
1.1 Background  
 The board of directors is one of the top decision-making sub-groups in modern organisations 
(Roberson and Park, 2007; Mahadeo et al., 2012; Bart and McQueen, 2013; Dale-Olsen et al., 2013; 
Luckerath-Rovers, 2013; Arnegger et al., 2014; Ntim, 2012b, 2015). Boards are associated with the 
responsibility for taking strategic decisions on mergers, acquisitions, hiring/firing/promoting 
executives and capital structure (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; 
Adams et al., 2010; Lincoln and Adedoyin, 2012; Abdullah, 2013; Ntim et al., 2016a). In addition, 
boards of directors help modern organisations to have better contacts with sources of finance, contacts 
and business contracts (Welbourne et al., 2007; Triana et al., 2013; Wellalage and Locke, 2013; 
Estélyi and Nisar, 2016). 
CG codes of best practices and reforms have focused mainly on the composition of the board 
of directors (e.g., size, independence, diversity) as an influential tool to enhance CG (Carter et al., 
2003, 2010; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Ntim, 2015). Appointing female, ethnic minority and non-
national members not only improves board diversity and brings different talents, skills, backgrounds 
and experience to boardrooms (Carter, 2003, 2010: Ntim, 2015; Gyapong et al., 2015), but also 
enhances board independence and monitoring functions (Jamail et al., 2007; Hillman et al., 2002; 
Kramer et al., 2007; Baranchuk and Dybvig, 2009). Therefore, emerging interest in diversifying 
corporate board membership is driven by many growing cultural, political and societal views (Carter 
et al., 2010). Furthermore, there is a global desire for improving CG measures following financial 
scandals and governance failure (Carter et al., 2010; Adams et al., 2015). One way to improve 
corporate boards’ governance role is to increase the number of women, ethnic minorities and 
foreigners (Rose, 2007; Carter et al., 2010; Terjesen et al., 2015a; Estélyi and Nisar, 2016). 
 Recently, diversifying boards on the basis of gender, ethnicity and nationality has become one 
of the evolving CG issues encountered by authoritative bodies in many countries (Adams and 
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Ferreira, 2009; Mahadeo et al., 2012; Gyapong et al., 2015). Recent legislative initiatives, especially 
regarding board gender diversity, have been driven by the perception that the appointment of female 
directors may enhance the effectiveness of organisational governance (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). 
Scandinavian countries have shown a significant interest in issuing legislation to specify quotas for 
the number of female directors on publicly traded firms and/or state-owned enterprises (Rose, 2007; 
Terjesen et al., 2015a). For example, Norway, Finland and Iceland passed laws in 2003, 2005 and 
2010, respectively requiring 40% of board members to be female. The European Commission also 
proposed legislation for a 40% female quota on the boards of listed companies by 2020 (European 
Union, 2012). Developing countries also recognise the importance of board diversity as a good CG 
mechanism. Accordingly, these emerging countries have issued either legislation for quotas for 
women directors, or CG codes recommending the appointment of women on corporate boards 
(Terjesen et al., 2015a). Kenya, for instance, passed a law in 2010 requiring 33% of the directors of 
state-owned enterprises to be women. Similarly, South Africa, Malawi and Nigeria issued codes of 
good governance that include board gender recommendations, in 2009, 2010 and 2011, respectively. 
 Board diversity is driven by two main motives. First is social equity or equality of opportunity 
(Carter et al., 2003; Terjesen et al., 2009, 2015; Torchia, et al., 2011; Gregory‐Smith et al., 2014; 
Gyapong et al., 2015). Appointing female, ethnic minority and foreign directors helps in building 
more inclusive and fair business institutions that better reflect the constituencies of existing 
stakeholders (Jamali et al., 2007; Terjesen et al., 2009, 2015a; Terjesen and Sealy, 2016). Despite a 
number of previous studies documenting empirical evidence to support the negative impact of gender 
diversity on firm performance (e.g., Smith et al., 2006; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Adhern and 
Dittmar, 2012), the proposals for appointing women to boards would be better based on the moral 
value of equal opportunity (Gregort-Smith et al., 2014). As Gregort-Smith et al. (2014:125) state, 
“The moral case that gender diversity is inherently valuable in and of itself does not require 
justification by citing performance effects”. Second, diversity improves corporate outcomes and 
increases shareholder value (Carter et al., 2003; Gyapong et al., 2015). Diversified boards incorporate 
talented human capital to improve CG and thereby corporate outcomes (Terjesen et al., 2009, 2015; 
Ntim, 2015; Gyapong et al., 2015; Post and Byron, 2015; Estélyi and Nisar, 2016; Terjesen and Sealy, 
2016). 
 
1.2 Motivation   
Apart from the distinctive context pursued, many previous studies have argued that the 
association between board diversity and firm value may not just be influenced by organisation-level 
variations (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Goodstein et al., 1994), but 
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also by differences in country-level regulatory and institutional structures (Van der Walt and Ingley, 
2003; Singh and Vinnicombe, 2004; Singh, 2007; Byron and Post, 2016). Thus country-level 
institutions may influence the strength of the relationship between board diversity and corporate 
outcomes (Adams et al., 2015; Byron and Post, 2016; Estélyi and Nisar, 2016). Despite this 
development, most previous studies investigating the association between board diversity and firm 
value have been conducted in developed countries like Australia, the US and Denmark, which have 
relatively similar institutional contexts (Carter et al., 2003; Smith et al., 2006; Kang et al., 2007; 
Rose, 2007; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Carter et al., 2010), with only a limited number of studies 
investigating emerging markets like China and South Africa (Liu et al., 2014; Gyapong et al., 2015; 
Ntim, 2015). Furthermore, most of the studies conducted in developed countries are concerned with 
board diversity on the basis of gender (Shrader et al., 1997; Burges and Tharenou, 2002; Erhardt et 
al., 2003; Welbourne et al., 2007; Johnston and Malina, 2008; Dobbin and Jung, 2011; Lincoln and 
Adedoyin, 2012; Abdullah, 2013; Luckerath-Rovers, 2013). Despite the increasing interest in 
examining the impact of board diversity on corporate outcomes worldwide, the Middle East remains 
one of the few regions where this aspect has been seriously neglected (Piesse et al., 2012; Hasan et 
al., 2014). The economic, political, legal, cultural and CG structures in MENA countries differ from 
those of other areas, which limits the generalisability of their results (Jamali et al., 2007; Metcalfe, 
2007; Samaha et al., 2012; Hasan et al., 2014). MENA countries as emerging economies have a 
unique regulatory, culture and institutional context (as will be illustrated in the next section), so the 
impact of board diversity on the basis of gender, ethnicity and nationality on corporate outcomes may 
be different from that documented for public corporations operating in developed countries. 
 
1.3 Contributions  
Adams et al. (2015) argues that the mixed findings in the literature on the relationship between 
diversity and corporate outcomes can be due to differences across studies in measures of performance, 
methodologies, time horizons, omitted variable biases and other contextual issues. Thus, this essay 
investigates the implications of appointing female, ethnic minority and foreign board members on the 
organisational outcomes in MENA countries, thereby enhancing the literature with a number of 
distinctive contributions. First, this study uniquely uses a sample of firms listed in five MENA 
countries to provide evidence on the relationship between diversity and firm outcomes. As explained 
above, empirical evidence to date is largely from developed countries (Kang et al., 2007; Gyapong et 
al., 2015; Ntim, 2015), and their findings may not be generalisable across contexts with varied 
regulatory and economic environments, cultural differences, market size and development of CG 
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measures. Accordingly, the impact of board diversity on corporate outcomes should be separately 
investigated in different countries (Kang et al., 2007).          
Second, the study offers new critical insights on the impact of board diversity on corporate 
outcomes. It considers gender, ethnicity and nationality, unusual in the literature. While the majority 
of studies investigate the impact of board gender diversity on corporate outcomes (Carter et al., 2010; 
Ntim, 2015), it is argued that ethnic, national and gender diversity are dissimilar phenomena, and 
they will impact corporate outcomes in different ways (Hillman et al., 2002, Carter et al., 2010; Ntim, 
2015; Gyapong et al., 2015). Third, this study aims to shed light on a more comprehensive impact of 
gender, ethnic and nationality board diversity on different aspects of firm outcome. Although most 
studies have investigated the impact of board diversity on financial performance (i.e., accounting 
returns and/or firm market value) (Campbell and Minguez-vera, 2008; Carter et al., 2006, 2010; 
Luckerath-Rovers, 2013; Ntim, 2015, Gyapong et al., 2015), a limited number have examined the 
association between board diversity and EP (e.g., Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Elkinawya and Staterb, 
2011; Vieito, 2012). Fourth, the study documents evidence on the relative impact of gender versus 
ethnic and nationality diversity on different organisational outcomes. Fifth, this essay is distinct from 
previous studies in that it depends on a multi-theory (agency, resource dependence, cognitive 
development, social identity and stakeholder) framework to infer the results. Finally, the study uses 
different econometric methods to ensure the robustness of the results. 
 
1.4 Structure of the essay  
The rest of the essay is structured as follows. The second section provides a brief overview of 
the social and cultural context of board diversity within the MENA region. The third section 
documents the existing theoretical and empirical literature on the impact of board diversity on 
different corporate outcomes. The fourth section presents the research design. The fifth section reports 
empirical analyses, whilst the final section contains the summary and conclusion. 
 
2. Social and Cultural Context of Board Diversity within the MENA 
Region 
 Recent corporate scandals have directed more attention to CG mechanisms (Hasan et al., 
2014), mainly the importance of board of directors’ roles, effectiveness and the board composition, 
with particular interest on board diversity (Hyland and Marcellino, 2002; Burke, 2003; Carter et al., 
2003, 2010). The MENA region has also recognised the importance of diversifying boards to improve 
corporate outcomes (Jamali et al., 2007; Ibrahim and Hanefah, 2014; Loukil and Yousfi, 2016). The 
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events of the Arab Spring seemed to initiate a demand for change throughout the region, reflecting 
new aspirations. Young people, especially women, wanted to play a greater role in society, with better 
economic opportunities. In addition, women in MENA countries today are generally younger, better 
educated, and have fewer children (Jamali et al., 2007; Chamlou, 2008; World Bank, 2013). 
Moreover, most MENA countries have made significant progress toward education and health 
outcomes and gender equality. According to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 
(2010), MENA countries have made the world’s fastest progress in human development since 1970 
(five MENA countries, Algeria, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia, were among the top ten 
fastest movers). However, this investment in human development is not yet reflected in higher rates 
of female participation in senior management positions, on corporate boards, and in the labour force 
in general: it is ‘a gender equality paradox’11 (Jamali et al., 2007; Metcalfe, 2007; World Bank, 2013). 
 In a cross-country study, Terjesen and Singh (2008) find that boards’ gender diversity is 
influenced by social, political and economic macro-environmental factors. Thus, specific national 
contextual factors such as social norms, legal framework and structure of the economy can have a 
powerful influence on the incentives, preferences, opportunities and ability of women to participate 
in work and politics (Metcalfe, 2007; World Bank, 2013). Therefore, in this section the current study 
attempts to explore the ‘gender equality paradox’ in the MENA region by finding new important 
empirical insights on social norms, legal framework, and the structure of the economy in the MENA 
region. 
 
2.1 MENA Dominated Culture, Traditions, Customs, Norms and Beliefs 
MENA countries have inherited cultural practices, traditions, customs and beliefs that are 
biased against women and support the dominance of men (Jamali et al., 2007; Metcalfe, 2007; World 
Bank, 2013). According to Chamlou (2008), the World Values Survey 1999-2004 shows that both 
men’s and women’s perceptions of working women are less positive in the MENA region than 
elsewhere.  The variation in male and female perception of working women also is far wider in the 
MENA region. Men’s less favourable attitude toward working women may affect women’s 
participation in the labour force, especially because women have to obtain the permission of their 
husbands to travel and work in most Middle East countries. More negative attitudes toward working 
                                               
11 In fact the female labour force grew by 5.2% during the period 2000-2005 compared to 4.7% during the 1990s. 
Women’s share in the labour force rose from 25% in the period from 1990 to 2000 to 27% from 2000 to 2005, where new 
female entrants in the labour market rose from 32% in the 1990s to 36% in 2005 (World Bank, 2007). The increase in the 
number of women entering the labour market is because of rising education, falling fertility and growing economies 
(Chamlou, 2008). However, given the general increase in unemployment in the MENA region, the female unemployment 
rates are higher than for men. For example, despite, male unemployment rates decreasing in Bahrain, Iran, Jordan and 
Tunisia, female unemployment rates increased. Egypt, with the largest gender unemployment gap in the region, recorded 
unemployment for women four times that for men (World Bank, 2007). 
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women also hinder female participation in top management positions and on corporate boards. Using 
focus-group research in Jordan, Miles (2002) shows that the limited economic participation of women 
in communities in and around Amman are driven by gender norms related to their restricted mobility, 
household burdens, occupational segregation and preference for male children. Miles reports, for 
example, that families are more willing to use their connections to help their educated sons, rather 
than their educated daughters, to secure good jobs.  
Undeniably, religion has played a significant role in the evolution of customs, social norms 
and laws in the MENA region (World Bank, 2013; Syed and Van Buren, 2014). In Muslim-majority 
countries, culture and religion are mutually reinforcing (Metcalfe, 2007; Syed and Van Buren, 2014). 
Within Islam both women and men have equal rights for work and compensation (Syed and Van 
Buren, 2014), and Islam equally binds both women and men to seek education as a religious duty 
(Ibn Majah, 1952). Islam also allows women to operate their own business (Hassan, 1994), and 
recognises a woman’s economic rights (Hussain, 1987). Hussain further argues that in Islam, women 
have economic, political and social separate identities, and the right to earn money and vote. Islamic 
traditions place significant value on women as mothers; men are responsible for supporting their 
families economically, so women are less likely to seek paid jobs unless they are forced by special 
circumstances or for their personal fulfilment (Chamlou, 2008; Syed and Van Buren, 2014). However, 
much of the Islamic impetus for gender equality in educational, economic and employment rights has 
been modified because of the influence of pre-existing attitudes, customs and traditions (Hussain, 
1987; Mernissi, 1991; Lewis, 1995). Women in many Muslim-majority countries still face relatively 
higher gender discrimination than women in the West, because of the narrow interpretation of Islamic 
female modesty and gender segregation (Ali, 2000; Syed et al., 2005; Syed and Van Buren, 2014). 
 
2.2 Legal Framework in MENA Countries 
 Equal citizenship is stated in almost all MENA countries’ constitutions. According to the 
World Bank Women Business and the Law database, ten of the 14 MENA countries have 
constitutions or laws that mandate gender equal pay for equal work, and five have legislation that 
prohibits discrimination in employment practices (World Bank, 2012). However, the practical 
enforcement of anti-discrimination laws in countries like Algeria and Egypt is not effective. The 
provisions for gender equality payment are not applied efficiently in practice as many non-wage 
benefits, such as child and family allowances, are usually paid to the husband (Kelly and Breslin, 
2010). All countries in the MENA region mandate laws that require firms to pay for maternity leave 
and child-care facilities. On the other hand, pension laws stipulate an earlier retirement age for women 
than for men. In the MENA region, women’s participation in numerous sectors of the economy is 
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limited by laws that ban women from working in certain industries that are considered dangerous, 
hazardous, or morally harmful to their reputation, or involve night work; this is in order to protect 
women (World Bank, 2013). Likewise, many MENA countries have guardianship laws that restrict 
women’s mobility and occupational choices. These laws require permission from a husband or male 
relative for a woman to obtain a passport, travel outside the country, apply for a job and get married. 
For example, Jordan, Iran, Oman, Saudi Arabia and Yemen have issued laws that require male 
permission for women to travel outside the country. Gender discriminating pension laws effectively 
reduce the amount of pension that a woman receives, and can negatively impact women’s expected 
career progression (World Bank, 2013). 
 
2.3 Economic Structure and Institutional Context in MENA Countries 
 Most listed companies in MENA countries have highly concentrated ownership, with 
dominance of the state and family controls (Fawzy, 2003; Jamali et al., 2007; Omran et al., 2008; 
Ararat et al., 2010; Weir, 2011; Piesse et al., 2012; Hasan et al., 2014). Smith (2009) documents that 
75% of the region’s companies are controlled by families. Powerful families in the MENA region 
tend to actively shape the board of directors by choosing one of their own inner circle (a close relative 
or senior manager) to be appointed to the board, so the family continues to influence and control the 
decision-making process (Jamali et al., 2007; Weir, 2011). Loukil and Yousfi (2016) report that the 
director’s effect on corporate outcomes (cash holding and investment opportunities) is maximised if 
the director is a state officer/bureaucrat and/or politically connected. In their exploratory study in 
Egypt and Saudi Arabia, Piesse et al. (2012) find that board independence is influenced by the powers 
of large shareholders (families and state). A better overall governance environment and investment 
climate, with greater emphasis on qualifications and meritocracy, would have a positive impact on 
women’s opportunity to compete for jobs. Conversely, wide corruption, poor governance and weak 
rule of law in MENA societies may negatively impact women’s participation in the workforce, and 
their opportunities for appointment to top management positions and boardrooms, because preference 
might be given to those (men) with connections (Chamlou, 2008). Most MENA countries began to 
introduce economic and governance reforms in the mid-1990s, aiming for more market-driven, open 
and diversified economies; this was well after the collapse of oil prices in the mid-1980s (World 
Bank, 2007; Piesse et al., 2012; Aljifri et al., 2014). More recently, corporations in MENA countries 
have begun to attract a significant number of foreign equity investors,12 many of which are holding 
                                               
12 According to the World Bank (2007), the MENA region witnessed a huge raise in foreign direct investment (FDI) that 
records $24.4 billion with 40 percent increase in 2006, and three times the level of 2004.  This is can be a result of the 
completion of major privatization reforms in the region and increase investment in energy, infrastructure, real estate and 
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companies listed on stock exchanges with stricter listing requirements than existing standards on 
MENA stock exchanges (Jamali et al., 2007; World Bank, 2007). Thus, it is expected that foreign 
investors influence the composition of the board of directors, for example by asking for diversification 
of the board to include female, ethnic minority and foreign members (Jamali et al., 2007; Estélyi and 
Nisar, 2016). 
Many governments in the MENA region responded to the Arab Spring in the wake of earlier 
(2011) protests by increasing spending on subsidies and public sector wages. Consequently, public 
sector employment and compensation increased at the expense of private sector job creation. 
According to the World Bank (2013), on average, the public sector in MENA countries accounts for 
45% of total employment. However, there is a recent trend for the proportion of public sector jobs to 
decline, especially in the resource-poor countries (e.g., Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and 
Lebanon). In the MENA region many women prefer to work in the public sector especially in 
“female-friendly” fields such as teaching and administration, especially as private sector employers 
tend to perceive women as less productive and more costly. In conclusion, many women are 
discouraged from entering the workforce after graduation, because of the lack of suitable public sector 
jobs and the difficulty of finding attractive private employment (Assad, 2006; Chamlou, 2008; World 
Bank, 2013). 
 
3 Theoretical Framework, Literature Review and Development of 
Hypotheses  
 3.1 Board Diversity and Firm Performance 
The main functions of the board of directors are controlling and monitoring managers, 
providing advice and counsel to managers, monitoring organisational compliance with applicable 
rules and legislation, and connecting the organisation to the external environment (Lipton and Lorsch, 
1992; Jensen, 1993; Mallin, 2004; Monks and Minow, 2004; Lincoln and Adedoyin, 2012; Abdullah, 
2013). Many theories have been used to investigate the association between board diversity and firm 
performance, including resource dependence theory, human capital theory, agency theory, 
stakeholder theory and social psychology theory. The arguments driven by these theories suggest that 
the gender, ethnic and nationality diversity of board members may impact firm value either positively, 
negatively or neutrally (Kang et al., 2007; Singh, 2007; Campbell and Minquez-Vera, 2008; Du 
Plessis, 2008; Carter et al., 2010; Ntim, 2015; Estélyi and Nisar, 2016).  
                                               
tourism sectors. For example the FDI in Egypt increases to $6.1 billion in 2006, due to investment in telecommunications, 
banking sector and oil and gas. 
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3.1.1 Agency Theory 
Agency theory suggests that more diversified boards are more independent and better able to 
perform their monitoring function (Kesner, 1988; Carter et al., 2003; Van der Walt and Ingley, 2003; 
Johnston and Malina, 2008; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Lincoln and Adedoyin, 2012; Triana et al., 
2013; Abdullah, 2014). Females, foreigners and ethnic minorities as sub-groups are more coordinated 
and effective in their monitoring role (Adams and Ferrira, 2009; Gul et al., 2011; Butler, 2012; 
Gyapong et al., 2015), and thus the appointment of women, foreigners and different ethnic directors 
reduces the extent of agency conflict (Ntim et al., 2012a; Xiao and Zahoo, 2014) and enhances firm 
value (Ntim, 2015; Estélyi and Nisar, 2016). Adams and Ferreira (2009) find that not only do women 
directors have better attendance records than men, but also that the presence of women on boards 
improves male attendance records, and that females are more likely to joint monitoring committees 
(e.g., audit, nominating and CG) which indicates that gender diversified boards perform their 
monitoring function more efficiently. Estélyi and Nisar (2016) suggest that foreign directors improve 
performance through their positive effect on the board monitoring function (high attendance records 
not only for foreign national directors but also for the whole board, with foreign directors sitting on 
audit and CG committees). Estélyi and Nisar also argue that foreign directors are more likely to 
improve their reputation in labour capital markets as good monitors. Board gender, nationality and 
ethnicity diversity enhances the decision-making process by adding various ideas, skills, 
backgrounds, perspectives and business knowledge (Watson et al., 1993; Gilbert and Stead, 1999; 
Baranchuk and Dybvig, 2009; Luckerath-Rovers, 2013), increasing the board’s ability to deal with 
different opportunities and challenges in the organisational external environment (Ntim, 2015). 
Kandel and Lazear (1992) argue that group diversity helps in controlling ‘freeriding’, as greater 
diversity among team members increases mutual monitoring.  
 On the other hand, agency theory argues that qualified women directors tend to hold multiple 
directorships (Sealy et al., 2008). This ‘director busyness’ has a negative impact on their ability to 
provide their monitoring and advisory roles, increasing agency problems and thereby reducing firm 
value (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Jiraporn et al., 2009; Faleye et al., 2011; Falato et al., 2014; Field 
et al., 2014). Women and ethnic minorities may lack the necessary level of skills, qualifications and 
experience required for directorship (Hillman et al., 2002; Terjesen et al., 2009), as women, compared 
to men, may have lower levels of investment in education and work experience (Tharenou et al., 
1994). Thus, the monitoring and advisory roles of the board will be affected negatively by the 
appointment of women and ethnic minorities, and consequently the firm value will decrease 
(Gyapong et al., 2015). Adams and Ferreira (2009) argue that management may choose not to 
distribute important strategic information to boards which provide intense monitoring. Therefore, 
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firm value may decrease as a result of the reduction in the quality of the advisory role provided by 
female and ethnic directors (Upadhyay, 2014). 
 
3.1.2 Resource Dependence Theory 
Resource dependence theory argues that the appointment of women, foreigners and ethnic 
minority directors increases board legitimacy (Carter et al., 2003; Branco and Rodrigues, 2008; Liao 
and Yu, 2012; Liu et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2014; Saeidi et al., 2015). This legitimacy is associated 
with gaining stakeholders’ appreciation, increased capital inflows, investment opportunities, 
government support and community acceptance (Goodstein et al., 1994; Westphal and Bednar, 2005; 
Mahadeo et al., 2011; Arnegger et al., 2014; Loukil and Yousfi, 2016). Consequently, this will be 
positively associated with increase in firm value (Gyapong et al., 2015; Ntim, 2015). Estélyi and 
Nisar (2016) and Masulis et al. (2012) also suggest that foreign directors bring differing perspectives 
and contracts to the board and facilitate access to different national and international markets, 
enhancing geographic and product diversification and thereby firm performance. Miletkova et al. 
(2014) argue that foreign directors may provide advice, using their expertise and business networks, 
to large firms with rapidly growing foreign operations that need access to global capital markets. The 
international expertise and business networks of foreign directors could facilitate their firms’ access 
to global capital markets. Similarly, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) and Hillman et al. (2000) argue that 
the board of directors links the organisation to the external environment through performing the 
following functions: providing information, perspectives and expertise, connecting the organisation 
with important constituents, getting support from important stakeholders in the external environment, 
and creating legitimacy for the organisation in the external environment. Consequently, more 
diversified boards help organisations to gain important resources that may improve performance and 
outcomes (Carter et al., 2010).   
 
3.1.3 Psychology/Cognitive Development Theory  
Cognitive development theory argues that since children recognise their gender during their 
first years, they are motivated to pursue gender-compatible behaviour and characteristics (Lewis and 
Brooks-Gunn, 1979:270). Children also identify their gender differences instinctively without any 
external influences (Cazden, 1968), and naturally use a developing gender schema to deal with 
information (Bem, 1983). This means that gender schematic processing affects the way of taking 
decisions (Bem, 1983), so natural gender cognitive behaviour drives the process by which men and 
women make the decisions that have an effect on firm value (Gyapong et al., 2016). Sunden and 
Surette (1998) and Loukil and Yousfi (2015) argue that women are less confident and more likely to 
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take risk-averse decisions than men. These characteristics improve a board’s ability to take strategic 
decisions (Carter et al., 2010). Women fill their monitoring role better than men as a result of their 
inquisitive nature (Carter et al., 2003). Consequently, board diversity on the basis of gender improves 
a firm’s earning capacity and CG quality, and thereby its value (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Gul et al., 
2011). Gender-diverse boards are more likely to consider, discuss and integrate available information 
deeply and extensively (Post and Byron, 2015) because female directors tend to value 
interdependency, benevolence and tolerance (Adams and Funk, 2012). These values help elicit 
information and perspectives from, and enhance collaboration among, all board members (Post and 
Byron, 2015). Bart and McQueen (2013) find that female directors prefer the cooperative decision 
making that helps in taking fair decisions, particularly with regard to competing interests, while male 
directors are more likely to use rules, regulations and traditional ways of doing business. Similarly, 
Rosener (1995) argues that women in top management positions are characterised by flexible and 
better dealing with ambiguous situations than males, and that these characteristics are essential for 
the success of modern organisations, especially those working in high-risk environments. Likewise, 
diversified boards whose members have different cognitive abilities improve creativity and 
innovation in decision making (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992; Carter et al., 2003; Welbourne et al., 
2007; Lincoln and Adedoyin, 2012; Bart and McQueen, 2013), and thereby improve firm value 
(Ntim, 2015). 
 
3.1.4 Social Identity Theory 
On the other hand, social identity theory argues that more diverse boards, with different 
backgrounds, ideas and perceptions, have a heterogeneous working environment which includes a 
number of sub-groups based on race, gender or nationality. Thus, board diversity may increase 
communication problems and thereby degrade the board’s decision-making process and increase 
organisational and operational risk (Smith et al., 1994, Lau and Murnighan, 1998, Westphal and 
Milton, 2000; Carter et al., 2010; Dumas et al., 2013; Delias et al., 2016). Westphal and Milton (2000) 
argue that demographic diversity weakens the social cohesion in boardrooms. Thus, majority 
viewpoints will dominate board decisions and individual directors will be unable to influence the 
boards. Similarly, Campbell and Mínguez-Vera (2008) suggest that the appointment of women 
directors introduces conflicting viewpoints and unnecessary critical thinking that delays and 
negatively impacts the decision-making process. 
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3.1.5 Stakeholder Theory 
Gender, national and ethnic diversity reflecting stakeholders and society constituents has 
become a recent requirement for investment choices among a large number of investors and funds 
(Jamali et al., 2007; Estélyi and Nisar, 2016). Thus, stakeholder theory argues that the appointment 
of women and ethnic minorities enhances the organisation’s connections with its stakeholders, such 
as customers and suppliers, and may improve its reputation and value (Shrader et al., 1997; Ryan and 
Haslam, 2007; Mahadeo et al., 2012; Wellalage and Locke, 2013), and improve access to new 
markets (Carter et., 2003). Female directors are found to have new and different understandings of 
customer markets (Bilimoria and Wheeler, 2000; Carter et al., 2003; Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 
2008), a more diverse set of network interests, and greater interest in philanthropy and community 
service (Groysberg and Bell, 2013). Accordingly, female directors with different interests and social 
networks may enhance a board’s insights with regard to the firm’s multiple stakeholders (Post and 
Byron, 2015). Firms are more likely to appoint foreign directors to mirror their shareholder population 
(Estélyi and Nisar, 2016). Diversified boards can serve as a tool to signal to investors and markets 
that they can deal with operating challenges (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992; Goodstein et al., 1994). 
In line with this inconsistency in the theoretical literature on the expected impact of board 
diversity on firm performance, previous studies have offered mixed empirical evidence for the 
association between diversified boards and firm performance (e.g., Zahra and Stanton, 1988; 
Wiersema and Bantel, 1992; Shrader et al., 1997; Carter et al., 2003, 2010; Ujunwa, 2012; Dale-
Olsen et al., 2013; Post and Byron, 2015). The first group of studies has reported a positive impact 
of board heterogeneity on performance. In the context of developed countries, Carter et al. (2003), 
Campbell and Minguez-vera (2008), Francoeur et al. (2008) and Luckerath-Rovers (2013) find 
empirical evidence of the positive impact of diversified boards on firm value in the US, Netherlands, 
Spain and Canada, respectively. Erhardt et al. (2003) investigated the link between board 
demographic diversity and firm performance in a total of 127 large US companies for 1993 and 1998. 
Their findings suggest a positive association between board diversity and financial performance. 
Based on 1,085 firms listed on the London and North American stock exchanges during the period 
1999 to 2012, Delis et al. (2016) find that appointing board members from countries with different 
levels of diversity (i.e., social, cultural, physiological and institutional characteristics) improves 
performance. Using data from UK listed firms over the period 2001-2011, Estélyi and Nisar (2016) 
report that nationality-diverse boards are significantly associated with shareholder heterogeneity, 
product market diversification, firms’ international market operations and operating performance. 
Similarly, but in a developing country context, Mahadeo et al. (2012), Abdullah (2013), Wellalage 
and Locke (2013) and Ntim (2015) document a positive association between diversified boards and 
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firm value in Mauritius, Malaysia, Sri Lanka and South Africa, respectively. Gyapong et al. (2015), 
using data from 245 South African listed firms from 2008-2013, find a positive and significant effect 
of both gender and ethnic diversity on firm value. Also, Ntim (2015), using 169 South African listed 
firms from 2003 to 2007, finds board diversity based on women and ethnic minorities have a positive 
relationship with firm value.   
On the other hand, another group of studies has found a negative effect of board diversity on 
firm performance (e.g., Watson et al., 1993; Shrader et al., 1997; Hillman et al., 2007; Ujunwa 2012; 
Ujunwa et al., 2012; Dale-Olsen et al., 2013). The results of these studies suggest that not only women 
and ethnic minorities have a token status on the board but they may also have financial consequences 
for the organisation, resulting in a negative impact on firm value (Ntim, 2015). Adams and Ferreira 
(2009), investigating the impact of female directors on board inputs and corporate outcomes in a 
sample of 1,939 firms for 1998-2003, find that gender diversity has a negative impact on performance, 
which further suggests that assigning gender quotas may have a negative impact on performance in 
better governed firms. Surveying Danish firms, Smith et al. (2006) also find a negative effect of board 
gender diversity on firm performance. A third set of empirical studies (e.g., Zahra and Stanton, 1988; 
Farrell and Hersch, 2005; Westphal and Bednar, 2005; Rose, 2007; Gregory-Smith et al., 2014) has 
documented no link between board diversity and firm value. For example, Carter et al. (2010) 
examine the relation between appointment of women and ethnic minority members of the board and 
board committees and financial performance for a sample of 641 US firms for the five-year period 
1998-2002. They document no significant impact of diversified boards and performance, which 
supports the contingency explanation that board gender and ethnic diversity have different effects on 
performance under different circumstances at different times. Consequently, the various results may 
offset each other to produce no effect. In the Danish context, Rose (2007) also finds no significant 
association between board diversity based on gender and Tobin’s Q.  
Most developing countries, including the MENA region, have adopted a set of CG guidelines 
inspired by the OECD’s CG principles (Ararat et al., 2010). These principles emphasise some issues 
related to corporate board composition, such as its size and independence, in addition to the 
construction and functions of board committees (e.g., audit, compensation and nomination 
committees) in enhancing board effectiveness. For example, the Jordanian CG code 2012, which is 
based upon the “comply-or-explain” principle, recommends that the structure of boards of directors 
should take into consideration a balanced mix of age, gender and experience in order to achieve its 
roles and responsibilities. Although several MENA countries have established CG codes, there is still 
a deficit of empirical studies investigating the effect of best practice on improving corporate outcomes 
(Bishara, 2011; Hasan et al., 2014). In the MENA context, M’hamid et al. (2011) document that 
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female presence in the boardroom has a positive impact on Tunisian firms’ performance. Aliani et al. 
(2011) illustrate the effectiveness of women’s monitoring role in Tunisian boardrooms, and find that 
gender diversity helps in minimising tax optimisation. Furthermore, using a sample of 30 Tunisian-
listed firms between 1997 and 2010, Loukil and Yousfi (2015) find that women have a risk perception 
that leads to risk-avoidance behaviour, as the presence of women directors is positively associated 
with cash ratio. Using 95 listed firms on the Istanbul stock exchange in 2006, Ararat et al. (2010) find 
that a more diverse board (based on gender, age, education and nationality) is positively associated 
with board monitoring intensity and firm performance. They also find that the monitoring intensity 
mediates the relation between board diversity and firm performance. The current study tries to resolve 
many deficiencies in these studies. First, they examine a single country (e.g., Aliani et al. (2011) and 
Loukil and Yousfi (2015) from Tunisia; Ararat et al. (2010) from Turkey), while the current study 
uses a cross-country design for better generalisation of the results. Second, they depend on a small 
sample size, for example, Ararat et al.’s (2010) 95 observations for one year, 2006. Thus, based on 
these arguments and mixed results, the first hypothesis is as follows:  
H1. There is an association between board diversity on the basis of gender, ethnicity and 
nationality, and firm performance. 
 
3.2 Moderating Effect of Corporate Governance on the Relationship between 
Board Diversity and Firm Performance 
Although, the association between board diversity and firm performance may be affected by 
organisation-level heterogeneities (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; 
Goodstein et al., 1994), it is probably also affected by variation in country-level regulations, CG 
reforms and institutional features (Ntim, 2015; Post and Byron, 2015; Byron and Post, 2016). Firms 
might use their internal CG mechanisms (e.g., board charactristics and ownership structure 
mechanisms) to compensate for a poor legal environment and enhance investors’ protection in 
aligning managers’ and shareholders’ interests (Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002; Klapper and Love, 
2004), thereby improving firm performance (Yermack, 1996; Gompers et al, 2003; Castrillo et al., 
2010). Gul et al. (2011) suggest that board diversity substitutes other CG measures in monitoring 
firms. Therefore, board diversity’s positive impact on firm value is more observable in weakly 
governed firms (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Gul et al., 2011). In well governed firms, the extra 
monitoring provided by diversified boards may lead to negative effects on value (Adams and Ferreira, 
2009; Gul et al., 2011). For example, Adams and Ferreira (2007) argue that the CEO is less likely to 
communicate with boards that provide more monitoring intensity. Furthermore, strong board 
monitoring discourages the CEO from carrying out risky projects with high NPV. Adams and Ferreira 
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(2009) also document that gender-diversified boards improve the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm 
market value (tougher monitoring of the CEO). As a result, management may choose not to distribute 
important strategic information to boards which provide intense monitoring (Adams and Ferreira, 
2009), so the firm value may decrease as a result of the reduction in the quality of the advisory role 
provided by women and ethnic directors (Upadhyay, 2014). On the other hand, Gyapong et al. (2015) 
suggest that developing countries, compared to developed countries, have weaker investor protection 
and a weaker external regulatory environment. Thus, the additional monitoring function performed 
by female directors is of more value in firms with strong CG mechanisms. This is supported by the 
findings of Miletkov et al. (2014) which confirm that, in countries with lower levels of investor 
protection, the presence of foreign directors is associated with positive impact on operating 
performance.   
The implication of the firm’s regulatory and CG context on the association between board 
diversity and firm performance has been investigated widely in developed countries (Adams and 
Ferreira, 2009; Gul et al., 2011) but less so in developing countries (Gyapong et al., 2015). Therefore, 
this essay investigates whether the association between board diversity and firm performance is 
affected by the firm’s CG in the MENA context where sound CG mechanisms may work to substitute 
for weak investor protection and regulatory environment. Developing countries, including the MENA 
region, are characterised by concentrated ownership that is dominated by families and governments 
(Jamali et al., 2007; Omran et al., 2008; Piesse et al., 2012; Samaha et al., 2012). Furthermore, these 
countries have a weak external corporate regulatory environment, weak legal enforcement, and 
inadequate external discipline by the market for corporate control (LaPorta et al., 2000; Ntim et al., 
2012a; Khalil and Ozkan, 2016). Accordingly, these features participate in reducing shareholders’ 
rights and increasing agency problems (Gyapong et al., 2015).  
Using empirical evidence from the US, Adams and Ferreira (2009) and Gul et al. (2011) 
confirm that board gender diversity is strongly associated with firm performance and stock price 
informativeness, respectively for firms with weak governance. This means that gender-diverse boards 
might act as a substitute mechanism for weak CG. However, in the South African context Gyapong 
et al. (2015) find that the additional monitoring function performed by minority ethnic directors is 
more value-relevant than that performed by female directors in better governed firms.  Given the 
previous theoretical and empirical literature, the second hypothesis is as follows:   
H2. The strength of the association between board diversity based on gender, nationality 
and ethnic minority directors, and firm performance is weaker/stronger in better-
governed firms. 
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3.3 The Association between Board Diversity and Executive Pay (EP) 
Executive pay (EP) is highly influenced by the efficiency of the board’s control and 
monitoring (Lambert et al., 1993; Boyd 1994; Lin, 2005: Ozkan, 2007; Conyon and He, 2011; Ntim 
et al., 2016a). Agency theory argues that board members monitor managers on behalf of stockholders 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976), to align the interests of managers with those of shareholders (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Estélyi and Nisar, 2016). The monitoring role of directors includes, for example, hiring 
and firing top managers and determining EP (Monks and Minow, 1995).  
In general, the association between good CG practice and EP can be interpreted from two 
main perspectives of agency theory: optimal contracting theory (OCT) and managerial power 
hypothesis (MPH) (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Bebchuk et al., 2002; Bebchuk and Fried, 2004, 2005; 
Edmans and Gabaix, 2009; Andreas et al., 2012). OCT argues that firms with independent corporate 
boards perform arms-length negotiations with executives in order to set EP schemes that are able to 
optimise executive performance (Edmans and Gabaix, 2009; Conyon, 2014). Thus, OCT assumes 
that more diversified boards have an essential impact on the effectiveness of the board of directors, 
since they are able to constrain managers from expropriating shareholders’ wealth by enhancing the 
controlling and monitoring role of the board (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Gul et al., 2011; Ntim, 2015; 
Gyapong et al., 2015), as well as by bringing diverse talents, backgrounds, ideas, knowledge and 
experience to the board (Carter et al., 2003; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Triana et al., 2013; Abdullah, 
2014). Accordingly, agency theory suggests that managers’ payment is associated with their efforts 
to ensure that directors and executives behave in the interest of shareholders (Adams and Ferreira, 
2009); thus, better governed firms (more diversified boards) are less likely to overpay their executives 
(Stulz, 1988).  
In contrast, MPH suggests that EP packages are set by opportunistic corporate executives in 
firms with weak CG structures (Bebchuk et al., 2002; Bebchuck and Fried, 2004). Accordingly, MPH 
proposes that women and minority ethnic board members are perceived as tokens (Hillman et al., 
2007; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Kristie, 2011; Abdullah, 2014) and are appointed to boards mainly 
for symbolic reasons (Carter et al., 2003; Terjesen et al., 2009, 2015; Torchia et al., 2011; Gregory‐
Smith et al., 2014; Gyapong et al., 2015). Thus, corporate executives can influence the decisions of 
more diversified boards, especially those relating to the structure and level of EP. Westphal and Zajac 
(1995) find evidence that CEOs are more likely to attempt to influence the hiring of directors who 
have similar demographic characteristics to themselves. They also document that in firms where 
CEOs and directors share similar demographic attributes, CEOs are more likely to be awarded higher 
salaries. 
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Although a number of prior studies have documented the positive association between board 
diversity and firm performance (e.g., Carter et al., 2003; Campbell and Minguez-vera, 2008; 
Luckerath-Rovers, 2013; Ntim, 2015; Gyapong et al., 2015), studies investigating the impact of 
gender, ethnicity and nationality on EP are rare, and thus this study provides a timely contribution to 
the extant literature. For example, Adams and Ferreira (2009) document that directors on gender-
diversified boards receive comparatively more equity-based compensation, which provides more 
performance-based incentives, while they have found no statistical evidence for the impact of board 
gender diversity on CEO compensation. They argue that the absence of the relation between a high 
percentage of female directors on boards and CEOs’ pay is consistent with lower representation of 
women in compensation committees. Using unbalanced panel data composed of 62,418 firm-year 
observations from US listed firms during 1992 to 2004, Vieito (2012) reports that female CEOs are 
better than male CEOs at improving performance, and that there is a smaller compensation gap 
between the CEO and company vice-presidents (VPs). Using data from US listed firms from 1996 to 
2004, Elkinawya and Staterb (2011) report that more female directors appointed to boards improves 
gender equality in executives’ salary. Given the previous theoretical and empirical literature, the third 
hypothesis is as follows: 
H3. There is an association between board diversity based on gender, nationality and ethnic 
minority directors, and executive pay. 
 
3.4 Moderating Effect of Board Diversity on the Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity 
(PPS) 
Agency theory has been developed as a result of the separation of ownership and control, 
where the firm is viewed as an interrelated set of contracting relationships among different parties 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Likewise, the theory assumes that both parties of the contract 
relationship will act to maximise their utility by using the information available to them. Thus, EP is 
introduced as one of the mechanisms that can be used to direct managers’ behaviour in the interest of 
shareholders (Jensen and Murphy 1990; Beatty and Zajac 1994; Tosi et al., 1997).  
In this context, the literature on the link between EP and organisational performance has been 
influenced by two main standpoints: OCT and MPH already mentioned (Core et al., 2003; Basu et 
al., 2007; Goergen and Renneboog, 2011; Chen and Jermias, 2014). First, OCT argues that 
independent corporate boards construct EP schemes after arms-length negotiations with executives. 
Therefore, corporate boards can enhance a firm’s value by linking executive performance to the EP 
package (Edmans and Gabaix, 2009; Conyon, 2014). Consequently, OCT suggests that because 
executives are less involved in determining their own pay, there is a positive and/or strong association 
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between EP and their performance (Van Essen et al., 2015). In contrast, MPH suggests that close 
negotiations between a weak/dependent board and strong executives may lead to the foundation of 
an inefficient EP contract, increasing agency problems (Bebchuk et al., 2002; Bebchuk and Fried, 
2004). Thus, MPH proposes a negative and/or weak link between EP and firm performance, because 
of strong interference from executives in setting their own incentive schemes (Van Essen et al., 2015).  
Both internal CG mechanisms (as monitoring mechanisms) and EP contracts (for alignment 
of interests) can be used by modern organisations to limit the implications of agency conflict (Chen 
et al., 2015; Lee and Isa, 2015; Ntim et al., 2015a, b). A number of previous studies have recognised 
the importance of controlling for a comprehensive number of internal CG variables (e.g., board 
characteristics and ownership structure mechanisms) when investigating the association between EP 
and firm performance (e.g., Benito and Conyon, 1999; Core et al., 1999; Conyon and Sadler, 2001; 
Buck et al., 2003; Ozkan, 2011; Balafas and Florackis, 2014; Dong, 2014; Kuo et al., 2014; Newton, 
2015; Ntim et al., 2015a, b). A major limitation of these studies is that they undermine possible 
endogeneity concerns of simultaneous use of both CG mechanisms and EP to mitigate agency 
problems (Chen et al., 2015; Lee and Isa, 2015; Ntim et al., 2015a, b). Thus, and in order to take into 
consideration the possible impact of interdependency/simultaneities between CG mechanisms and EP 
when investigating the PPS, this study conducts regression analysis containing interaction terms 
between performance measures (i.e., Tobin’s Q) and gender, nationality and ethnicity board diversity 
variables. 
Many scholars have documented the importance of the boardroom monitoring role in 
enhancing the link between EP and firm performance (Conyon and He, 2011). For example, Conyon 
and He (2011), using 1,342 publicly listed Chinese firms from 2001 to 2005, find evidence that firms 
with more independent directors on the board have a higher pay-for-performance link. Adams and 
Ferreira (2009) document that directors on gender-diversified boards receive comparatively more 
equity-based compensation, which provides more performance-based incentives. They also cite 
empirical evidence from the US that, in boards with more female directors, poor stock return 
performance increases the likelihood of CEO turnover. In addition, Vieito (2012) finds that smaller 
differences in the total compensation gap between CEO and vice-presidents (VPs) are associated with 
better performance in US firms managed by a female CEO. Given the previous theoretical and 
empirical literature, the fourth hypothesis is as follows: 
H4. Board diversity moderates the association between executive-pay and performance, 
with the pay-for-performance sensitivity being stronger in firms with more diversified 
boards. 
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4. Research Design  
4.1 Sample Selection and Data Sources 
The current study depends on a sample of 600 firm-year observations of 100 firms listed on 
five MENA countries’ stock markets for six years from 2009 to 2014.13 Listed firms in the selected 
five countries are classified into five main industries: basic materials/oil and gas; industrial; customer 
goods; customer services/health care; and technology/telecommunication. Financial and utility firms 
are excluded from the sample selection due to their different capital structure and regulations 
(Gyaponge et al., 2015; Ntim, 2015). CG variables (i.e., board characteristics and ownership structure 
mechanisms) were collected from the sampled firms’ annual reports, their websites, capital markets 
websites, and other websites. Financial and accounting variables were collected from the Datastream 
database. Finally, country-level data, including GDP and Control of Corruption Index, were collected 
from the website of the World Bank, while the Inflation Index came from the International Monetary 
Fund’s website. 
Two criteria have been used in order to include organisations in the final sample: the 
accessibility of an organisation’s CG data for the six-year period from 2009 to 2014; and the 
availability of financial data for the same time period. These criteria have been used for the following 
reasons. First, it helps in satisfying the requirements for a balanced panel data analysis (Yermack, 
1996; Carter et al., 2003); the data set includes both time series and cross-sectional observations. This 
panel data structure is characterised by its ability to provide a greater degree of freedom, lower 
multicollinearity among examined variables (Gujarati, 2003; Wooldridge, 2010), opportunity to 
examine whether the link between board diversity and corporate outcomes holds over time (Carter et 
al., 2003, 2010; Ntim et al., 2012a; Ntim, 2015) and opportunity to compare the findings with those 
of previous studies (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Ntim, 2015; Gyaponge et al., 2015). The DataStream 
provides full data for firm performance (Tobin’s Q and ROA). However, financial reports do not 
identify executives’ compensation for the whole sample (600 firm-year observations). It provides 
data for 502 firm-year observations. Thus, the study employs firm-year observations that could be 
identified for the executives’ compensation in order to test H3 and H4. 
 
4.2 Measurement of Variables 
This section illustrates dependent, independent and control variables of the study. Table 12 
contains a full definition of these variables.  
                                               
13 For the purpose of conducting the current study, five countries are selected: Egypt, Jordan, Oman, Saudi Arabia and 
the UAE. The criteria followed to select these countries were discussed in detail in the first essay.  
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4.2.1 Dependent Variables 
The current study selects firm performance and EP to measure corporate outcomes. Firm 
performance is measured using Tobin’s Q and ROA, as market- and accounting-based firm value 
measures, respectively, for the following reasons. First, Tobin’s Q has been used to measure market 
performance/long-term firm value, while ROA measures accounting return/short-term firm 
performance (Bhagat and Black, 2002; Thomas and Eden, 2004, Gyapong et al., 2015). Carter et al. 
(2010), Post and Byron (2015) and Estélyi and Nisar (2016) argue that market performance (Tobin’s 
Q) shows the wealth position of both shareholders and creditors (firm value). It also refers to the 
market behaviour of a security or asset, reflecting external perceptions and expectations of an 
organisation’s future or long-term value (Thaler, 2004) and predicting the firm’s ability to gain future 
cash flows and investment opportunities (Carter et al., 2010). On the other hand, ROA, as a measure 
of accounting returns, reflects past or short-term financial performance and illustrates how efficiently 
the organisation utilises its assets and investments to generate earnings (Combs et al., 2005; Gentry 
and Shen, 2010; Estélyi and Nisar, 2016). Carter et al. (2003) and Yermack (1996) document a 
statistical relation between both Tobin’s Q and ROA. Second, they have been commonly used in 
literature to measure financial performance (e.g., Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Carter et al., 2010; Ntim, 
2015; Post and Byron, 2015; Estélyi and Nisar, 2016), allowing for comparing the findings with those 
of previous studies.         
Executive compensation (EXE_PAY) is measured using the natural log of all executives’ cash 
compensation (e.g., salary, bonus, and other benefits) scaled by the total number of executives in a 
financial year to get an estimate of the average EP. The use of cash compensation is consistent with 
previous research (e.g., Firth et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2010; Conyon and He, 2011; Wang and Xiao, 
2011).14 
 
4.2.2 Independent Variables 
Literature employs different measures of board diversity (e.g., age, race, gender, educational 
background, experience and professional qualifications); the current study uses gender, nationality 
and ethnic diversity for two reasons. First, these three measures can be observed and calculated easily 
(Milliken and Martin, 1996; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Carter et al., 2010; Miletkov et al., 2014; 
Gyapong et al., 2015). Second, they have been widely investigated (Carter et al., 2003; Ntim 2015; 
Estélyi and Nisar 2016). 
                                               
14Public traded firms in some MENA countries such as Oman and Saudi Arabia are required to report the sum of total 
compensation for the five highest-paid executives. For example Omani CG code 2002 requires listed firms to disclose, in 
their report of CG, details of remuneration paid to all directors and the top five officers. In other countries such as Egypt 
listed firms voluntarily disclose executive compensation data.  
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Following Adams and Ferreira (2009), Liu et al. (2014), Gyapong et al. (2015) and Ntim 
(2015), diversity is measured using percentage of women, foreign and ethnic minority directors on 
the board of directors (BDIV). The main independent variable is divided into the following sub-
measures: board diversity on the basis of ethnicity (BDIVE); board diversity on the basis of gender 
(BDIVG); and board diversity on the basis of nationality (BDIVN). 
 
4.2.3 Rationale for Control Variables 
Consistent with previous studies (e.g., Carter et al., 2003, 2010; Chamlou, 2008; Johnston and 
Malina, 2008; Dale-Olsen et al., 2013; Ntim, 2015; Hasan et al., 2014), the study controls for possible 
omitted variables bias by including a number of control variables. The study controls for CG 
mechanisms that have been examined in previous studies: board characteristics (e.g., board size, CEO 
role non-duality, board independence) and ownership structure mechanisms (e.g., government, 
institutional and block ownership). The study also controls for firm-level variables that could be 
related to firm’s outcome such as firm size, sales growth, leverage, age, and audit quality; and 
country-level variables such as control of corruption, inflation and GDP growth (Miletkov et al., 
2014; Delis, et al., 2016). Finally, some scholars argue that firm performance and EP may be affected 
by industry type and financial years (e.g., Roberson and Park 2007; Welbourne et al., 2007; Johnston 
and Malina, 2008; Ntim, 2015; Reddy et al., 2015). Therefore, the study includes industry dummies 
(INDU) for the five industries: basic materials and oil and gas; consumer goods; consumer services 
and health care; industrials; and technology and telecoms; and year dummies (YED) for the financial 
years from 2009 to 2014.  
      
Board Characteristics 
4.2.3.1 Board Size 
One of the main functions of the board of directors is to monitor management and the CEO, 
thus board size could have a positive influence on firm value (Jensen, 1993; Adams and Ferriera, 
2007; Adams et al., 2010; Lincoln and Adedoyin, 2012; Abdullah, 2013) and designing a pay package 
that may be more closely aligned with executive performance (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). Larger 
boards may have directors with different expertise, capable of accessing a wider range of contracts 
and resources (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Welbourne et al., 2007; Triana et al., 2013; Wellalage and 
Locke, 2013; Estélyi and Nisar, 2016). On the other hand, larger boards may have problems in 
communication and coordination among their members, leading to a negative effect of board size on 
firm performance (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Sonnenfeld, 2002). Likewise, larger boards may be 
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associated with paying their executives more than necessary compared with firms with smaller 
boards.  
Empirically, previous studies examining the association between board size and firm 
performance have shown mixed results. The first group of studies has documented a positive 
relationship between board size and firm performance (e.g., Dalton et al., 1998; Cheng, 2008). On 
the other hand, the second group has documented a negative impact (e.g., Yermack, 1996; Haniffa 
and Hudaib, 2006; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Guest, 2009; Gyapong et al., 2015), whilst Carter et 
al. (2010) and Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013b) find no relationship between board size and firm 
performance. With regard to EP, many studies report that firms with larger boards are more likely to 
pay their CEOs higher than their counterparts (e.g., Yermack, 1996; Guest, 2009; Schultz et al., 2013; 
Reddy et al., 2015).   
 
4.2.3.2 Board Independence 
 CG codes issued in many countries, including MENA countries, recommend that boards be 
dominated by non-executive and independent directors to ensure board independence and ability to 
fulfil the monitoring role efficiently. Firms with outsiders dominating the board of directors are more 
likely to replace the CEO on the basis of the performance of the firm (Weisbach, 1988; Dahya et al., 
2002). Furthermore, independent outside directors have an incentive to monitor the opportunistic 
behaviour of management in the form of excessive EP (Mehran, 1995; Byrd et al., 2010), so they can 
improve their current and future reputation in the labour market (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
  Many empirical studies have found a significant positive relationship between the degree of 
board independence and financial performance (e.g., Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Mashayekhi and Bazaz, 
2008; Ehikioya, 2009; Uadiale, 2010; Rashid et al., 2010; Faleye et al., 2011; Khan and Awan, 2012), 
and pay of CEOs (e.g., Boyd, 1994; Johnston, 2007; Ozkan, 2007, 2011; Conyon and He, 2011; Van 
Essen et al., 2015). On the other hand, Bhagat and Black (2002) report a negative relationship between 
board independence and firm performance (measured by Tobin’s Q, turnover ratio, return on asset, 
sales per employee and operating margin). Byrd et al. (2010) and Armstrong et al. (2012) report that 
outside directors are more effective in monitoring CEO pay. Others’ findings show an insignificant 
relationship between board independence and firm performance (e.g., Klein, 1998; Cotter and 
Silvester, 2003) and CEO pay (e.g., Mangel and Singh, 1993; Sapp, 2008; Gregory-Smith, 2012).  
 
4.2.3.3 Board Leadership Structure 
Despite the important role of the chairperson at the head of modern firms, combining it with 
the CEO’s role represents a significant concentration of power. This weakens the monitoring 
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effectiveness of the board of directors (Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994; Lo and Wu, 2016). Therefore, 
the dual role of the CEO may crucially affect firm performance and EP. The CEO may seek his own 
interest at the expense of the shareholders which could increase agency problems (Jensen, 1993; 
Yermack, 1996). Therefore, shareholders will pay more monitoring and residual costs to mitigate 
these problems (White and Ingrassia, 1992). In companies with dual role of the CEO, the board is 
unable to ensure discipline of the CEO or replacing an underperforming CEO (Goyal and Park, 2002). 
In addition, the CEO/Chairperson uses his power to influence board decisions in order to gain higher 
payment (Lo and Wu, 2016). 
Empirically, a considerable number of studies have reported a positive significant impact of 
separating the CEO and chairperson roles on firm performance (e.g., Abdul Rahman and Haniffa 
2005; Jackling and Johl, 2009; Ujunwa, 2012; Gyapong et al., 2015). Likewise, other studies have 
documented that CEOs who are also the Chair of their boards receive higher compensation (e.g., Core 
et al., 1999; Cyert et al., 2002; Grinstein and Hribar, 2004). However, Conyon and Murphy (2000) 
and Carter et al. (2010) find no significant association between combining the CEO and chairperson 
positions and corporate performance. Conyon and Peck (1998) find no evidence supporting the notion 
that firms with CEO role duality are paying excessive EP. On the contrary, Al-Najjar et al. (2016) 
confirm that CEOs get lower compensation when they chair the board.   
 
Ownership Structure Mechanisms 
4.2.3.4 Block Ownership 
Unlike developed countries, ownership concentration is high in the MENA region where 
minority shareholders have less protection (Fawzy, 2003; Jamali et al., 2007; Omran et al., 2008; 
Ararat et al., 2010; Weir, 2011; Piesse et al., 2012; Hasan et al., 2014). Higher ownership 
concentration may encourage large shareholders to expropriate firm resources (i.e. wealth) through 
benefit transfer dealings or tunnelling behaviours (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Demsetz and Lehn, 
1985; Fan and Wong, 2002; La Porta et al., 2002; Anderson et al., 2004; Chau and Leung, 2006), 
leading to a decrease in firm performance. This justifies the intent of firms with concentrated 
ownership to avoid being monitored by higher-quality auditors to maximise self-interest (Lin and 
Liu, 2009, 2010). Furthermore, block shareholders may connive with executives to maximise their 
own interests (pay themselves an excessively high rate) at the expense of minority shareholders 
(Johnson et al., 2000; Conyon and He, 2011, 2012; Wang and Xiao, 2011). In contrast, ownership 
concentration provides a strong incentive and ability of large shareholders to monitor managerial 
opportunistic behaviour (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, 1997; La Porta et 
al., 2002; Nguyen et al., 2013; Dong et al., 2014; He et al., 2014) and to set EP in such a way that 
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aligns executives’ interests with those of shareholders, leading to minimise agency problems (Hartzell 
and Starks, 2003) and increase firm value. 
Similar to theoretical evidence, empirical literature has shown mixed results. Many previous 
studies have reported a negative relationship between concentrated ownership and firm performance 
(e.g., Gursoy and Aydogan, 2002; Gunasekarage et al., 2007; Reddy et al., 2015) and EP (e.g., 
Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003; Lin, 2005; Sapp, 2008; Baixauli-Soler 
and Sanchez-Marin, 2015). On the other hand, another group of studies has documented a positive 
impact on firm performance (e.g., Claesses and Djankov, 1999; Xu and Wang, 1999; Gorton and 
Schmid, 2000; Hiraki et al., 2003) and EP (e.g., Reddy et al., 2015). 
 
4.2.3.5 Government Ownership 
The relationship between government ownership on the one hand and firm performance and 
EP on the other hand is controversial. Government tends to own shares in a firm to achieve political 
or multiple objectives, such as employment growth, instead of commercial objectives such as profit 
maximization (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; La Porta et al., 2002; Najid and Abdul Rahman, 2011). 
Thus, government owned firms may set contracts with lower pay-for-performance incentives 
(Conyon and He, 2011) and can suffer from weak monitoring and accountability (Mak and Li, 2001), 
leading to poor firm performance. Likewise, state owned firms are more likely to appoint a bureaucrat 
in the position of the CEO (Firth et al., 2007) and employ poor-quality executives with lower 
equilibrium wages compared to private controlled firms (Conyon and He, 2011). On the other hand, 
firms with higher government ownership have better connections with senior government officials 
and influential political figures that helps in gaining government support and investment opportunities 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Yu, 2013). Furthermore, government, with a large portion of shares, 
tends to fulfil its monitoring and counselling roles more efficiently to minimise agency costs and 
maximise firm performance (Eng and Mak, 2003). 
In line with theoretical evidence, empirical studies have provided mixed results. A number of 
past studies have found a negative impact of government ownership on firm performance (e.g., Qi et 
al., 2000; Sun and Tong, 2003; Orden and Garmendia, 2005; Alfaraih et al., 2012) and EP and CEO 
incentives (e.g., Conyon and He, 2011). Other studies have documented no impact on firm 
performance (e.g., Hovey et al., 2003) while Jiang et al. (2008) report a positive impact.    
  
4.2.3.6 Institutional Ownership 
Institutional investors are more sophisticated than any other shareholders; more professional 
regarding capital markets, business and industries; and better informed. Therefore, they have better 
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capability and motivation to control and monitor managers’ decision more effectively and less costly, 
leading to minimising agency problems and maximising firm value (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; 
Smith, 1996; Bushee, 1998; Guercio and Hawkins, 1999; Gillan and Starks, 2000; Cremers and Nair, 
2005; Koh, 2007; Alfaraih et al., 2012). Institutional ownership is a CG mechanism used to monitor 
managers by reducing their pay excesses and to align their interests with those of shareholders through 
designing suitable incentive schemes that connect EP to the firm value and performance (Hartzell and 
Starks, 2003). In contrast, institutional investors may be more interested in maximising their own 
liquidity and short-term profits (Coffee, 1991; Maug, 1998). Accordingly, this may encourage 
managers to maximise their own utility by paying themselves excessively high rewards at the expense 
of shareholders and thereby negatively affecting firm performance and value. 
The relationship between institutional ownership, and firm performance and EP has been 
widely investigated. Most empirical evidence has confirmed a positive relationship between 
institutional ownership and firm performance (e.g., Guercio and Hawkins, 1999; Gillan and Starks, 
2000; Cornett et al., 2007; Koh, 2007; Alfaraih et al., 2012). Similarly, David et al. (1998), Almazan 
et al. (2005), Khan et al. (2005), Dong and Ozkan (2008), Ozkan (2007), (2011), Zheng (2010) and 
Victoravich et al. (2012) report a negative impact of institutional ownership on EP. However, Cosh 
and Hughes (1997) document no link between institutional investors and CEO pay.  
 
Firm-Level Characteristics 
4.2.3.7 Firm Size 
Short and Keasey (1999) argue that firm size may impact firm performance in two ways. First, 
large firms are able to generate funds internally and have easier access to external sources of funds 
that could be used to support investment in profitable projects. Second, large firms are able to put 
entry obstacles to improve their performance. Large organisations also may benefit from economy of 
scale, market power and wider connections to attain higher performance and firm value (Beiner et 
al., 2006; Roberson and Park, 2007). Furthermore, large organisations tend to appoint executives with 
a higher level of skills and managerial talent in order to deal with a higher degree of complexity and 
diversity of activities within these organisations (Canarella and Nourayi, 2008). Gaver and Gaver 
(1993) report a significant positive relationship between level of cash compensation and firm size. 
Cyert et al. (2002) find a significant positive relationship between contingent compensation and firm 
size, and that the level of total CEO compensation is related to firm size. Therefore, it is expected that 
EP tends to increase with company size. On the other hand, the market perceives that small firms 
perform better than larger firms, as small firms may have greater growth opportunity than larger firms 
(Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Kang et al., 2007; Guest, 2009; Dale-Olsen et al., 2013; Triana et al., 
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2013). Jensen and Murphy (1990) find that CEOs in large firms have fewer compensation based 
incentives than CEOs in smaller firms, as large firms have more diversification of ownership and 
their management could be disciplined by other control measures. 
A large number of previous studies have documented a positive impact of firm size on firm 
performance (e.g., Carter et al., 2010; Gyapong et al., 2015) and EP (e.g., Girma et al., 2007; Ozkan, 
2007; Gabaix and Landier, 2008; Gregg et al., 2012; Ferri and Maber, 2013; Gabaix et al., 2014). 
Thus, and consistent with previous studies examining the relationship between board diversity and 
corporate outcomes (e.g., Carter et al., 2003, 2010; Johnston and Malina, 2008; Adams and Ferreira, 
2009; Dale-Olsen et al., 2013; Gyapong et al., 2015; Ntim, 2015), firm size proxied by natural log of 
the total sales is included as a control variable.    
 
4.2.3.8 Leverage 
There is a controversy among researchers about the possible effect of leverage on firm 
performance. On the one hand, more debt is considered as an internal CG mechanism that plays an 
important role in mitigating agency problems, as it can reduce the ability of opportunistic managers 
to extract ‘free cash flows’ (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986; Guest, 2009). Furthermore, 
lenders are more likely to exert effective control of managerial behaviour compared to shareholders 
(Stiglitz, 1985; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). This can impact positively on firm performance. On 
the other hand, organisations with high levels of leverage have less ability to fully utilise commercial 
opportunities, as they may be not able to raise new debt. Therefore, this may increase the risk of 
financial distress and bankruptcy, and thereby negatively impact firm performance (Myers, 1977; 
Stulz, 1988; Andrade and Kaplan, 1998; Ntim et al., 2012a; Ntim, 2015). Furthermore, debt ratio may 
affect the firm’s policy in designing executives’ compensation schemes to ensure greater interest 
alignment between management and shareholders (Bryan et al., 2000; Brick et al., 2006; Sundaram 
and Yermack, 2007). 
Many previous studies have reported a negative impact of leverage on firm performance (e.g., 
Gyapong et al., 2015; Ntim, 2015) and EP (e.g., Bryan et al., 2000). Therefore and consistent with 
prior literature (e.g., Gyapong et al., 2015; Ntim, 2015; Estélyi and Nisar, 2016), leverage proxied by 
the percentage of total debt to total assets is added as a control variable in the fixed effect regression 
models.  
 
4.2.3.9 Firm Age 
Older firms are more likely to have experience and skills, liquid trading, diversified activities, 
better disclosure, and attention from analysts (Evans, 1987; Lipczynski and Wilson, 2001; Claessens 
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et al., 2002; Black et al., 2006; Boone et al., 2007; Borghesi et al., 2007). This may lead to lower risk 
of financial distress and bankruptcy but less flexibility in dealing with adjustments in the business 
environment and thereby fewer growth opportunities. On the other hand, younger firms are less 
experienced, trying to establish their own presence in the market, seeking to cover their cost structure, 
and exposed to adverse market conditions. However, they have better growth opportunities. 
Therefore, firm age may impact their performance and EP.   
Consistent with previous studies (e.g., Berger and Udell, 1998; Gregory et al., 2005; Boone 
et al., 2007; Borghesi et al., 2007), this essay controls for firm age proxied by the natural log of the 
total number of years since a company was established.  
 
4.2.3.10 Audit Firm Size 
Large audit firms are more likely to provide higher audit quality (DeAngelo, 1981; Lennox, 
2005; Lin and Liu, 2009; Eshleman and Guo, 2014), because they usually have superior training 
programmes, a higher degree of independence and industrial expertise, which qualify them to detect 
and report irregularities and misstatements in financial statements provided by management (DeFond, 
1992; Lennox, 1999; Reed et al., 2000; Mansi et al., 2004; Eshleman and Guo, 2014). Therefore, 
organisations audited by large audit firms are more likely to have higher market value. Pittman and 
Fortin (2004) find evidence suggesting that retaining one of the Big 6 auditors improves the credibility 
of financial statements, helping young firms to minimise their borrowing costs. Thus, it is predicted 
that the size of the audit firm (BIG4) has a positive impact on firm performance and influence EP.    
Empirically, Ntim (2015) and Ntim et al. (2015a) document a positive relationship between 
auditor size and firm market value, while Gyapong et al. (2015) find an insignificant association 
between the two variables. In line with past studies (e.g., Gyapong et al., 2015; Ntim, 2015; Ntim et 
al., 2015a), this essay controls for audit firm size by including a dummy variable that takes the value 
of 1 if a firm is audited by a Big 4 audit firm, 0 otherwise. 
 
4.2.3.11 Growth Opportunity 
Companies with greater investment opportunities often grow faster (Beiner et al., 2006; Ntim 
et al., 2012a; Ntim, 2015) and hence, they are more likely to have high market value. Bracker et al. 
(1988) argue that small firms in growing industries and incorporating sophisticated strategic 
management procedures are more likely to attain high levels of financial performance. Moreover, 
firms with growing business activities need to increase voluntary CG disclosure in order to attract 
more investors and improve their ability to access more finance at lower cost (Collett and Hrasky, 
2005; Hossain et al., 2005, Khurana et al., 2006), leading to reduction in information asymmetry, 
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mitigation of agency problems among different stakeholders and increase in firm value. Additionally, 
firms with greater growth opportunities usually require more highly qualified and talented managers 
and hence, need to pay higher levels of remuneration (Rosen, 1982; Smith and Watts, 1992).       
Empirical evidence is generally consistent with theory. For example, Ntim (2015) and Ntim 
et al. (2015a) find that growth opportunity is positively associated with firm value and EP, 
respectively. In line with prior studies, growth opportunity is calculated as a percentage of current 
year’s sales minus previous year’s sales divided by previous year’s sales (e.g., Ozkan, 2007; Conyon 
et al., 2009; Ntim et al., 2012a; Gyapong et al., 2015; Ntim, 2015; Ntim et al., 2015a). 
  
4.2.3.12 Year and Industry Dummies 
Firm performance could be sensitive to the industry and year influences (Demsetz and Lehn, 
1985; Short and Keasey, 1999; Black et al., 2006; Roberson and Park, 2007; Welbourne et al., 2007; 
Johnston and Malina, 2008; Gyapong et al., 2015; Ntim, 2015). Yu (2013) documents that the 
relationship between CG measures and firm performance varies among different industries and 
different years. CG practices vary among different industries due to the differences in capital 
structure, complexity of operations and line of business (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Lim et al., 2007; 
Elsayed, 2007), which could also affect firm performance. Likewise, CG practices and firm 
performance may change over time during the periods of economic boom and recession (Tan et al., 
2011).  Gabaix and Landier (2008) document a significant increase in CEO pay over time.     
Following previous studies (e.g., Hanifia and Cook, 2002; Roberson and Park, 2007; 
Welbourne et al., 2007; Johnston and Malina, 2008; Mandaci, 2010; Lin et al., 2012; Gyapong et al., 
2015; Ntim, 2015; Reddy et al., 2015), industry dummies for the five industries (i.e., basic materials 
and oil and gas; consumer goods; consumer services and health care; industrials; and technology and 
telecoms) and year dummies for the financial years from 2009 to 2014 are included as control 
variables for the possible relationship between them and firm performance and EP.  
 
4.2.3.13 Country-level Control Variables 
Board diversity may be influenced by the institutional environment (Terjesen and Singh, 
2008; Estélyi and Nisar, 2016). Country-level institutional and contextual factors such as inflation, 
economic growth, tax policies, corruption perception and government regulations may also impact 
CG structure, financial performance and EP (Eggertsson, 1990; Short and Keasey, 1999; Wan and 
Hoskisson, 2003; Conyon and He, 2011; Tan et al., 2011). For instance, Wan and Hoskisson (2003) 
find that country-level factors and institutions influence companies’ performance outcomes of 
product and international diversification strategies adopted. Similarly, Gugler et al. (2003) find that 
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CG measures’ effectiveness in aligning managers and shareholders’ interests is considerably different 
between developed and developing countries. Conyon and He (2011) find differences in the level of 
EP between the US and China and they argue that country culture and institutional arrangements such 
as voice and accountability, control of corruption and economic factors may justify these differences.   
Consistent with previous studies examining the impact of board diversity on firm performance 
and EP in a cross-country context (e.g., Conyon and He, 2011; Miletkov et al., 2014; Terjesen et al., 
2015b; Delis et al., 2016; Estélyi and Nisar, 2016), this study controls for a number of country level 
institutional factors: Control of Corruption Index, Inflation and GDP growth that may impact 
corporate outcomes.  
 
Table 12: Summary of variables and measures 
 Dependent variables: Corporate outcomes 
Q Ratio of total assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity to total assets in a 
financial year.    
ROA Percentage of operating profit to total assets in a financial year.      
EXE_PAY Natural log of total cash (salary, performance bonus, pension contribution and others)-based pay of 
all executives scaled by the total number of executives in a financial year.      
Independent variables: Board diversity  
BDIV The percentage of the total number of women, ethnic minority and foreign directors to the total 
number of board members. 
BDIVG The percentage of women directors to the total number of board members. 
BDIVE The percentage of ethnic minority (non-Arab) directors to the total number of board members 
BDIVN The percentage of non-national directors to the total number of board members. 
Control variables: Corporate Governance  
BSIZE Natural log of the total number of directors on the board of directors. 
NED The percentage of non-executive directors to the total number of board members. 
DBLS A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the roles of chairperson and CEO of firm are separated 
at the end of its financial year, 0 otherwise. 
BOWN Percentage of shares held by shareholders with at least 5% of the total firm shareholdings.  
GOWN Percentage of shares held by government.    
IOWN Percentage of shares held by institutional investors.    
Control variables: Firm-level  
LNTS Natural log of the total sales of a firm. 
LEV 
AGE 
BIG4 
 
SGR 
Percentage of total debt to total assets in a financial year  
Natural log of the total number of years since a company was established. 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm is audited by a Big 4 audit firm 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, and KPMG), 0 otherwise. 
Percentage of current year’s sales minus previous year’s sales divided divided by previous year’s sales. 
YDU Dummies for the years 2009 to 2014 inclusive. 
INDU 
 
Dummies for each of the five main industries: basic materials/oil and gas; industrial; customer goods; 
customer services/health care and technology/telecommunication. 
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Control variables: Country-level variables 
CCI 
 
 
INFL 
GDP 
Control of Corruption Index. Control of corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
"capture" of the state by elites and private interests.  
Inflation, average consumer prices.  
Gross domestic product (current US$).  
 
4.3 Model Specification 
The relationship between board characteristics and corporate outcomes is jointly and 
dynamically determined (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Guest, 2009). Therefore, a number of 
endogenous problems emerge as a result of possible omitted variables that concurrently impact both 
the appointment of women and ethnic minority directors and corporate outcomes (Adams and 
Ferreira, 2009). In addition, endogenous problems may increase due to organisation specific 
characteristics, such as financial leverage, challenges, opportunities and managerial skills, which 
change overtime (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Guest, 2009; Carter, 2010; Ntim et al., 2012a). Thus, 
and given the panel nature of the data, as well as in line with previous studies (e.g., Adams and 
Ferreira, 2009; Guest, 2009; Carter et al., 2010; Gyapong et al., 2015; Ntim, 2015), the study 
estimates a fixed-effects regressions in order to control for possible omitted variables and unobserved 
organisation-specific heterogeneities.15  
The study starts its analysis with a fixed effects regression model which is specified as 
follows:              
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Where Qit is Tobin’s Q for firm i at time t and ROA is return on assets for firm i at time t; 
Diversityit refers to BDIV, BDIVG, BDIVE, or BDIVN; Controls stands for BSIZE, NED, DBLS, 
BOWN, GOWN, IOWN, LNTS, LEV, AGE, BIG4, SGR, CCI, INFL, GDP, INDU, YED; and δ is the 
fixed effect of a vector of the mean differences of all time-variant variables. All variables are fully 
defined in Table 12. 
For the purpose of examining the moderating effect of the strength of CG on the relation 
between different board diversity measures and firm value (Q) and accounting returns (ROA), the 
study uses the CG Index (MCGI). The MCGI follows a checklist developed by the Intergovernmental 
                                               
15 In order to determine the suitable panel estimation technique (Gujarati, 2003; Wooldridge, 2010), the study first 
conducts the Breusch and Pagan (1980) LM test. The result of the test rejects the null hypothesis of the existence of zero 
variance across entities. Thus, OLS is inappropriate technique to test the hypothesis. Second, the study tests whether the 
individual effects are correlated with the repressors by performing Hausman (1978) test and the findings reject the null 
hypothesis, supporting the appropriateness of the fixed effect model for the study. Sub-section 4.4 shows detailed 
discussion of these tests.         
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Working Group of Experts on International Standards of Accounting and Reporting (ISAR), 
organised by United Nations Conference Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2006). This checklist 
(“UNCTAD ISAR benchmark”) for good practice in CG disclosure is based on five sections used to 
construct five sub-indices: (i) ownership structure and exercise of control rights (OSH); (ii) financial 
transparency (TCY); (iii) auditing (AUD); (iv) corporate responsibility and compliance (RTY); and 
(v) board and management structure and process (BMS). The MCGI is constructed by awarding a 
value of 1 if each of the 51 CG provisions is disclosed, and 0 otherwise. With this binary scoring 
scheme a firm’s total disclosure score in a particular firm-year can vary between 0 (perfect non-
compliance and non-disclosure) and 100% (perfect compliance and disclosure), with higher index 
levels indicating better compliance and disclosure. Following Gyapong et al. (2015), the MCGI is 
interacted with each board diversity measure in different regression estimates of the following fixed 
effects regression model:                
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Where Qit is Tobin’s Q for firm i at time t and ROA is return on assets for firm i at time t; 
Diversityit refers to BDIV, BDIVG, BDIVE, or BDIVN; MCGI denotes CG disclosure; 
Diversity*MCGI refers to the interaction variable between Diversity and the MCGI; Controls stands 
for LNTS, LEV, AGE, BIG4, SGR, CCI, INFL, GDP, INDU, YED; and δ is the fixed effect of a vector 
of the mean differences of all time-variant variables. All variables are fully defined in Table 12. 
The effect of different diversity measures on EP is examined using the following fixed effect 
regression model: 
          )3(_
1



n
i
itititiititit CONTROLSDiversityPAYEXE 
  
Where EXE_PAYit is the natural log of total cash (base salary, performance bonus, pension 
contribution and others)-based pay of all executives scaled by the total number of executives for firm 
i at time t; Diversityit refers to BDIV, BDIVG, BDIVE, or BDIVN; MCGI denotes CG disclosure; 
Controls stands for BSIZE, NED, DBLS, BOWN, GOWN, IOWN, LNTS, LEV, AGE, BIG4, SGR, CCI, 
INFL, GDP, INDU, YED; and δ is the fixed effect of a vector of the mean differences of all time-
variant variables. All variables are fully defined in Table 12. 
To examine the moderating effect of different diversity variables on the association between 
EP and performance, the study conducts its analysis with a fixed effects regression model which is 
specified as follows: 
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Where EXE_PAYit is the natural log of total cash (base salary, performance bonus, pension 
contribution and others)-based pay of all executives scaled by the total number of executives for firm 
i at time t; Qit is Tobin’s Q for firm i at time t ; Diversityit refers to BDIV, BDIVG, BDIVE, or BDIVN; 
MCGI denotes CG disclosure; Q*EXE_PAY refers to the interaction variable between Q and 
EXE_PAY; Controls stands for LNTS, LEV, AGE, BIG4, SGR, CCI, INFL, GDP, INDU, YED; and δ 
is the fixed effect of a vector of the mean differences of all time-variant variables. All variables are 
fully defined in Table 12. 
 
4.4 Panel Regression Specification Tests 
Using panel data has a number of advantages over the traditional cross-sectional or time series 
data analysis. First, panel data allows both time series and cross-sectional observations to be used. 
That means, the time effect is taken into account that is not detectable when using pure cross-section 
data (Gujarati, 2003; Wooldridge, 2010). Second, it also helps to minimise the multicollinearity 
among the variables (Gujarati, 2003; Wooldridge, 2010). The large number of observations used in 
panel data increase the degrees of freedom and reduce any collinearity problems among the 
explanatory variables, increasing the estimation efficiency and providing more reliable and stable 
parameter estimates (Baltagi, 2005). Third, the use of panel data mitigates the problems arising 
because of omitted variables and controls for unobservable individual heterogeneity and dynamics 
which is not affordable when using the traditional cross-sectional or time series data analysis (Hsiao, 
2013). Finally, examination of six-year data with both cross-sectional and time series properties may 
be useful in detecting whether the observed cross-sectional relationships among board diversity and 
different sets of corporate outcomes hold over time. Despite the advantages of using panel data, it is 
rarely employed in accounting literature. This represent an opportunity for the current study to add to 
the literature by providing novel evidence for the impact of board diversity on accounting returns, 
firm market value, EP and the PPS from MENA countries.   
This section discusses a number of diagnostic tests and procedures to check whether the 
regression model specification fits the data. These tests also try to address some concerns that include: 
whether to run the regression analysis based on pool data or panel data, and the tests for individual 
and time effects. 
 
4.4.1 Pooling Test  
One of the main assumptions of the OLS method is to ensure that observations are 
independently distributed across time and thereby error terms are not likely to be correlated across 
different time periods. However, this correlation between the error terms is not considered as a 
144 
 
problem when using panel data models, which represents an important advantage of them. Therefore, 
an important procedure is to justify the need for panel data models compared to an OLS regression 
model. Two tests have been used to ensure the appropriateness of the panel data model, namely Chow 
test and Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian multiplier (LM) (1980) test.  
Chow test is used to compare the pooled and unpooled estimates, and thereby to decide 
whether to use panel data models or not (Beck, 2001). Normality of residuals is the main underlying 
assumption of the Chow test. To ensure that this assumption is met, the Jacques Bera Test for 
normality of residuals has been run. The Jacques Bera provides a test for normality based on skewness 
and another based on kurtosis and then combines the two tests into an overall test statistic, with p-
value based on the assumption that the distribution is normal. The Jacques Bera test result supports 
the absence of the non-normality problem where the null hypothesis of normality of error terms 
cannot be rejected.  
After conducting the Jacques Bera, The following step is to perform the Chow test statistic 
which follows an F-distribution. This statistic is generated automatically after running a fixed effect 
regression in Stata. The Chow test result rejects the null hypothesis of homogeneity among 
individuals at the level of 1%, indicating that panel data models are more appropriate for conducting 
the regression analysis.  
Following Kennedy (2008), Ntim (2015), and Gyapong et al. (2015), the Breusch and Pagan 
LM test has been conducted to test for the appropriateness of either a pooled OLS or a random-effects 
regression model. The result of the test rejects the null hypothesis of the existence of zero variance 
among individuals. Thus, OLS is an inappropriate technique to test the current study hypothesis. 
 
4.4.2 Tests for Individual and Time Effects 
The results of Chow and the Breusch and Pagan LM tests suggest the presence of specific 
effects in the current study’s cross-sectional time series data. Therefore, the OLS model is no longer 
the best unbiased linear estimator. On the other hand, the panel data models, namely fixed effects 
and random effects models are able to deal with these problems.  
 The Hausman (1978) test, which compares a random effect model to its fixed counterpart, 
has been run to reveal which model provides accurate inference from current studies’ panel data. The 
test’s result rejects the null hypothesis that the individual effects are uncorrelated with the regressors 
at the 1% level. This indicates that random effects estimation is unsuitable and the fixed effects model 
is more fitting for the panel data.  
The next step after the Hausman test result of supporting the use of a fixed effects model is to 
decide whether time fixed effects are needed when running a fixed effects regression. Accordingly, 
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the Stata command testparm has been used after running a fixed effect regression with year dummies. 
The test result rejects the null hypothesis that all years coefficients are jointly equal to zero at the 
level of 1%, indicating that time fixed effects are needed. 
To summarise, the results of the Chow test and Breusch-Pagan (LM) test suggest that panel 
data models are more appropriate to the current study data. After that, the Hausman (1978) test and 
testparm STASTA command findings support the use of an individual and time fixed effects 
regression model to provide better estimates of the regression parameters.  
 
5. Empirical Results and Discussion  
5.1 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 13 shows detailed descriptive statistics of different measures of board diversity within 
MENA listed firms. Panel A reveals the wide variation of different measures of corporate outcomes. 
For example, Tobin’s Q (Q) ranges from 0.08 to 9.07, with an average (standard deviation) of 1.38 
(.98), which means firm values display wide variation which is consistent with previous studies (e.g., 
Delis et al., 2016). Furthermore, accounting returns (ROA) ranges from –32.09% to 31.03%, and has 
a mean (median) of 6.43% (6.06%) and standard deviation of 7.66%. The average EP records a 
minimum of $4,413, maximum of $3,887,360, mean of $290,945 and median of $131,877. Similarly 
this means that the EXE_PAY is highly varied among firms listed in MENA countries. Panel B 
illustrates that board diversity based on gender, nationality and ethnicity (BDIV) has widespread 
variation ranging from 0% to 76.92%, and averaging of 14.08%. With regard to gender board 
diversity (BDIVG), the ethnic board diversity (BDIVE) and nationality board diversity (BDIVN) 
results range from 0% to 37.50%, 66.67% and 72.73%, with an average of 2.71%, 5.20% and 11.40%, 
respectively. The findings document that on average the boards of directors in the MENA region 
firms are dominated by Arab national men. This low representation of women, foreigners and non-
Arab directors on board rooms is in line with evidence coming from most developing countries (e.g., 
Ararat et al., 2010; Mahadeo et al., 2012; Loukil and Yousfi, 2015). For example, Ibrahim and 
Hanefah (2014) document that the average number of females and non-nationals is 2.8% and 11%, 
respectively in 117 Jordanian listed companies for the period between 2007 and 2011.      
Moreover, the descriptive statistics for CG variables are illustrated in panel C. Board size 
(BSIZE) with an average of 8.52 board members ranges between a minimum of four and a maximum 
of 19. Panel C also shows that NEDs dominate boards of MENA listed firms with an average (median) 
of 87.43% (88.89%). Moreover, most sampled firms have separate CEO and chairperson positions 
(DBLS) with average of 79% and median of 100%. Ownership structure mechanisms also display an 
adequate variation, where block ownership (BOWN), government ownership (GOWN) and 
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institutional ownership (IOWN) range from 5%, 0% and 0% to 98.92%, 98.87% and 98.23% with an 
average of 55.89%, 16.15% and 34.01%, respectively. Ownership statistics are consistent with 
previous studies conducted in MENA countries (e.g., Samaha et al., 2012; Al-Janadi et al., 2013). 
Similarly, the descriptive statistics for firm control variables and country control variables, which are 
illustrated in Panels D and E, respectively, display wide variation.  
 
Table 13: Summary of descriptive statistics of all variables for all sampled firms 
 
  Variables  Mean Median STD Minimum Maximum 
Panel A: Dependent variables 
Q 1.38 1.18 0.98 0.08 9.07 
ROA % 6.43 6.06 7.66 -32.09 31.03 
EXE_PAY 290945.50 131876.86 432203.18 4413.15 3887360 
Panel B: Independent variables 
BDIV% 14.08 0 20.17 0 76.92 
BDIVG% 2.71 0 6.61 0 37.50 
BDIVE% 5.20 0 12.78 0 66.67 
BDIVN% 11.40 0 19.34 0 72.73 
Panel C: Control variables: Corporate Governance  
BSIZE 8.52 9 2.59 4 19 
NED% 87.43 88.89 14.03 40 100 
DBLS% 79 100 40.9 0 100 
BOWN% 55.89 59.49 23.39 5 98.92 
GOWN% 16.15 3.29 24.60 0 98.87 
IOWN% 34.01 27.45 27.50 0 98.23 
Panel D: Control variables: Firm-level  
LNTS ($000) 3599.51 252.10 9390.71 0.12 62010.88 
LEV% 20.29 17.76 17.65 0 69.75 
AGE 21.84 20 10.06 1 47 
BIG4% 59 100 49.30 0 100 
SGR% 9.06 5.94 45.45 -92.59 594.06 
Panel E: Control variables: Country-level  
CCI% 59.31 60.77 16.19 27.96 87.56 
INFL% 179.70 149.43 59.92 110.50 316.99 
GDP ($000,000) 265136.31 244774.61 228668.68 23818.32 746248.53 
 
Notes: the table shows summary descriptive statistics. Variables are defined as follows: Tobin’s Q (Q); return on assets (ROA); 
executive pay (EXE_PAY); board diversity on the basis of gender, ethnic minority and nationality (BDIV); board diversity 
on the basis of gender (BDIVG); board diversity on the basis of ethnicity (BDIVE); board diversity on the basis of nationality 
(BDIVN); board size (BSIZE); percent of non-executive directors on the board (NED); separate of CEO and chairperson roles 
(DBLS); block ownership (BOWN); government ownership (GOWN); institutional ownership (IOWN); firm size (LNTA); 
leverage (LEV); firm age (AGE); audit firm size (BIG4); growth opportunity (SGR); Corruption Control Index (CCI); Inflation 
Index (INFL); and gross domestic product (GDP). Table 12 fully defines all the variables used. 
 
Table 14 presents the correlation matrix (including both Pearson’s parametric and Spearman’s 
non-parametric bivariate coefficients) among different corporate outcomes variables, independent 
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and control variables.16 The correlation analysis (i.e., Person’s parametric correlation coefficients 
only) reveals that Tobin’s Q positively and significantly correlates with the percentage of female 
directors on the board. Additionally, it shows that ROA has a positive significant correlation with all 
board diversity measures (BDIV, BDIVG, BDIVE, and BDIVN). EXE-PAY has a positive correlation 
with BDIV, BDIVE and BDIVN, while it has a negative significant correlation with BDIVG. In 
general, the results of the correlation matrix support that different board diversity measures have a 
significant impact on various corporate outcomes.  
 
 
                                               
16 The correlation matrix shows that there is no presence of multicollinearity among the variables, as the correlation 
coefficients do not exceed 0.80 (Hannifa and Hudaib, 2006; Ramly, 2012) (as cited by Gujarati, 2003).  
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Table 14: Pearson and Spearman correlation matrices of all variables     
 Q ROA EXE_PAY BDIV BDIVG BDIVE BDIVN BSIZE NED DRLS BOWN GOWN IOWN LNTA LEV AGE Big4 SGR CCI INFL GDP  
Q 1 .377*** .223*** 0.047 0.119*** -0.020 0.009 0.010 0.044 0.049 0.063 -0.089** 0.051 0.094** -0.059 -0.127*** 0.017 0.070* -0.199*** -0.300*** 0.112*** 
ROA  0.349*** 1 0.248*** 0.183*** 0.101** 0.136*** 0.169*** .081** 0.143*** 0.005 0.222*** 0.128*** 0.139*** 0.285*** -0.163*** -0.056 0.164*** 0.302*** -0.017 -0.022 -0.076* 
EXE-PAY 0.178*** 0.213*** 1 0.057 -0.068 .088** 0.108** 0.290*** 0.240*** 0.414*** 0.001 0.419*** -0.098** 0.724*** 0.207*** -0.149*** 0.575*** 0.250*** 0.066 0.055 0.563*** 
BDIV 0.062 0.183*** 0.085* 1 0.431*** .615*** 0.881*** 0.130*** 0.225*** 0.029 0.253*** 0.017 0.392*** 0.130*** 0.044 -0.234*** 0.206*** 0.066 -0.016 0.040 -0.160*** 
BDIVG 0.128*** 0.084** -0.093** 0.306*** 1 0.027 0.023 0.276*** -0.060 -0.311*** 0.124*** 0.167*** 0.071* 0.007 -0.147*** -0.063 0.018 -0.019 -0.203*** 0.134*** -0.148*** 
BDIVE -0.003 0.137*** 0.08* 0.664*** 0.030 1 0.700*** -0.119*** 0.280*** 0.244*** 0.269*** -0.097** 0.367*** 0.101** 0.135*** -0.157*** 0.233*** -0.023 0.035 0.002 -0.126*** 
BDIVN 0.03 0.166*** 0.114*** 0.945*** -0.005 0.694*** 1 0.024 0.278*** 0.179*** 0.239*** -0.083** 0.412*** 0.149*** 0.130*** -0.236*** 0.232*** 0.082** 0.093** -0.020 -0.121*** 
BSIZE -0.041 0.089** 0.308*** 0.121*** 0.274*** -0.074* 0.041 1 0.011 -0.243*** -.098** 0.273*** -0.101** 0.310*** 0.016 -0.005 0.150*** 0.102** -0.213*** 0.083** 0.080* 
NED 0.049 0.08* 0.253*** 0.214*** -0.087** 0.246*** 0.246*** 0.029 1 0.448*** 0.137*** 0.226*** 0.136*** 0.122*** 0.023 0 0.339*** 0.025 0.333*** -0.024 -0.020 
DBLS 0.04 -0.01 0.410*** 0.124*** -0.279*** 0.236*** 0.212*** -0.249*** 0.435*** 1 0.017 0.023 0.067* 0.149*** 0.085** -0.067 0.296*** -0.016 0.372*** -0.121*** 0.232*** 
BOWN 0.042 0.243*** -0.019 0.258*** 0.099** 0.269*** 0.241*** -0.067 0.049 0.018 1 0.220*** 0.490*** 0.185*** 0.033 -0.113*** 0.178*** 0.062 -0.019 0.300*** -0.126*** 
GOWN -0.074* 0.044 0.303*** -0.114*** 0.077* -0.123*** -0.152*** 0.167*** 0.062 0.027 0.328*** 1 -0.311*** 0.493*** -0.012 0.114*** 0.350*** 0.053 0.007 0.313*** 0.181*** 
IOWN 0.062 0.149*** -0.127*** 0.456*** 0.089** 0.370*** 0.453*** -0.090** 0.175*** 0.069* 0.538*** -0.409*** 1 -0.057 0.059 -0.183*** 0.128*** 0.027 0.010 0.126*** -0.258*** 
LNTS .099** 0.262*** 0.721*** 0.158*** -0.002 0.117*** 0.165*** 0.301*** 0.080* 0.152*** 0.223*** 0.443*** -0.054 1 0.368*** -0.102** 0.535*** 0.216*** -0.023 0.143*** .440*** 
LEV -0.031 -0.207*** 0.198*** 0.060 -0.151*** 0.145*** 0.114*** 0.027 0.033 0.078* 0.051 -0.054 0.057 0.355*** 1 -0.221*** 0.223*** 0.047 0.013 -0.028 0.080** 
AGE -0.134*** -0.009 -0.215*** -0.240*** -0.042 -0.117*** -0.230*** -0.030 -0.075* -0.117*** -0.070* 0.053 -0.168*** -0.204*** -0.273*** 1 -0.088** -0.074* 0.092** 0.206*** 0.051 
BIG4 0.022 0.145*** 0.567*** 0.222*** 0.026 0.235*** 0.226*** 0.135*** 0.352*** 0.296*** 0.200*** 0.238*** 0.113*** 0.527*** 0.208*** -0.123*** 1 0.107*** 0.078* 0.109*** 0.230*** 
SGR 0.074* 0.287*** 0.228*** 0.074* -0.014 -0.020 0.083** 0.096** 0.027 -0.015 0.089** 0.033 0.040 0.232*** 0.059 -0.116*** 0.117*** 1 -0.121** 0.062 0.158*** 
CCI -0.152*** -0.036 0.238*** -0.037 -0.254*** -0.008 0.042 -0.230*** 0.330*** 0.460*** -0.072* 0.019 -0.082** 0.048 0.013 0.018 0.119*** -0.094** 1 0.071* -0.146*** 
INFL -0.304*** -0.073* 0.095** -0.052 0.109*** -0.089** -0.085** 0.184*** -0.140*** -0.160*** 0.240*** 0.282*** 0.056 0.185*** 0.008 0.184*** 0.098** 0.064 -0.074* 1 0.095** 
GDP  0.182*** -0.078* 0.498*** -0.175*** -0.160*** -0.170*** -0.133*** 0.081** -0.037 0.210*** -0.242*** 0.092** -0.275*** 0.399*** 0.105*** -0.075* 0.169*** 0.132*** -0.005 0.016 1 
 
Notes: the bottom half of the table contains Person’s parametric correlation coefficients, whereas the upper right half of the table shows Spearman’s non-parametric correlation coefficients. ***, **, and 
* indicate that correlation is significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively. Variables are defined as follows: Tobin’s Q (Q); return on assets (ROA); executive pay (EXE_PAY); board diversity 
on the basis of gender, ethnic minority and nationality (BDIV); board diversity on the basis of gender (BDIVG); board diversity on the basis of ethnicity (BDIVE), board diversity on the basis of 
nationality (BDIVE); board size (BSIZE); percent of non-executive directors on the board (NED); separate of CEO and chairperson roles (DBLS); block ownership (BOWN); government ownership 
(GOWN); institutional ownership (IOWN); firm size (LNTA); leverage (LEV); firm age (AGE); audit firm size (BIG4); growth opportunity (SGR); Corruption Control Index (CCI); Inflation Index 
(INFL); and gross domestic product (GDP). Table 12 fully defines all the variables used. 
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5.2 Multivariate Fixed Effect Regression Analyses 
Fixed effect regression results of the impact of different board diversity measures on firm 
value (Q) and accounting returns (ROA) are illustrated in Table 15. First, to determine the impact of 
board diversity (BDIV) on firm performance, the study runs Q on BDIV and control variables without 
including CG measures in Model 1 and including CG measures in Model 5; while, Models 9 and 13 
document the results of regressing ROA on BDIV and control variables without including and 
including CG measures, respectively. These Models show that diversified boards have a positive and 
significant impact on both firm value (Q) at 10% level and accounting returns (ROA) at 1% level. 
These findings provide support for H1 and are in line with previous studies that have investigated the 
impact of board diversity on Q and/or ROA (e.g., Erhardt et al., 2003; Francoeur et al., 2008; Dobbin 
and Jung, 2011; Wellalage and Locke, 2013; Ntim, 2015). This evidence is consistent with the 
theoretical predictions of agency theory (Kesner, 1988; Carter et al., 2003; Van der Walt and Ingley, 
2003; Johnston and Malina, 2008; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Lincoln and Adedoyin, 2012; Triana et 
al., 2013; Abdullah, 2014), resource dependence theory (Goodstein et al., 1994; Westphal and 
Bednar, 2005; Mahadeo et al., 2011; Arnegger et al., 2014; Loukil and Yousfi, 2016), cognitive 
development theory (Sunden and Surette, 1998; Loukil and Yousfi, 2015; Gyapong et al., 2015; Post 
and Byron, 2015) and stakeholder theory (Shrader et al., 1997; Carter et al., 2003; Ryan and Haslam, 
2007; Mahadeo et al., 2012; Wellalage and Locke, 2013; Estélyi and Nisar, 2016), suggesting that 
board diversity based on gender, ethnic and nationality enhances board independence and monitoring 
function, and helps companies to gain legitimacy, contracts and investment opportunities. Diversified 
boards also provide expertise, knowledge and opinions that improve decision making effectiveness 
and hence firm performance.  
Second, Models 2, 6, 10, and 14 illustrate that board diversity measured on the basis of gender 
(BDIVG) similarly has a positive and significant effect on firm value (Q) at 1% level and accounting 
returns (ROA) at 10% level, providing further support for H1 and similar findings of previous studies 
(e.g., Johnston and Malina, 2008; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Adler, 2010; Bart and McQueen, 2013; 
Luckerath-Rovers, 2013; Wellalage and Locke, 2013; Gyapong et al., 2015; Ntim, 2015; Terjesen et 
al., 2015b). These findings are consistent with the theoretical predictions of agency theory that female 
directors are more likely to provide better monitoring function compared to male directors (Adams 
and Ferreira, 2009); resource dependence theory which predicts that appointing female directors 
improves firm legitimacy and provides firms with more capital inflows, investment opportunities, 
government support and community acceptance (Goodstein et al., 1994; Westphal and Bednar, 2005;  
Mahadeo et al., 2011; Loukil and Yousfi, 2016); and development cognitive theory which argues that 
more gender diversified boards are more likely to deeply and extensively consider, discuss and 
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integrate available information (Adams and Funk, 2012; Bart and McQueen, 2013; Post and Byron, 
2015), because of female distinctive interests, characteristics and cognitive behaviour, leading to 
increase in firm performance and value (Gyapong et al., 2015; Ntim, 2015; Terjesen et al., 2015b). 
Third, to examine the effect of ethnic minority board members (non-Arab) on firm value (Q) 
and accounting returns (ROA), the study regresses BDIVE on Q and ROA by re-estimating equation 
(1). The results reported in Models 3, 7, 11, and 15, generally, indicate that board diversity measured 
on the basis of ethnicity (BDIVE) has an insignificant impact on firm value (Q) and accounting returns 
(ROA) (except Model 7 which shows that appointing ethnic minority directors on boards is valued 
significantly and negatively by the market at 10% level).  The results are in line with previous studies 
that have documented no relationship between appointing ethnic minority directors and different 
measures of firm performance (Zahra and Stanton, 1988; Carter et al., 2010). Fourth, equation (1) 
was re-estimated by regressing BDIVN on firm value (Q) and accounting returns (ROA) including 
control variables, in order to examine the impact of appointing foreign directors on firm performance.  
Findings stated in Models 4, 8, 12 and 16 display mixed results. Model 4 and 8 document no 
relationship between national board diversity and firm value Q, while the positive significant impact 
of foreign directors on accounting returns is illustrated in Models 12 and 13 at 10% and 5% levels, 
respectively, supporting H1 and in line with resource dependence theory and previous studies which 
have suggested that appointing directors with diverse nationalities brings different perspectives and 
contracts to the board and facilitates access to different national and international markets that 
enhance the geographic and product diversification, and thereby improves firm performance 
(Mahadeo et al., 2011; Masulis et al., 2012; Miletkova et al., 2014; Estélyi and Nisar, 2016). Finally, 
with regard to control variables, results reported in Models 1 to 8 show that board independence, 
institutional ownership and auditor quality have a positive and significant impact on firm market 
value, while block ownership and inflation have a negative and significant effect on firm market 
value. On the other hand and with reference to the results illustrated in Models 9 to 16, there is a 
positive and significant association between separation of chairperson and CEO roles, firm size, age, 
sales growth and accounting returns (ROA). However, the results report that firms with high leverage 
and listed in countries with high GDP have lower ROA.   
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Table 15: Fixed-effect regression of the relationship between board diversity and firm performance 
   
Indepdent Variables Q ROA  
Model Pred.  sign 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
BDIV +/- .857* 
(.059) 
   .802* 
(.075) 
   .091*** 
(.004) 
   .086*** 
(.006) 
   
BDIVG +/-  3.773*** 
(.001) 
   3.884*** 
(.000) 
   .141* 
(.067) 
   .131* 
(.085) 
  
BDIVE +/-   -1.231 
(.132) 
   -1.469* 
(.075) 
   .024 
(.676) 
   .030 
(.601) 
 
BDIVN +/-    -.030 
(.960) 
   -.199 
(.733) 
   .080* 
(.053) 
   .081** 
(.046) 
Control Variables: Corporate Governance               
BSIZE +/-     -.551 
(.163) 
-.612 
(.118) 
-.393 
(.329) 
-.529 
(.182) 
    -.009 
(.754) 
-.009 
(.747) 
-.009 
(.753) 
-.006 
(.839) 
NED +     1.443*** 
(.006) 
1.428*** 
(.006) 
1.510*** 
(.004) 
1.506*** 
(.004) 
    .0123 
(.735) 
.016 
(.668) 
.018 
(.629) 
.014 
(.699) 
DBLS +     0.048 
(.765) 
.050 
(.754) 
.051 
(.752) 
.048 
(.768) 
    .043*** 
(.000) 
.043*** 
(.000) 
0.043*** 
(.000) 
.044*** 
(.000) 
BOWN +/-     -1.843*** 
(.000) 
-1.897*** 
(.000) 
-1.925*** 
(.000) 
-1.849*** 
(.000) 
    .015 
(.656) 
.013 
(.697) 
.017 
(.625) 
.018 
(.603) 
GOWN +/-     .916 
(.239) 
.931 
(.226) 
1.186 
(.128) 
1.064 
(.172) 
    .039 
(.470) 
.049 
(.365) 
.050 
(.359) 
.046 
(.401) 
IOWN +/-     .792* 
(.080) 
.798* 
(.075) 
.862* 
(.057) 
.824* 
(.070) 
    .040 
(.209) 
.042 
(.188) 
.041 
(.192) 
.040 
(.202) 
Control Variables: Firm-level                
LNTS +/- .085 
(.202) 
.080 
(.224) 
.093 
(.162) 
.090 
(.175) 
.052 
(.444) 
.048 
(.491) 
.053 
(.439) 
.059 
(.408) 
.026*** 
(.000) 
.027*** 
(.000) 
.027*** 
(.000) 
.027*** 
(.000) 
.028*** 
(.000) 
.028*** 
(.000) 
.028*** 
(.000) 
.028*** 
(.000) 
LEV +/- -.134 
(.703) 
-.138 
.690 
-.230 
(.513) 
-.192 
(.584) 
-.007 
(.983) 
-.002 
(.995) 
-.111 
(.751) 
-.072 
(.837) 
-.118*** 
(.000) 
-.1222 
(.000) 
-.123*** 
(.000) 
-.121*** 
(.000) 
-.108*** 
(.000) 
-.112*** 
(.000) 
-.113*** 
(.000) 
-.111*** 
(.000) 
AGE +/- .086 
(.722) 
.080 
(.739) 
.148 
(.551) 
.077 
(.751) 
.248 
(.317) 
.251 
(.306) 
.306 
(.223) 
.230 
(.354) 
.068*** 
(.000) 
.068*** 
(.000) 
.066*** 
(.000) 
.068*** 
(.000) 
.072*** 
(.000) 
.071*** 
(.000) 
.069*** 
(.000) 
.070*** 
(.000) 
BIG4 + .329*** 
(.001) 
.299*** 
(.003) 
.322*** 
(.001) 
.327*** 
(.001) 
.328*** 
(.001) 
.300*** 
(.003) 
.315*** 
(.002) 
.323*** 
(.001) 
-.002 
(.759) 
-.003 
(.627) 
-.002 
(.751) 
-.001 
(.837) 
-.005 
(.521) 
-.006 
(.417) 
-.005 
(.508) 
-.004 
(.574) 
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SGR + -.071 
(.206) 
-.062 
(.270) 
-.083 
(.146) 
-.074 
(.190) 
-.045 
(.427) 
-.034 
(.539) 
-.056 
(.319) 
-.047 
(.402) 
.021*** 
(.000) 
.021*** 
(.000) 
.021*** 
(.000) 
.020*** 
(.004) 
.020*** 
(.000) 
.021*** 
(.000) 
.020*** 
(.000) 
.020*** 
(.000) 
Control Variables: Country -level                
CCI +/- -.896 
(.130) 
-.859 
(.143) 
-.916 
(.122) 
-.869 
(.143) 
-.896 
(.126) 
-.858 
(.138) 
-.940 
(.109) 
-.878 
(.134) 
.062 
(.133) 
.065 
(.116) 
.066 
(.114) 
.065 
(.116) 
.050 
(.223) 
.052 
(.202) 
.053 
(.198) 
.052 
(.203) 
INFL +/- -.222* 
(.098) 
-.219* 
(.100) 
-.244* 
(.070) 
-.226* 
(.093) 
-.238* 
(.078) 
-.234* 
(.080) 
-.265* 
(.051) 
-.242* 
(.074) 
-.010 
(.282) 
-.010 
(.277) 
-.010 
(.285) 
-.010 
(.285) 
-.017* 
(.065) 
-.017* 
(.064) 
-.017* 
(.070) 
-.017* 
(.065) 
GDP +/- .199 
(.354) 
.218 
(.306) 
.214 
(.319) 
.221 
(.306) 
.086 
(.754) 
.080 
(.710) 
.093 
(.668) 
.094 
(.667) 
-.074*** 
(.000) 
-.072*** 
(.000) 
-.072*** 
(.000) 
-.074*** 
(.000) 
-.083*** 
(.000) 
-.081*** 
(.000) 
-.080*** 
(.000) 
-.082*** 
(.000) 
INDU   Included  Included Included Included Included  Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
YDU  Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
CONSTANT  -4.351 -4.760 -4.743 -4.827 -.588 -.688 -1.514 -1.230 1.461*** 1.414*** 1.411*** 1.448*** 1.618*** 1.574*** 1.567*** 1.595*** 
F-value  2.95*** 3.93*** 2.80*** 2.53*** 3.31*** 4.03*** 3.31*** 3.09*** 13.80*** 13.11*** 12.67*** 13.16*** 10.06*** 9.67*** 9.43*** 9.75*** 
Adjusted R2  0.7341 0.7385 0.7334 .7805 .7426 .7477 .7426 .7410 0.7940 0.7919 0.7906 0.7921 0.8007 0.799 0.7978 .8375 
No. of obse  600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 
 
Notes: P-values are between brackets. ***, **, * indicate that the relationships are significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. Variables are defined as follows: Tobin’s Q (Q); return 
on assets (ROA); board diversity on the basis of gender, ethnic minority and nationality (BDIV); board diversity on the basis of gender (BDIVG); board diversity on the basis of ethnicity (BDIVE); 
board diversity on the basis of nationality (BDIVN); board size (BSIZE); percent of non-executive directors on the board (NED); separate of CEO and chairperson roles (DBLS); block ownership 
(BOWN); government ownership (GOWN); institutional ownership (IOWN); firm size (LNTA); leverage (LEV); firm age (AGE); audit firm size (BIG4); growth opportunity (SGR); Corruption 
Control Index (CCI); Inflation Index (INFL); gross domestic product (GDP); industry dummy (INDU); and year dummy (YDU). Table 12 fully defines all the variables used. 
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Table 16 shows the fixed effect regression results of the moderating effect of CG strength on 
the association between different diversity measures and firm value (Q) and accounting returns 
(ROA). The study runs Q/ROA on different board diversity measures, MCGI, interaction of different 
diversity measures and MCGI, and control variables. With reference to the interaction variables, the 
evidence generally indicates no relationship between interaction variables (Diversity*MCGI) and Q 
in Models 1 to 4, which appear to be at variance with H2. On the other hand, Models 5 to 8 show the 
moderating effect of the CG strength on the association between board diversity and ROA. The results 
of the interaction variables indicate statistically significant and negative effect of the interaction 
variables (except BDIVG*MCGI) on ROA in Models 5, 7 and 8. However, MCGI has a significantly 
positive impact on ROA in Models 5 to 8. Additionally, the interaction variable improves the 
magnitudes of the coefficients of board diversity variables BDIV, BDIVE and BDIVN compared to 
Models 13, 15 and 16 in Table 15, supporting H2. In well-governed firms, the more monitoring effort 
provided by highly diversified boards and diversified boards on the basis of ethnicity and nationality 
impact firm accounting returns (ROA) negatively. Accordingly, the results are consistent with results 
of Adams and Ferreira (2009) and Gul et al. (2011), which suggest that board diversity substitutes 
other CG measures in monitoring firms. 
 
Table 16: Fixed-effect regression of the moderation effect on the relationship between board and firm 
performance 
 Q ROA 
Ind. Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
BDIV .463 
(.776) 
   .314*** 
(.006) 
   
BDIVG  -3.009 
(.571) 
   .578 
(.127) 
  
BDIVE   -.2.442 
(.658) 
   1.219*** 
(.002) 
 
BDIVN    .661 
(.744) 
   .335** 
(.018) 
CG variable:         
MCGI  -2.479*** 
(.002) 
-2.552*** 
(.001) 
-2.393*** 
(.004) 
-2.342*** 
(.004) 
.111** 
(.050) 
.099* 
(.078) 
.140** 
(.015) 
.110* 
(.053) 
Interaction variable        
BDI* MCGI .727 
(.785) 
11.662 
(.192) 
2.002 
(.804) 
-1.022 
(.744) 
-.382** 
(.041) 
-.750 
(.238) 
-1.772*** 
(.002) 
-.416* 
(.058) 
Control Variables: Firm-level        
LNTS .091 
(.169) 
.086 
(.180) 
.099 
(.134) 
.099 
(.135) 
.027*** 
(.000) 
.026*** 
(.000) 
.027*** 
(.000) 
.027*** 
(.000) 
LEV -.119 
(.734) 
-.134 
(.696) 
-.216 
(.536) 
-.162 
(.583) 
-.122*** 
(.000) 
-.122*** 
(.000) 
-.127*** 
(.000) 
-.124*** 
(.000) 
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AGE .005 
(.985) 
-.022 
(.928) 
.062 
(.806) 
.023 
(.926) 
.078*** 
(.000) 
.072*** 
(.000) 
.079*** 
(.000) 
.075*** 
(.000) 
BIG4 .355*** 
(.000) 
.323*** 
(.001) 
.346*** 
(.001) 
.350*** 
(.001) 
-.004 
(.600) 
-.004 
(.538) 
-.004 
(.586) 
-.003 
(.685) 
SGR -.071 
(.205) 
-.069 
(.218) 
-.082 
(.184) 
-.076 
(.179) 
.021*** 
(.000) 
.021*** 
(.000) 
.020*** 
(.000) 
.020*** 
(.000) 
Control Variables: Country level  
CCI  -.309 
(.616) 
-.253 
(.677) 
-.361 
(.560) 
-.297 
(.630) 
.037 
(.387) 
.042 
(.335) 
.051 
(.239) 
.044 
(.310) 
INFL  -.183 
(.170) 
-.200 
(.133) 
-.208 
(.122) 
-.193 
(.152) 
-.012 
(.194) 
-.010 
(.271) 
-.010 
(.299) 
-.013 
(.174) 
GDP .589** 
(.589) 
.619** 
(.012) 
.591** 
(.018) 
.602** 
(.016) 
-.089*** 
(.000) 
-.087*** 
(.000) 
-.089*** 
(.000) 
-.088*** 
(.000) 
INDU  Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
YDU Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
CONSTANT -13.278** -13.845** -13.352** -13.698** 1.773*** 1.758*** 1.746*** 1.738*** 
F-value 3.33*** 4.30*** 3.12*** 2.96*** 12.00*** 11.13*** 11.73*** 11.41*** 
Adjusted R2 .7382 .7434 .7371 .7362 .7960 .7928 .7950 .7938 
No. of observ 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 
Notes: P-values are between brackets. ***, **, * indicate that the relationships are significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
Variables are defined as follows: Tobin’s Q (Q); return on assets (ROA); board diversity on the basis of gender, ethnic minority and 
nationality (BDIV); board diversity on the basis of gender (BDIVG); board diversity on the basis of ethnicity (BDIVE); board diversity on 
the basis of nationality (BDIVE); the MENA countries overall Corporate Governance Disclosure Index (MCGI); firm size (LNTA); leverage 
(LEV); firm age (AGE); audit firm size (BIG4); growth opportunity (SGR); Corruption Control Index (CCI); Inflation Index (INFL); gross 
domestic product (GDP); industry dummy (INDU); and year dummy (YDU). Table 12 fully defines all the variables used. 
 
Models 1 to 8 in Table 17 show the fixed effect regression results of the influence of different 
diversity measures on EP. The findings reported in Models 1 to 8 suggest that different measures of 
board diversity (BDIV, BDIVG, BDIVE and BDIVN) have no impact on EP. These results do not 
support H3, but are consistent with findings of Adams and Ferreira (2009) who report that gender 
diversified boards are less likely to impact CEO pay due to lower representation of female directors 
in compensation committees. With regard to control variables, Models 1 to 8 document that the 
separation of board leadership positions between chairperson and CEO (DBLS) and inflation impact 
EP negatively and significantly, while firm size and GDP have a positive and significant relationship 
with EP.          
 Models 10 to 13 present the fixed effect regression results of the moderating effect of 
different measures of diversity on the relationship between EP and performance. Model 9 shows the 
fixed effect regression results of the EXE_PAY on corporate performance (Q) and control variables 
in order to determine the PPS. The results suggest that there is a positive and significant association 
between corporate performance and EP in MENA countries. This result is consistent with OCT which 
argues that, as executives are less involved in determining their own pay, a positive and strong 
association exists between EP and performance. The results reported in Models 10 to 13 show that 
the coefficients of Q on EXE_PAY in models 11 and 12 are positive and statistically significant. 
155 
 
Crucially, it is clearly observable from the results that the PPS has noticeably improved, suggesting 
that gender and ethnic minority directors moderate the PPS. The coefficient of Q has increased from 
.046 (.094) in Model 9 to .055 (.065) and .064 (.044) in Models 11 and 12, respectively, supporting 
H4 and suggesting that board diversity based on gender and ethnicity moderates the association 
between EP and performance. This means that the PPS being stronger in firms with higher gender 
and ethnicity diversified boards. The findings are in line with predictions of OCT that board diversity 
can enhance firm value by linking EP to performance (Edmans and Gabaix, 2009; Conyon, 2014). 
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Table 17: Fixed-effect regression of the relationship between board diversity and executive pay and the moderation effect of board 
diversity on the pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS)   
Independent variables EXE-PAY 
Model Pred. sign 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Q +         .046* 
(.094) 
.044 
(.155) 
.055* 
(.065) 
.064** 
(.044) 
.049 
(.108) 
BDIV +/- -.010 
(.972) 
   -.054 
(.848) 
    -.049 
(.828) 
   
BDIVG +/-  1.046 
(.145) 
   .925 
(.198) 
    2.286* 
(.084) 
  
BDIVE +/-   .138 
(.776) 
   .618 
(.900) 
    .747 
(.284) 
 
BDIVN +/-    -.018 
(.959) 
   -.063 
(.853) 
    .041 
(.921) 
Interaction variable             
Q*DIV +/-          .018 
(.891) 
-.712 
(.203) 
-.365 
(.273) 
-.035 
(.806) 
Control Variables: Corporate Governance           
BSIZE +/-     .062 
(.813) 
.065 
(.802) 
.058 
(.826) 
.061 
(.814) 
     
NED -     .234 
(.495) 
.183 
(.593) 
.230 
(.501) 
.232 
(.498) 
     
DBLS  -     -.383*** 
(.002) 
-.365*** 
(.003) 
-.382*** 
(.002) 
-.382*** 
(.002) 
     
BOWN +/-     -.372 
(.229) 
-.368 
(.232) 
-.362 
(.245) 
-.374 
(.228) 
     
GOWN +/-     -.050 
(.920) 
-.122 
(.804) 
-.075 
(.881) 
-.054 
(.913) 
     
IOWN +/-     .110 
(.734) 
.071 
(.825) 
.095 
(.768) 
.109 
(.736) 
     
Control Variables: Firm-level             
LNTS + .240*** 
(.000) 
.239*** 
(.000) 
.240*** 
(.000) 
.240*** 
(.000) 
.215*** 
(.000) 
.213*** 
(.000) 
.215*** 
(.000) 
.215*** 
(.130) 
.233*** 
(.000) 
.233*** 
(.000) 
.230*** 
(.000) 
.232*** 
(.000) 
.234000 
(.000) 
LEV +/- .271 
(.210) 
.282 
(.189) 
.276 
(.201) 
.270 
(.210) 
.211 
.330 
.231 
(.283) 
.218 
(.314) 
.212 
(.328) 
.277 
(.196) 
.277 
(.201) 
.267 
(.213) 
.286 
(.184) 
.272 
(.209) 
AGE +/- .067 
(.652) 
.061 
(.681) 
.060 
(.691) 
.067 
(.652) 
.062 
(.685) 
.059 
(.698) 
.058 
(.709) 
.062 
(.684) 
.074 
(.618) 
.075 
(.615) 
.068 
(.649) 
.058 
(.701) 
.074 
(.619) 
BIG4 - .039 
(.506) 
.030 
(.606) 
.040 
(.495) 
.038 
(.511) 
.063 
(.287) 
.056 
(.344) 
.064 
(.281) 
.062 
(.294) 
.023 
(.693) 
.023 
(.693) 
.016 
(.782) 
.020 
(.736) 
.022 
(.708) 
SGR + .005 
(.884) 
.010 
(.786) 
.006 
(.859) 
.005 
(.883) 
.017 
(.622) 
.021 
(.578) 
.018 
(.616) 
.018 
(.617) 
.009 
(.788) 
.010 
(.784) 
.122 
(.728) 
.011 
(.753) 
.009 
(.798) 
Control Variables: Country-level             
CCI  +/- .291 
(.434) 
.306 
(.409) 
.298 
(.423) 
.290 
(.434) 
.450 
(.227) 
.464 
(.213) 
.453 
(.226) 
.449 
(.228) 
.290 
(.433) 
.300 
(.426) 
.295 
(.424) 
.291 
(.433) 
.285 
(.444) 
INFL  +/- -.314*** 
(.003) 
-.313*** 
(.002) 
-.311*** 
(.003) 
-.314*** 
(.003) 
-.346*** 
(.001) 
-.342*** 
(.001) 
-.343*** 
(.001) 
-.345*** 
(.001) 
-.305*** 
(.003) 
-.306*** 
(.003) 
-.323*** 
(.002) 
-.302*** 
(.004) 
-.306*** 
(.003) 
GDP +/- .586*** 
(.000) 
.590*** 
(.000) 
.587*** 
(.000) 
.586*** 
(.000) 
.697*** 
(.000) 
.697*** 
(.000) 
.696*** 
(.000) 
.697*** 
(.000) 
.559*** 
(.000) 
.560*** 
(.000) 
.577*** 
(.000) 
.556*** 
(.000) 
.561*** 
(.000) 
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INDU  Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
YDU  Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
CONSTANT  -5.804* -5.888* -5.814* -5.807* -8.216** -8.18** -8.181** -8.210** -5.118 -5.126 -5.545 -5.020 -5.157 
F-value  12.10*** 12.40*** 12.11*** 12.10*** 8.41*** 8.56*** 8.41*** 8.41*** 12.49*** 10.18*** 10.53*** 10.33*** 10.18*** 
Adjusted R2  .9365 .9369 .9366 .9365 .9379 .9509 .9379 .9379 .9270 .9367 .9371 .9369 .9367 
No. of obs.  502 502 520 520 502 502 502 502 502 502 502 502 502 
 
Notes: P-values are between brackets. ***, **, * indicate that the relationships are significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. Variables are 
defined as follows: Executive pay (EXE_PAY); board diversity on the basis of gender, ethnic minority and nationality (BDIV); board diversity on the 
basis of gender (BDIVG); board diversity on the basis of ethnicity (BDIVE); board diversity on the basis of nationality (BDIVN); board size (BSIZE); 
percent of non-executive directors on the board (NED); separate of CEO and chairperson roles (DBLS); block ownership (BOWN); government ownership 
(GOWN); institutional ownership (IOWN); firm size (LNTA); leverage (LEV); firm age (AGE); auditor size (BIG4); growth opportunity (SGR); 
Corruption Control Index (CCI); Inflation Index (INFL); gross domestic product (GDP); industry dummy (INDU); and year dummy (YDU). Table 12 
fully defines all the variables used. 
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5.3 Robustness Tests 
This section discusses the effect of the number of female directors on firm value in addition 
to a number of additional analyses that have been carried out to further examine the robustness of the 
results to the existence of alternative measures of diversity and firm performance measures, non-
monotonic associations and lagged effect.  
 
5.3.1 Results Based on the Number of Female Directors           
Section 1.1 discusses the recent worldwide effort to empower women in the business field by, 
for instance, specifying a female quota on boards to achieve gender parity. On the other hand, firms 
may not voluntarily respond to gender empowerment views unless there is a business rationale for it. 
According to token status theory (Kanter, 1977) and critical mass theory (Kramer et al., 2007; Kristie, 
2011), which states that one is a token, two is a presence, three is a voice, and driven by results which 
are reported in Table 15, the value relevance of increasing the number of female directors on 
boardrooms was investigated. Following, Liu et al. (2014) and Gyapong et al. (2015), equation (1) 
was re-estimated using the following dummies; GENDER_1 refers to a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
a firm has one female director on the board, otherwise 0; GENDER_2 refers to a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if a firm has two female directors on the board, otherwise 0; GENDER_3 refers to a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if a firm has three or more female directors on the board, otherwise 0. Results 
reported in Models 1–3 in Table 18 show that appointing one female director GENDER_1 has a 
positive and significant impact on firm value (Q) (.328 (.006)), while increasing the number of female 
directors GENDER_2 and GENDER_3 have a positive but insignificant impact on firm value and thus 
critical mass theory is not applicable to female directors in MENA countries. This finding supports 
that qualified women appointed in corporate boards are limited, and in most cases they hold multiple 
directorship (Sealy et al., 2008). This ‘director busyness’ has a negative impact on women’s ability 
to provide their monitoring and advisory roles, increases agency problems and thereby reduces firm 
value (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Jiraporn et al., 2009; Faleye et al., 2011; Field et al., 2013). 
Alternatively, firms are motivated by increasing their legitimacy, public image and shareholders’ 
representation to appoint female directors (Goodstein et al., 1994; Westphal and Bednar, 2005; Jamali 
et al., 2007; Arnegger et al., 2014; Loukil and Yousfi, 2016). The possible dearth of qualified women 
directors and the intervention of control families and the state to appoint directors from their inner 
circle in MENA countries (Jamali et al., 2007; Loukil and Yousfi, 2016) leads to appointing less-
qualified directors.  
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5.3.2 Results based on Alternative Firm Performance Measures                  
Following literature (e.g., Adams and Ferreira, 2009, Liu et al., 2014; Ntim, 2015), the 
association between firm performance and board diversity was re-investigated using total share return 
(TSR) and return on equity (ROE) as alternative market value and accounting return measures, 
respectively. The results in Models 4 and 5 in Table 18 illustrate that, board diversity has a positive 
and insignificant relationship with TRS, while board diversity has a positive but significant effect on 
ROE. 
 
5.3.3 Results Based on Non-Linear Assumption  
In order to examine whether there is a non-linear relationship between board diversity and 
firm performance, equation (1) was re-estimated using percentage of board diversity (BDIVE) and 
its quadratic form (BDIVE2). Models 6 and 7 in Table 18 show positive and insignificant effect of 
BDIVE2 on Q, supporting that the positive impact of BDIVE on Q holds against non-monotonic 
specification, and consistent with findings of Cotter et al. (2002) and Ntim (2015). In contrast, Model 
7 shows positive but statistically significant impact of BDIV2 on ROA, confirming a probable concave 
relationship between BDIV and ROA, and consistent with findings of Gyapone et al. (2015).   
 
5.3.4 Results Based on Alternative Measures of Diversity                  
Following Carter et al. (2003, 2010), Gyapong et al. (2015) and Louki and Yousfi (2016), the 
study includes tests of sensitivity of its results to alternative measures of board diversity. It therefore 
uses the number of women, ethnic minority and foreign directors on the board (BDIV_NO) and a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the board has at least one woman, ethnic minority or foreign director, 
and 0 otherwise (BDIV_DU). Equation 1 was re-run using the two alternative diversity measures. 
The results are presented in Models 8 to 11 in Table 18. The results are fairly robust to the use of the 
number of diversified directors (BDIV_NO) or board diversity dummy measure (BDIV_DU), instead 
of percentage of diversified directors on the board (BDIV).  
 
5.3.5 Results based on Lagged Structure Model 
A number of previous studies have argued that the current year’s firm performance is affected 
by the last year’s governance structure (e.g., Yermach, 2009; Ntim et al., 2012a). Accordingly, and 
following Ntim (2015), a one year lag between board diversity and firm performance (Q and ROA) 
was introduce to account for possible endogeneity problems probably caused by simultaneous 
association between explanatory variables (i.e., BDIV) and dependent variables (i.e., Q and ROA). 
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Statistically significant and positive impact of lagged board diversity BDIV on Q and ROA is 
presented in Models 12 and 13 in Table 18, suggesting that the findings in Models 1 and 9 in Table 
15 are largely robust to estimating a lagged board diversity.  
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Table 18: Additional and sensitivity analyses of the determinants of CG disclosures 
 Q TSR ROE Q ROA Q ROA Q ROA Q ROA 
 GENDER_1 GENDER_2 GENDER_3   No-linearity BDIV_NO BDIV_DUM Lagged 
Independ. Var. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
BDIV    .520 
(.434) 
.167* 
(.051) 
.649 
(.483) 
-.071 
(.266) 
    1.218** 
(.028) 
.075* 
(.077) 
BDIV_NO        .061 
(.205) 
.009*** 
(.005) 
    
BDIV_DUM          .272** 
(.050) 
-.006 
(.559) 
  
BDIV2      .398 
(.796) 
.312*** 
(.004) 
      
GENDER_1  .328*** 
(.006) 
            
GENDER_2  .028 
(.859) 
           
GENDER_3   .108 
(.660) 
          
Control variables: Firm-level             
LNTS .087 
(.187) 
.091 
(.174) 
.089 
(.183) 
-.053 
(.583) 
.033*** 
(.009) 
.084 
(.208) 
.026*** 
(.000) 
.086 
(.198) 
.026*** 
(.000) 
.094 
(.159) 
.027*** 
(.000) 
.058 
(.435) 
-.008 
(.160) 
LEV -.157 
(.653) 
-.193 
(.582) 
-.186 
(.597) 
-.171 
(.739) 
-.324*** 
(.000) 
-.128 
(.717) 
-.113*** 
(.000) 
-.161 
(.646) 
-.120*** 
(.000) 
-.186 
(.595) 
-.124*** 
.000 
-.221 
(.545) 
-.057** 
(.041) 
AGE .049 
(.840) 
.077 
(.753) 
.085 
(.727) 
-.302 
(.396) 
.005 
(.897) 
.088 
(.717) 
.070*** 
(.000) 
.084 
(.729) 
.069*** 
.000 
.073 
(.762) 
.068*** 
(.000) 
.314 
(.234) 
.031 
(.132) 
BIG4 .303*** 
(.003) 
.327*** 
(.001) 
.328*** 
(.001) 
-.196 
.181 
.000 
(.981) 
.328*** 
(.001) 
-.003 
(.635) 
.328*** 
(.001) 
-.002 
(.746) 
.331*** 
(.001) 
-.002 
(.730) 
.179* 
(.075) 
.006 
(.454) 
SGR -.063 
(.264) 
-.075 
(.186) 
-.073 
(.200) 
.131 
(.115) 
.048*** 
(.000) 
-.072 
(.203) 
.020*** 
(.000) 
-.072 
(.203) 
.021*** 
.000 
-.069 
.222 
.020*** 
(.000) 
.058 
(.313) 
.011** 
(.011) 
Control variables: Country-level            
CCI  -.756 
(.200) 
-.873 
(.141) 
-.883 
(.137) 
2.538*** 
(.003) 
.201* 
(.072) 
-.891 
(.133) 
.066 
(.105) 
-.902 
(.128) 
.060 
(.148) 
-.899 
(.128) 
.065 
(.115) 
1.554*** 
(.006) 
-.005 
(.914) 
INFL -.195 
(.146) 
-.222 
(.103) 
-.238 
(.083) 
.586*** 
(.003) 
-.050** 
(.048) 
-.224* 
(.096) 
-.011 
(.218) 
-.228* 
(.089) 
-.011 
(.247) 
-.181 
(.182) 
-.011 
(.233) 
-.268 
(.131) 
-.016 
(.233) 
GDP .216 
(.313) 
.220 
(.307) 
.221 
(.306) 
-.157 
(.619) 
-.023 
(.562) 
.203 
(.347) 
-.071*** 
(.000) 
.212 
(.325) 
-.073*** 
.000 
.165 
(.447) 
-.071*** 
(.000) 
-.007 
(.974) 
-.016 
(.323) 
INDU  Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
YDU Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant -4.730 -4.811 -4.797 3.272 .307 -4.432 1.398*** -4.624 1.442*** -3.584 1.386*** -.685 .520 
F-value 3.41*** 2.54*** 2.56*** 2.25** 7.25*** 2.66*** 13.46*** 2.72*** 13.76*** 2.98*** 12.69*** 2.84*** 2.17** 
Adjusted R2 .7362 .7322 .7323 .0826 .7007 .7336 .7971 .7331 .7939 .7343 .7907 .7931 .7938 
No. of obs. 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 
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Notes: P-values are between brackets. ***, **, * indicate that the relationships are significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. Variables are defined as follows: Tobin’s 
Q (Q); return on assets (ROA); board diversity on the basis of gender, ethnic minority and nationality (BDIV); board diversity on the basis of gender (BDIVG); board diversity on the 
basis of ethnicity (BDIVE); board diversity on the basis of nationality (BDIVN); firm size (LNTA); leverage (LEV); firm age (AGE); audit firm size (BIG4); growth opportunity 
(SGR); Corruption Control Index (CCI); Inflation Index (INFL); gross domestic product (GDP); industry dummy (INDU); year dummy (YDU); square the percentage of the total 
number of women, ethnic minority, and foreign directors to the total number of board directors (BDIV2); number of the total number of women, ethnic minority, and foreign directors 
to the total number of board directors (BDIV_NO); dummy variable equal 1 if the board has one women, ethnic minority, or foreign director and 0 otherwise (BDIVG_DU); A dummy 
variable equal to 1 if a firm has one woman director on the board (GENDER_1); A dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm has two woman directors on the board (GENDER_2); A dummy 
variable equal to 1 if a firm has more than 2 woman directors on the board (GENDER_3); return on equity (ROE); and total shareholder returns (TSR). Table 12 fully defines all the 
variables used. 
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6 Summary and Conclusions 
The board of directors is the top decision-making sub-group in modern organisations, and is 
associated with responsibility for a set of functions (e.g., advising, controlling, monitoring, hiring, 
motivating and firing executives), in addition to taking strategic decisions (e.g., mergers, acquisitions 
and capital structure). However, previous studies investigating the impact of board diversity on 
corporate outcomes have provided mixed results. Consequently, this study attempts to determine 
whether board diversity affects corporate outcomes. Specifically, it examines the relationship 
between board diversity, based on gender, nationality and ethnicity, and firm value and accounting 
returns, and whether firm governance moderates this relationship. It also investigates the effect of 
board diversity on EP and on the PPS. The study sample was 600 firm-year observations of 100 
publicly listed firms in five MENA countries from 2009 to 2014.  
Summary descriptive statistics reveal a wide variation of board diversity on the basis of 
gender, nationality and ethnicity, ranging from 0% to 76.92%, with an average of 14.08%. This 
indicates that most boards of MENA listed firms are dominated by national Arab males. Furthermore, 
the results document a positive and significant impact of diversified boards, based on gender, 
nationality and ethnicity, on both firm market value and accounting returns. Specifically, appointing 
female directors improves firm market value and accounting returns, while foreign directors have a 
positive and significant effect on firm accounting returns. Furthermore, the study found no empirical 
evidence for a moderating effect of CG quality on the link between board diversity and market value, 
although board diversity based on ethnic minority and nationality was found to substitute for other 
CG measures in monitoring firms. Therefore, the positive impact of board ethnic and national 
diversity on firm accounting returns is more observable in weakly governed firms. Moreover, the 
study found no empirical evidence for the effect of different measures of board diversity on EP. 
However, the inclusion of female and minority ethnic directors improves the PPS. 
 
6.1 Contributions, Policy Implications and Recommendations 
The results of this essay contribute to the literature in a number of ways. First, most studies 
examining the impact of board diversity on corporate outcomes were conducted in developed 
countries, where institutional structures and corporate settings are largely similar. However, there is 
limited evidence from emerging countries. Therefore, the current study contributes to the literature 
investigating board diversity in MENA countries using one of the largest and most extensive hand-
collected data sets to date (a sample of 100 MENA listed firms from 2009 to 2014, with 600 firm-
year observations) in order to enhance the generalisability of the results. Also, distinct from previous 
studies that relied on either time series or cross-sectional data, this study employed panel data to 
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mitigate the effect of multicollinearity, control unobserved heterogeneity among variables and 
increase the degree of freedom. 
Second, unlike past studies that have restricted their investigation to a single theoretical 
framework, the current study offers a uniform theoretical framework that can be used to explain the 
impact of board diversity on corporate outcomes by articulating a multi-theoretical framework. This 
framework includes most related theories, namely agency, resource dependence, cognitive 
development, social identity and stakeholder theories. This methodology is useful in predicting 
hypotheses and interpreting results, especially in the unique and distinctive corporate context of 
MENA countries, whose distinctive features are expected to result in mixed predictions on the impact 
of board diversity on corporate outcomes. Generally, the findings are consistent with the multi-
theoretical framework, which suggests that appointing gender, national and ethnic diversified 
directors increases boards’ ability to exercise their monitoring, advising and decision making, 
independently and efficiently, as well as helping boards to better reflect stakeholder composition. 
This may improve legitimacy, securing critical resources, government blessing and thereby 
enhancing firm performance. 
Third, unlike many previous studies that restrict their investigation to one feature of board 
diversity (e.g., gender) or one set of corporate outcomes (e.g., market value), this study offers 
comprehensive evidence for how and why board diversity affects corporate outcomes among MENA 
listed firms. In particular, it contributes to the existing literature by offering evidence on the effects 
of wide features of board diversity on the basis of gender, ethnicity and nationality on various types 
of corporate outcome, namely firm accounting returns, market value, EP and the PPS. This provides 
comprehensive evidence for the possible influence of wide features of board diversity on various 
types of corporate outcomes in the distinct context of MENA countries.  
Fourth, unlike previous studies, this research offers empirical evidence on whether the 
observed differences in corporate outcomes can be explained by board diversity, using alternative 
models and estimations. A number of analyses were conducted to test the extent to which the main 
results are robust or sensitive to different types of endogeneity problems and corporate outcomes 
measures. Overall, the findings are insensitive across the range of econometric models.  
The evidence has important implications for governments, policy makers and regulatory 
authorities, especially in the MENA region, other devolving countries and emerging markets. The 
recent Arab Spring called for a greater role for young people and women in society, and access to 
better economic opportunities. In addition, the significant increase in foreign direct investments and 
the number of higher-level educated women and declining fertility rates strongly influenced women 
to enter the workforce. However, the findings are consistent with the arguments of Jamali et al. 
(2007), Ibrahim and Hanefah (2014) and Loukil and Yousfi (2015) that the under-representation of 
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women on corporate boards in MENA countries is influenced by the glass ceiling hypothesis, and the 
importance of the issuance of government regulations in line with international CG best practices to 
address the weak representation of women in top management and corporate board level positions. 
Thus, the results suggest that decisions about board diversity are not merely influenced by moral 
values; they arise because of the cost-benefit considerations of what diversity can bring to the firm. 
 
6.2 Limitations and Avenues for Further Research 
 The current study is subject to a number of weaknesses. The sample size was small (i.e., 600 
firm-year observations collected from five MENA countries) because using content analysis to collect 
data manually from financial reports and websites consumes much time and effort. The availability, 
accessibility, funding and time constraints of completing the PhD within the appointed timeframe 
further limited the size of the sample that could be handled. Thus, future studies might use a larger 
representative sample to enhance the generalisability of the results.  
Second, the current study employs only quantitative analysis to investigate the influence of 
board diversity based on gender, nationality and ethnicity on firm performance (i.e., accounting 
returns and market value), EP and the PPS, and to examine its hypotheses. However, quantitative and 
qualitative analysis together might result in better inferences and interpretation of the results.  
Finally, given the unavailability of data on different features of boards of directors, this study 
focuses on board diversity based on gender, nationality and ethnicity, to examine the impact of board 
diversity on corporate outcomes. However, there are other features of board diversity that may have 
a significant impact on corporate outcomes, such as educational background, age, experience and 
professional qualifications. Future studies with more data sources could capture different features of 
board diversity and examine its impact on various corporate outcomes. 
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Abstract 
This essay investigates the effect of corporate governance (CG) on auditor choice and fees 
using a sample of 100 listed firms from MENA countries over the period 2009-2014. The findings in 
general suggest that auditor choice and fees can be significantly influenced by firm-level CG. First, 
the empirical results demonstrate that the CG Index, board diversity based on gender and ethnicity, 
board independence, separation of the CEO/chairperson roles, and concentrated ownership impact 
significantly and positively on the choice of the Big 4 auditors. Board size impacts positively, but 
insignificantly on the Big 4 auditors choice, whereas government ownership and director ownership 
are insignificantly negatively related to the Big 4 auditor choice. Second, the CG Index, board 
diversity based on gender and ethnicity, and government ownership are significantly and negatively 
related to audit fees, whereas board size, board independence and director ownership impact 
significantly, but positively on audit fees. Non-dual board leadership and concentrated ownership 
have no significant impact on audit fees. Overall, the study findings suggest that external audit quality 
(Big 4 auditor, high audit fees) do have a CG monitoring role in MENA countries. Furthermore, 
auditor choice and fees decisions are affected by the firm-level CG MENA listed firms.   
 
  
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Auditor Choice, Audit Fees, MENA.    
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1. Introduction  
The purpose of this study is to contribute to the extant CG and auditing literature by examining 
whether firm-level CG quality, board characteristics (i.e., board size, board diversity, board 
independence and separation of CEO/chairperson roles) and ownership structure mechanisms 
(government, director and block ownership) impact (i) auditor choice; and (ii) auditor fees, with 
specific focus on providing new empirical evidence from MENA countries. The analysis is drawn 
from agency theory perspective.  
 
1.1 Background 
Recently the world has witnessed an increased interest in the quality of CG, particularly the 
role of CG in enhancing the quality of corporate financial reporting (Ntim et al., 2012b, Al-Bassam 
et al., 2015; Elghuweel et al. 2016; Elmagrhi et al. 2016). The audit process also seeks to provide 
independent verification of the financial statement prepared by management (O’Sullivan, 2000). 
Financial scandals in the early 1990s directed attention to the quality and reliability of audited 
information (Cadbury, 1992; Humphrey et al., 1993; O’Sullivan, 2000; Asthana et al., 2010). Most 
existing CG codes aim to keep the external auditor independent from corporate management. In an 
attempt to increase the objectivity of managerial behaviour, these codes tend to recommend the 
appointment of more non-executive independent directors in addition to avoiding the duality of the 
chairperson and CEO positions. These codes also recommend the establishment of an audit 
committee, composed primarily of non-executive and independent directors, to help auditors provide 
their independent verification of the financial statement and to maintain an objective relation between 
external auditors and management. Therefore, independent auditing is considered as an essential 
governance mechanism through which shareholders can monitor management. This motivates 
researchers to investigate the association between external auditing and other CG mechanisms applied 
by modern organisations (O’Sullivan, 2000; O’Sullivan and Diacon, 2002; Fan and Wong, 2005; 
Zaman et al., 2011). 
The primary concern of CG is to direct and control any deviation in the interests of corporate 
managers from those of shareholders (O’Sullivan, 2000; Ntim et al., 2016a). Agency theory proposes 
a set of mechanisms to mitigate the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders, including 
board characteristics (e.g., existence of independent non-executive directors) (Fama and Jensen, 
1983) and ownership structure mechanisms (e.g., block and executive ownership) (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). The likelihood of manager-shareholder conflict may 
also be monitored by the audit process, whereby the external auditor annually provides shareholders 
with a report assessing the appropriateness of the financial statements prepared by management 
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(Watts and Zimmerman, 1983). Therefore, external auditing is considered one of the CG mechanisms 
used to attest the credibility of accounting information provided by management; it helps to alleviate 
agency conflicts between owners/shareholders and management because it enhances the external 
monitoring of owners/shareholders (Abdel-khalik, 2002; Cohen et al., 2002; Ashbaugh and Warfield, 
2003; Beck et al., 2013; Luypaert and Van Caneghem, 2013). Several previous studies have reported 
that firms facing high levels of agency conflict are advised to hire a high-quality auditor to improve 
their CG and to mitigate probable agency conflicts (e.g., Fan and Wong, 2005; Hay and Davis, 2004; 
Gul et al., 2013), because low-quality auditors will probably be unable to exercise appropriate 
monitoring of the client’s financial reports (Claessens et al., 2002; Mayhew et al., 2003). The 
literature has documented that firms applying stronger CG mechanisms are more likely to provide 
higher-quality financial reporting, as a result of the positive impact on the improvement of audit 
quality and CG (Wang, 2006; Lin and Liu, 2009, 2010). On the other hand, firms with weaker internal 
CG mechanisms may be more opaque and thus less likely to select high-quality (Big 4) auditors in 
order to avoid more effective audit monitoring (Lin and Liu 2009; 2010). 
Audit fees are determined according to the economic costs of efficient auditors (Carcello et 
al., 2002); these costs vary with the size, complexity, risk and other characteristics of the auditee 
(Simunic and Stein, 1996; Kalelkar and Khan, 2016). Auditors tend to seek to minimise total costs 
by reducing the amount of additional audit work, and at the same time trying to avoid future losses 
from legal liability (Simunic and Stein, 1996, Kalelkar and Khan, 2016). Larger audit investigations 
require more audit hours and/or use of more specialised audit staff, resulting in higher audit fees 
(O’Sullivan, 2000). Chaney et al. (2004) argue that large audit firms invest heavily in technology, 
training and other facilities and are able to provide more efficient audit for large and relatively 
complex clients. The costs of these investments are passed on to clients in the form of high audit fees. 
Generally, the expected superior quality offered and benefits received may drive public listed firms 
to pay premium fees for larger audit firms (Chaney et al., 2004; Bills and Cunningham, 2015; Bills 
and Stephens, 2015). Beck et al. (2013) find empirical evidence that audit fee disclosures affect 
investor perceptions of audit characteristics. Big 4 audit firms have greater resources, technical 
knowledge and global reach, allowing them to deal with clients more objectively without fear of 
termination. In addition, the key factors which enhance the credibility of an audit report provided by 
one of the Big 4 auditors include professional audit expertise, a wide range of skills, reputation, 
accounting-and-auditing knowledge, real value for fees, and ethical standards (Al-Ajmi, 2009; 
Samaha and Hegazy, 2010; Eshleman and Guo, 2014). Therefore, audit fees and Big 4 auditors can 
be used as indicators of audit quality. 
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1.2 Motivation  
The current study is driven by a number of motives. First, previous studies investigating the 
antecedents of the variation in the level of audit fees paid by companies, and auditor choice, have 
reported mixed results (Chan et al., 1993; Hay et al., 2008). Therefore, this study is motivated to offer 
further evidence relating to the determinants of audit fees and auditor choice in MENA countries. 
Second, most studies on auditor choice and fees concentrate on the client’s characteristics (e.g., size, 
complexity, free cash flow and risk) (Simunic, 1980; Gul and Tsui, 1998), and the client-auditor 
relationship (e.g., auditor tenure and the type of non-audit services) (Barkness and Simnett, 1994; 
Ezzamel et al, 1996; Firth, 1997a, b; O’Sullivan and Diacon, 2002) to explain variations in auditor 
choice and fees. In response to calls for empirical testing of the relationship between CG and audit 
quality (Defond and Francis, 2005; Al-Ajmi, 2009), this essay is motivated to investigate the impact 
of various internal CG mechanisms (CG index, board characteristics and ownership structure 
mechanisms) on audit fees and auditor choice.  
Despite considerable research on audit fees and auditor choice, such studies in the MENA 
region are scarce (Al-Ajmi, 2009). Therefore, the third motive driving this study is to provide MENA-
related evidence on CG determinants of audit fees and auditor choice. Most of the audit literature 
derives from developed countries (e.g., the US and UK) where the audit market and CG environment 
are not identical with those in the MENA region (Chan et al., 1993; Carcello et al., 2002; Al-Ajmi, 
2009). Hence, this research provides additional insights into determinants of audit pricing and auditor 
choice. Finally, external auditing is one of many potential monitoring mechanisms designed to 
mitigate agency conflicts in public traded firms by ensuring the quality of financial reports (Larcker 
and Richardson, 2004; Fan and Wong, 2005). Furthermore, a large number of previous studies have 
documented the positive impact of internal CG mechanisms on monitoring and improving the quality 
of financial reporting (e.g., Eng and Mak, 2003; Alsaeed, 2006; Omar and Simon, 2011; Ntim et al., 
2012a; Samaha et al., 2012; Al-Bassam et al., 2015; Habbash et al., 2015; Elghuweel et al. 2016; 
Elmagrhi et al., 2016). Therefore, examining the association between the external auditing process 
and alternative governance mechanisms provides a comprehensive analysis of the associations among 
the determinants of financial reporting quality. 
 
1.3 Contributions         
Both the literature and current regulatory developments can benefit from this study. First, the 
findings meet the demand for an examination of the effects of internal governance mechanisms on 
the auditor choice and fees (Johansen and Pettersson, 2013). Second, they may be useful to policy 
makers. Many authors are concerned about the effectiveness of audit markets and the failure resulting 
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from their limited ex-ante differentiation (e.g., Oxera, 2006; Department of the Treasury, 2008; 
European Commission, 2008; OECD, 2009). The current study proposes that internal governance has 
economic implications on the audit market, developing earlier work on the extent to which market 
players select auditors, using criteria other than the size of the audit firm and its industry expertise 
(Francis, 2004). Third, the context beyond traditional Western settings is explored (Carcello et al., 
2011). Within developed countries the auditing environments are similar to each other (Lin and Liu, 
2009), but this essay extends the literature to MENA countries. Fourth, the findings suggest ways of 
improving CG and audit monitoring to ensure the reliability of corporate reporting; this is necessary 
to the development of MENA capital markets. Finally, the findings shed light on recent developments 
on MENA countries’ audit functions and CG, encouraging close monitoring of the independent 
auditing process by investors and market regulators and increasing the reliability of financial 
reporting. 
 
1.4 Structure of the Essay 
The essay is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the audit quality and audit profession in 
the MENA region. Section 3 reviews the literature and formulates hypotheses to examine the 
association between internal CG mechanisms, and auditor choice and fees decisions. The research 
design is presented in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the empirical results and conducts sensitivity 
tests. Section 6 concludes the essay. 
 
2 Audit Quality and Audit Profession in the MENA Region: 
Background and Institutional Framework 
MENA countries, like other developing countries, share common cultural characteristics such 
as a strong hierarchical social structure, importance of personal relationships, religion, accountability 
and trust, and the nature of some of the socio-economic institutions (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Al-
Ajmi, 2009). The MENA stock market and auditing environment have some distinct features, 
different from most developed countries. For instance, there is concentrated ownership dominated by 
the state and powerful families (Fawzy, 2004; Wahdan et al., 2005a, b; Al-Ajmi, 2009; Samaha and 
Hegazy, 2010; Mohamed and Habib, 2013). In addition, the auditing profession is directly regulated 
by the government and the utility of auditing services may not be fully realised in the relatively less 
efficient capital market of the MENA region (Wahdan et al., 2005a, b; Al-Ajmi, 2009; Samaha and 
Hegazy, 2010; Mohamed and Habib, 2013). Thus, care is needed when interpreting the results of this 
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study; in particular the effects of different environmental factors should be taken into account when 
comparing auditing practices in MENA and developed countries.  
 
2.1 Institutional Framework and Audit Profession in MENA Countries 
The quality of the audit process and the audit profession in the MENA region are not well 
established compared to developed countries. In Egypt, for example, in accordance with law number 
52 of 1942, the State Audit Bureau was established to audit public sector accounts. This was the start 
of the auditing profession in Egypt. Auditing of private businesses was regulated under Accounting 
Practice Law number 133, 1951, and after the expansion of public sector in 1964, the Central Auditing 
Organisation (CAO) of Egypt was established by Law number 129. In 1946, the Egyptian Society of 
Accountants and Auditors (ESAA) was established by Royal Decree. This widely recognised 
association of chartered accountants and auditors plays a central role in developing educational and 
professional standards of accounting. It was reorganised in 1977 as a non-profit organisation, and in 
1983 it became a member of the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC). The association 
between external auditors and corporations has been regulated by Company Law number 159 since 
1981. This act requires listed companies in Egypt to maintain proper accounting records separate 
from those of their owners, and to hire an external auditor at the end of each fiscal year. It also requires 
that external audits be carried out in compliance with the Accounting Practice Law 133/1951, and 
that the General Assembly is responsible for deciding whether to renew the audit engagement or 
change the external auditor (Wahdan et al., 2005a, b). 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2007) explained that the Saudi auditing profession is regulated according 
to the Companies Act 1965 (amended 1985), the Income Tax and Zakah Law 1950, the Banking 
Control Law 1966, the General Auditing Bureau Constitution and Regulation 1970, the Saudi 
Auditing Standards 1985, the Statutory Accountants Act 1973 (amended 1994), as well as the 
Professional Code of Ethical Conduct (PCEC) 1994. These rules are derived from Anglo-American 
sources without amendments to meet the local socio-economic environment (Shinawi, 1970; Haniffa 
and Hudaib, 2007; Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008; Baydoun et al., 2013). The Saudi Organisation 
for Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA), a professional membership organisation, was established 
by Royal Decree No. M/12 in 1992. It has many objectives, such as to review, develop and approve 
accounting and auditing standards, and to organise continuous education programmes for its 
members. However, it has had little power or impact on the accounting and auditing profession 
(Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007). Similarly, the Bahrain Accountants Association (BAA), which was 
established in 1972 as a non-governmental organisation, provides workshops, seminars and public 
lectures. It has limited power in the further development of the profession (Al-Ajmi, 2009). 
173 
 
The state and powerful families and classes in most MENA countries can influence the 
recruitment and appointment of staff members in most of professions, including audit firms (Al-
Awaji, 1971; Helms, 1981; Wahdan et al., 2005a, b; Mohamed and Habib, 2013). Some of these 
countries also have laws requiring audit firms to hire a certain percentage of nationals; SOCPA, for 
example, requires all audit firms to have at least 30% of their staff composed of Saudi nationals. This 
may affect the quality of the audit service provided in these countries (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007). 
The political and legal structure and social values (religion, norms and ethics) may also impact the 
audit profession and the quality of audit services provided (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007). The 
appointments of auditors, as required by company law in most MENA countries, should be made on 
a yearly basis at annual stockholders’ meetings. In practice, boards of directors may be empowered 
by annual meetings to appoint auditors and to determine their remuneration. This practice conflicts 
with the auditor’s role of mitigating agency problems that might exist between the board and the 
shareholders (Al-Ajmi, 2009). 
Mohamed and Habib (2013) report many factors negatively affecting audit quality in Egypt. 
First, there is no effective code of professional ethics governing the accountants’ and auditors’ work 
and practices. Although the Commercial Syndicate’s Law number 40, 1972, discusses breach of 
ethics criteria including fraud, some accountants and auditors ignore this code (Wahdan et al., 2005a; 
Samaha and Hegazy, 2010; Mohamed and Habib, 2013). Second is the absence of a powerful 
professional organisation responsible for developing the auditing profession, despite the existence of 
the ESAA, which has no authority to issue auditing standards or to license auditors for public practice. 
The ESAA is unable to confirm that its members are complying with ethical conduct standards and 
auditing best practice (Samaha and Hegazy, 2010; Mohamed and Habib, 2013). Third, most audit 
firms provides both audit and non-audit services, including management advisory services. This 
increases the auditor’s economic interest in the client, thus giving rise to conflict of interest and 
threatening auditor independence (Moizer, 1985; Wahdan et al., 2005a; Samaha and Hegazy, 2010; 
Mohamed and Habib, 2013). Fourth, although the Egyptian Company Law number 159 of 1981 
stipulates that shareholders hire the auditor and decide the audit fees in the general assembly, the 
concentrated ownership of most Egyptian companies enables powerful shareholders to intervene in 
these decisions. Therefore, auditors may face a conflict of interests between their fairness on the one 
hand and their selection and fees on the other hand (Wahdan et al., 2005b; Mohamed and Habib, 
2013). Finally, there are few opportunities for new audit services to enter the Egyptian market, 
limiting auditors’ independence and therefore audit quality (Mohamed and Habib, 2013). 
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2.2 Corporate Governance and the Role of Big 4 Audit Firms in Developing the 
Audit Profession in MENA Countries 
The CG codes issued by most MENA countries stress the importance of the services provided 
by the external auditor in enhancing the quality and credibility of corporate financial statements. In 
addition, these codes recommend measures to ensure external auditors’ independence from 
management. For example, the Egyptian CG code 2011 stipulates that shareholders select auditors, 
only in the annual general assembly. It recommends that the general assembly should not allow the 
board to choose the external auditor or determine his/her annual fees without specifying a maximum 
value. Similarly, boards of directors should not assign additional non-audit services to the company’s 
external auditor as this might affect his/her independence, unless the board consults the audit 
committee. Similarly, Jordanian CG code 2012 and Omani CG code 2002 rule that, during their 
annual general meeting, shareholders shall appoint the external auditor for one year, to be renewable 
as appropriate. The board of directors, after consulting the audit committee, can make 
recommendations for the selection, appointment, reappointment and terms of the auditor’s 
engagement. In order to ensure the independence of the external auditor, these codes also proposed 
that the audit engagement should not be renewed after four consecutive years, and the external auditor 
should not provide non-audit services that might weaken their independence.  
Similarly, in developed countries CG codes stress the importance of the objective relationship 
between auditors and management. Cadbury (1992), for example, recommended that audit firms 
should not provide other types of service to their audit clients. However, it supported full disclosure 
of fees paid to audit firms for non-audit work, and proposed the introduction of some form of 
compulsory rotation of audit firms in order to maintain the objectivity of relationships between 
management and auditors.    
Despite the undevelopment of the audit profession and audit market in the MENA region, 
most MENA countries experienced a rapid shift in economic development following the oil boom of 
the 1970s, thereby increasing the demand for high-quality auditing (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007). Other 
factors which encourage the development of the accounting and auditing profession in these countries 
are the strong presence of multinational firms and international financial institutions, and 
governments having long-standing policies of attracting foreign investments. Furthermore, the shift 
of ownership rights from the state to private and institutional investors as a result of increasing 
economic diversification (Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003) requires better protection of such 
investments through better-quality audit by more reputable auditors (Al-Ajmi, 2009; Samaha and 
Hegazy, 2010). The region has experienced an increase in the number of foreign investors, raised 
awareness of investors, improvement in the efficiency of the judiciary system, increase in the 
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probability of materialisation of risk, more investment in continuing education programmes for 
qualifying accountants and auditors, an increase in government privatisation programmes and a 
reduction in government ownership in listed firms: these factors are likely to increase the demand for 
better quality audit services (Al-Ajmi, 2009). 
Given the relatively recent development of the accounting and auditing profession in MENA 
countries, and the lack of qualified and experienced nationals, foreign professional audit firms tend 
to dominate the local audit and accountancy market, introducing standards and procedures, as well as 
professional ethical codes, from their home countries (Al-Rehaily, 1992; Al-Ajmi, 2009). They have 
also created an image as providers of high-quality audits (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007). In Egypt, 
reputable audit firms with international affiliations representing the large international audit firms 
usually employ qualified staff, mostly members of international professional bodies such as American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and Association of Chartered Certified 
Accountants (ACCA). On the other hand, the small- and medium-sized firms hire practitioners who 
lack sufficient knowledge and formal qualifications in both accounting and auditing standards, and 
who perform audit examination for tax purposes only (World Bank, 2002; Samaha and Hegazy, 
2010). Most the MENA region’s accounting and auditing markets are dominated by large audit firms; 
for example Al-Ajmi (2009) reports that 82.5% of the 41 companies listed on the Bahrain Stock 
Exchange were audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms. He suggests that Big 4 have greater resources, 
technical knowledge and global reach, allowing them to deal with clients more objectively without 
fear of termination. He identifies the key factors which ensure the credibility of an audit report 
provided by one of the Big 4 auditors as professional audit expertise, a wide range of skills, reputation, 
accounting-and-auditing knowledge, real value for fees, and ethical standards. 
Likewise, Samaha and Hegazy, (2010) provide an empirical evidence from Egypt illustrating 
that there is general lack of training and proper knowledge for supporting high-quality financial 
reporting. This restricts ensuring sound audit practice and quality. However, auditors from Big 4 firms 
are more professional and complying with international auditing standards (found to use International 
Standards on Auditing (ISA) No. 520 relating to analytical procedures (APs) to a greater extent) than 
auditors from non-Big 4 firms. Similarly, and using a survey of 300 credit and financial analysts in 
Bahrain, Al-Ajmi, (2009) reports that firm specific CG mechanisms (e.g., effective audit committee) 
enhances the perceived quality of the audit report. He also documents that credit and financial analysts 
believe that Big 4 audit firms have required qualifications, expertise and independency for conducting 
high-quality audit process. Therefore, the credibility of financial statements may be a function of 
audit firm size. In addition, the dual providing of audit and non-audit services affects auditor’s 
independence negatively and probably impair audit quality.  
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3 Theoretical Framework, Literature Review and Development of 
Hypotheses 
3.1 Agency Theory Framework for Auditor Choice and Fees 
The separation of ownership and management in modern corporations encourages 
management to undertake opportunistic behaviour and hence increase the cost of agency problems 
that may be ultimately borne by management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The separation of 
ownership and management is not the only source of agency conflict. Since various interested parties 
are associated with business organisations, there have been different types of principal-agent 
relationship (e.g., between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, creditors and 
owners/management). Therefore, CG’s main objective is to monitor the behaviours of different 
interested parties and ultimately to reduce the agency costs raised by different principal-agent 
relationships (Karpoff et al., 1996; Singh and Davidson, 2003; Lashgari, 2004; Maniam et al., 2006). 
Thus, CG is a set of external and internal rules, regulations, procedures and measures to govern the 
behaviours of different interested parties within a firm to maximise its value (Denis and McConnell, 
2003; Lin and Liu, 2009). Previous studies have revealed the positive impact of CG on firms’ 
operating efficiency and effectiveness (e.g., Bushman and Smith, 2001; La Porta et al., 2002; 
Anderson et al. 2004). Other studies have found that sound CG mechanisms have a greater 
information content (Gompers et al., 2003; Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Bai et al., 2004; Steen, 2005. 
Ntim, 2015). Regulators, researchers and practitioners in developed and developing countries have 
devoted much effort in CG studies and proposed various procedures to raise the standards of CG over 
recent years, especially after the corporate scandals of the early 2000s, such as Enron and WorldCom 
(Denis and McConnell, 2003; Bai et al., 2004; Jiraporn et al., 2005). 
Agency conflicts also lead to a demand for the services of independent auditors to ensure the 
fairness of financial reports prepared by management for shareholders, and to detect material 
deviations from generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) (Francis and Wilson, 1988; Dye, 
1993; Imhoff, 2003). Therefore, firms may voluntarily hire high-quality auditors to improve the 
credibility of their financial disclosure and thereby mitigate agency problems (Willenborg, 1999; 
Anderson et al., 2004; Wei et al., 2014; Asthana et al., 2015). Past studies have reported that firms 
facing serious agency conflicts are more likely to hire high-quality auditors to improve their CG and 
mitigate the probable conflicts (Hay and Davis, 2004; Fan and Wong, 2005; Srinidhi et al., 2014), 
while poor-quality auditors may be unable to exercise appropriate monitoring of the client’s financial 
reports (Claessens et al., 2002; Mayhew et al., 2003). For example, Wei et al. (2014) document that 
firms with a sufficiently high proportion of sophisticated investors are more likely to choose high-
177 
 
quality auditors. Also, Luypaert and Van Caneghem (2013) have evidence supporting that appointing 
one of the Big 6/5/4 auditors mitigates information asymmetry in mergers and acquisitions; 
contingent payments are less common when the target is audited by these auditors, after controlling 
for several other characteristics of the deal and firm. Furthermore, they report that the incentive to 
use stock payments in periods of stock market overvaluation is lower for acquirers with Big 
6/5/4 auditors, and target shareholders are more likely to accept a contingent offer if the acquirer’s 
financial statements are certified by them. Likewise, firms with higher information asymmetry 
problems benefit more from Big 6/5/4 auditors in terms of lower cost of debt (Gul et al., 2013). 
Srinidhi et al. (2014) agree that strongly governed firms are more likely to choose better-quality 
(specialist) auditors and to exhibit higher earnings quality than other firms. This means that reputable 
auditors may be considered as a CG device to monitor a firm’s financial reporting process (Cohen et 
al., 2002; Ashbaugh and Warfield, 2003; Fan and Wong, 2005; Lin and Liu, 2009, 2010; Asthana et 
al., 2015). Firm-specific CG may also affect a firm’s choice of audit/auditor quality. In general, firms 
adopting sound CG mechanisms have a better control over operating activities and management 
performance. Thus the firm’s management or its controlling shareholders are not totally free in the 
choice of auditor. On the other hand, in weak governed firms, the management or controlling 
shareholders have a better opportunity to direct the auditor-hiring decision towards their own interests 
(Lin and Liu, 2009, 2010). This increases the risk of aggressive earning management or tunnelling 
behaviours, and thereby the credibility of financial statements may decrease.  
The heterogeneous demands for independent audit services and different levels of audit 
quality to serve as a monitoring function depend on various levels of agency conflict among different 
firms (Lin and Liu, 2009; Luypaert and Van Caneghem, 2013; Srinidhi et al., 2014). Audit quality 
refers to the ability to detect misstatements, and the willingness to report misstatements uncovered in 
an audit process (DeAngelo, 1981; Copley and Douthett, 2002; Lee et al., 2003; Mohamed and Habib, 
2013). That is, audit quality depends on the auditor’s ability to discover and report inaccuracies in the 
financial statements provided by management. The auditor’s technical capabilities and competence 
determine his/her ability to discover a breach in the client’s accounting system. However, the 
probability of reporting the misstatements is a function of the auditor’s independence (De Angelo, 
1981; Deis and Giroux, 1992; Vanstraelen, 2000). Audit quality is difficult to observe directly, so 
several observable attributes are used to proxy for it, including the size of the audit firm (DeAngelo, 
1981; Palmrose, 1988; Eshleman and Guo, 2014), tenure on audit engagement (Simunic and Stein, 
1987), audit structure (Knapp, 1991), auditors’ industrial expertise composition (Schauer, 2002), 
audit fees (Beck et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2016) and litigation or stock market actions against listed 
firms and their auditors (Allen et al., 2005). Lin and Liu (2009, 2010) argue that the main attributes 
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of a high-quality auditor are independence (relationship based), sufficient expertise (technique based) 
and high integrity (honesty and forthrightness). 
DeAngelo (1981) argues that the quality of an audit process is a function of the size of the 
audit firm, or its market share. Large audit firms are more likely to provide higher quality audit to 
sustain their reputation and avoid litigation costs (Francis and Krishnan, 1999; Eshleman and Guo, 
2014). Despite the case of Arthur Andersen, the audit literature provides much evidence confirming 
that large audit firms are positively associated with providing higher-quality services and a better 
monitoring role (e.g., Wolson and Grimlund, 1990; Willenborg, 1999; Bandyopadhyay and Kao, 
2001; Ireland and Lennox, 2002; Lee et al., 2003; Francis, 2004; Watkins et al., 2004; Farbar, 2005; 
Lennox, 2005; Lin and Liu, 2009; Eshleman and Guo, 2014). This is because they usually have better 
training programmes, and a higher degree of independence and industrial expertise, which qualify 
them to detect and report irregularities in the financial statements provided by management (DeFond, 
1992; Lennox, 1999; Reed et al., 2000; Mansi et al., 2004; Eshleman and Guo, 2014). A number of 
previous studies have provided empirical evidence suggesting that high-quality auditors (Big 6/5) can 
effectively detect earnings management and thus eventually improve the truthfulness and usefulness 
of accounting information (Francis and Krishnan, 1999; Balsam et al., 2003; Watkins et al., 2004). 
On the other hand, because of the relatively limited industrial knowledge and resources available to 
small audit firms, these are more likely to provide low-quality audit services (Teoh and Wong, 1993; 
Becker et al., 1998; Krishnan, 2003; Ghosh and Moon, 2005). Furthermore, some empirical studies 
have revealed that accounting numbers (e.g., earnings and book values) reported by the clients of 
large audit firms have greater information content for the market (Krishnan, 2003; Francis, 2004; 
Watkins et al., 2004; Lennox, 2005; Knechel et al., 2007). Similarly, higher audit fees may reflect 
audit quality and auditor effort (Beck et al., 2013), and thus may increase the credibility of corporate 
reporting and thereby accelerate the incorporation of future earnings information into current 
stock prices (Chen et al., 2016). 
Managers and controlling shareholders may gain self-benefits by manipulating accounting 
numbers or transferring resources through tunnelling behaviour (DeFond and Subramanyam, 1998), 
and they may take these self-benefits into consideration when hiring external auditors (Johnson et al., 
2000; La Porta et al., 2002). Firms hiring a more reputable auditor signal to the market that their 
financial reports are more reliable. This helps in reducing information asymmetry (Beatty, 1989; 
Willenborg, 1999), as well as mitigating agency costs and allowing firms to obtain finance 
(debt/equity) at lower costs (Beatty, 1989; Ang et al., 2000; Lin and Liu, 2009, 2010). Firms also 
seek to obtain high-quality audit to improve the credibility and reliability of their accounting 
information. Reliable accounting information, along with market measures, helps in evaluating and 
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compensating management (Antle, 1982; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Blackwell et al., 1994). 
Firms not only demand the better-quality audit services provided by large audit firms but they also 
believe that large audit firms can provide superior tax expertise or advisory services among the other 
non-audit services provided (Chaney et al., 2004).    
From the auditors’ point of view, they aim to provide high-quality audit process to minimise 
their business risk by increasing the auditee’s satisfaction, avoiding litigation, and reducing damage 
to their reputation in the case of audit failure (Al-Ajmi, 2009; Eshleman and Guo, 2014; Kalelkar and 
Khan, 2016). Large audit firms also provide high-quality audit services for a number of other reasons, 
including availability of highly qualified and experienced staff; adequate technological resources 
(DeAngelo, 1981; Frantz, 1999); effective control systems (Al-Ajmi, 2009); more independence of 
their clients (DeAngelo, 1981); high economic costs imposed on the auditor in the event of audit 
failure, and the risk of losing the reputation (DeAngelo, 1981) which enables them to charge high 
audit fees and therefore devote more time and effort to each audit engagement (Francis, 2004; 
Goodwin-Stewart and Kent, 2006). A considerable number of studies have investigated whether the 
big audit firms may provide a superior audit quality service, with mixed results. Although extensive 
empirical evidence suggests that these auditors provide high-quality audits (DeAngelo 1981; 
Palmrose, 1988; Deis and Giroux, 1992; Mutchler et al., 1997; Krishnan and Schauer, 2000; Fuerman, 
2004; Eshleman and Guo, 2014), there is also evidence which suggests that no differences in quality 
exist between the big and non-big auditors (Jeong and Rho 2004; Khurana and Raman, 2004). 
In conclusion, the independent audit process can be considered as one of the effective CG 
mechanisms, where an independent and professional auditor will provide external monitoring of the 
financial information provided by management and thereby enhance market confidence in corporate 
financial reporting (Lin and Liu, 2009, 2010; Luypaert and Van Caneghem, 2013). Auditors can also 
improve the monitoring role of CG by examining and evaluating a firm’s internal control procedures 
to ensure the reliability of disclosed financial reports (Beasley et al., 2000; La Porta, 2002; Fan and 
Wong, 2005). The big audit firms are usually more independent and possess greater professional 
industrial expertise, both of which are necessary to detect and report misstatements and irregularities 
in financial reports and thereby better fulfil their monitoring role (Willenborg, 1999; Chaney and 
Philipich, 2002; Cohen et al., 2002; Ghosh and Moon, 2005; Lin and Liu, 2009; 2010). Well governed 
firms are more likely to hire a higher-quality auditor to ensure that financial reports are fairly 
presented in conformity with GAAP, eventually enhancing the credibility and usefulness of financial 
reports to various stakeholders (Bushman and Smith, 2001; Dewing and Russell, 2003; Fan and 
Wong, 2005; Maniam et al., 2006; Srinidhi et al., 2014). Therefore, sound CG mechanisms are 
associated with the quality and effectiveness of the auditing process (Ashbaugh and Warfield, 2003; 
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Francis et al., 2005; Abbott et al., 2007). On the other hand, in firms with weak CG mechanisms, it 
is more likely that managers and controlling shareholders will interfere in the choice of external 
auditor, so that the independent audit process may not be able to fulfil its monitoring role (Rosner, 
2003; Marnet, 2005; Lin and Liu, 2009, 2010).  
Indeed, the impact of sound CG mechanisms on external auditing (including auditor choice 
and fees) is an important issue worthy of study. In particular, the auditing profession and CG practices 
in MENA countries differ substantially from those in developed countries (as discussed in detail in 
Section 2), which may have different impacts on the utility of the auditing function in the MENA 
context. Therefore, investigating the antecedents of auditor choice and fees from the perspective of 
CG context in the MENA market environment should not only promote the development of CG and 
independent auditing in these emerging economies, but also enrich the literature on the CG/audit 
quality-related issues. In particular, this study examines the impact of the CG index, board 
characteristics (size, diversity, independence, and non-duality of chairperson and CEO roles) and 
ownership structure mechanisms (government, director and block ownership) on both auditor choice 
and fees decisions in the MENA context. 
 
3.2 Literature Review and Development of Hypotheses 
3.2.1 A Broad Composite Quality CG Index 
Major financial reporting scandals have, to a large extent, been attributed to poor governance 
oversight. Therefore, many countries have implemented new rules to improve the quality of CG 
(Byard et al., 2006; Zaman et al., 2011). CG reforms which provide guidelines and recommendations 
relating to the composition and effectiveness of boards and audit committees are intended to improve 
financial reporting and external audit quality (Conyon, 2000; Cohen et al., 2004; Larcker and 
Richardson, 2004; Peasnell et al., 2005; Turley and Zaman, 2007; Beasley et al., 2009; Krishnan and 
Visvanathan, 2009). Effective CG measures are more likely to result in higher transparency and 
reliability of financial reporting as well as assisting auditors to effectively accomplish their 
monitoring role and provide correct audit opinions (Young, 2000; Turley and Zaman, 2004). 
Furthermore, effective boards and audit committees are expected to maintain auditor independence 
by taking responsibility for the appointment and remuneration of auditors (i.e., audit fees and non-
audit services fees), and playing an important role in ensuring the independence of the auditors in 
expressing their opinions on management policies (DeZoort et al., 2002; Turley and Zaman, 2004; 
Knechel and Willekens, 2006; Hay et al., 2008; Beasley et al., 2009). 
Researchers examining the relationship between internal CG mechanisms and external 
auditing have found mixed results (Hay et al., 2008). One group argues that internal CG measures 
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and external auditing can substitute for each other, so that better CG measures will be associated with 
hiring lower-quality (small) audit firms and paying lower audit fees. Simunic (1980), Wallace (1984) 
and Felix et al. (2001) find empirical evidence confirming that the greater the contribution of effective 
internal control to the financial statement audit, the lower the external audit fees. This means that 
high investment in effective internal control systems leads to a decrease in inherent risk (Libby et al., 
1985; Maletta, 1993; Maletta and Kida, 1993), thereby cutting the cost of external audit services, 
indicating that an effective internal control system substitutes for external audit services. Fan and 
Wong (2005) document that in emerging markets with serious agency conflicts between controlling 
owners and minority shareholders, firms may employ Big 5 auditors to reduce these conflicts as a 
substitute for conventional corporate control mechanisms such as boards of directors and takeovers. 
Likewise, Larcker and Richardson (2004) report that in firms with weak CG measures (i.e., low 
market capitalisation, high growth prospects, less independent boards, low institutional holdings and 
high insider holdings), the auditor appears to play a key monitoring role to ensure financial reporting 
quality. 
The other group suggests that CG mechanisms and external audit services are complementary, 
meaning that improved governance is associated with employing reputable (Big 4) auditors and 
paying higher audit fees. Directors on boards and audit committees are expected to be responsible for 
monitoring the external audit process effectively, to avoid potential litigation risk and improve their 
reputation. This requires a wider scope of audit to ensure its quality, and therefore higher audit fees 
(Zaman et al., 2011). Several studies have documented that firms voluntarily forming an audit 
committee are more likely to switch to one of the Big 8 auditors (e.g., Eichenseher and Shields, 1985; 
Pincus et al., 1989) and pay higher audit fees (e.g., Collier and Gregory, 1996). Hay et al. (2008) 
document that measures of internal auditing, CG, and concentration of ownership are all positively 
related to audit fees, suggesting that these controls are complementary. 
The majority of previous studies have documented evidence supporting the complementary 
view of the association between CG and audit quality (choice of reputable auditor and high audit 
fees). For example, Abbott et al. (2003) find that audit committee characteristics (i.e., independence 
and financial expertise) are positively associated with audit fees. O’Sullivan (2000) finds that firms 
with a high percentage of executive director ownership pay higher fees. Providing evidence from the 
US, Carcello et al. (2002) report that board of director independence, diligence and expertise are 
associated with higher audit fees. Using data from New Zealand listed firms in 1995 and 2005, Hay 
et al. (2008) document that CG mechanisms (existence of an audit committee, number of outside 
directors, and existence of a major outside shareholder) are positively related to audit fees, confirming 
that internal CG mechanisms complement external auditors in providing a monitoring role, although 
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only where there is sufficient variation in CG arrangements. Zaman et al. (2011) investigate the 
influence of audit committee effectiveness (i.e., independence, financial expertise, diligence and size) 
on auditor remuneration in the UK, using a sample of 540 firm-year observations for the period 2001–
2004 drawn from 135 UK FTSE-350 non-financial companies. They find a significant positive impact 
of audit committee effectiveness on audit fees, indicating that good CG measures (effective audit 
committee) tend to ensure higher audit quality. This demands a wider scope of the audit and in turn 
audit fees will be increased.  
On the other hand, Fan and Wong (2005) report empirical evidence, using data from eight 
East Asian economies between 1994 and 1996, confirming that firms with agency problems 
embedded in their ownership structures (highly concentrated ownership), between controlling owners 
and the minority shareholders, are more likely to hire Big 5 auditors and pay higher audit fees. Using 
a large sample of 3,424 US firms for fiscal years 2000 and 2001, Larcker and Richardson (2004) find 
a statistically negative relationship between auditor independence (using four alternative measures) 
and earnings quality in firms with weak CG measures (i.e., low market capitalisation, high growth 
prospects, less independent boards, low institutional holdings and high insider holdings). This means 
that CG is considered an important determinant of the association between auditor independence and 
earnings quality. Furthermore, in firms with weak governance, the auditor appears to play a key role 
in the governance process to ensure financial reporting quality. These results also suggest that external 
auditors are motivated to improve their reputation capital by ensuring the earnings quality of clients. 
Studies examining the association between CG and audit quality have shown mixed results. 
The main problem with these studies is that they use a small number of CG provisions (e.g., audit 
committee; board of directors characteristics), and arguably limiting the generalisability of their 
findings. Therefore, our study seeks to contribute to the literature by examining the relationship 
between CG quality (51 CG provisions) and audit quality (i.e., auditor choice and fees). Thus, based 
on these arguments and mixed results, the first hypothesis is as follows: 
H1a. A firm with high CG quality is more/less likely to choose a high-quality (Big 4) auditor. 
H1b. A firm with high CG quality is more/less likely to pay high audit fees. 
 
3.2.2 Corporate Board Characteristics Variables 
The board of directors stands on the top of the decision-making hierarchy in modern 
organisations. It has many functions, including controlling and monitoring managers, providing 
advice and counsel to managers, monitoring organisational compliance with applicable rules and 
legislation, in addition to linking the organisation to the external environment (Lipton and Lorsch, 
1992; Jensen, 1993; Mallin, 2004; Monks and Minow, 2004; Chen, 2005; Lin and Liu, 2009; Ntim, 
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2012b). Many studies have examined the effect of various board characteristics, such as board size, 
number of board meetings, dual board leadership structure and the proportion of independent 
members on the board, on corporate voluntary disclosure, earnings quality, executives’ 
compensation, pay-performance relationship, performance and value relevance of earnings (e.g., 
Klein 2002a,b; Cotter and Sylvester, 2003; Gul et al., 2003; Gul and Leung, 2004; Ajinkya et al., 
2005; Niemi, 2005; Tauringana and Mangena, 2014; Elmagrhi et al., 2016; Ntim et al., 2016a,b; 
Tauringana and Chithambo, 2016). However, studies examining the effect of board characteristics on 
auditor choice and fees are limited. The next sub-sections will discuss the theoretical link, empirical 
review and hypotheses development of the association between various board characteristics and 
auditor choice and fees.  
 
3.2.2.1 Board Size 
Agency theory suggests that large boards are more efficient in monitoring and evaluating 
managers’ behaviour to make sure they are consistent with shareholders’ interests (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Dalton et al., 1998; Lin and Hwong, 2010; Ntim, 2015). 
This is because large boards are less likely to be affected by a dominant CEO than are small boards 
(Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013b).  
Large boards may include independent, diligent and expert board members who are more 
likely to demand higher audit quality to protect their reputational capital (Fama 1980; Fama and 
Jensen 1983), avoid legal liability (Gilson 1990; Sahlman 1990) and promote shareholders’ interests 
(Carcello et al., 2002). This means selecting a large audit firm with a wider remit, thereby increasing 
the auditor’s costs and therefore fees, because the auditor’s additional costs are ultimately borne by 
the client (Carcello et al., 2002). Prior studies have suggested that there is a high correlation between 
audit effort and audit fees (e.g., Deis and Giroux 1996). Effective boards demand higher assurance 
services because directors’ marginal benefits are greater than marginal audit costs (Carcello et al., 
2002). 
Carcello et al. (2002) argue that the board of directors affects the quality of the audit services 
performed, either formally or informally. First, with regard to the formal way, the board of directors 
generally deliberates with management to select the external auditor, subject to shareholder 
ratification. Consequently, the board is more likely to be involved in reviewing the overall planned 
audit scope and proposed audit fees (Blue Ribbon Committee, 1999; Public Oversight Board, 1994). 
Second, with regard to the informal way, external auditors may perform a higher-quality audit to meet 
the expectations of high-quality boards (e.g., independent, diligent and expert). On the other hand and 
from the auditor’s perspective, Carcello et al. also suggest that external auditors assess a lower control 
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risk for companies with a stronger control environment (e.g., large and qualified boards). This reduces 
the extent of audit procedures and consequently the audit fees (Carcello et al., 2002). Therefore, it is 
expected that there is a negative relationship between board size and audit fees. 
Empirically, investigating 937 Andersen clients in 2001, Asthana et al. (2010) document 
empirical evidence suggesting that board size is positively associated with quick disassociation from 
auditors with a bad reputation. Lin and Liu (2009) report empirical evidence, using a sample of 
Chinese firms, suggesting that firms with stronger internal CG caused by a large number of 
supervisory board (SB) members are more likely to hire high-quality auditor to enhance the 
supervision or monitoring role of the board. However, in their later study, Lin and Liu (2010) find 
that SB size does not have a significant impact on auditor switching decisions.  
The CG codes for listed companies in most MENA countries recommend that members of the 
board of directors should be qualified and enjoy adequate knowledge and experience that are 
necessary to fulfil their assigned responsibilities. There is disagreement about the actual size of the 
board. The Egyptian CG code 2011, for example, suggests that it should not to be less than five 
members, while Saudi CG code 2010 and Jordan CG code 2012 recommend a board size of 3 to 11 
and 3 to 13 members, respectively. Given the previous theoretical and empirical literature, the second 
hypothesis is as follows: 
 H2a. A firm with large board size is more/less likely to choose a high-quality (Big 4) auditor. 
H2b. A firm with large board size is more/less likely to pay high audit fees. 
 
3.2.2.2 Board Diversity 
Recent corporate failures (e.g., Enron and WorldCom) have renewed interest in the effective 
oversight role played by the board of directors (Gul et al., 2008; Carter et al., 2010; Adams et al., 
2015). One way to improve boards’ monitoring role is to increase diversity among its members, 
because board diversity enables them to execute their oversight function (Rose, 2007; Carter et al., 
2010; Terjesen et al., 2015a; Gyapong et al., 2015; Ntim, 2015). 
The argument that an effective board (e.g., a diversified board) leads to the choice of Big 4 
auditors, higher audit effort and audit fees is subject to two counter viewpoints. On the one hand, a 
production function viewpoint of auditing suggests that an effective board works to improve the 
financial reporting process that, in turn, should reduce inherent risk and the need for extensive 
external auditing (Simunic, 1980; Wallace, 1984, Felix et al., 2001). On the other hand, other view 
argues that although the production function viewpoint assumes a constant demand for assurance, the 
aggregate demand for auditing is a function of the set of risks faced by different stakeholders in the 
firm, including the board members (Knechel and Willekens, 2006). Furthermore, directors on an 
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effective board need to provide a monitoring role to protect their reputational capital, avoid legal 
liability and promote shareholder interests (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Gilson, 1990; Carcello et al., 
2002). Therefore, more diversified boards are more likely to demand an extensive external audit 
process, appoint Big 4 auditors and pay higher audit fees.    
Agency theory argues that female and minority ethnic directors are able to provide an efficient 
monitoring function to protect shareholders’ interests by improving board independence (Carter et 
al., 2003; Gyapong et al., 2015; Ntim, 2015). Several studies have suggested that women are more 
sensitive to ethical issues than men in most cases of decision making (Bruns and Merchant, 1990; 
Bernardi and Arnold, 1997; Cohen et al., 1998). Therefore, boards with female directors are more 
likely to have higher levels of awareness in the financial reporting process (Gul et al., 2008). 
Additionally, female directors are more averse to risk and complexity (Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 
1998; Barber and Odean, 2001; Brooks and Zank, 2005), indicating that boards with female and 
ethnic minority directors may demand higher levels of monitoring to protect the firms’ reputational 
capital and to avoid legal liability (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Gilson, 1990; Sahlman, 1990). Women 
leaders seem to create an atmosphere of greater communication of information (Jelinek and Adler 
1988), adopt more participative leadership with a transformational perspective (Trinidad and 
Normore, 2005), offer a more cooperative and collaborative conflict management style compared to 
the competitive style adopted by men, and show greater concern for interpersonal relationships and 
reliance on rules of fairness in the exercise of power (Klenke, 2003). These distinctive characteristics 
of female directors qualify them to demand extensive audit effort. 
The effect of board diversity on firm performance and financial reporting quality has been 
extensively investigated (e.g., Kang et al., 2007; Singh, 2007; Campbell and Minquez-Vera, 2008; 
Du Plessis, 2008; Carter et al., 2010; Gyapong et al., 2015; Ntim, 2015; Estélyi and Nisar, 2016; 
Elmagrhi et al., 2016). However, there is a dearth of studies examining the impact of board diversity 
on audit quality (i.e., auditor choice and fees). 
Using a sample of US firms from 2001 to 2003, Gul et al. (2008) examine whether female 
corporate board membership impacts the board’s demand for audit effort measured by audit fees. 
They report that firms that have at least one female director or a higher proportion of female directors 
on the board are more likely pay higher audit fees. Similarly, a female non-executive director or high 
proportion of female non-executive directors are positively associated with demanding higher audit 
effort and thereby paying higher audit fees, particularly in firms with greater information asymmetry, 
more complexity and a higher level of ethical dilemma. Jordan’s CG code 2012 recommends that 
boards should consider a balance between age, gender and experience to achieve its required roles 
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and responsibilities effectively. Thus, based on these arguments and mixed results, the third 
hypothesis is as follows: 
H3a. A firm with high board diversity is more/less likely to choose a high-quality (Big 4) 
auditor. 
H3b. A firm with high board diversity is more/less likely to pay high audit fees. 
 
3.2.2.3 Board Independence  
Independent directors tend to act in the best interests of shareholders (Cotter et al., 1997, 
Carcello et al., 2002). Since ownership and management are separated in most modern corporations, 
managers have an opportunity to manipulate reported financial results for opportunistic purposes 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 1983). On the other hand, outside directors are 
motivated to work as representatives of shareholders to prevent and detect such opportunistic 
reporting by management (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Hay et al., 2008), and this can be achieved by 
pursuing higher-quality audit services. This incentive is driven by the following motivations. First, 
the directors aim to protect and enhance their reputational capital in the market as expert monitors by 
not associating themselves with poor corporate performance (Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983; 
Gilson 1990). Second, directors aim to fulfil their monitoring role with due care in order to avoid 
legal liability (Eichenseher and Shields, 1985; Gilson, 1990; Sahlman, 1990). Third, directors seek to 
protect shareholders’ wealth from losses arising because of financial reporting problems (Beasley et 
al., 1999; Carcello et al., 2002). Since outside directors aim to monitor the opportunistic reporting 
behaviour of managers and to reduce the likelihood of fraudulent reporting (unlike executive 
directors, who may face greater conflicts of interest), so they are more likely to support the purchase 
of high-quality audit services, leading to the selection of big auditors and high audit fees (Carcello et 
al., 2002). Furthermore, NEDs benefit from their network connections to recommend auditor choice 
and fees (Johansen and Pettersson, 2013). O’Sullivan (2000) has empirical results from UK quoted 
companies suggesting that the presence of more NEDs on boards encourages intensive audit to satisfy 
their own monitoring role.  
Most CG codes illustrate the value of non-executive representation on boards (e.g., Cadbury, 
1992; Hampel, 1998). A higher percentage of NEDs on the board increases board independence and 
the ability to take better decisions (O’Sullivan and Diacon, 2002). O’Sullivan (2000) and O’Sullivan 
and Diacon (2002) argue that appointment of non-executives on boards enhances the quality of the 
audit process and thereby the size of audit fees in a number of ways. Since management prepares 
financial statements, external auditors and NEDs discuss the way in which the financial statements 
have been prepared, in order to reach an opinion on the quality of the statements. External directors 
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place more emphasis on the extent and quality of the audit process than on the cost, compared to 
executive directors. Both NEDs and external auditors share the objective to overseeing the quality of 
the financial reporting process. Consequently, NEDs are expected to demand more extensive (costly) 
auditing to help them to fulfil their own monitoring responsibility.  
Empirically, many studies have documented the effectiveness of outside directors in 
monitoring the financial reporting process. Beasley (1996) reports a significant impact of outside 
directors on minimising the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting. Dechow et al. (1996) also 
find that the percentage of outside directors has an inverse relation with SEC enforcement actions 
related to earnings overstatements. Regarding the effect of board independence on auditor choice and 
audit fees, Carcello et al. (2002) employ data from 258 Fortune 1000 (US) companies for the fiscal 
year April 1992-March 1993. They find a positive relationship between the percentage of outsiders 
on the board and audit fees. Similarly, the empirical results of O’Sullivan (2000), using a sample of 
402 UK quoted companies for 1992, support the positive and significant relationship between the 
percentage of non-executives on the board and audit fees. Using a sample of Danish listed companies 
for the period 2002-2008, Johansen and Pettersson (2013) find a positive and significant link between 
the percentage of non-executive board members and audit fees. Likewise, Hay et al. (2008), using 
data from New Zealand listed firms in 1995 and 2005, document that the number of outside directors 
is positively related to audit fees, although only where there is sufficient variation in CG 
arrangements. 
However, O’Sullivan and Diacon (2002) find no empirical evidence from their survey of 117 
UK registered insurance companies in 1992 to support the relationship between the percentage of 
NEDs and audit fees. They justify this finding by the likelihood that NEDs, in their sample of 
insurance companies, monitor directly and have no impact on the extent and fees of the audit. In their 
study of Danish listed companies 1988-2008, Johansen and Pettersson (2013) in general report no 
impact of the percentage of NEDs on the choice of either the audit partner or the audit firm.  
The majority of CG codes recommend the formation of audit committees of non-executive 
and independent directors to maintain the objectivity of the relationship between management and 
auditors (e.g., Cadbury, 1992; Hampel, 1998). Audit committees dominated by NEDs play an 
important role in ensuring that auditor’s effort and opinion will not affected by the level of non-audit 
fees the company’s auditor could earn from the company. This suggests that the appointment of non-
executives on boards increases the demand for a more extensive and better-quality auditing process 
and this ultimately results in high audit fees. Similarly, most of the CG codes issued in MENA 
countries emphasise the importance of increasing the number of non-executive and independent 
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directors on boards, as they tend to improve the independence and objectivity of the board’s decisions. 
Given the theoretical and empirical literature, the fourth hypothesis is as follows:  
H4a. A firm with a high percentage of outside directors is more likely to choose a high-quality 
(Big 4) auditor. 
H4b. A firm with a high percentage of outside directors is more likely to pay high audit fees. 
 
3.2.2.4 Board Leadership Structure 
The board of directors is an effective CG mechanism to ensure that management behave in 
the interest of shareholders (La Porta et al., 1998; Fan and Wong, 2002). It is responsible for executing 
the decisions taken during shareholders’ meetings, hiring, firing, remunerating, counselling and 
monitoring senior managers. However, executive directors (including the CEO) may be biased in 
monitoring and evaluating management. Therefore, the separation of CEO and board chairperson 
positions is essential if the board is to effectively meet its internal CG monitoring role (La Porta et 
al., 1999; Cohen et al., 2002; Gelb and Zarowin, 2002; Lee et al., 2004; Wilkinson and Clements, 
2006). The duality of the CEO/chairperson positions is more likely to concentrate a great amount of 
power and authority in one person, compromising the independence of the board of directors (Jensen, 
1993). The literature documents the duality of CEO/chairperson positions is associated with weak 
CG and aggressive earning management (Dechow et al., 1996; Hudaib and Cooke, 2005). Although 
combining the two roles may provide the CEO with more perspectives on the company and encourage 
him/her to act with determination (Lin and Liu, 2009, 2010), it may lead to weak firm transparency 
and corruption since there will be weak monitoring of the CEO’s actions (Shara, 2004). Therefore, 
separation of the CEO/chairperson roles improves board independence and enhances the chair’s 
ability to independently and effectively oversee executives’ (including the CEO’s) performance, and 
thus protect shareholder interests (La Porta et al., 2002; Steven, 2006). It may also enhance corporate 
transparency, thus ultimately reducing agency conflicts (NYSE, 2002; Imhoff, 2003; SEC, 2003). 
Raghunandan and Rama (2003) document evidence suggesting that in firms where the CEO also acts 
as the chairperson, shareholders are likely to vote against the auditor ratification proposal. On the 
other hand, in firms separating these roles, shareholders support the choice of auditor. Companies 
dominated by a single CEO/chairperson have less motivation to seek an intensive audit, and 
consequently hire small audit firms and/or pay a lower fees (O’Sullivan, 2000). 
Asthana et al. (2010) document empirical evidence suggesting that separation of the CEO and 
chairperson roles is positively associated with quick disassociation from auditors with a bad 
reputation. Lin and Liu (2009) report evidence confirming that firms whose board chairperson is 
independent from the CEO are more likely to select a high-quality auditor to monitor and ensure the 
189 
 
quality of the financial reporting process and management performance. In their later study, Lin and 
Liu (2010) document empirical results to demonstrate that firms in which the CEO and chairperson 
positions are held by the same person are more likely to switch to a smaller auditor rather than to a 
larger one. However, the results of O’Sullivan (2000), from a sample of 402 UK quoted companies 
in 1992, suggest no relationship between CEO/chairperson role duality and audit fees.  
The perception of researchers, investors, regulators and various stakeholders that separating 
the CEO/chairperson positions is good CG practice has increased since recent financial scandals. In 
practice, market regulators and professional bodies in most developed countries have imposed 
separation of the two positions as a good CG device (Jiraporn et al., 2005). Similarly, the CG codes 
of listed companies in many MENA countries recommend preventing the same person from holding 
the position of chairperson of the board of directors and any executive position in the company at the 
same time. Given the theoretical and empirical literature, the fifth hypothesis is as follows: 
 H5a. A firm with separate positions of CEO and board chairperson is more likely to choose 
a high-quality (Big 4) auditor. 
H5b. A firm with separate positions of CEO and board chairperson is more likely to pay high 
audit fees. 
 
3.2.3 Ownership Structure Mechanisms 
Many studies have examined the effect of ownership structure mechanisms on financial 
reporting quality (e.g., Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Dam and Scholtens, 2012; Samaha et al., 2012; Al 
Janadi et al., 2013; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013b; Albitar, 2015; Ntim, 2016). However, there are 
limited studies examining the effect of ownership structure mechanisms on auditor choice and fees. 
The next sub-sections will discuss the theoretical link, empirical review and hypotheses development 
of the relationship between ownership structure mechanisms and auditor choice and fees.  
 
3.2.3.1 Government Ownership  
Corporations with high government ownership pursue government support by providing more 
transparent and trustworthy financial statements (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013b). The winning of 
government support can be translated into legitimisation of corporate operations (Ashforth and Gibbs, 
1990; Suchman, 1995; Aguilera et al., 2007) and greater opportunity to acquire essential resources 
such as subsidies, tax exemptions and contracts to improve performance (Pfeffer and Salanick, 1978; 
Malherbe and Segal, 2003; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Branco and Rodrigues, 2008; Reverte, 2009). 
Similarly, the monitoring role provided by high-quality auditors helps in reducing agency conflicts 
between management and influential owners, including governments (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
190 
 
Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013b). Additionally, corporations with higher government ownership face 
more agency conflict between government and other shareholders, and therefore prefer to conduct 
better and more extensive auditing to provide more informative financial statements (Eng and Mak, 
2003; Al-Janadi et al., 2013; Al-Bassam et al., 2015). However, government agencies can exercise a 
substantial influence over government-controlled firms, and can readily access the firm’s information 
(Chan et al., 2006). Therefore, firms with higher government ownership have little incentive to 
provide highly credible financial reports and thus are less likely to choose higher-quality audit firms, 
preferring to pay lower fees (Lin and Liu, 2010). Likewise, some studies argue that higher levels of 
state ownership, with wide and powerful political connections, provide protection against review and 
discipline by regulatory authorities (e.g., Jia et al., 2009; Hou and Moore, 2010). Consequently, firms 
with a high level of government ownership are less likely to be extensively monitored by better-
quality auditors.    
Recently in the MENA region, governments have conducted many economic and financial 
reforms to attract foreign investment. Therefore they may provide more insurance and protection for 
such investments by performing better-quality audit by more reputable auditors (Al-Ajmi, 2009; 
Samaha and Hegazy, 2010).  
Empirically, there is a dearth of studies that examine the association between government 
ownership and auditing issues. However, a considerable number of studies have documented a 
positive relationship between government ownership and financial reporting quality (e.g., Eng and 
Mak 2003; Ntim et al. 2012; Ntim and Soobaroyen 2013b; Al-Bassam et al., 2015), while others have 
reported a negative impact (e.g., Dam and Scholtens, 2012; Al Janadi et al., 2013). Lin and Liu, 
(2010), using 316 Chinese firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from the 
beginning of 2001 to the end of 2004, find no evidence for the impact of government ownership on 
auditor switching decisions. Thus, based on these arguments and mixed results, the sixth hypothesis 
is as follows:  
H6a. A firm with a high percentage of total shares held by the government is more/less likely 
to choose a high-quality (Big 4) auditor. 
H6b. A firm with a high percentage of total shares held by the government is more/less likely 
to pay high audit fees. 
 
3.2.3.2 Director Ownership 
Manager ownership reduces agency conflict with shareholders, and thereby increases firm 
value (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Boards have the power to make or at least approve all important 
company decisions, therefore it is probable that board members with appropriate stock ownership 
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will have the incentive to offer effective monitoring and oversight of these important corporate 
decisions (Bhagat et al., 2008). Increase in director ownership reduces the conventional agency 
problems and enhances directors’ incentives to provide more disclosure to reduce information 
asymmetry and thereby lower the cost of capital; therefore greater alignment of interest occurs when 
management ownership is increased, increasing the incentive for more voluntary disclosure (Leung 
and Horwitz, 2004). 
Since manager ownership helps to reconcile the interests of managers and shareholders, 
managers who own a significant percentage of equity are less motivated to issue misleading 
information to shareholders, which may be used in setting their remuneration (Chow, 1982). This 
reduces the need for intensive auditing and thereby decreases audit costs (O’Sullivan, 2000). 
Accordingly, the extent of auditing and ultimately the audit fees may have a negative relationship 
with the percentage of director ownership.           
 However, in firms with concentrated ownership, the agency problem shifts from the manager-
stockholder relation to conflicts between the controlling owners and minority stockholders (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997; Fan and Wong, 2002). On the basis of this argument, Leung and Horwitz (2004) 
expect and find that the controlling owners (directors) have an incentive to avoid voluntary disclosure 
that would attract close monitoring by outside shareholders. They find that discretionary segment 
disclosure is non-linearly related to director ownership. That is, there is a positive relationship 
between executive director ownership and the extent of voluntary segment disclosure at lower levels 
of ownership (when it rises from 1% to 25%). This suggests that the expected alignment of interests 
between management and shareholders increases corporate disclosure. However, as director 
ownership rises to concentrated levels, such disclosure declines, suggesting that at high levels of 
board ownership the conflict between controlling owners and minority shareholders negatively 
influences disclosure decisions. Likewise, Fan and Wong (2005) find empirical evidence confirming 
that firms with agency problems embedded in the ownership structure (highly concentrated 
ownership), between controlling owners and minority shareholders, are more likely to hire Big 5 
auditors and pay higher audit fees. This suggests that external independent auditors are employed as 
monitors and bonding mechanisms to mitigate the agency problems. 
With regard to empirical evidence, there is a dearth in studies examining the impact of director 
ownership on auditor choice and fees. However, a number of studies have documented a negative 
relationship between director ownership and financial reporting quality (e.g., Ruland et al., 1990; Oh 
et al., 2011; Samaha and Dahawy, 2011; Hussain and Al-Najjar, 2012; Khan et al., 2013; Albitar, 
2015). For example, using a sample of 376 Hong Kong listed companies for 1996, Leung and Horwitz 
(2004) document a negative relationship between board ownership and the extent of voluntary 
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segment disclosure. However, Samaha et al. (2012) report an insignificant impact of director 
ownership on voluntary CG disclosure. 
Empirical results of O’Sullivan, (2000), using a sample of 402 UK quoted companies for 
1992, suggest a negative and significant relationship between executives and non-executives 
ownership and audit fees. This indicates that non-executives owning significant equity interests may 
also have business or family links with the company and consequently behave in a similar way to 
their executive colleagues. Thus, based on these arguments and mixed results, the seventh hypothesis 
is as follows: 
H7a. A firm with a high percentage of total shares held by the directors is more/less likely to 
choose a high-quality (Big 4) auditor. 
H7b. A firm with a high percentage of total shares held by the directors is more/less likely to 
pay high audit fees. 
 
3.2.3.3 Block Ownership 
Ownership structure affects CG and corporate values in different ways (Lin and Liu, 2009). 
Agency theory suggests that a higher extent of separation between ownership and control might 
increase agency costs and motivate firms to demand timely independent audits to monitor managerial 
performance (Abdel-khalik, 1993; Chan et al., 1993; O’Sullivan and Diacon, 2002). As ownership 
becomes more dispersed, direct monitoring by shareholders becomes more costly (O’Sullivan, 2000; 
O’Sullivan and Diacon, 2002). Therefore, Chan et al. (1993), O’Sullivan (2000) and O’Sullivan and 
Diacon (2002) suggest that firms with widely dispersed ownership (a lower level of block ownership) 
are more likely to demand higher-quality audit as a means of monitoring managerial behaviour, thus 
paying higher audit fees to mitigate agency conflict. Furthermore, agency costs are expected to 
increase in firms with dispersed ownership, because managers are more likely to pursue their own 
interests at owners’ expense (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Reverte, 2009). However, managers are 
expected to bond by a more extensive audit, signalling their concern for shareholders’ interests (Chan 
et al., 1993; O’Sullivan, 2000; O’Sullivan and Diacon, 2002). O’Sullivan (2000) and O’Sullivan and 
Diacon (2002) argue that firms with dispersed ownership demand better-quality audit and thereby 
pay higher fees to minimise opportunities for managerial discretion. Therefore, firms with dispersed 
ownership may utilise extensive auditing to substitute for this weakness in the ownership structure, 
and consequently pay higher audit fees. Expected losses for audit firms arising from subsequent 
discovery of errors in the audit may be higher in firms with dispersed ownership than in those with 
more concentrated ownership (Simunic, 1980; Pratt and Stice, 1994; Simunic and Stein, 1996). These 
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possible losses increase auditors’ claimed risk premium, and thereby increase audit fees (O’Sullivan 
and Diacon 2002). 
Similarly, firms with concentrated ownership are exposed to greater agency conflict because 
controlling shareholders may have a prevailing influence on most of the firm’s affairs to serve their 
self-interest at the expense of minority shareholders, and it is probably easier for controlling 
shareholders to bypass the monitoring of other stakeholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Johnson et al., 
2000). This means that controlling shareholders may be engaged in aggressive tunnelling behaviours 
that ultimately expropriate the minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 1998, 1999; Fan and Wong, 
2002). Therefore, firms with concentrated ownership try to avoid being monitored by high-quality 
(large) auditors, to maximise self-interest through earning management and tunnelling behaviours 
(Lin and Liu, 2009, 2010). Controlling shareholders can secure more opaqueness in firms with a 
concentrated ownership structure (Chau and Leung, 2006). Listed firms’ motives for issuing less 
transparent financial statements not only include securing private benefits but may also involve 
reducing political costs encountered by these firms. This means that listed firms with concentrated 
ownership may prefer to have a weak CG (e.g., hiring a low-quality auditor) and to issue less 
transparent financial reporting to prevent competition or social sanctions (Lin and Liu, 2009). High-
quality auditors provide a more efficient monitoring role and thereby detect and report misstatements 
in financial reporting. This may lead to external intervention by minority shareholders, analysts, stock 
exchanges or regulators (Haw et al., 2004). Moreover, shareholders with controlling ownership can 
easily control and dominate the nomination and appointment of directors, senior management and 
auditors (Lin and Liu, 2009, 2010). Therefore, firms with more concentrated ownership may prefer 
to select lower-quality auditors so that they can easily obtain private benefits (Karpoff et al., 1996; 
Copley and Douthett, 2002; Lin and Liu, 2009, 2010).  
On the other hand, and as mentioned above, large shareholders are more likely to try to 
maximise their own interest by benefit-transfer dealings or tunnelling behaviours, thereby 
expropriating other stakeholders (Claessens et al., 2002; Copley and Douthett, 2002; Fan and Wong, 
2002; La Porta et al., 2002; Anderson et al., 2004; Chau and Leung, 2006). Consequently, this 
enrichment increases agency costs, for example by increasing the cost of issuing new shares in the 
market (Claessens et al., 2002; Gelb and Zarowin, 2002). Firms with concentrated ownership tend to 
use monitoring or bonding mechanisms to protect stakeholders’ interests and thereby reduce agency 
costs (Ang et al., 2000; Fan and Wong, 2005). This leads these firms to hire large auditors to signal 
good CG and credible financial reporting to minority shareholders and other stakeholders, to mitigate 
agency costs (Reed et al., 2000; Johnstone and Bedard, 2004; Fan and Wong, 2005; Lin and Liu, 
2009). Similarly, in firms with more concentrated ownership, block shareholders are motivated to 
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extensively monitor managerial behaviour, given to the size of their equity holdings and the probable 
cost of any non-value-maximising behaviour by managers (O’Sullivan, 2000). Accordingly, block 
shareholders are more likely to demand more extensive auditing, paying higher audit fees.  
Overall, previous studies have suggested the appointment of large audit firms and higher audit 
fees both in companies with widely dispersed ownership due to the effective monitoring role of 
auditors and the bonding motivation of managers, and in companies with large external block holders 
due to monitoring of block holders’ financial incentives and to obtain finance with lower costs. 
Generally, MENA listed firms are characterised by concentrated ownership, particularly dominated 
by state and family control (Fawzy, 2004; Jamali et al., 2007; Omran et al., 2008; Ararat et al., 2010; 
Weir, 2011; Piesse et al., 2012; Hasan et al., 2014). In other words, a MENA listed firm normally has 
a dominant controlling owner, either the government or a family. The controlling owner tends to 
interfere in many of the firm’s decisions, including the choice of audit firm (Al-Awaji, 1971; Helms, 
1981; Wahdan et al., 2005a, b; Mohamed and Habib, 2013). Previous studies have suggested that the 
decision to hire a high-quality auditor involves a trade-off between relevant benefits (e.g., obtaining 
debt at a lower cost or issuing equity at higher prices) and costs (e.g., giving up opaqueness gains 
from earning management and tunnelling behaviour) to the controlling owner. The MENA region 
aims to increase foreign investments and to protect minority shareholders’ interests. Therefore, firms 
listed in MENA markets are motivated to raise capital with lower costs. This posits that firms with 
weak CG (e.g., concentrated ownership) intend to signal more concern to protect minority 
shareholders’ interests and thereby choose higher-quality auditors. 
Generally, there is a dearth of studies investigating the relationship between the degree of 
concentration of share ownership and audit fees (Chan et al., 1993). Using data from 300 UK quoted 
companies in 1987, Chan et al. (1993) document a significant negative association between 
ownership concentration and audit fees. Additionally, O’Sullivan and Diacon’s (2002) empirical 
evidence based on 117 UK registered insurance companies in 1992 supports the negative relationship 
between concentrated ownership and audit fees. Datar et al. (1991) and Copley and Douthett (2002) 
document empirical evidence supporting the inverse relationship between the selection of better-
quality auditors and retained ownership.  
Lin and Liu (2009), using 184 IPO firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges 2001-2004, find that firms with highly concentrated ownership are less likely to choose a 
Top 10 (high-quality) auditor in China. Furthermore, they report in a later study (Lin and Liu, 2010) 
that firms with a high level of controlling owners are more likely to switch to a smaller auditor than 
to a larger one. These results reflect the Chinese context at a specific period of time when the stock 
market was weak and listed firms were less enthusiastic to offer new equity securities to the public. 
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The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) even stopped the listed firms from issuing new 
equity securities to the public in June 2002. In such a market it is suggested that the benefits of 
lowering capital-raising costs are insignificant because the listed firms have little intention or 
possibility of offering new equity securities to the public. Therefore, the opaqueness gains from weak 
CG are supposed to outweigh this.  
However, using data from eight East Asian economies between 1994 and 1996, Fan and Wong 
(2005) find empirical evidence confirming that firms with agency problems embedded in the 
ownership structure (highly concentrated ownership) between controlling owners and the minority 
shareholders, are more likely to hire Big 5 auditors and to pay higher audit fees. Likewise, using data 
from New Zealand listed firms in 1995 and 2005, Hay et al. (2008) document that the existence of a 
major outside shareholder is positively related to audit fees but only where there is sufficient variation 
in CG arrangements. However, the empirical results of O’Sullivan (2000), using a sample of 402 UK 
quoted companies in 1992, suggests no relationship between concentrated (financial institutions and 
non-financial institutions) ownership and audit fees. Given the inconclusive theoretical and empirical 
literature, the eighth hypothesis is as follows:  
H8a. A firm with a high percentage of total shares held by the largest owners is more/less 
likely to choose a high-quality (Big 4) auditor. 
H8b. A firm with a high percentage of total shares held by the largest owners is more/less 
likely to pay high audit fees. 
 
4 Research Design  
4.1 Sample Selection and Data Sources      
The study’s sample covers 600 firm-year observations of 100 firms listed on five MENA 
countries’ stock exchanges from 2009 to 2014.17 Financial and utility firms are excluded from this 
study because their operations and governance structures are quite different from other types of firms 
(Lin and Liu, 2009, 2010). Additionally, since the majority of literature examining the link between 
CG and audit quality emphasise non-financial institutions (O’Sullivan, 2000; Carcello et al., 2002), 
financial companies are excluded from this study. Therefore, the results can be discussed in the 
context of existing studies. The remaining companies are classified into five main industries: basic 
materials/oil and gas; industrial; customer goods; customer services/health care; and 
technology/telecommunication. 
                                               
UAE. The choice of these the and  Jordan, Oman, Saudi Arabia Egypt, arestudy  MENA countries used in the current 17
specific countries is subject to a number of criteria which are discussed in detail in the first essay.   
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In order to examine the impact of internal CG on both auditor choice and fees decision, CG 
variables (i.e., CG index, board characteristics and ownership structure mechanisms) were collected 
by hand from the sampled firms’ annual reports, their websites, capital markets websites and other 
websites. Financial and accounting variables were collected from the Datastream database. Country-
level data, including GDP and Corruption Perception Index were collected from the website of the 
World Bank and Transparency International websites, respectively, while the Inflation Index came 
from the International Monetary Fund’s website. 
With regard to audit fees, Jordan, the UAE and Omani companies are obliged to disclose the 
amount of the audit fees paid to their auditor in their annual financial statements. However, Egyptian 
companies’ audit fees were collected from general assembly meetings reported on the Egyptian stock 
exchange market website. Saudi Arabia listed firms do not disclose audit fees to the public, and the 
researcher tried to obtain this information by direct contact with companies and audit firms but 
unfortunately was unsuccessful in this. Therefore, the current study ends up with audit fees data for 
470 firm-year observations (there are ten missing audit fees data in the UAE sampled firms). Thus, 
the current study only uses firm-year observations that were identified in order to test hypotheses.     
The final sample has satisfied two predetermined criteria. Firstly, organisation’s CG data 
should be available for all the six-year period from 2009 to 2014. Secondly, financial data should be 
accessible for sampled firms for the same time period. These criteria help us to obtain a balanced 
panel data analysis to increase degrees of freedom and decrease multicollinearity among examined 
variables (Gujarati 2003; Wooldridge 2010). This design also provides the opportunity to compare 
the current findings with results of previous studies (Lin and Liu, 2009, 2010; Johansen and 
Pettersson, 2013).   
 
4.2 Measurement of Variables 
This section illustrates dependent, independent and control variables, and models 
specifications of the study. The study’s variables are classified into three main categories as illustrated 
in Table 19.  
 
4.2.1 Dependent Variables  
Following previous studies, a natural log of audit fee (LNFEE) in thousands of dollars was 
used to measure audit fees (e.g., Chan et al., 1993; Behn et al., 1999; O’Sullivan, 2000; Carcello et 
al., 2002; O’Sullivan and Diacon, 2002; Johansen and Pettersson, 2013). 18 With regard to the second 
                                               
18 The study converted audit fees from local currencies to US dollars using the exchange rate quoted on the World Bank 
website for each of the sampled years http://data.worldbank.org   
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dependent variable, a binary classification was employed to divide audit firms in MENA countries 
into two categories: the Big 4 audit firms to proxy for high-quality auditors and non-Big 4 audit firms 
to proxy for low-quality ones. Audit firm size has been used effectively and commonly as a surrogate 
for audit quality in many previous studies (e.g., DeAngelo, 1981; Willenborg, 1999; Lennox, 1999, 
2005; Copley and Douthett, 2002; Lee et al., 2003; Farbar, 2005; Lin and Liu, 2009, 2010; Eshleman 
and Guo, 2014). The constructed model examines whether firms’ auditor choice is associated with 
their internal CG mechanisms. Firms will randomly select auditors if the two types of auditors (Big 
4 and non-Big 4) do not differ in providing their monitoring service, suggesting that internal CG 
mechanisms have no impact on the choice of auditors. Otherwise, the two groups of auditors offer 
monitoring services with varied levels of quality, suggesting that firms’ internal CG mechanism 
should impact their choice of auditors, based on the expected benefits and costs of needed level of 
audit quality.  
 
4.2.2 Independent Variables  
The independent variables are: the CG Index (MCGI), board size (BSIZE), board diversity 
based on gender and ethnicity (BDIV), proportion of NEDs (NED), the separation of the 
CEO/chairperson roles (DBLS), government ownership (GOWN), director ownership (DOWN) and 
block holders ownership (BOWN). A limited number of prior studies have suggested that firm-level 
CG, board characteristics (e.g., board size, board diversity, board independence and non-duality of 
board leadership) and ownership structure mechanisms (e.g., government, director and block 
ownership) influence auditor choice and fees (e.g., O’Sullivan, 2000; Carcello et al., 2002; Fan and 
Wong, 2005; Lin and Liu, 2009, 2010; Zaman et al., 2011). Therefore, this study constitutes a timely 
contribution to the extant literature. The detailed definitions of independent variables are illustrated 
in Table 19. 
 
4.2.3 Rationale for Control Variables 
Consistent with previous studies (e.g., Chan et al., 1993; DeFond et al., 1999; O’Sullivan, 
2000; Carcello et al., 2002; O’Sullivan and Diacon, 2002; Chaney et al., 2004; Lin and Liu, 2009, 
2010; Asthana et al., 2010), the current study controls for possible omitted variables bias by including 
a number of control variables.  
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Firm-level Control Variables 
4.2.3.1 Firm Size 
The study employs the logarithm of total assets (LNTA) to control for audit effort. The 
majority of past studies have documented that auditee size is the most significant factor in determining 
auditor choice and fees (e.g., Chan et al., 1993; Chaney et al., 2004; Cullinan et al., 2016). Large 
firms are usually more complicated in operations and therefore need to hire larger auditors with more 
expertise (Lin and Liu, 2009) and/or pay higher audit fees (Cullinan et al., 2016). Lin and Liu (2009) 
also argue that large firms could generate a price premium for the issued stocks by hiring high-quality 
auditors. Furthermore, large auditors are able to audit large firms at lower average costs because of 
the economies of scale (Chaney and Philipich, 2002; Chaney et al., 2004). In general, large audit 
firms possess expertise necessary to audit large firms with complicated operations (Willenborg, 
1999), suggesting that large firms will choose to hire big auditors (Lin and Liu, 2009, 2010).  
Most empirical past studies have documented a positive relationship between client firm size 
and auditor choice (e.g., Chaney et al., 2004; Lin and Liu, 2009), and fees (e.g., Chan et al., 1993; 
O’Sullivan, 2000; Carcello et al., 2002; O’Sullivan and Diacon, 2002; Johansen and Pettersson, 
2013).   Following Lennox (1999), Carcello et al., (2002), and Lin and Liu, (2009, 2010), the study 
uses the log of total assets to control for the firm size effect.  
  
4.2.3.2 Busy 
The study includes a dummy variable for the year-end (BUSY) to control for off-peak pricing. 
It is expected that the incremental workload around fiscal year-ends may be relatively higher for audit 
firms. Therefore, these firms may charge clients who have year-ends in months other than January 
and March lower fees (Chan et al., 1993; Chaney et al., 2004).  
Empirically, Johansen and Pettersson (2013) document evidence supporting that companies 
are charged premium fees if they are audited in the busy season. However, other studies (e.g., Chan 
et al., 1993; O’Sullivan, 2000) find an insignificant relationship between audit fees and audit process 
being conducted in the busy season. In line with past studies (e.g., Chan et al., 1993; O’Sullivan, 
2000), the study proxies for busy season by using a binary variable =1 if financial year-end is between 
31 December and 31 March inclusive; = 0 otherwise.  
 
4.2.3.3 Quick Ratio and Leverage           
Quick ratio (QUICK) and leverage (LEV) are included to measure the short-term and long- 
term financial structures of client firm. Leverage and liquidity ratios are usually used as measures of 
client risk to reflect the nature of the business and the control environment of the client. The perceived 
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auditee’s risk has an impact on the planned extent and scope of audit testing (Turley and Cooper, 
1991; Chan et al., 1993). Therefore, auditors may charge higher audit fees for companies with higher 
audit risk as a result of more audit testing or as an insurance premium (Wallace, 1989; Chan et al., 
1993). Similarly, Firms with high leverage ratio face more agency costs, thus they prefer to hire an 
auditor with "superior" reputation to reduce these costs (Chaney et al., 2004).  
 In line with theory, Chaney et al., 2004 find empirical evidence supporting that firms with 
high quick and debt ratios are more likely pay lower audit fees and choose one of the Big 5 audit 
firms, respectively. However, other past studies have documented no impact of quick ratio and 
leverage on auditor choice and fees (e.g., Chan et al., 1993; Lin and Liu, 2009; Johansen and 
Pettersson, 2013). In order to control for the risk associated with short-term and long-term financial 
structures of the auditee, this essay includes quick ratio and leverage, respectively in the regression 
models.       
          
4.2.3.4 Loss  
To control for audit risk, the study includes a variable for loss (LOSS) of the company if it 
incurred loss in the previous year. Chan et al. (1993) argue that there is no consensus on the relation 
between auditee risk and audit fees. Firms facing financial difficulties often seek to control all 
overhead costs including audit fees. On the other hand, auditors of these companies need to extend 
the scope of the audit work to focus on some issues including the value of assets, the going concern 
of the auditee, probable breaches of loan covenants and cash flow forecasts. This may lead to an 
increase in audit fees. Furthermore, firms that incur loss will be less desirable as clients and thus will 
incur higher costs of finding a new auditor (Asthana et al., 2010). Therefore, firms that incurred loss 
in the previous year may seek to switch to a poor-quality (small) auditor (DeFond et al., 1999). 
Chaney et al. (2004) and Asthana et al. (2010) find that firms that incur loss are less likely to 
hire big auditors. Likewise, Carcello et al. (2002) document a significant positive relationship 
between incurring loss and audit fees. However, another group of studies report no association 
between loss incurred and auditor choice (i.e., Lin and Liu, 2010) and fees (e.g., Johansen and 
Pettersson, 2013). This essay proxies for loss by binary variable equal to 1 if the firm incurred a loss 
in the previous year, 0 otherwise. 
 
4.2.3.5 Profitability  
More profitable firms usually have sufficient funds to hire a high-quality (large) auditor 
(Chaney et al., 2004). More profitable firms also are motivated to testify their performance to the 
market by choosing a high-quality auditor (Lin and Liu, 2009, 2010). Furthermore, Asthana et al. 
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(2010) argue that it is easier to find a successor auditor for firms with better performance. They find 
a positive association between probability of changing the auditor and ROA.  
Empirical evidence provided by Willenborg (1999), Chaney et al. (2004), and Lin and Liu 
(2009) illustrates that more profitable firms are more likely to be audited by large auditing firms. 
Despite this, Chan et al. (1993) document a negative association between profitability and audit fees. 
O’Sullivan and Diacon (2002) report an insignificant relationship between these variables. Therefore, 
this study controls for client profitability by including return on assets ratio (ROA) in the regression 
models. 
 
4.2.3.6 Growth Opportunity  
 Firms with higher growth potential are inclined to hire poor-quality auditors. Normally, fast 
growing firms have a relatively higher degree of risk in business expansion and would prefer to hire 
smaller auditing firms to have a relatively lower degree of audit monitoring (Lin and Liu, 2010). In 
contrast, firms with growing business activities are more likely need to attract more investors and 
increase their ability to access financing at lower cost. Therefore, these firms are motivated to choose 
high-quality auditors to benefit from the signalling effect of the better reputation and quality of large 
auditors (Anderson et al., 2004).  
Similar to theory, empirical evidence of the association between firm’s growth potential and 
auditor choice and fees is mixed.  Lin and Liu (2009) find that firms with high growth potential are 
more likely choose one of the big auditors. However, Chaney et al. (2004) report a negative 
relationship between growth opportunity and hiring one of the big audit firms. Following Carcello et 
al. (2002), the study controls for firm growth opportunity (SGR) by including the percentage of 
current year’s sales minus previous year’s sales divided by previous year’s sales to the regression 
model.   
 
4.2.3.7 Year and Industry Dummies 
Audit firms are required by auditing standards to understand industry characteristics (Cairney 
and Stewart, 2015), helping audit firms to benefit from lower average costs of economies of scale 
(Mayhew and Wilkins 2003; Cahan et al., 2011). Cairney and Stewart (2015) provide recent empirical 
evidence that supports client industry’s specific characteristics (i.e., homogeneity), influences audit 
costs and hence audit fees. O’Sullivan (2000) also document that regulated industries including 
telecommunication companies, water and electricity utilities pay a lower audit fee compared to their 
unregulated counterparts. Likewise, Zaman et al. (2011) argues that level of risk and business 
complexity differs among industries and times. 
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Accordingly, this essay intends to control for any potential industry or yearly effect that may 
have an impact on the auditor choice and fees. In line with past studies, industry and year dummies 
are included in the test model to control for the type of industry (e.g., O’Sullivan, 2000; Carcello et 
al., 2002; Zaman et al., 2011) and the year effects (e.g., Lin and Liu, 2009; Zaman et al., 2011).  
 
Country-level Control Variables 
4.2.3.8 Country-level Control Variables 
Past studies have argued that a country’s institutional factors, including gross domestic 
product, inflation and Corruption Perception Index, may affect financial reporting quality (e.g., 
Adhikari and Tondkar, 1992; Doupnik and Salter, 1995; Salter, 1998; Archambault and Archambault, 
2003; Judge et al., 2008; Mateescu, 2015; Baldini et al., 2016), and thus they may influence auditor 
choice and fees. Therefore, this essay controls for a number of country level institutional factors: 
gross domestic product, inflation and Corruption Perception Index that may impact auditor choice 
and fees. 
  
Table 19: Summary of variables and measures 
 
 Dependent variables 
LNFEE Natural log of audit fee in thousands of dollars.  
BIG4 
 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm is audited by a Big 4 audit 
firm (PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, and KPMG), 
0 otherwise.      
Independent variables  
MCGI 
 
 
 
 
BSIZE 
BDIV 
Corporate Governance (CG) Compliance and Disclosure Index containing 51 CG 
provisions using the CG benchmark of the United Nations Conference Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD 2006)'s guidance on good practice in CG disclosure, that 
takes 1 if each of the CG provisions is disclosed, 0 otherwise; scaled to a value 
between 0 and 100%.    
Natural log of the total number of directors on the board of directors. 
The percentage of the total number of women and ethnic minority (non-Arab) 
directors to the total number of board members. 
NED The percentage of non-executive directors to the total number of board members. 
DBLS A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the roles of chairperson and CEO of 
firm are separated at the end of its financial year, 0 otherwise. 
GOWN 
DOWN 
Percentage of shares held by government. 
Percentage of shares held by all members of the board of directors. 
BOWN Percentage of shares held by shareholders with at least 5% of the total firm 
shareholdings. 
Control variables: Firm level 
LNTA Natural log of the total assets of a firm. 
BUSY Binary variable =1 if financial year-end is between 31 December and 31 March 
inclusive; =0 otherwise. 
QUICK Quick Ratio is (Cash & Equivalents + Receivables (Net))/Current Liabilities-Total.  
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LOSS Binary variable = 1 if the firm incurred a loss in the previous year, 0 otherwise. 
LEV 
SGR 
 
Percentage of total debt to total assets in a financial year.  
Percentage of current year’s sales minus previous year’s sales divided by previous 
year’s sales. 
ROA  Percentage of operating profit to total assets in a financial year. 
YDU Dummies for the years 2009 to 2014 inclusive. 
INDU 
 
Dummies for each of the five main industries: basic materials/oil and gas; 
industrial; customer goods; customer services/health care and 
technology/telecommunication. 
Control variables: Country level 
GDP 
INFL 
CPI 
 
Gross domestic product growth (annual %). 
Inflation, average consumer prices.  
Corruption Perception Index. The Corruption Perceptions Index measures the 
perceived levels of public sector corruption.   
 
4.3 Models Specification 
Consistent with previous studies investigating determinants of audit fees, the current study 
uses OLS regression models to explain the determinants of audit fees (e.g., Chan et al., 1993; 
O’Sullivan, 2000; O’Sullivan and Diacon, 2002; Carcello et al., 2002; Fan and Wong, 2005; Zaman 
et al., 2011).19 Model 1 regresses CG and control variables on the log of the audit fee for 470 firm-
year observations, as follows: 
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The study also develops a logit regression model to test the impact of firms’ internal CG 
mechanism on auditor choice decisions for 600 firm-year observations during the period 2009 to 
2014. Model 2 specification is of the following general form:  
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Where LNFEE is natural log of audit fee in dollars, BIG4 is audit firm size, MCGI is firm-
level composite CG Index, BSIZE is board size, BDIV is board diversity, NED is the percent of NEDs 
on the board, DBLS is the separation of the CEO/chairperson roles, GOWN is government ownership, 
DOWN is director ownership, BOWN is block holder ownership, and CONTROLS refers to a number 
of control variables including: LNTA is firm size, BUSY is busy season, QUICK is quick ratio, LOSS 
is firm loss, LEV is leverage, SGR is growth opportunity, ROA is return on assets, YDU is year 
dummies for the study period 2009–2014, industry dummies (BM&OG is basic materials/oil and gas; 
INDUTR is industrial; CGODS is customer goods; CSER&HCARE is customer services/health care 
                                               
19 Following literature (e.g., O’Sullivan, 2000; Carcello et al., 2002; Chaney et al., 2004; Fan and Wong, 2005) and since 
the dependent variable (logarithm of audit fee) is highly serially correlated, the study did not use panel regression.   
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and TECH&TELE is technology/ telecommunication), while country control variables include: GDP 
is gross domestic product growth, INFL is Inflation Index; and CPI is Corruption Perception Index.   
 
4.4 Ordinary Least Squares Assumptions 
As indicated earlier, the current study uses the OLS regression as the main estimation 
technique to examine the determinants of audit fees. In doing so, all the OLS assumptions, namely 
normality, multicollinearity, homoskedasticity, linearity, and autocorrelation had to be checked 
before applying the model. Similar to Essay 1, this section discusses a number of statistical procedures 
to check the validity of the OLS assumptions and resolve any problems associated with meeting these 
assumptions. 
First, the probability-probability (P-P), quintile-quintile (Q-Q) and histograms were used to 
test the normal distribution of continuous variables. Although the audit fees variable (LNFEE) 
appears to have a linear distribution, the normality test for explanatory variables and control variables 
shows mixed results. For example, percentage of NEDs on the board, government ownership 
(GOWN), and leverage (LEV) show non-normal distribution. While the CG Index (MCGI), board 
size (BSIZE), director ownership (DOWN), block ownership (BOWN) and profitability (ROA) are 
fairly normally distributed. The non-normality problem was addressed by transforming affected 
variables such as quick ratio (QUICK), and sales growth (SGR). The histogram depicting the 
distribution of the LNFEE model is presented in Appendix 3. 
The LNFEE model also was tested for normality using standardised skewness and kurtosis. 
Table 20 shows that, in general, skewness and kurtosis statistics cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
most of the variables are symmetrically and mesokurtically distributed. For instance, the skewness of 
the LNFEE is 0.033. Since the skewness value of symmetrical distribution is zero (Gujarati, 2003; 
Brooks, 2008), LNFEES is slightly skewed to the right. That means it approximately follows a normal 
distribution. For kurtosis, Gujarati (2003) and Brooks (2008) argue that the critical value is 3. Table 
20 documents that the kurtosis value of the LNFEE is –0.093, implying that the data is mesokurtically 
distributed.   
In addition, Table 20 shows that the skewness values for most of the continuous explanatory 
and control variables range between 0.000 and 1.655. With regard to kurtosis test statistics, the 
variables fall between –0.081 and 3.228, indicating slight mesokurtically in some of the data. 
However, some variables violate the normality assumption. The current study’s relatively large 
sample size (470 firm-year observation) can mitigate any remaining non-normality problem that may 
cause serious violation of the OLS assumptions (Brooks, 2008).  
 
204 
 
Table 20: The OLS assumptions tests  
Variable VIF Tolerance Skewness Kurtosis Cook’s distances Leverage Values 
     Min Mix Min Max 
LNFEE   0.033 -0.093     
MCGI 3.559 0.281 -0.008 -0.740     
BSIZE  1.651 0.606 0.189 0.130 0.000 0.025 0.031 0.119 
BDIV 1.479 0.676 1.282 0.466     
NED 1.826 0.548 -1.437 2.015     
DBLS 2.120 0.472       
GOWN 1.990 0.503 1.655 1.655     
DOWN 2.545 0.393 -0.007 -1.072     
BOWN 2.450 0.408 -0.510 -0.495     
BIG4 1.701 0.588       
LNTA 3.392 0.295 0.501 -0.363     
BUSY 1.440 0.694       
QUICK 2.177 0.459 0.028 -0.081     
LOSS 1.325 0.755       
LEV 2.132 0.469 0.562 -0.723     
SGR 1.269 0.788 0.000 -0.123     
ROA 1.760 0.568 0.111 1.836     
GDP 1.200 0.833 -0.753 3.228     
INFL 2.025 0.494 0.612 -1.053     
CPI 3.187 0.314 0.265 -0.485     
 
Notes: variables are defined as follows: natural log of audit fee in thousands of dollars (LNFEE); audit firm size (BIG4); 
the MENA countries overall Corporate Governance Disclosure Index (MCGI); board size (BSIZE); board diversity on 
the basis of both gender and ethnic minority (BDIV); the percent of NEDs on the board (NED); separate of CEO and 
chairperson roles (DBLS); government ownership (GOWN); director ownership (DOWN); block ownership (BOWN); 
firm size (LNTA), busy season (BUSY); quick ratio (QUICK); loss (LOSS); leverage (LEV); growth opportunity (SGR), 
profitability (ROA); gross domestic product growth (GDP);  Inflation Index (INFL); and Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI). Table 19 fully defines all the variables used. 
 
Second, the correlation matrix in Table 22 is used to test the multicollinearity assumption 
among the models’ variables. Table 22 reports a correlation matrix for the LNFEE, Big4 and all the 
explanatory and control variables of the OLS and the logit regression models. Table 22 illustrates 
both Pearson’s parametric and Spearman’s non-parametric correlation coefficients, as the previous 
reported results of the skewness and kurtosis statistics in Table 20 indicate that some variables 
generally have a degree of non-normal behaviour. The coefficients of both the parametric and non-
parametric bivariate correlations suggest that there is no serious multicollinearity among variables, 
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as the level of both parametric and non-parametric correlation coefficients is moderately low. The 
highest coefficient is between audit fees (LNFEE) and firm size (LNTA) and between director 
ownership (DOWN) and block ownership (BOWN) (0.710), as indicated by Pearson’s parametric 
correlation coefficients. Tolerance and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) statistics were used to test 
multicollinearity. Table 20 shows that the tolerance values range between 0.281 and 0.788, and VIF 
values range between 1.200 and 3.559, suggesting that there are no severe multicollinearity threats in 
the current study (Gujarati, 2003).  
Third, heteroscedasticity is another assumption that has to be tested to ascertain whether the 
OLS technique can be estimated properly. Thus, the Breusch-Pagan test was used to diagnose whether 
the variance of the error term in the estimated model is not constant (Cooke, 1989; Ramly, 2012). 
The test’s result confirms the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity. Furthermore, the construct scatter 
diagram of the residuals for the LNFEE model indicated that the error term is homoscedastic (for 
brevity purposes scatter diagram is not reported here). Therefore, the results of both Breusch-Pagan 
test and construct scatter diagram indicate that the model does not suffer from heteroscedasticity.    
Fourth, in order to check the linearity of the model variables, Cook’s distance and leverage 
values tests were used. It is argued that linear association amongst the variables used in the model are 
met if these values do not exceed the critical value of one (Pryce, 2005; Maddala and Lahiri, 2009). 
Table 20 shows that the Cook’s distance values range between 0.000 and 0.025. Also, leverage values 
range from 0.031 to 0.119 confirming that the linearity of the model variables assumption has been 
considerably satisfied. 
Finally, autocorrelation of the regression residuals should be tested to ensure the adequacy of 
the model specification. The Durbin-Watson test was used to check for the relationship between an 
error and its lagged value (autocorrelation or serial correlation). The null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation could be confirmed if the Durbin-Watson value is equal or close to 2 (Gujarati, 2003; 
Brooks, 2008). Table 20 shows that Durbin-Watson values range between 1.884 and 2.235 among all 
used models, indicating the absence of serious violation of the autocorrelation or serial correlation 
problems. 
Overall, the conducted analyses: P-P, Q-Q, histograms, skewness and kurtosis, correlation 
matrix, VIF Factor, tolerance statistics, scatter plots, Breusch-Pagan test, Cook’s distance, leverage 
values, and Durbin-Watson indicate that any remaining non-normalities, multicollinearities, 
heteroscedasticities, non-linearities and autocorrelation in the variables are not so serious as to cause 
severe threat to the OLS assumptions. Therefore, it will be statistically appropriate to conduct 
multivariate OLS regression analyses. 
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5 Empirical Results and Discussion  
5.1 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 21 summarises the descriptive analysis of the dependent, independent and control 
variables over the study period. Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the two main dependent 
variables. The average audit fees is $49.35 thousand and ranges from a minimum of $4.06 thousand 
to a maximum of $865.79 thousand, with standard deviation of $82.31 thousand, confirming that 
audit fees paid to external auditors have wide variation among firms listed in MENA countries. 
Furthermore, the Big 4 audit firms dominate the audit market in MENA countries as they audit most 
of the sampled firms with the mean of 59% (354/600), confirming the argument that the audit 
profession and audit market of the MENA region is undeveloped (Wahdan et al., 2005a; Al-Ajmi, 
2009; Samaha and Hegazy, 2010; Mohamed and Habib, 2013), and the Big 4 audit firms provide a 
superior and trustful audit service that qualify them to dominate most of the MENA region’s 
accounting and auditing markets (Al-Ajmi, 2009). These results are consistent with the findings of 
Al-Ajmi (2009) who find that 82.5% of companies listed on the Bahrain Stock Exchange are audited 
by one of the Big 4 audit firms. 
Moreover, the descriptive statistics for independent and control variables (firm-and country-
levels) are reported in Panels B, D, and E, respectively. Panel B shows wide variation of the MCGI 
index. It ranges from 31.37% to 84.31%, with the average (median) firm complying with 56.45 % 
(56.86%) of the 51 CG provisions included in the Index. Board size (BSIZE) has an average of 8.52 
board members and ranges between a minimum of four and a maximum of 19. Board diversity on the 
basis of both gender and ethnic minority (BDIV) ranges from 0% to 69.23% with an average of 
7.88%, which suggests that on average MENA listed firms’ boards are dominated by Arab males. 
 Panel B shows that the percentage of NEDs (NED) varies between 40% and 100% with an 
average of 87.43%, indicating that the board of directors in MENA listed firms are more likely to be 
dominated by NEDs. Additionally, 474 (79%) of the firm-year observation investigated reveals that 
listed firms in the MENA region are complying with the recommendations of CG codes issued in 
these countries by having separate board CEO/chairperson roles. Ownership structure mechanisms in 
sampled firms show an adequate variation, where governmental ownership (GOWN), director 
ownership (DOWN) and block ownership (BOWN) range from 0%, 0% and 5% to 98.67%, 98.92% 
and 98.92% with an average of 16.15%, 44.94% and 55.88%, respectively, confirming previous 
studies conducted in MENA countries. For example, Samaha et al. (2012) find block ownership to 
be 57.1% on average. The results also support the argument that firms in developing countries are 
characterized by a relatively high concentrated ownership. Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013b) document 
an average block ownership of (53.14%) in South Africa. 
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Firm- and country-level control variables’ basic statistics are presented in Panel D and E, 
respectively. The results, in general, reveal high level of variation among listed firms. For example, 
firm size (LNTA) records a minimum of $3.45 million, maximum of $35222.66 million, mean of 
$2091 million and median of $184.45 million. Profitability (ROA) ranges from –32.09% to 31.03%, 
and has a mean (median) of 6.43% (6.06%) and standard deviation of 7.66%. 
 
Table 21: Summary of descriptive statistics of all variables for all sampled firms  
 Variables  Mean Median STD Minimum Maximum 
Panel A: Dependent variables 
LNFEE ($000) 49.35 23.61 82.31 4.06 865.79 
BIG4% 59 100 49.30 0 100 
Panel B: Independent variables: Corporate Governance 
MCGI% 56.45 56.86 11.59 31.37 84.31 
BSIZE 8.52 9 2.59 4 19 
BDIV% 7.88 0 14.34 0 69.23 
NED% 87.43 88.89 14.03 40 100 
DBLS% 79 100 40.90 0 100 
GOWN% 16.15 3.29 24.60 0 98.67 
DOWN% 44.94 47.89 27.90 0 98.92 
BOWN% 55.88 59.49 23.39 5 98.92 
Panel D: Control variables: Firm-level  
LNTA ($000,000) 2091.00 184.45 5728.09 3.45 35222.66 
BUSY% 95 100 22.50 0 100 
QUICK% 138.82 100 133.02 10 967 
LOSS% 16 0 36.40 0 1 
LEV% 20.29 17.76 17.65 0 69.75 
SGR% 9.06 5.94 45.45 -92.59 594.06 
ROA% 6.43 6.06 7.66 -32.09 31.03 
Panel E: Control variables: Country-level  
GDP% 3.46 3.30 2.58 -5.20 10 
INFL% 179.70 149.43 59.92 110.50 316.99 
CPI 48.20 47.00 11.68 28.00 70.00 
Notes: the table shows summary descriptive statistics. Variables are defined as follows: natural log of audit fee in thousands 
of dollars (LNFEE); audit firm size (BIG4); the MENA countries overall Corporate Governance Disclosure Index (MCGI); 
board size (BSIZE); board diversity on the basis of both gender and ethnic minority (BDIV); the percent of non-executive 
directors on the board (NED); separate of CEO and chairperson roles (DBLS); government ownership (GOWN); director 
ownership (DOWN); block ownership (BOWN); firm size (LNTA); busy season (BUSY); quick ratio (QUICK); loss (LOSS); 
leverage (LEV); growth opportunity (SGR); profitanility (ROA); gross domestic product growth (GDP); Inflation Index 
(INFL); and Corruption Perception Index (CPI). Table 19 fully defines all the variables used. 
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 Table 22 presents the correlation coefficient matrix (including both Pearson’s parametric and 
Spearman’s non-parametric bivariate coefficients) for different corporate outcomes variables, 
independent and control variables. Using Pearson’s parametric correlation coefficients only, the audit 
fee (LNFEE) variable is positively related, at the significant level, to auditor size (BIG4), the CG 
Index (MCGI), board size (BSIZE), the percent of independent directors on the board (NED), 
separation of the CEO/chairperson roles (DBLS), government ownership (GOWN), block ownership 
(BOWN), firm size (LNTA), busy season (BUSY), leverage (LEV), Inflation Index (INFL) and 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI). Likewise, Table 22 shows that the choice of Big 4 auditors (BIG4) 
is positively related, at a significant level, to the CG Index (MCGI), board size (BSIZE), board 
diversity (BDIV), the percent of NEDs on the board (NED), separation of the CEO/chairperson roles 
(DBLS), government ownership (GOWN), director ownership (DOWN), block ownership (BOWN), 
firm size (LNTA), busy season (BUSY), leverage (LEV), growth opportunity (SGR), profitability 
(ROA), Inflation Index (INFL) and Corruption Perception Index (CPI), whereas Big 4 auditors 
(BIG4) is significantly and negatively related to firm loss (LOSS). 
Correlation coefficients among the independent variables are not high with only one at the 
level of .710 (between audit fees and the firm size and between director ownership and block 
ownership), so multicollinearity is moderate and have an insignificant effect on the relationship 
between the dependent and independent variables, as the correlation coefficients do not exceed 0.80 
(Hannifa and Hudaib, 2006; Ramly, 2012) (as cited by Gujarati, 2003). In general the results of the 
correlation matrix support that auditor choice and fees are affected by internal CG measures, that the 
CG Index, board characteristics (large boards, independent boards, and separation of 
CEO/chairperson positions) and ownership structure mechanisms (block and governmental 
ownership) have a positive and significant effect on audit fees and the choice of the Big 4 auditors. 
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Table 22. Pearson and Spearman correlation matrices of all variables     
 LNFEE BIG4 MCGI BSIZE BDIV NED DBLS GOWN DOWN BOWN LNTA BUSY QUICK LOSS LEV SGR ROA GDP INFL CPI 
LNFEE 1 .468*** .459*** .146*** -.054 .314*** .337*** .365*** .025 .133*** .706*** .203*** .064 -.071 .197*** .011 -.019 .032 .341*** .413*** 
BIG4 .467*** 1 .420*** .150*** .163*** .339*** .296*** .350*** .154*** .178*** .492*** .178*** .029 -.133*** .223*** .107*** .164*** .053 .109*** .137*** 
MCGI .493*** .421*** 1 -.052 .034 .399*** .501*** .166*** -.137*** -.014 .467*** .204*** .147*** -.113*** .146*** .083** .12*** .220*** .053 .508*** 
BSIZE .175*** .135*** -.033 1 .054 .011 -.243*** .273*** .093** -.098*** .355*** .010 -.010 -.083*** .016 .102** .081** -.091** .083** -.221*** 
BDIV -.025 .181*** .055 .062 1 .159*** -.039 .016 .308*** .281*** -.034 -.005 -.053 -.038 0 -.022 .163*** .070* .077* -.103*** 
NED .340*** .352*** .386*** .029 .134*** 1 .448*** .226*** .107*** .137*** .138*** .083** .116*** -.043 .023 .025 .143*** .159*** -.024 .365*** 
DBLS .353*** .296*** .500*** -.249*** .003 .435*** 1 .023 -.068*** .017 .201*** .240*** .147*** .021 .085** -.016 .005 .152*** -.121*** .435*** 
GOWN .312*** .238*** .140*** .167*** -.052 .062 .027 1 .206*** .220*** .557*** -.218*** .110*** -.183*** -.012 .053 .128*** -.033 .313*** .027 
DOWN .031 .145*** -.155*** .107*** .323*** .022 -.072*** .273*** 1 .709*** .122*** -.202*** -.062 -.188*** .074* .116*** .266*** -.062 .255*** -.193*** 
BOWN .125*** .200*** -.007 -.067 .279*** .049 .018 .328*** .710*** 1 .153*** -.220*** -.025 -.165*** .033 .062 .222*** -.018 .300*** -.017 
LNTA .710*** .489*** .457*** .353*** -.019 .124*** .208*** .532*** .134*** .177*** 1 .082** -.055 -.171*** .297*** .155*** .083** .013 .183*** .066 
BUSY .205*** .178*** 0.209*** -.016 .018 .202*** .240*** -.277*** -.212*** -.207*** .088** 1 .001 .102** .136*** -.005 -.037 .018 -.135*** .179*** 
QUICK .066 .034 .147*** -.01 -.045 .138*** .150*** .137*** -.064 -.020 -.066 -.032 1 -.230*** -.568*** .056 .263*** .027 0.046 .242*** 
LOSS -.063 -.133*** -.102** -.102** -.025 -.005 .021 -.164*** -.190*** -.187*** -.149*** .102** -.235*** 1 .096 -.096*** -.474*** -.008 -.129*** -.041 
LEV .153*** .208*** .141*** .027 .021 .033 .078* -.054 .061 .051 .329*** .136*** -.524*** .134*** 1 .047 -.163*** .031 -.028*** .024 
SGR .016 .117*** .078* .096** -.011 .027 -.015 .033 .127*** .089** .173*** -.014 .042 -.089** .059 1 .302*** -.003 .062 -.062 
ROA -.007 .145*** .097** .089** .156*** .080* -.010 .044 .243*** .243*** .068* -.020 .243*** -.441*** -.207*** .287*** 1 .086** -.022 -.005 
GDP  -.033 .016 .117*** -.025 .059 .059 .054 -.037 -.042 -.048 .011 -.002 -.050 .047 .026 .016 .052 1 -.253*** .182*** 
INFL 0.269*** .098** .024 .184*** -.031 -.140*** -.160*** .282*** .199*** .240*** .243*** -.113*** -.002 -.095** .008 .064 -.073* -.277*** 1 .097** 
CPI .486*** .157*** .597*** -.202*** -.166*** .322*** .466*** .071* -.262*** -.042 .175*** .205*** .255*** -.036 .023 -.049 -.045 -.046 .105*** 1 
 
Notes: the bottom half of the table contains Person’s parametric correlation coefficients, whereas the upper right half of the table shows Spearman’s non-parametric correlation coefficients. ***, **, and * 
indicate that correlation is significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively. Variables are defined as follows: natural log of audit fee in thousands of dollars (LNFEE); audit firm size (BIG4); the 
MENA countries overall Corporate Governance Disclosure Index (MCGI); board size (BSIZE), board diversity on the basis of both gender and ethnic minority (BDIV); the percent of non-executive 
directors on the board (NED); separate of CEO and chairperson roles (DBLS); government ownership (GOWN); director ownership (DOWN), block ownership (BOWN); firm size (LNTA), busy season 
(BUSY); quick ratio (QUICK); loss (LOSS); leverage (LEV); growth opportunity (SGR); profitability (ROA); gross domestic product growth (GDP);  Inflation Index (INFL); and Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI). Table 19 fully defines all the variables used. 
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5.2 Multivariate Regression Analyses 
Table 23 provides empirical results for the two regression models to test the association 
between firms’ internal CG mechanisms and their audit fees and auditor choice decisions.  Models 1, 
2, 3, and 4 show the cross-sectional OLS regressions of the CG Index, board characteristics, 
ownership structure mechanisms and control variables on audit fees, while Models 5, 6, 7 and 8 report 
the logistic regressions of independent and control variables on auditor choice decision. With Pseudo 
R-square of 36.88% and a Chi-square 299.79***, the logistic model (Model 8) is statistically 
significant and differentiate the listed firms selecting Big 4 (high-quality) auditors from those 
selecting non-Big 4 auditors. 
First, with regard to composite CG index, Models 1 and 4 show a negative and significant 
relationship between the CG Index (MCGI) and audit fees (LNFEE), whereas Models 5 and 8 reveal 
a positive and significant association between the CG index (MCGI) and Big 4 auditors, suggesting 
that H1a and H1b are empirically supported. This evidence is consistent with the theoretical 
predictions of the agency theory insights, which suggest that firms with good CG practices are more 
likely to hire Big 4 auditors, indicating that CG mechanisms and external audit services are 
complementary in providing their monitoring roles. Members of the board of directors and audit 
committees are expected to provide their responsibilities and monitor the external audit process more 
effectively to avoid potential litigation risk and improve their reputation capital. This increases the 
demand for both employing good CG provisions and hiring high-quality (Big 4) auditors (Eichenseher 
and Shields, 1985; Pincus et al., 1989; Hay et al., 2008; Zaman et al., 2011). On the other hand the 
substitution view of the association between CG and audit quality suggests that good CG practices is 
associated with less extensive audit work and thereby lower audit fees. This point of view argues that 
firms adopting better internal CG practices have lower inherent risk and are not need to conduct more 
extensive external audit work, thus they pay lower audit fees (Simunic, 1980; Wallace, 1984; Libby 
et al., 1985; Maletta, 1993; Maletta and Kida, 1993; Felix et al., 2001; Fan and Wong, 2005). These 
results are consistent with Fan and Wong (2005) who find empirical evidence supporting that firms 
with higher agency problems and weak CG embedded in the ownership structure (high concentrated 
ownership) are more likely to pay higher audit fees. However, they are not in line with the findings 
of O’Sullivan (2000); Abbott et al. (2003); Carcello et al. (2002); Hay et al. (2008) which document 
a positive impact of CG measures on audit fees.  
Second, large boards (BSIZE) have a positive significant impact on audit fees (as illustrated 
in Models 2 and 4); however, they have an insignificant impact on auditor choice decision (as reported 
in Models 6 and 8). This finding supports H2b and is consistent with the suggestions of agency theory 
of the ability of large boards to meet their monitoring function more efficiently. Since large boards 
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may include independent, knowledgeable, experienced and externally connected members, they are 
more likely to demand higher audit quality to protect their reputational capital (Fama, 1980; Fama 
and Jensen 1983), avoid legal liability (Gilson, 1990; Sahlman, 1990) and promote shareholder 
interests (Carcello et al., 2002). This requires more audit work, increases auditor’s costs and 
consequently raises audit fees as the auditor’s additional costs are ultimately borne by the client 
(Carcello et al., 2002). This finding is consistent with Lin and Liu (2010) who find that SB size does 
not have a significant impact on auditor switching decisions to one of the big audit firms. However, 
the reported finding does not support the findings of Asthana et al. (2010) and Lin and Liu (2009), 
which suggest that big audit firms are selected by firms with larger board of directors and SB size, 
respectively.    
Third, the results presented in Models 2, 4, 6 and 8 suggest that board diversity based on 
gender and ethnicity has a significant negative effect on audit fees, whereas it significantly but 
positively impacts Big 4 auditors choice. These results support the agency theory argument that 
diversified boards are more likely able to provide an effective monitoring role (Rose, 2007; Carter et 
al., 2010; Terjesen et al., 2015a; Gyapong et al., 2015; Ntim, 2015). Therefore, firms with more 
diversified boards are more likely to hire one of the Big 4 audit firms to complement the monitoring 
role of diversified directors, which supports H3a. However, this expected effective monitoring role 
of diversified boards reduces client inherent risk, thereby decreasing the need for a more extensive 
external audit (Simunic, 1980; Wallace, 1984, Felix et al., 2001). Therefore, this leads to the payment 
of lower audit fees, which supports H3b. The results offered in Models 2 and 4 contradict the 
empirical results of Gul et al. (2008) that document that firms with at least one female director and a 
higher proportion of female directors on the board are more likely to pay higher audit fees.   
Fourth, the findings reported in Models 2, 4, 6 and 8 show a positive and significant 
relationship between the percentage of independent non-executive board members, and payment of 
more audit fees and hiring one of the Big 4 auditors. This suggests that boards with a high proportion 
of independent non-executive members (NED) are more likely to demand an extensive audit service 
and ultimately hire reputable audit firms (one of the Big 4) and pay higher audit fees, which supports 
H4a and H4b. Therefore, the findings are consistent with agency theory which argues that 
independent NEDs aim to protect and enhance their reputational capital in the market of directors as 
expert monitors (Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983; Gilson 1990), to avoid legal liability (Gilson 
1990; Sahlman 1990), and to protect shareholders’ wealth from losses arising because of financial 
reporting problems (Beasley et al., 1999; Carcello et al., 2002), through not associating themselves 
with poor corporate performance and providing their monitoring role with due care. Therefore, they 
prefer to obtain a higher quality audit service, which leads to more audit fees and the selection of 
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large audit firms (Carcello et al., 2002). Empirically, the results support previous studies that 
document a positive and significant relationship between board independence and audit fees (e.g., 
O’Sullivan, 2000; Carcello et al., 2002; Johansen and Pettersson, 2013).  
Fifth, Models 2, 4, 6 and 8 reveal that separation of the CEO/chairperson roles (DBLS) does 
not impact audit fees, but has a positive significant association with auditor choice, which supports 
H5a. Theoretically, these findings are consistent with agency theory, which suggests that separation 
of the roles of chairperson and the CEO enhances the monitoring role of the board of directors (La 
Porta et al., 1999; Cohen et al., 2002; Gelb and Zarowin, 2002; Lee et al., 2004; Wilkinson and 
Clements, 2006). Therefore firms with separate CEO/chairperson roles are more likely to hire one of 
the big audit firms. Empirically, these findings are in line with Lin and Liu (2009) who find evidence 
supporting that firms with the board chairperson is independent from the CEO are more likely to 
select a high-quality auditor to ensure the quality of the firm’s financial statements and to monitor 
management performance. 
Sixth, Models 3, 4, 7 and 8 show that although government ownership is negative and 
significantly associated with audit fees at the 10% level of significance, it has a negative but 
insignificant impact on auditor choice decision, so H6b is supported empirically. From the agency 
theory perspective, government institutions can exercise a substantial influence over government-
controlled firms, and they can easily access a firm’s information (Chan et al., 2006). Consequently, 
firms with higher government ownership are less likely to provide highly credible financial reports 
and thus they are less likely to choose higher quality audit firms and prefer to pay lower fees (Lin and 
Liu, 2010). Empirically, the insignificant impact of government ownership on auditor choice is 
congruent with Lin and Liu (2010) who find no evidence for the impact of governmental ownership 
on auditor switching decision in China. 
Seventh, the results shown in Models 3, 4, 7 and 8 reveal a positive and significant relationship 
between director ownership and audit fees, which supports H7b, while it reports insignificant impact 
of director ownership on auditors choice decision. These findings support the notion that in firms 
with higher levels of ownership, the agency problem shifts from the manager–stockholder relation to 
conflicts between the controlling owners and minority stockholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Fan 
and Wong, 2002). On the basis of this argument, Fan and Wong (2005) expect that the controlling 
owners (directors) have an incentive to hire Big 5 auditors and pay higher audit fees in order to 
mitigate agency conflicts between controlling owners and the minority shareholders. Empirically, the 
significant positive impact of concentrated ownership on audit fees is consistent with Fan and Wong 
(2005) who find that firms with concentrated ownership structures are more likely to pay higher audit 
fees. In contrast, the current results contradict the results of O’Sullivan (2000), which suggest a 
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negative and significant relationship between executives and non-executives ownership and audit 
fees. 
Eighth, Models 3, 4, 7 and 8 illustrate that concentrated ownership is positively and 
significantly impacts auditor choice, whereas it has an insignificant effect on audit fees, confirming 
H8a. These findings suggest that firms with a higher level of ownership concentration (i.e., 
percentage of equity shares held by the largest owners) prefer to hire reputable auditors (Big 4). Since 
concentrated ownership normally represents weak CG, the reported results propose that these firms 
would be inclined to choose big audit firms to signal good CG and credible financial reporting to 
minority shareholders and other stakeholders. This helps in mitigating agency costs (Reed et al., 2000; 
Johnstone and Bedard, 2004; Fan and Wong, 2005; Lin and Liu, 2009) and in extensively monitoring 
managerial behaviour to avoid any non-value-maximising behaviour by managers (O’Sullivan, 
2000). Empirically, the reported results confirm Fan and Wong (2005) who find empirical evidence 
supporting that firms with high concentrated ownership are more likely to hire Big 5 auditors. 
However, the current results are inconsistent with the findings provided by Datar et al. (1991); Chan 
et al. (1993); Copley and Douthett (2002) and Lin and Liu (2009) that support the negative 
relationship between concentrated ownership and audit fees.   
With regard to the association between control variables and audit fees and the choice 
illustrated in Models 1 to 8, the study finds mixed results. For example, Models 1 to 4 show that 
auditor size (Big4) has a positive and significant impact on audit fees. This is consistent with the 
empirical findings of Francis (1984), Francis and Simon (1987) and Chan et al. (1993) which argue 
that audit teams of large audit firms have greater expertise, skills and seniority; thus big auditors are 
more likely provide higher quality of audit services with higher fees compared to non-big auditors. 
Similarly firm size (LNTA) has a positive and significant effect at 1% level on both audit fees and 
choice, which suggests that large firms are usually more complicated in operation and therefore need 
extensive audit process (Chan et al., 1993) and to hire larger auditors with more expertise (Lin and 
Liu, 2009). Lin and Liu (2009) also argue that large firms could generate price premium for the issued 
stocks by hiring high-quality auditors. Furthermore, large auditors are able to audit large firms at low 
average costs because of the economies of scale (Chaney and Philipich, 2002; Chaney et al., 2004). 
In general, large audit firms possess the expertise necessary to audit large firms with complicated 
operations (Willenborg, 1999). Models 1 to 4, also, show a positive significant association between 
firm-year ends being on busy audit months and audit fees, confirming previous studies which argue 
that the incremental workload around fiscal year-ends may be relatively higher for audit firms, 
therefore audit firms may charge clients which have year-ends in months other than January and 
March lower fees (Chan et al., 1993; Chaney et al., 2004).  
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However, and in general, the empirical results do not find a significant impact of quick ratio 
(QUICK), firm loss (LOSS) and growth opportunity (SGR) on auditor choice and fees, which is 
consistent with the empirical findings of  Chan et al. (1993), Chaney et al. (2004), Lin and Liu (2010), 
and Johansen and Pettersson (2013). Although, leverage (LEV) has an insignificant impact on audit 
fees, it has a positive but significant impact on auditor choice, supporting the argument that more 
leveraged firms are motivated to choose high-quality auditors to decrease market’s suspicion on their 
performance and to lower their costs of capital (Reed et al., 2000; Chaney et al., 2004). With regard 
to client profitability (ROA), Models 1 to 8 report mixed results. The study records a positive and 
significant impact of client profitability on choosing one of the Big 4 audit firms, consistent with the 
argument that more profitable firms usually have sufficient funds to hire a large (high-quality) auditor 
(Chaney et al., 2004), and they are also motivated to testify their performance to the market by 
choosing a high-quality auditor (Lin and Liu, 2009, 2010). However, the empirical results document 
a positive and insignificant relationship between firm profitability and audit fees. This insignificant 
relationship is consistent with the empirical results of O’Sullivan and Diacon (2002). 
Finally and with regard to country level control variables the study finds mixed results. For 
example, Corruption Perception Index (CPI) has a significantly positive relationship with audit fees 
but it has a significantly negative relationship with auditor choice. The empirical results suggest that 
firms listed in countries that have a high Corruption Perception Index are more likely to prefer to 
provide investors with more reliable financial reports (Judge et al., 2008; Baldini et al., 2016) and 
therefore conduct more extensive audit procedures and thus pay higher audit fees. However, these 
firms have no need to hire one of the Big 4 auditors. The empirical results also illustrate that although 
there is no significant impact of inflation on auditor choice, firms listed in countries with high 
inflation rates are more likely to pay lower audit fees, confirming Archambault and Archambault 
(2003) who report a negative relationship between inflation and corporate disclosure. Furthermore, 
reported results in Models 1 to 8, in general, do not suggest any significant effect of the degree of 
economic development (GDP) on auditor choice and fees.                 
In summary, the empirical results, in general, support that there is an association between 
firm’s internal CG mechanisms and auditor choice and fees, which means that external audit quality 
(Big 4 auditor, high audit fees) is more likely to have a CG monitoring role in MENA countries. 
Furthermore, auditor choice and fees decisions are affected by the firm-level CG among firms listed 
in MENA countries.
215 
 
Table 23: Determinants of auditor choice and fees 
 
Independent variables: CG LNFEE  LNFEE  LNFEE  LNFEE  BIG4  BIG4  BIG4  BIG4 
(Model) Predicted sign 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
MCGI +/- -1.689*** 
(0.000) 
     -1.814*** 
(0.000) 
 7.549*** 
(0.000) 
     4.674*** 
(0.005) 
BSIZE +/-   0.264*** 
(0.006) 
   0.317*** 
(0.001) 
   -0.006 
(0.990) 
   0.366 
(0.444) 
BDIV +/-   -0.559** 
(0.024) 
   -0.551** 
(0.026) 
   4.495*** 
(0.000) 
   3.678*** 
(0.005) 
NED +   0.739*** 
(0.001) 
   0.854*** 
(0.000) 
   5.305*** 
(0.000) 
   4.827*** 
(0.000) 
DBLS +   -0.010 
(0.900) 
   -0.052 
(0.501) 
   0.910** 
(0.016) 
   0.829** 
(0.032) 
GOWN +/-     -0.170 
(0.236) 
 -0.240* 
(0.078) 
     -0.263 
(0.659) 
 -0.094 
(0.887) 
DOWN +/-     0.606*** 
(0.000) 
 0.491*** 
(0.000) 
     0.238 
(0.688) 
 -0.377 
0.568 
BOWN +/-     -0.113 
(0.492) 
 0.211 
(0.210) 
     1.378** 
(0.033) 
 1.203* 
(0.088) 
Control variables: Firm-level    
BIG4 + 0.342*** 
(0.000) 
 0.238*** 
(0.000) 
 0.246*** 
(0.000) 
 0.262*** 
(0.000) 
        
LNTA + 0.350*** 
(0.000) 
 0.315*** 
(0.000) 
 0.339*** 
(0.000) 
 0.337*** 
(0.000) 
 0.487*** 
(0.000) 
 0.687 
(0.000***) 
 0.664*** 
(0.000) 
 0.574*** 
(0.000) 
BUSY + 0.340*** 
(0.001) 
 0.283*** 
(0.008) 
 0.344*** 
(0.003) 
 0.341*** 
(0.002) 
        
QUICK + 0.020 
(0.461) 
 0.002 
(0.939) 
 0.017 
(0.531) 
 0.042 
(0.115) 
 0.195* 
(0.073) 
 0.143 
(0.209) 
 0.276** 
(0.012) 
 0.123 
(0.288) 
LOSS +/- 0.039 
(0.626) 
 0.048 
(0.540) 
 0.105 
(0.187) 
 0.058 
(0.436) 
 0.109 
(0.738) 
 0.004 
(0.991) 
 0.063 
(0.842) 
 0.134 
(0.707) 
LEV + -0.250 
(0.227) 
 -0.304 
(0.140) 
 -0.387* 
(0.066) 
 -0.223 
(0.266) 
 2.205** 
(0.011) 
 1.652* 
(0.072) 
 2.120** 
(0.019) 
 1.734* 
(0.081) 
SGR +/- -0.022 
(0.719) 
 -0.040 
(0.518) 
 -0.065 
(0.298) 
 -0.060 
(0.307) 
 -0.008 
(0.974) 
 0.107 
(0.695) 
 0.061 
(0.809) 
 0.046 
(0.870) 
ROA + -0.414 
(0.323) 
 -0.573 
(0.182) 
 -0.899** 
(0.034) 
 -0.834** 
(0.042) 
 3.630** 
(0.032) 
 3.796** 
(0.034) 
 2.437 
(0.153) 
 3.230* 
(0.090) 
Control variables: Country-level   
GDP  + -0.712 
(0.528) 
 -1.247 
(0.266) 
 1.514 
(0.177) 
 -0.742 
(0.486) 
 -2.828 
(0.525) 
 -0.278 
(0.952) 
 0.350 
(0.935) 
 -2.319 
(0.620) 
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INFL + -0.157*** 
(0.007) 
 -0.131** 
(0.029) 
 -0.152*** 
(0.009) 
 -0.121** 
(0.033) 
 0.167 
(0.433) 
 0.376 
(0.104) 
 -0.320 
(0.139) 
 0.414 
(0.104) 
CPI + 3.351*** 
(0.000) 
 2.296*** 
(0.000) 
 2.800*** 
(0.000) 
 3.713*** 
(0.000) 
 -2.635** 
(0.048) 
 -1.292 
(0.297) 
 1.880* 
(0.066) 
 -3.767** 
(0.014) 
YDU  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
INDU Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
Constant  4.958***  3.928***  4.311***  3.255***  -9.833***  -14.446***  -9.528***  -15.625 
Durbin-Watson statistics 2.253  2.216    2.216  1.930         
F-value 50.94***  44.98***  46.75***  45.64         
Chi-square         231.75****  288.87***  215.37***  299.79 
Adjusted R2 69.10%  69.23%  69.17%  72.71%         
Pseudo R2           28.51%  35.53%  26.49%  36.88% 
No. of observations 470  470  470  470  600  600  600  600 
 
Notes: P-values are between brackets. ***, **, * indicate that the relationships are significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. Variables are defined as follows: 
natural log of audit fee in thousands of dollars (LNFEE); audit firm size (BIG4); the MENA countries overall Corporate Governance Disclosure Index (MCGI); board size 
(BSIZE); board diversity on the basis of both gender and ethnic minority (BDIV); the percent of non-executive directors on the board (NED); separate of CEO and chairperson 
roles (DBLS); government ownership (GOWN); director ownership (DOWN); block ownership (BOWN); firm size (LNTA); busy season (BUSY); quick ratio (QUICK); loss 
(LOSS); leverage (LEV); growth opportunity (SGR); profitability (ROA); gross domestic product growth (GDP); Inflation Index (INFL); Corruption Perception Index (CPI); 
year dummies (YDU) and industry dummies (INDU). Table 19 fully defines all the variables used. 
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5.3 Robustness Tests           
A series of further tests were conducted to examine the robustness of the results.  
 
5.3.1 Results Based on Alternative Proxies to Measure the Control Variables 
This study adopts alternative proxies to measure the control variables. It uses the log of 
revenues (LNTS) to proxy for firm size, the return on equity (ROE) to proxy for profitability, the 
current ratio (CURRENT) to proxy for firm-specific risk, and the market to book value of equity 
(MTB) ratio to proxy for firm growth opportunity. Models 1 and 2 in Table 24 show that the results 
are generally supported (except the coefficients of GOWN in Model 1 and MCGI in Model 2 which 
become insignificant) after adopting the alternative measures for the control variables. This indicates 
that the study’s results documented in Models 4 and 8 in Table 23 are robust to the use of alternative 
control variables.   
 
5.3.2 Results Based on Non-Linear Assumption  
Additionally, a number of previous studies have suggested that some of corporate board 
characteristics (e.g., board size) and ownership structure mechanisms (e.g., government, director and 
block ownership) have non-linear relationship with financial reporting quality (e.g., Leung and 
Horwitz, 2004; Guest, 2009; Sun et al., 2015; Elmagrhi et al., 2016). This suggests that the extent of 
external auditing and ultimately the audit fees and auditor choice may have a nonlinear association 
with board characteristics and ownership structure mechanisms (O’Sullivan, 2000). To identify the 
existence of non-linear relationship between board size, government ownership, director ownership 
and block ownership on the one hand, and the audit fees and auditor choice decision on the other 
hand, Models 4 and 8 in Table 23 have been re-stimated by adding the square root of board size, 
government ownership, director ownership and block ownership. The findings are reported in Models 
3 and 4 in Table 24. With respect to board size, Model 3 and 4 show that larger boards have a positive 
significant impact on audit fees and a negative and significant effect on the choice of large audit firms, 
respectively. This indicates that there is a curvilinear relationship between board size and auditor 
choice decision, which suggests that larger boards provide a more effective monitoring role and 
thereby firms do not need to hire Big 4 auditors (Simunic, 1980; Wallace, 1984 and Felix et al., 2001). 
This evidence also supports the findings of Guest (2009) and Elmagrhi et al. (2016) who reported 
similar non-linear evidence between board size and financial reporting quality.  
The findings presented in Models 3 and 4 generally suggest the existence of non-linear 
relationships between the ownership structure mechanisms and both audit fees and the auditor choice 
decision. For example, and with respect to government ownership, the evidence suggests that there is 
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a non-linear relationship between government ownership and auditor choice decision. Model 4 shows 
that larger government ownership has a negative and significant effect on choice of large auditors, 
supporting the argument that government agencies can exercise a substantial influence over 
government-controlled firms, and they can easily access a firm’s information (Chan et al., 2006). 
Therefore, firms with higher government ownership have low incentive to provide higher credible 
financial reports, and thus they are less likely to choose higher-quality auditors (Lin and Liu, 2010).  
Similarly, and with regard to director ownership, the evidence reported in Model 4 suggests 
that director shareholders become more entrenched at higher levels of ownership. This result confirms 
the notion that managerial ownership helps to reconcile the interests of managers and shareholders; 
managers obtaining a significant percentage of equity have less incentive to issue misleading 
information to shareholders (Chow, 1982). This reduces the need for intensive auditing (O’Sullivan, 
2000). Furthermore, this evidence confirms the findings of Leung and Horwitz (2004), which 
suggests that directors with concentrated ownership negatively influence disclosure decisions. On the 
other hand, the findings reported in Model 3 in Table 24 propose that directors with high levels of 
ownership have an insignificant effect on audit fees. Finally, the evidence in Models 3 and 4 suggests 
that block holders become less entrenched at higher levels of ownership. This result indicates that 
highly concentrated ownership has an insignificant effect on both auditor choice and fees. 
 
5.3.3 Results Based on Lagged Structure Model 
The third sensitivity test is related to the lagged effect of CG index, board characteristics and 
ownership structure mechanisms on auditor choice and fees as suggested by Lin and Liu (2010). In 
general, the findings presented in Models 5 and 6 in Table 24 support the robustness of the results 
reported in Models 4 and 8 in Table 23 on the effect of lagged effect (except the non-dual structure 
of board leadership that was found to have an insignificant impact on auditor choice).  
 
5.3.4 Results Based on the Effect of Client Size 
The final sensitivity test is related to the proposed moderating effect of client size on the 
relationship among firm-specific characteristics (CG index, board characteristics and ownership 
structure mechanisms) and auditor choice and fees (Chan et al., 1993; Carcello et al., 2002). 
Following Carcello et al. (2002), the study sample was split at the median to test regression Models 
1 and 2 within each subset of the data. The figures shown in Models 7 and 9 in Table 24 suggest that 
the results hold in large companies (except for government ownership which has a negative but 
insignificant effect on audit fees) and some of the results hold in the small subset (such as board size 
and non-dual structure of board leadership). Furthermore, Models 8 and 10 in Table 24 illustrate the 
219 
 
moderating effect of client size on the relationship between internal governance variables and auditor 
choice decision. The results reported in Model 8 in Table 24 support those of small companies (except 
for CG Index and separating the CEO/chairperson roles which have a significantly negative and 
insignificant impact on auditor choice decision in small companies, respectively). However, Model 
10 in Table 24 shows that board diversity and block ownership have an insignificant relationship with 
auditor choice in large firms. To summarise, Models 7, 8, 9 and 10 in Table 24 support the argument 
that client size moderates the relationship between firm-specific CG characteristics (CG index, board 
characteristics and ownership structure mechanisms) and audit fees and auditor choice decision (Chan 
et al., 1993; Carcello et al., 2002).  
 In conclusion, a number of additional tests were conducted to examine the robustness of the 
results, including results based on alternative proxies to measure the control variables, results based 
on non-linear assumption, results based on lagged structure model and results based on the effect of 
client size. In total, the findings are fairly robust across these econometric models. Overall, the 
findings are generally consistent with the predictions of agency theory. 
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Table 24: Sensitivity analyses of the determinants of auditor choice and fees 
 
  Additional control var.  Linearity   Lagged   Small size firms   Large size firms  
Ind. Variables LNFEE  Big4  LNFEE  Big4  LNFEE  Big4  LNFEE  Big4  LNFEE  Big4 
(Model) 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
MCGI -1.897*** 
(0.000) 
 2.520 
(0.164) 
 -1.692*** 
(0.000) 
 5.453*** 
(0.002) 
 -1.860*** 
(0.000) 
 3.873** 
(0.036) 
 -0.281 
(0.663) 
 -4.586* 
(0.081) 
 -2.836*** 
(0.000) 
 30.608*** 
(0.000) 
BSIZE 0. 587*** 
(0.000) 
 0.442 
(0.362) 
 -1.534 
(0.101) 
 14.860*** 
(0.003) 
 0.319*** 
(0.003) 
 -0.095 
(0.855) 
 0.427** 
(0.019) 
 1.101 
(0.125) 
 0.486*** 
(0.000) 
 -1.553 
(0.323) 
BSIZE2     0.411* 
(0.060) 
 -3.543*** 
(0.003) 
            
BDIV -0.663** 
(0.013) 
 3.645*** 
(0.006) 
 -0.688*** 
(0.006) 
 4.102*** 
(0.005) 
 -0.611** 
(0.026) 
 3.219** 
(0.024) 
 -0.446 
(0.334) 
 9.880*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.730** 
(0.028) 
 -0.851 
(0.832) 
NED 0.974*** 
(0.000) 
 6.340*** 
(0.000) 
 0.752*** 
(0.001) 
 4.221*** 
(0.000) 
 0.971*** 
(0.000) 
 5.267*** 
(0.000) 
 0.357 
(0.299) 
 4.857** 
(0.035) 
 1.335*** 
(0.000) 
 5.402** 
(0.024) 
DBLS 0.087 
(0.298) 
 0.917** 
(0.020) 
 -0.090 
(0.247) 
 0.686* 
(0.094) 
 -0.087 
(0.296) 
 0.389 
(0.339) 
 0.129 
(0.241) 
 0.697 
(0.164) 
 -0.202 
(0.177) 
 7.712*** 
(0.001) 
GOWN 0.154 
(0.276) 
 -0.363 
(0.582) 
 0.938** 
(0.013) 
 4.414** 
(0.026) 
 -0.289** 
(0.049) 
 -0.179 
(0.803) 
 0.363 
(0.362) 
 0.907 
(0.549) 
 -0.050 
(0.792) 
 2.592 
(0.147) 
GOWN2     -1.570*** 
(0.001) 
 -6.979** 
(0.013) 
            
DOWN 0.420*** 
(0.006) 
 -0.266 
(0.693) 
 0.754 
(0.129) 
 5.882** 
(0.017) 
 0.471*** 
(0.002) 
 -0.552 
(0.455) 
 -0.187 
(0.424) 
 -1.596 
(0.113) 
 1.012*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.568 
(0.773) 
DOWN2     -0.322 
(0.579) 
 -6.473** 
(0.028) 
            
BOWN 0.341* 
(0.075) 
 1.292* 
(0.082) 
 -0.603 
(0.334) 
 3.057 
(0.312) 
 0.264 
(0.160) 
 1.385* 
(0.084) 
 0.549** 
(0.050) 
 3.097*** 
(0.008) 
 0.060 
(0.820) 
 -0.523 
(0.776) 
BOWN2     0.838 
(0.197) 
 -1.205 
(0.711) 
            
Control variables: Firm-level          
BIG4 0.266*** 
(0.000) 
   0.228*** 
(0.000) 
   0.231*** 
(0.001) 
   0.302*** 
(0.000) 
   0.185 
(0.125) 
  
LNTA     0.344*** 
(0.000) 
 0.643*** 
(0.000) 
 0.342*** 
(0.000) 
 0.641*** 
(0.000) 
 0.357*** 
(0.000) 
 0.707*** 
(0.001) 
 0.330*** 
(0.000) 
 0.566 
(0.191) 
BUSY 0.384*** 
(0.002) 
   0.417*** 
(0.000) 
   0.395*** 
(0.001) 
   0.587*** 
(0.001) 
   0.569*** 
(0.001) 
  
QUICK     0.048* 
(0.072) 
 0.137 
(0.271) 
 0.056* 
(0.052) 
 0.101 
(0.424) 
 0.099** 
(0.018) 
 0.353** 
(0.045) 
 -0.009 
(0.813) 
 0.795** 
(0.048) 
LOSS 0.078 
(0.347) 
 0.390 
(0.293) 
 0.067 
(0.370) 
 0.182 
(0.634) 
 0.023 
(0.779) 
 -0.008 
(0.983) 
 0.031 
(0.756) 
 -0.210 
(0.625) 
 0.226* 
(0.070) 
 -0.850 
(0.558) 
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LEV -0.382* 
(0.075) 
 1.046 
(0.308) 
 -0.246 
(0.221) 
 0.678 
(0.535) 
 -0.160 
(0.459) 
 1.256 
(0.250) 
 -0.075 
(0.825) 
 2.523* 
(0.084) 
 0.159 
(0.566) 
 6.881** 
(0.028) 
SGR     -0.068 
(0.242) 
 0.028 
(0.927) 
 0.008 
(0.900) 
 0.092 
(0.761) 
 -0.044 
(0.591) 
 -0.028 
(0.941) 
 -0.066 
(0.428) 
 -0.244 
(0.720) 
ROA    
 
 -0.858** 
(0.036) 
 -0.457 
(0.823) 
 -0.971** 
(0.027) 
 4.247** 
(0.042) 
 -1.216** 
(0.022) 
 -1.251 
(0.617) 
 -1.081 
(0.166) 
 3.001 
(0.656) 
LNTS 0.237*** 
(0.000) 
 0.776*** 
(0.000) 
                
CURRENT  -0.024 
(0.185) 
 0.155** 
(0.049) 
                
MTB -0.006* 
(0.073) 
 -0.008 
(0.563) 
                
ROE  -0.495** 
(0.018) 
 -0.266 
(0.781) 
                
Control variables: Country level         
GDP -0.749 
(0.517) 
 0.311 
(0.949) 
 -0.826 
(0.433) 
 -1.742 
(0.727) 
 -0.421 
(0.692) 
 0.593 
(0.900) 
 -0.503 
(0.803) 
 -4.211 
0.571 
 -1.004 
(0.469) 
 9.002 
(0.422) 
INFL  0.038 
(0.513) 
 0.582** 
(0.023) 
 0.168*** 
(0.004) 
 0.323 
(0.261) 
 -0.106 
(0.112) 
 0.416 
(0.161) 
 -0.183* 
(0.061) 
 -0.097 
(0.822) 
 0.201* 
(0.082) 
 4.067*** 
(0.001) 
CPI 4.309*** 
(0.000) 
 -3.099* 
(0.060) 
 3.581*** 
(0.000) 
 -4.977*** 
(0.003) 
 3.720*** 
(0.000) 
 -3.079* 
(0.068) 
 1.496** 
(0.027) 
 -4.277* 
(0.097) 
 5.231*** 
(0.000) 
 -30.503*** 
(0.000) 
YDU  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
INDU Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
Constant  3.334***  -18.217***  5.436***  -31.207***  3.726***  -15.268***  3.724***  -14.484***  2.658***  -25.589*** 
Durb-Watson  2.096    1.884    1.975    1.915    1.926   
F-value 36.26***    41.48***    41.91***    10.52***    21.58***   
Chi-square   325.44***    345.38****    249.75***    119.05***    211.83*** 
Adjusted R2 67.79%    73.42%    73.81%    53.26%    71.12%   
Pseudo R2     40.03%    42.48%    36.94%    29.60%    67.55% 
No. of obs. 470  600  470  600  470  600  235  300  235  300 
 
Notes: P-values are between brackets. ***, **, * indicate that the relationships are significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. Variables are defined as follows: natural log of audit 
fee in thousands of dollars (LNFEE); audit firm size (BIG4); the MENA countries overall Corporate Governance Disclosure Index (MCGI); board size (BSIZE); board diversity on the basis of 
both gender and ethnic minority (BDIV); the percent of non-executive directors on the board (NED); separate of CEO and chairperson roles (DBLS); government ownership (GOWN); director 
ownership (DOWN); block ownership (BOWN); firm size (LNTA); busy season (BUSY); quick ratio (QUICK); firm loss (LOSS); leverage (LEV); growth opportunity (SGR); profitability 
(ROA); country’s gross domestic product growth (GDP);  Inflation Index (INFL); Corruption Perception Index (CPI); year dummies (YDU); and industry dummies (INDU). Table 19 fully defines 
all the variables used. 
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6. Summary and Conclusions 
The audit profession in MENA countries is less well established than in developed countries. 
There is no effective code of professional ethics governing the accountants’ and auditors’ work and 
practice, and no powerful professional organisations responsible for the development of the auditing 
profession. However, MENA countries have recently experienced a rapid shift in economic 
development and the strong presence of multinational firms and international financial institutions, 
requiring better protection of their investments through better-quality audit performed by more 
reputable auditors. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to examine the association between firms’ 
internal CG mechanisms (i.e., CG index, board characteristics and ownership structure mechanisms) 
and auditor choice and fees, in the MENA context. The study uses available data on audit fees; 
auditors are classified into two groups, the Big 4 and non-Big 4. Through OLS and logit regression 
models, the study identifies the impact of the internal CG variables on the choice of auditor and fees 
among listed firms in MENA countries during the period 2009 to 2014. 
  The empirical results suggest that choice of auditor and fees can be significantly influenced 
by firm-level CG measures. Specifically, the empirical results reveal that CG index, board diversity 
based on gender and ethnicity, board independence, separation of the CEO/chairperson roles, and 
concentrated ownership impact significantly and positively on firms’ choice of Big 4 auditors. Board 
size has a positive but insignificant effect on the choice of Big 4 auditors, whereas government 
ownership and director ownership are insignificant and negatively related to the choice of Big 4 
auditors. With regard to audit fees, the research findings suggests that CG index, board diversity 
based on gender and ethnicity, and government ownership are significantly and negatively related to 
audit fees, whereas board size, board independence and director ownership have a positive significant 
effect. Non-dual board leadership structure and concentrated ownership have no significant impact 
on audit fees. Generally, the study concludes that external audit quality (Big 4 auditors, high audit 
fees) has an effective monitoring role in MENA countries in protecting shareholders’ interests and 
hence minimising agency conflict. Furthermore, auditor choice and fee decisions are affected by the 
firm-level CG among MENA listed firms.  
 
6.1 Contributions, Policy Implications and Recommendations 
The current study makes a number of contributions to the CG and auditing literature. First, 
the evidence in general suggests that large auditors have been able to product-differentiate themselves 
in the MENA equity market. Empirical evidence of the antecedents of auditor choice in the MENA 
context emphasises how to improve a firm’s CG and audit monitoring to enhance the credibility of 
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corporate reporting, which in turn helps to promote development of capital markets and attracts 
foreign investment to the MENA region.  
Second, many studies have examined the impact of CG mechanisms on auditor choice and 
fees in developed countries, where institutional structures and corporate settings are largely similar. 
However, limited evidence is available from emerging countries. Therefore, the current study 
contributes to the limited literature investigating auditor choice and fees in MENA countries, using 
one of the most extensive hand-collected data sets to date (i.e., a sample of 100 MENA listed firms 
from 2009 to 2014, with 600 firm-year observations) in order to enhance the generalisability of the 
results. Therefore, this study can expand current understanding of the role that CG mechanisms play 
in influencing auditor choice and fees in emerging markets. Moreover, unlike the many studies that 
employed either time series or cross-sectional data, this study employs panel data that mitigates the 
effect of multicollinearity, controls unobserved heterogeneity among variables and increases the 
degree of freedom. 
Third, again unlike previous studies, this study adds to the auditing and CG literature by 
examining a number of CG measures that have not been widely investigated before. It does not limit 
its analyses to a few types of board characteristics and ownership structure mechanisms in 
investigating why and how these antecedents may influence auditor choice and fees. Instead, it 
provides empirical evidence for a broad composite CG index, a number of board characteristics (i.e., 
board size, board diversity, board independence and separation of CEO/chairperson roles), as well as 
some ownership structure mechanisms (i.e., government, director and block ownership). The study’s 
results generally illustrate that these factors significantly influence auditor choice and fees. 
Fourth, unlike previous studies, a series of different econometric models and estimations were 
conducted to ensure the robustness of the empirical results of the study. A number of analyses were 
conducted to check the extent to which the main results are robust or sensitive to alternative models 
and estimations. The results of the robustness analyses confirmed a priori theoretical expectation that 
sound CG practices have a significant influence on auditor choice and fees.   
Finally, given the distinct nature of the MENA context, it was assumed that most national CG 
codes issued in MENA countries based on the Anglo-American model would not necessarily lead to 
the desired outcomes. However, this study provides empirical evidence that national CG codes 
generally attain favourable outcomes, although differences in the corporate contexts between 
emerging and developed countries should be taken into account when intoducing new CG reforms or 
modifying existing ones. This evidence also supports the suggestion that emerging economies tend 
to implement CG best practice issued by leading international organisations (e.g., OECD) in order to 
be globally competitive, attain international legitimacy, and thereby attract foreign investment. This 
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is consistent with the international movement towards CG harmonisation, where national CG 
structures tend to be similar to the Anglo-American model.  
Furthermore, the current study has implications for international investors. As the reports 
issued by the International Bank demonstrate an increase in foreign direct investments in the MENA 
region, the findings suggest that foreign investors need to be aware of the structure of CG mechanisms 
of listed firms and the quality of external audit monitoring. It is good practice for listed firms with 
strong internal CG mechanisms to choose to conduct higher-quality audit to strengthen the confidence 
of the market participants. Therefore, the MENA governments and regulatory bodies should promote 
reform of the CG of listed firms and encourage the development of the accounting and auditing 
profession. 
 
6.2 Limitations and Avenues for Further Research 
As an empirical study, this essay is subject to a number of limitations. First, the sample is 
limited to 100 non-financial and non-utility listed MENA firms, because it involved a great deal of 
hand-collected data which consumes time and effort; the availability, accessibility, funding and time 
constraints of the PhD registration timeframe was a further restriction on the size of the sample. Future 
studies should consider a large data set to improve the generalisability of the findings. Second, the 
study attempted to control for determinants of auditor choice and fees reported in the literature that 
may be correlated with CG variables and auditor choice and fees; however, there may be other 
exogenous factors that are correlated with both the CG mechanisms examined in this study and with 
auditor choice and fees. Likewise, although this study attempted to control for many factors that 
previous studies have found to affect auditor choice and fees, other variables are not included because 
the data was not available, such as for non-audit services and the composition of audit committees. 
These limitations represent important items for future research. 
Third, the current study depends only on quantitative analysis in investigating the CG 
antecedents of auditor choice and fees in MENA countries. Future studies could use mixed methods, 
that is both quantitative and qualitative analysis to interpret the data. Finally, this essay contributes 
to the literature by using agency theory to explain firms’ motivations for auditor choice and fees in 
MENA countries. However, future studies might prefer a multi-theoretical methodology (e.g., 
political cost theory and signalling theory) in order to arrive at a uniform theoretical framework that 
could be used to examine the antecedents of auditor choice and fees. 
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Concluding Chapter  
Summary and Conclusion: Objectives, Findings, Implications and 
Recommendations, Contributions, Limitations and Avenues for Future Research 
 The detailed discussions presented in the three essays suggest that the majority of empirical 
evidence on how and to what extent a firm’s CG might impact its outcomes comes from developed 
countries; similar studies in emerging economics, especially those in the MENA region, are few. 
Furthermore, the special characteristics of the MENA context are a motivation for investigating how, 
and to what extent, a firm’s CG might affect a number of specific outcomes, including voluntary CG 
disclosure, firm market value, accounting returns, EP, the PPS, and auditor choice and fees. 
Accordingly, this study was designed to quantitatively examine the extent to which national CG 
reforms have been effective in improving corporate outcomes through focusing on a number of 
closely related CG topics over the 6-year period (2009-2014). The period selected to investigate these 
three topics coincides with that in which the authorities in most MENA countries pursued economic 
and CG reforms designed to improve corporate performance. In particular, in response to the 
corporate scandals of the early 1990s, the financial crisis in 2007/2008, and the increased flow of 
foreign investments, MENA governments carried out a number of CG reforms including issuing 
national CG codes. These reforms aim to improve firms’ internal control procedures and protect 
stakeholders’ interests. The series of CG codes issued in the MENA region started in 2002 with a 
voluntary CG code in Oman, followed by Egypt in 2005, Saudi Arabia in 2006, Jordan in 2007 and 
the UAE in 2007. These codes comprise a number of recommendations which seek to encourage a 
culture of compliance and CG disclosure, to mitigate agency conflicts, and to reduce agency costs 
associated with conflicts of interest between management and other stakeholders. 
 
i) Objectives       
 This study seeks to achieve the following main objectives. First, it aims to assess the level of 
MENA listed firms’ voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices. Second, it attempts to 
ascertain whether the observed differences in levels of voluntary CG compliance and disclosure can 
be explained by compliance and disclosure of Islamic values, board characteristics and ownership 
structure mechanisms. Third, it hopes to determine whether national religion and governance quality 
can explain noticeable variations in the level of voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices. 
Fourth, it intends to examine whether more diversified boards based on gender, ethnic minority and 
nationality improve firm market value and accounting returns. Fifth, it ascertains whether a firm’s 
CG quality moderates the relationship between board diversity and firm performance. Sixth, it 
examines whether appointing women, ethnic minorities and foreign directors has an impact on EP. 
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Seventh, it seeks to investigate whether board diversity enhances the PPS. Eighth, it attempts to 
ascertain the extent to which the CG Index, board characteristics and ownership structure mechanisms 
can explain the auditor choice. Finally, it attempts to determine the extent to which the CG Index, 
board characteristics and ownership structure mechanisms can explain observable variations in audit 
fees. 
 
ii) Findings 
The theoretical expectation of this thesis is that an effective CG system should lead to better 
corporate outcomes. Motivated by limited previous evidence from the MENA region, the study seeks 
to empirically investigate whether MENA countries’ listed firms that voluntary comply with CG 
measures proposed by the UNCTAD ISAR benchmark of guidance on good practice in CG disclosure 
tend to result in better performance than their poorly governed counterparts. The main findings of 
each essay are summarised below. 
The first essay investigates the level of voluntary CG compliance and disclosure among 
MENA countries’ listed firms, and factors potentially explaining such behaviour. The results indicate 
several conclusions. First, in spite of the initial theoretical prediction that the release of the voluntary 
national CG codes would promote a culture of CG compliance and disclosure among listed firms in 
MENA countries, the results clearly suggest that the level of CG compliance and disclosure is 
generally low compared to empirical evidence from developed countries. Second, regarding 
antecedents of voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices, MENA listed firms have had some 
positive response to the voluntary codes’ recommendations. This result is contrary to general 
expectations about the ability of national voluntary codes to improve CG standards in MENA context, 
where norms, traditions and ownership concentration were expected to negatively affect firms’ 
willingness to comply with these codes. Third, the introduction of the national voluntary CG codes 
has had a positive impact in enhancing good CG practices over time, as the levels of CG compliance 
and disclosure have improved over the examined period. Fourth, there is an obvious variation in the 
levels of CG compliance and disclosure among the countries examined. This may be attributable to 
the institutional and contextual differences among sampled countries. Fifth, the theoretical evidence 
suggests that the CG codes’ reliance on an Anglo-American model may not be suitable to the MENA 
context and thereby will not improve CG practice. The results show that the national codes were able 
to promote CG practices to some extent. Sixth, the findings generally indicate that Islamic values, 
board characteristics and ownership structure mechanisms have a significant impact on firm-level 
voluntary CG disclosure. Board characteristics which have a significant and positive influence on 
firm-level voluntary CG disclosure include board diversity on the basis of gender and ethnicity, board 
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independence, and separation of the CEO/chairperson roles; whereas board size has a significant but 
negative impact. Similarly, director ownership is significantly and negatively associated with firm-
level voluntary CG disclosure whereas government and block ownership have an insignificant 
influence. Seventh, the results indicate that firms in countries complying with Islamic economic 
principles and having high-quality national governance are more likely to voluntarily comply and 
disclose more CG practices than those that do not. Overall, these findings are in line with the 
predictions of the study’s neo-institutional theory insights, and with prior studies (e.g., Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002; Maali et al., 2006; Cerdioni and Parbonetti, 2007; Ezat and El-Masry, 2008; Judge et 
al., 2008; Farook et al., 2011; Oh et al., 2011; Samaha et al., 2012; Al Janadi et al., 2013, Khan et 
al., 2013; Albitar, 2015; Mateescu, 2015; Baldini et al., 2016; Elmagrhi et al., 2016). 
 The second essay examines the impact of board diversity (based on gender, ethnic minorities 
and nationality) on a number of corporate outcomes, namely market value, accounting returns, EP 
and the PPS. Contrary to the initial theoretical expectation that the impact of board diversity on such 
corporate outcomes might be different from what is reported in developed countries, because of the 
differences in corporate contexts, the results generally indicate that board diversity influences firm 
market value, accounting returns and the PPS. On average, firms with more diversified boards are 
more likely to attain higher market value, accounting returns and the PPS than are their less diversified 
counterparts. The empirical evidence suggests that national Arab males dominate the majority of 
boards of directors in MENA listed firms. These results also suggest that firms with more diversified 
boards based on gender, ethnic minorities and nationality are more likely to attain higher accounting 
returns and market value. Furthermore, these findings indicate that there is a statistically significant 
positive association between the percentage of female directors in boardrooms and firm market value 
and accounting returns, while foreign directors impact significantly and positively on firm accounting 
returns. Further, the results suggest that firm CG quality has no influence on the relationship between 
board diversity and firm market value. However, a high percentage of ethnic and foreign directors 
positively and significantly affects accounting returns in firms with weak CG. Moreover, the results 
suppose that different measures of board diversity have insignificant impact on EP. However, a high 
percentage of female and minority ethnic directors on boards improves the PPS. These findings are 
generally consistent with the predictions of the study’s multi-theoretical framework that incorporates 
insights from agency theory, stakeholder theory, resource dependence theory and social psychology 
theory, and are in line with empirical literature (e.g., Zahra and Stanton, 1988; Johnston and Malina, 
2008; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Edmans and Gabaix, 2009; Adler, 2010; Carter et al., 2010;  Bart 
and McQueen, 2013; Luckerath-Rovers, 2013; Wellage and Locke, 2013; Conyon, 2014; Ntim, 2015; 
Gyapong et al., 2015). 
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 The final essay examines the effect of a number of CG measures on auditor choice and fees, 
specifically the extent to which firms with high-quality CG are more likely to hire one of the Big 4 
auditors and pay higher audit fees by testing the relationship between auditor choice and fees on the 
one hand and the CG Index, board characteristics and ownership structure mechanisms on the other 
hand. Contrary to the initial expectation that the impact of CG measures on auditor choice and fees 
would be different from what is reported in developed countries, the results suggest that the MENA 
firms’ CG system has been able to influence auditor choice and to clearly explain variations in the 
level of audit fees among MENA countries’ listed firms. First, the empirical results reveal that CG 
index, board diversity based on gender and ethnicity, board independence, separation of the 
CEO/chairperson roles and concentrated ownership have a significant and positive effect on choice 
of Big 4 auditors. Board size influences this decision positively but insignificantly, whereas 
government and director ownership are insignificant and negatively related to it. Second, CG index, 
board diversity based on gender and ethnicity, and government ownership have a significant and 
negative association with audit fees, whereas board size, board independence and director ownership 
have a significant but positive impact. A non-dual board leadership structure and concentrated 
ownership have insignificant impact on audit fees.  
Overall, the three essays provide empirical evidence that CG improves corporate outcomes in 
MENA countries, where its provisions mitigate a number of agency problems associated with 
separation of ownership and control and constraint of opportunistic managerial behaviour. This thesis 
illustrates that MENA countries, like other emerging economies, can utilise CG systems in reducing 
agency problems, constraining opportunistic managerial behaviour, restoring investors’ confidence, 
protecting stakeholders’ interests, improving corporate outcomes, and making their economies less 
vulnerable to financial crises.  
 
iii) Implications and Recommendations 
Although the MENA region has a unique corporate context that is different from developed 
countries, prior empirical evidence for the influence of CG provisions on corporate outcomes is 
limited. Therefore, this thesis identifies a number of implications and recommendations that can be 
drawn from examining the effect of CG mechanisms on three sets of corporate outcomes. 
First, given that the majority of national CG codes issued in MENA countries are based on an 
Anglo-American model, the theoretical assumption was that these codes are not suitable in the local 
corporate context and thereby may not lead to the desired outcomes. On the contrary, this thesis 
provides empirical evidence that national CG codes generally attain favourable outcomes, although 
differences in the corporate contexts between emerging and developed countries should be taken into 
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account whether in conducting new CG reforms or modifying existing ones. This evidence also 
supports the suggestion that emerging countries tend to implement CG best practice proposed by 
leading international organisations like OECD in order to be globally competitive, attain international 
legitimacy and thereby attract foreign investment. This supports the notion of the international 
movement toward attaining CG harmonisation, where different countries tend to adopt national CG 
structures similar to the Anglo-American model.  
Second, although the initial argument that applying the CG recommendations included in CG 
codes through a voluntary ‘comply or explain’ compliance and disclosure regime may not be effective 
in emerging economies, the empirical evidence of this research shows that the voluntary national CG 
codes improve CG practices among MENA listed firms. This suggests that regulatory bodies and 
policy makers in emerging economies can rely on voluntary ‘comply or explain’ CG regimes to 
improve CG practices in their countries, rather than mandatory CG systems which were introduced 
in some developed countries, for example by the US’s 2000 Sarbanes-Oxley Act.    
Third, the reported evidence for the improvement in voluntary compliance with CG best 
practices among listed firms in MENA countries indicates that CG reforms including the codes have 
a positive impact on CG practices in these countries. This may inspire other emerging countries 
including those in the MENA region which have not yet published CG codes, such as Iraq, Kuwait, 
Libya and Syria, to implement such codes in order to improve their firms’ CG practices. 
Fourth, the high extent of heterogeneity in the level of compliance with good CG practices 
among MENA listed firms and among the countries themselves does, however, suggest that there is 
a need for the regulatory authorities and policy makers to further enhance CG compliance and 
enforcement. This can be attained by strengthening legislative enforcement and establishing a 
‘compliance and enforcement’ unit that will continuously observe the implementation of CG 
practices. 
Fifth, evidence from the thesis indicates that firms adopting Islamic values and listed in 
countries observing Islamic economic principles are likely to disclose more voluntary CG 
information. This may encourage potential investors to invest in these firms and nations, as they 
expect better-quality financial reports to help them make optimal investment decisions.  
Sixth, the three essays generally provide evidence which highlights the importance of board 
characteristics as a CG mechanism and its role in mitigating agency problems. They illustrate that 
board size, board diversity, board independence, and separation of the CEO and chairperson roles 
give firms a strong impetus to actively monitor CG standards. Investors may be encouraged to invest 
in firms with a small board size, hiring more female, foreign and minority ethnic directors, a high 
percentage of NEDs, and separate CEO/chairperson roles, as they expect higher-quality corporate 
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financial reporting and/or better firm market value and accounting returns. Thus, policy makers in 
MENA countries should be encouraged to recommend board diversity when reforming or issuing 
new CG codes (such as the Jordanian CG code, 2012). 
Seventh, considering the concern that female directors in the restrictive context of MENA 
countries may be insufficiently represented to exert a significant influence on corporate outcomes 
(Assad, 2006; Jamali et al., 2007; Chamlou, 2008; World Bank, 2013; Ibrahim and Hanefah, 2014; 
Syed and Van Buren, 2014; Loukil and Yousfi, 2015), the main evidence that emerges is that these 
concerns are not justified. Appointing female directors to boardrooms enhances firm market value, 
accounting returns and the PPS. Therefore, documented evidence emphasises the importance of 
government regulations (e.g., legislation for quotas for women directors) and CG codes in line with 
international CG best practice to address the weak representation of women in top management and 
corporate board-level positions, despite the contextual differences between emerging and developed 
countries.  
Eighth, previous studies examining the auditing profession in MENA countries document that 
there is no effective code of professional ethics governing the accountants’ and auditors’ work and 
practices, and that no powerful professional organisations responsible exists. Therefore, theoretical 
predictions suggest that the efficient CG practices in these countries may have an impact on the audit 
profession and the quality of audit services. Consistent with these predictions, the evidence, in 
general, reveals external audit quality (Big 4 auditor, high audit fees) do have a CG monitoring role 
to ensure the quality of financial reporting in MENA countries. Moreover, auditor choice and fees 
decisions are affected by firm-level CG measures. This may encourage governments and regulatory 
bodies in MENA countries to develop the accounting and auditing profession. 
Ninth, unlike developed countries, emerging countries including the MENA region, have 
concentrated ownership, which appears to have important implications for corporate outcomes. The 
evidence shows that firms with large block shareholders are more likely to demand a higher-quality 
audit process (i.e. choose one of the Big 4 audit firms). However, they have low market value. This 
indicates that although block ownership does perform its function as a CG mechanism (providing a 
better monitoring function), it does not gain the trust of minority shareholders and markets. 
Accordingly, regulators and policy makers in MENA countries should introduce CG provisions that 
force firms with large-majority shareholders to extend their compliance levels and protect minority 
shareholders from being expropriated by large shareholders. For example, it is recommended that 
firms appoint a representative of minority shareholders to the board.  
Tenth, consistent with the theoretical predictions, the evidence illustrates that good CG 
mechanisms may help firms in mitigating agency problems; improving voluntary CG compliance and 
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disclosure practices; increasing firm market value, accounting returns and the PPS; and enhancing 
audit quality (i.e., appointing one of the Big 4 audit firms and paying higher audit fees). This suggests 
that new investors may be motivated to consider CG practices to distinguish between firms with better 
financial reporting and auditing quality and those with less reliable financial reporting. Moreover, 
individual investors, among others, may tend to invest in firms with more diversified boards, as they 
can gain more returns on their shares, and with good-quality external auditing. Accordingly, policy 
makers in MENA countries should issue regulations and recommendations to ensure that firms keep 
improving their CG structures. For instance, policy makers should stress the important role of board 
diversity and of board of directors’ committees (e.g., CG committee) to make sure that CG best 
practices are applied and regularly reviewed.       
Finally, in order to attain better corporate outcomes from applying sound CG practices, the 
findings of this thesis suggest the need for effective co-operation and co-ordination between the key 
financial regulatory and enforcement bodies that constitute CG systems in MENA countries. This can 
enhance legal enforcement of recommended CG practices and thereby achieve better corporate 
outcomes by constraining managers’ opportunistic behaviours. 
 
iv) Contributions 
The majority of previous studies examining the influence of CG measures on corporate 
outcomes have reported research conducted in developed countries. Using data from MENA 
countries, therefore, this thesis extends the literature by providing new evidence on the effect of CG 
on three different sets of corporate outcomes in MENA countries. It also contributes to the growing 
body of literature on the influence of CG on corporate outcomes in a number of ways.      
First, this research uses a sample of 100 firms from 2009 to 2014, with a total of 600 firm-
year observations, and can be considered one of the largest and most extensive hand-collected data 
sets to date on CG compliance and disclosure in MENA countries. Thus, it is a pioneer in offering 
empirical evidence on the effectiveness of CG reforms in improving listed firms’ outcomes. It 
provides detailed evidence on: (i) the level and antecedents of compliance with CG best practices 
among listed firms in MENA countries; (ii) why and how a firm’s board diversity impacts its market 
value, accounting returns, EP and the PPS; and (iii) whether CG influences the choice of auditors and 
fees. The findings from the extensive summary of descriptive statistics suggest improvement in the 
level of voluntary compliance with, and disclosure of, the CG practices among listed firms over the 
six years examined. However, the level of improvement differs widely among the five MENA 
countries investigated. The findings also illustrate that, in general, better-governed firms disclose 
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more information, attain better market value, accounting returns and PPS, and engage higher-quality 
audit.  
Second, this study uses the CG Index developed by the Intergovernmental Working Group of 
Experts on International Standards of Accounting and Reporting (ISAR), with five sections used to 
construct five sub-indices: ownership structure and exercise of control rights, financial transparency, 
auditing, corporate responsibility and compliance, and board and management structure and process. 
This index was used to investigate the influence of CG on voluntary compliance and disclosure, firm 
market value, accounting returns, the PPS and external audit quality in MENA countries.   
 Third, unlike most past studies that have attempted to examine the effect of individual CG 
mechanisms (e.g., board characteristics) on CG compliance and disclosure, firm market value, 
accounting returns, EP, the PPS and audit quality, this study uses a comprehensive measure of CG, 
comprising board characteristics, ownership structure mechanisms and CG Index, including 51 CG 
provisions to examine these relationships. This is in line with recent suggestions in the literature that 
CG can be better examined by more comprehensive CG measures rather than using individual CG 
mechanisms. 
Fourth, unlike a considerable number of previous studies, this thesis extends the literature by 
examining a number of CG measures that have not been widely investigated in the literature. It does 
not limit its analyses to a few types of board characteristics and ownership structure mechanisms in 
investigating why and how these antecedents may influence CG compliance and disclosure level, 
market value, accounting returns, EP, the PPS and audit quality. Instead, it extends the literature by 
providing empirical evidence for a broad composite CG index, a number of board characteristics 
including, board size, board diversity on the basis of gender, ethnicity, and nationality, board 
independence, and non-duality of board leadership, as well as some ownership structure mechanisms, 
namely government ownership, block ownership and director ownership. The results generally 
illustrate that these factors significantly influence different sets of corporate outcomes. 
Fifth, this work contributes to the literature by employing a number of theoretical frameworks 
for developing hypotheses and interpreting findings. This is useful in identifying an appropriate 
theoretical framework that can be used to explain firms’ motivations for different sets of corporate 
outcome, including voluntary CG compliance and disclosure, market value, accounting returns and 
the PPS, and using higher-quality audit, especially in complex corporate contexts, such as those in 
MENA countries whose unique corporate context may restrict voluntary CG codes from producing 
the desired outcomes.  
Sixth, although religion is often considered to be one of the main institutional and contextual 
factors that may influence corporate activities, this study, particularly the first essay, offers empirical 
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evidence that including religion as a CG measure provides new critical insight into the importance of 
the governance role of religion (both on the firm- and national-levels) in influencing corporate 
outcomes. The evidence suggests that there is a significant positive impact of firm and national 
compliance with Islamic principles and values on voluntary CG disclosure. Unlike developed 
countries, where religion is considered as a private matter, this thesis concludes that Islam could have 
a significant impact on daily activities and businesses, including corporate outcomes in MENA 
countries, as Islam is integrated in all aspects of society. 
Seventh, unlike most prior studies conducted in emerging markets that investigate the impact 
of CG measures on corporate outcomes in the context of a single country, this research examines 
cross-country empirical data from a number of MENA countries. Thus, this research design enables 
the results to be generalised to a large number of emerging economies with similar institutional 
contexts. This examination can expand current understanding of the role that CG mechanisms play in 
influencing CG compliance and disclosure levels, market value, accounting returns, EP, the PPS, and 
auditor choice and fees in MENA countries.      
Finally, distinguishing it from a large number of previous studies, this research used a series 
of different econometric models and estimations to ensure the robustness of the empirical results. The 
robustness analyses confirm a priori theoretical expectations that sound CG practices have a 
significant influence on CG compliance and disclosure levels, market value, accounting returns, the 
PPS and audit quality.   
In conclusion, the results documented in this thesis aim to fill a gap in the CG literature by 
providing empirical evidence from emerging economies in general and MENA countries in particular. 
  
v) Limitations and Avenues for Future Research 
Although the findings are generally robust across a number of econometric models, there are 
some weaknesses that suggest further research. First, this thesis employs a relatively limited sample 
size (600 firm-year observations) with content analysis to collect data manually from financial reports 
and websites, consuming much time and effort. Thus, future studies can employ a larger 
representative sample. Second, due to data limitations, the research focuses on the influence of a set 
of internal CG measures on the CG compliance level, market value, accounting returns, EP, the PPS 
and choice of auditor and fees. Therefore, future studies may investigate the association among 
external CG controls (e.g., government regulations, media exposure, market competition and takeover 
activities), other internal CG measures (e.g., composition and efficiency of audit committee), as well 
as characteristics unique to the MENA context (e.g., cultural practices and social norms) and CG 
compliance, market value, accounting returns, EP, the PPS and choice of auditor and fees.  
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Third, although the results based on un-weighted CG indices are generally robust, future 
research may enhance the analysis by employing a weighted CG index. Fourth, as the coding in this 
study was conducted by a single researcher, it was not possible to check the inter-coder reliability of 
the MCGI that could be measured if the coding was performed by more than one researcher. Fifth, 
the measures for CG, Islamic values, firm performance and audit quality variables may or may not 
accurately reflect the actual values in practice, due to potential measurement errors. Therefore, future 
studies could employ other measures for these variables. Finally, this study excludes financial firms 
from its analysis because these may be subject to additional governance requirements that probably 
lead to different reactions to corporate outcomes from the CG measures investigated. Future studies 
could include both financial and non-financial firms to ascertain whether there is a significant 
difference in terms of CG’s effect on CG disclosure, market value, accounting returns, EP, the PPS 
and choice of auditor and fees in MENA countries.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Full List of the MENA Corporate Governance Disclosure Benchmark Provisions  
MCGI Theme Disclosure Item Range 
of 
scores 
Total 
score per 
item 
(i) Ownership 
Structure and 
Exercise of 
Control 
Rights 
1. Ownership structure 0-1  
 
 
 
9 
2. Process for holding annual general meetings 0-1 
3. Changes in shareholdings 0-1 
4. Control structure 0-1 
5. Control and corresponding equity stake 0-1 
6. Availability and accessibility of meeting agenda 0-1 
7. Control rights 0-1 
8. Rules and procedures governing the acquisition of corporate control in capital markets 0-1 
9. Anti-takeover measures 0-1 
(ii) Financial 
Transparency 
10. Financial and operating results 0-1  
 
 
8 
11. Critical accounting estimates 0-1 
12. Nature, type and elements of related-party transactions 0-1 
13. Company objectives 0-1 
14. Impact of alternative accounting decisions 0-1 
15. The decision-making process for approving transactions with related parties 0-1 
16. Rules and procedures governing extraordinary transactions 0-1 
17. Board's responsibilities regarding financial communications 0-1 
(iii) Auditing 18. Process for interaction with internal auditors 0-1  
 
 
 
9 
19. Process for interaction with external auditors 0-1 
20. Process for appointment of external auditors 0-1 
21. Process for appointment of internal auditors/scope of work and responsibilities 0-1 
22. Board confidence in independence and integrity of external auditors 0-1 
23. Internal control systems 0-1 
24. Duration of current auditors 0-1 
25. Rotation of audit partners 0-1 
26. Auditors’ involvement in non-audit work and the fees paid to the auditors 0-1 
(iv) Corporate 
Responsibility 
and 
Compliance 
27. Policy and performance in connection with environmental and social responsibility 0-1  
 
 
7 
28. Impact of environmental and social responsibility policies on the firm’s sustainability 0-1 
29. A code of ethics for the board and waivers to the ethics code 0-1 
30. A code of ethics for all company employees 0-1 
31. Policy on “whistle blower” protection for all employees 0-1 
32. Mechanisms protecting the rights of other stakeholders in business 0-1 
33. The role of employees in corporate governance 0-1 
 (v) Board and 
Management 
Structure and 
Process 
34. Governance structures, such as committees and other mechanisms to prevent conflict of 
interest 
0-1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
35. “Checks and balances” mechanisms 0-1 
36. Composition of board of directors (executives and non-executives) 0-1 
37. Composition and function of governance committee structures 0-1 
38. Role and functions of the board of directors 0-1 
39. Risk management objectives, system and activities 0-1 
40. Qualifications and biographical information on board members 0-1 
41. Material interests of members of the board and management 0-1 
42. Existence of plan of succession 0-1 
43. Duration of director's contracts 0-1 
44. Compensation policy for senior executives departing the firm as a result of a merger or 
acquisition 
0-1 
45. Determination and composition of directors` remuneration 0-1 
46. Independence of the board of directors 0-1 
47. Number of outside board and management position directorships held by the directors 0-1 
48. Existence of procedure(s) for addressing conflicts of interest among board members 0-1 
49. Professional development and training activities 0-1 
50. Availability and use of advisorship facility during reporting period 0-1 
51. Performance evaluation process 0-1 
Total  51 MCGI Items  51 
Scoring procedure 
0: If a particular corporate governance item is not disclosed. 
1: If a particular corporate governance item is disclosed. 
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Appendix 2: A Normal Histogram of Distribution of the MENA Corporate Governance Index (MCGI) 
 
Appendix 3: A Normal Histogram of the Distribution of Audit Fees (LNFEE) 
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